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ABSTRACT
The fifteen year period 1880—1895 was one o f profound change in government finance, 
not only in the scale o f  expenditure (which increased by a quarter) but the very expectation 
o f what that expenditure should be as the traditional governing elite began to take notice o f  
the “democratic’’ society which would soon displace it. Although governed by the 
Conservatives for six o f those years, it was dominated by the fiscal theory o f  “Sound 
Finance”, especially as practiced and perfected by Gladstone as Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer. This philosophy demanded balanced budgets, a low tax burden and minimal 
government expenditure. It is necessary to explain why this philosophy came about and how 
it adapted to changing circumstances. “Sound Finance” as a fiscal theory was also closely 
associated with a belief in free trade and a commitment to the gold standard. Together these 
formed the trinity o f fiscal orthodoxy for the late Victorian governing class in Parliament, 
the Treasury, and at the Bank o f England. But as Britain fell into the “Great Depression” 
and economic growth seemed to stagnate, this consensus was attacked by those who 
believed that these old doctrines were capable o f fulfilling neither the government’s revenue 
requirements nor the economic imperatives o f the nation. Hence their advocacy o f  
bimetallism and “Fair Trade”. In spite o f this, at no time were these critics able to 
implement such doctrines nor even to deviate in any substantial ways from the imperatives 
o f “Sound Finance”. “Sound Finance” dominated the fiscal thinking o f politicians, 
bureaucrats and business leaders, regardless o f political stripe, because it was at the heart o f  
contemporary economic theory, and indeed because it seemed to explain for them the place 
o f the state in that economy while allowing crucial flexibility. Yet just as significantly, the 
strictures o f “Sound Finance” allowed both a political and economic control o f the state 
while providing, at least in theory, both Parliamentary and democratic supervision and 
accountability.
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CHAPTER 1 
GLADSTONE AND SOUND FINANCE
British Government expenditure was £83,107,925 in 1880 and £97,764,000 in 1895. 
Revenue had reached a peak o f £100,000,000 by then.1 This 15 year period was one o f  
profound fiscal change, not only in the scale o f expenditure but in the very expectation o f  
what that expenditure should be, as the traditional governing elite began to take notice o f  
the “democratic” society which would soon displace it. Although governed by the 
Conservatives for six o f those years, it was dominated by the fiscal theory o f “Sound 
Finance”, especially as practised and perfected by Gladstone as Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer. “Sound Finance” as a fiscal theory was also closely associated with a belief in 
Free Trade and a commitment to the gold standard. Together these formed the trinity o f  
fiscal orthodoxy for the late Victorian governing class. But as Britain fell into the “Great 
Depression” and economic growth stagnated, this consensus was attacked by those who 
believed that these old doctrines were capable o f fulfilling neither the government’s revenue 
requirements nor the economic imperatives o f the nation.
This period is significant because it was during this time that the 
Peelite—Gladstonian minimal state, which had itself developed in reaction to the old and 
corrupt Hanoverian fiscal-military state2 during the previous 50 years, was faced with the 
first real challenges to its fiscal orthodoxy. The expenditure requirements o f  Imperialism 
and what would become the nascent welfare state appeared to some to place the idea o f  
“Sound Finance” under duress, encouraging such heterodox notions as “Fair Trade/Tariff 
Reform” and a clamour in favour o f bimetallism. Yet the outcome was entirely orthodox,
1 B. Mallet, British Budgets 1887—88 to 1912—13 (London, 1913), p. 477 and Sydney Buxton, Finance and Politics: 
A n  Historical Study, 1783 - 1885 (2 vol., New York, 1966, reprint o f  the 1888 edition), v. ii, p. 356.
2 P.K. O ’Brien, “Imperialism and the Rise and Decline o f the British Economy, 1688—1989.” New Heft Review, 
238,1999 pp. 50—51; P.K. O ’Brien, “The Political Economy o f  British Taxation, 1688—1815”, Economic History 
Review, 41,1988 pp. 1—32; and J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688—1783 
(London, 1989).
and the fiscal philosophy o f “Sound Finance” emerged even stronger with the return o f  
Liberal government in 1905. “Sound Finance” was able to adapt to both the change in the 
electorate and their demands, as well as to evolve to accommodate the need for increased 
expenditure while still upholding the fundamental principles regarding sources o f  taxatioA 
and control o f that expenditure. In terms o f economic theory “Sound Finance”, although a 
seemingly conservative fiscal philosophy, was neither behind nor ahead o f contemporary 
thought but in step with the evolution o f that thinking. In fact it was quite capable o f 
adapting to and meeting the economic requirements o f a society and economy undergoing a 
rapid and profound change.
“Sound Finance” as a fiscal ideology developed almost insensibly over centuries £nd 
can be traced back to the anti-debt ‘country’ ideology o f the eighteenth century, but did not 
take on a coherent shape until the economic doctrines o f  Adam Smith defined and 
determined debate on the proper economic role for the state. Pitt in his financial struggles to 
finance the Napoleonic wars, and it was he who developed the income tax, can claim pride 
o f place as the precursor to Peel and the ancestor o f Gladstone in finance. From his 
demolition o f Disraeli’s 1852 Budget until his resignation from the Premiership in 1894 <on a 
matter o f fiscal principle, Gladstone set a standard in government finance that 
overshadowed all contemporary and subsequent Chancellors o f the Exchequer. “Sound 
Finance” as a fiscal system was simple but strict: balanced budgets, imposition o f taxation to 
make up a deficit, reduction o f existing debt, accurate and transparent annual budget 
statements, and responsible Parliamentary control o f expenditure.
The economic origins o f this ideology were to be found in the writings o f Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo, John McCulloch and especially John Stuart Mill. By the 1880s 
modem economic theory was itself adapting to come to terms with the great question off the
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role o f the state in society, but even here there was no radical break with the past, the theory 
was evolutionary rather than revolutionary.3 There was at this point really no conception o f  
a positive economic role for the state, excepting some unique circumstances to do with 
monopolies. The difference between Liberals and Conservatives in interpretation and 
application o f “Sound Finance” was subtle: the former stricter in application while the latter 
were more willing to condone debt finance, more active to protect vested (particularly 
landed) interests, and more tolerant o f the airing (but not necessarily the implementation) o f  
heterodox economic doctrines.
The period 1880—1895 was one o f profound change for the electorate, for the scale 
and scope o f government, and it also witnessed a variety o f fiscal shocks to the system such 
as the “Great Depression” and the rise o f Imperial militarism. The most significant and wide 
ranging change was the reform and expansion o f the electorate which called into question 
the very nature and responsibilities o f citizenship. The “Representation o f the People Bill 
(1884)” increased the voting register from 3 to 5 million, and meant that ‘something like 60 
per cent o f adult males were now eligible to vote/4 This raised the great question o f how to 
tax people without losing their votes, and from this point the incidence o f  direct and 
indirect taxation came under much greater scrutiny. Taxation had become a great class and 
political issue. Previously it had been the case that the non-voting working classes had 
supported Gladstonian “Sound Finance” because they had an interest in keeping all taxation 
low.5 Now that they had the vote, the fear amongst many political economists was that the 
newly enfranchised masses would use their votes to throw off taxation onto the wealthy, and 
that representation without taxation would lead to a tyranny o f the masses over the classes.
3 Especially C.F. Bastable, Public Finance (3rd ed., London, 1903, first edition 1892), and E.R.A. Seligman, Essays 
in Taxation (New York, 1895).
4 Richard Shannon, Gladstone: Heroic Minister. 1865—1898 (London: 1999), p. 342.
5 Eugenio F. Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform. Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 1860—1880 
(Cambridge, 1992), p. 105.
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This certainly was reflected in the nature o f taxation: almost all significant tax increases were 
based on direct taxation, particularly the income tax and death duties. It is telling that Lord 
Randolph Churchill, who seemed the Conservative politician most willing to embrace this 
change, based his construction o f a new “Tory Democracy” upon essentially Gladstonian 
financial principles which proved too much for his party when his quest for economy 
challenged the growth o f military expenditure.
Inextricably entwined with the growth o f  the electorate was the growth in 
government expenditure. This was o f a twofold nature: civil and military expenditure grew 
twenty-five and forty per cent over the period. This inexorable growth in expenditure 
seemed to put irresolvable pressure on the revenue sources, particularly as politicians felt 
that the class most demanding o f that expenditure was also the most reluctant to tolerate 
additional taxation. The cost o f Civil Services had gone from little more than £15 million in 
1880 to almost £20 million in 1895. The increase to military expenditure was o f the same 
magnitude and the two services which in 1880 cost some £27 million had exploded to £38 
million by 1895. If the question o f what part o f the electorate were responsible for this 
expenditure proved contentious it was nothing as to the question o f who ought to pay for it, 
and how? These questions were difficult enough when dealing with what had now to be 
recognized as “normal” expenditure, but proved excruciatingly painful for Chancellors o f  
the Exchequer when unexpected fiscal shocks threw their Budgets into disarray.
The “Great Depression” is historically controversial today6 but was unambiguously 
vexatious to Chancellors o f the Exchequer during this period, particularly as evidenced by 
fluctuations in the indirect taxes. The “elasticity” o f revenue was much talked about, and 
what this meant was the effect o f the growth or stagnation o f the economy on government
6 S.B. Saul, The Myth of the Great Depression (London, 1985).
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revenue. Most vulnerable were the indirect taxes on alcohol and tobacco, which accounted 
for some 45 to 40 per cent o f government revenue over 1880—1895. The income tax was 
likewise affected by the state o f  the underlying economy, whereas the variable yield o f the 
death duties seemed more dependent on the weather.7 All in all these fluctuating factors 
influencing the revenue provoked the argument that the Government depended upon too 
narrow a basis o f taxation, and the most commonly advocated remedy was a return to 
protective tariffs as a response to agricultural distress and increased industrial competition. 
O f even greater concern was the growing burden o f Imperial entanglements.
The British Empire required a growing military expenditure and colonial warfare or 
the threat o f it became almost a constant factor in British budgets for this period. From the 
point o f view o f the British, the minor colonial wars in South Africa, Afghanistan, Egypt 
and the Soudan were in the 1880s met through taxation. It was the increase in “peace time” 
military expenditure which was more difficult, particularly Naval expenditure through the 
“scares” and “panics” o f 1884,1889 and 1894.8 Significantly increased military 
establishments required commensurate increases in revenue (the idea o f increased 
expenditure being offset by savings on other areas was now seen to be a chimera). The 
problem in terms o f the principles o f “Sound Finance” was to determine the optimum 
balance between them, and it was on this that the Tory—Liberal consensus gave way. 
Although often described as the period o f Britain’s imperial over-stretch, that argument is 
untenable.9 The Navy was the exemplar o f this problem. The difficulty was not inability to 
pay, but how to pay.
7 PRO T168/30, E.W. Hamilton to W.V. Harcourt, 3 Jan. 1894.
8 Gladstone resigned as Prime Minister in 1894 rather than be a party to this increase in naval expenditure.
9 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weaiy Titan. Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline. 1895 — 1905 (Princeton, 1988), 
p. 130.
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The taxation response to these shocks and developments provides a telling 
endorsement o f “Sound Finance”, for these revenue requirements were accommodated 
within the framework o f the existing revenue system, however politically painful at the time. 
There was a consistent pattern o f recourse to the income tax for most needs followed by the 
income tax in combination with beer and spirit duties for more pressing crises. The one area 
in which expenditure was reduced to meet the exigencies o f the revenue requirements was in 
the provision for debt reduction: the New Sinking Fund was permanently reduced by 
Goschen in 1887 and 1889.10 It is no surprise that these departures from “Sound Finance” 
occurred under Tory—Unionist governments.
The income tax was the great engine o f Government finance during this period and 
after. It was applied at a rate o f from 5 to 8 pence in the pound, the yield per penny o f  
income tax varying from about £2 to £2A  million. This was usually sufficient to meet the 
normal expenditure requirements arising from colonial wars and other revenue shortfalls, 
and the movement up and down o f the rate o f income tax provides a rough proxy o f  
underlying economic conditions and military entanglements. Yet this almost 
unprecedented11 peace-time increase o f the income tax burden could hardly be 
unaccompanied by impositions on indirect taxation and soon the usual suspects were 
rounded up: spirits, beer, tobacco and tea.
These indirect taxes were a considerable source o f revenue, but presented the 
Chancellor o f the Exchequer with a double edged fiscal weapon, for the increases were felt 
most keenly by the working classes. Spirit and beer duties were raised only in exceptional 
circumstances: the war scare o f 1885 when there was a £10 million deficit to meet and the
10 This permanent reduction was from £28 to £26 and finally to £25 million in 1889. This had no effect on the 
payment o f  interest but did reduce the statutory provision for the reduction o f  debt each year.
11 It had reached 24 pence during the Napoleonic wars and 16 pence during the Crimean War. Buxton, ii, p. 
378.
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naval panic o f  1894, both times by Liberal governments after the income tax had been 
raised. In fact their importance was as much political as economic, intended to demonstrate 
fairness in taxation between classes and to ensure a “sharing o f the pain”. Tea and tobacco 
taxes were reduced rather than raised, and there was even a call for the former to be 
remitted entirely. This Goschen resisted on the grounds that it represented a minimal poll 
tax, ‘tea is the one article through which those who neither smoke nor drink contribute to 
the Revenue’.12
Neither did the dead smoke or drink, but they certainly contributed to the revenue, 
particularly after Harcourt’s famous Death duties budget o f 1894. Although much 
celebrated at the time and afterwards, it was less significant from a revenue point o f view 
than as a philosophy o f taxation question. Harcourt’s reform o f the Death duties equalized 
the treatment o f real and personal property, much to the cost o f the landed interests who 
had long enjoyed privileged tax treatment at succession, yet the increase in revenue — given 
the variability in mortality which it depended on — was a significant but not important £3—4 
million. What was important was that the principle o f graduation had been accepted as a 
basis o f taxation, seemingly opening the door to a similar treatment o f the income tax.
Throughout this period the state reacted to finance imperatives in a constant and 
consistent way conforming to Gladstonian “Sound Finance”. Deficits were made up by 
additional taxation, generally from direct revenue sources but from across the revenue 
spectrum when necessary, and the burden was shared by all o f the electorate and distributed 
throughout society on a basis which if  not strictly egalitarian at least made claim to some 
sort o f democratic and social consensus. “Sound Finance” had become almost an element 
of the British constitution, and it would continue to dominate government finance until the 
unimaginable fiscal consequences o f the First World War made it untenable. Even in 2004 it
12 3 H  343. 725,17 April 1890.
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could be argued that the spirit o f “Sound Finance” and the shade o f Gladstone continue to 
haunt both No. 11 Downing Street and British budgets.
The question and nature o f “Sound Finance” has been dealt with in the historical 
literature in two ways. The first and most common has been to discuss it from the point o f  
view o f Gladstone and his personality. This is logical, as the theory is so closely associated 
with the individual. This was the approach taken by H.C.G. Matthew in what is probably the 
best overall introduction to the subject, Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics o f Mid- 
Victorian Budgets.’13 Matthew, as the tide makes clear, is concerned with the Mid-Victorian 
period generally as it encompasses the high water mark o f Gladstone’s finance and is very 
good in dealing with the Income Tax and the Peelite origins o f Gladstone’s 1853 Budget, 
but above all his argument that Gladstone had constructed an ‘annually renewed social 
contract o f the Victorian State.... expressed through the balance between direct and indirect 
taxation, and through the political and social role o f the income tax.’14 It is also focussed on 
the personalities and so does not so much explore the process o f the finance itself. Being 
concerned, but not limited to, Gladstone’s motivations and some o f the key areas o f  his 
finance, such as the Income Tax and the idea o f the minimal state, it does not investigate in 
detail the structure o f the Budgets and the nature o f the finance. In confining his 
investigation to the mid-Victorian period there is necessarily a limited attempt to understand 
the applicability o f Gladstone’s finance to later periods and question why it was able to 
endure and flourish until the First World War. He does much to illuminate Gladstone’s 
place in “Sound Finance” but the question o f “Sound Finance” is distincdy secondary. He 
makes it abundandy clear why Gladstone chose his financial strategies and deals briefly with
13H.C.G. Matthew, ‘Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics o f  Mid-Victorian Budgets.’ The Historical journal, 22 
(1979), pp. 615—643. See also his Gladstone biographies, Matthew, Gladstone, 1809—1874 (Oxford, 1988) and 
Gladstone. 1874—1898 (Oxford, 1995). Hereafter, Matthew, ii.
14 H.C.G. Matthew, ‘Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics o f  Mid-Victorian Budgets.’ The HistoricalJournal, 22 
(1979), p. 616.
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why the nation acquiesced in this.15 This broader challenge o f explaining the endurance o f  
this Victorian fiscal system has been taken up in Martin Daunton’s ambitious study o f  the 
politics o f taxation in the ‘long nineteenth century.’16 Daunton argues persuasively, 
following Matthew, that Gladstone’s key contribution and the vital component o f the fiscal 
question in the late Victorian public policy debate concerned the nature o f this “fiscal 
constitution”.
The second theme in the literature is to effectively acknowledge that Britain’s pre­
war finance followed a pattern set by Gladstone and to leave it at that. This theme is 
prevalent in a number o f financial histories, Roseveare’s account o f the Treasury and Hicks’ 
study o f finance are examples o f this approach.17 In the former the concern is to study the 
evolution o f an institution and the growth o f its philosophy, the Treasury point o f  view’, 
which is charted rather than analysed in itself. Roseveare examines how the notion o f  
“Sound Finance” came to dominate the Treasury but does not attempt to explain its broader 
development and application. For Hicks the goal is to examine the results o f  whatever 
theories motivated British government finance and not to analyse how those theories 
developed to produce such results. In both cases a structural, institutional approach takes 
“Sound Finance” for granted. “Sound Finance” is a theory which outlasted its exponents 
and dominated the institutions and achievements o f British Government finance before, and 
to a considerable extent after, 1914. It is necessary to understand why.
15Ibid., p. 640. Christine Gunter and John Maloney argue from a statistical cointegration analysis that in fact 
Gladstone, despite the rhetoric, did not make a difference to taxation or spending in this period ‘Did  
Gladstone make a difference? Rhetoric and reality in mid-Victorian finance.’ Accounting, Business and Financial 
History. 9:3 Nov. 1999, pp. 325—47. Their study, however, and despite its value as an exercise, seems to 
demonstrate more the limitations o f  simplistic econometric techniques than it does Gladstone’s influence on 
government finance. What is necessary is a close study and understanding o f  the budgets and the 
circumstances which made them.
16 M.J. Daunton, Trusting Leviathan. The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799—1914 (Cambridge, 2001).
17Henry Roseveare, The Treasury, The Evolution of a British Institution (London, 1969) and Ursula K. Hicks, British 
Public Finances, their Structure and Development, 1880-1952  (London, 1963).
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The majority o f the scholarship is concerned with Gladstone and his contribution to 
what is here described as “Sound Finance”. Contemporary accounts, and there are a number 
o f very good studies o f government finance, have a tendency to note the deviations from 
sound financial practice which they have unconsciously accepted as the ideal form o f  
finance. They extol the virtues o f “Sound Finance” without really examining it. Three 
contemporary writers whose works may be considered the standards on the subject are, 
Northcote, Buxton and Mallet. Each have implicitly accepted the doctrines o f “Sound 
Finance”.18 Mallet’s work provides both the best explication o f government finance and the 
best example o f one who has appropriated the doctrine o f “Sound Finance” in his own 
work. Francis W. Hirst’s Gladstone as Financier and Economist19 contributes the most explicit 
study o f Gladstone and “Sound Finance”. This is inevitable for he was a staunch partisan 
for “Sound Finance” throughout his life, in particular the period 1907—1916 when he was 
editor o f The Economist.20 In fact his study o f Gladstone was in no small way motivated by a 
desire to use Gladstone to attack Keynes’ revolution in economics by extolling for his 
contemporaries the benefits o f Gladstone’s “Sound Finance”.21 In this it was related to 
Francis Edwin Hyde’s Mr. Gladstone at the Board of Trade?2 for which Hirst wrote the 
introduction. Hyde’s project is much more narrowly concerned with the formation o f  
Gladstone’s economic and fiscal theories during his tenure as Vice-President at the Board o f  
Trade. Hyde is convinced that this experience formed Gladstone’s financial principles.23 It is 
necessarily limited to this period for which its coverage is comprehensive.
18S.H. Northcote, Twenty Years of Financial Policy (London, 1862). Buxton, Finance and Politics (New York, 1966, 
reprint o f  the 1888 edition) and Bernard Mallet, British Budgets 1887 - 1913 (London, 1913).
19(London, 1931).
20Ruth Dudley Edwards, The Pursuit of Reason: The Economist 1843—1993 (London, 1993), p. 949.
21Hirst, Gladstone as Financier and Economist, (London, 1931), p. vii.
^(London, 1934).
23Ibid., p. 53.
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Among economic studies, Schumpeter’s brief survey o f Gladstone and “Sound Finance”24 is 
o f seminal influence because he was concerned to place it in an economic framework 
charting the progress o f economic liberalism. In his assessment Gladstone ‘stands in history 
as the greatest English financier o f economic liberalism.’25 Baysinger and Tollison take this 
as their starting point in creating their theory o f Gladstone’s finance and relating it to the so- 
called ‘Virginian School o f public finance’ o f the early 1980’s.26 In this Gladstone’s ‘minimal 
state’ and the fundamentals o f “Sound Finance” are utilized as a model for a modem theory 
o f minimal government finance. This is to some extent an anachronistic project which does 
not treat either Gladstone or “Sound Finance” on their own terms in historical context or 
with subtlety.27 In this it illustrates one o f the problems inherent in modem scholars 
bringing their own economic conceptions and biases to bear on the subject o f pre-war 
government finance. The past is often utilized as rhetorical ammunition for contemporary 
debates. It does little for our understanding o f government finance in this period to have it 
subjected to arguments for and against Keynesian economic policies unknown to Gladstone. 
This does, however, seem to be a temptation difficult to avoid and so is perhaps itself a 
reason to study “Sound Finance”. A corrective to this approach is found in Middleton’s 
study of the growth o f government, which concluded that the golden age o f minimalist 
government Svas largely a fiction and had been so for a generation or more.’28 The truth o f  
this will be seen not just in what governments did between 1880—1895, but what they said 
they would do, however reluctandy. “Sound Finance” and the minimal state were two 
different things: the first was a theoretical economic institution o f the state encompassing 
fiscal, monetary and trade policy; the latter was simply a manifestation o f that institutional 
theory at a particular convergence o f time and circumstances. Gladstone shaped both,
24 Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (London, 1994), pp. 402-405.
25Ibid., p. 402.
26Barry Baysinger and Robert Tollison, ‘Chaining Leviathan: the case o f  Gladstonian finance.’ History of Political 
Economy. 12 no. 2 (1980), pp. 206 - 213.
27This is pointed out by C.G.Leathers, ‘Gladstonian Finance and the Virginian School o f  Public Finance.’ 
History of'Political Economy. 18 no. 3 (1986), pp. 515-521.
28 Roger Middleton, Government versus the Market (Cheltenham, 1996), p. 210.
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indeed, his willingness to contemplate using in full the enormous fiscal resources o f the state 
to deliver Irish Home Rule in 1886 and again in 1893 demonstrates this conclusively.
Anachronism is not a problem in Ghosh’s investigation o f the Conservative party 
and fiscal policy which is a very useful complement to Matthew. Ghosh points out the 
extent to which the theory o f “Sound Finance” informed Disraeli’s finance, if  not his 
practice o f it. ‘For Disraeli, the reduction o f taxation was a matter o f political calculation.... 
Economy for its own sake did not interest him.’29 E.H.H. Green continues the analysis o f  
Conservative fiscal theory30 through the period o f  tariff reform and the bimetallic 
controversy although his concern is more with the political debate surrounding these 
challenges to “Sound Finance” than the reasons for which “Sound Finance” was able to 
defeat them.
The broader historiography concerning “Sound Finance” either touches upon larger 
issues relating to the Liberal party or to specific aspects o f the pillars o f that theory: the 
Treasury, contemporary economic theory, the Gold standard, and especially Free Trade and 
Tariff Reform. The Treasury and its role has been outlined, as mentioned, by Roseveare 
whose institutional analysis is very satisfactory as he points out the importance o f the 
Treasury’s financial control31 in shaping and making possible the implementation o f “Sound 
Finance”. I t  became a religion o f financial orthodoxy whose Trinity was Free Trade,
29P.R. Ghosh, ‘Disraelian Conservatism: a financial approach.’ The English Historical Review 99, no. 391 (1984), 
pp. 268-296.
30 E.H.H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism. The Politics, economics and ideology of the British Conservative party, 1880 — 
1914 (London, 1996). Also his ‘Rentiers versus Producers? The Political Economy o f  the Bimetallic 
Controversy c. 1880—1898.’ The English Historical Review 103 no. 408 (1988) pp. 588 - 612 and A.C. H owe’s 
‘Bimetallism, c. 1880—1898; a controversy re-opened?’ English Historical Review 105 no. 415 (1990), pp. 377 - 
391, for some o f  the reasons that this challenge to “Sound Finance” did not succeed and Green’s reply: T he  
Bimetallic Controversy: empiricism belimed or the case for the issues.’ The English Historical Review 105 no. 416 
(1990), pp. 673-683.
31 Roseveare, p. 142. Maurice Wright, however, notes the limitations o f  this control. T h e Treasury’s most 
difficult task was to get departments to acknowledge the discretion and responsibility conferred upon it by 
Parliament, and to accept its authority and judgements.’ Treasury Control of the Civil Service, 1854—1874 (Oxford, 
1969) p. 344.
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Balanced Budgets and the Gold Standard, whose Original Sin was the National Debt.’32 The 
evolution o f Treasury attitudes has been surveyed by George Peden to 1914, showing the 
process by which “Treasury control became less negative and more concerned with ensuring 
that proposals for expenditure were the most prudent and economical ways to achieve 
government policies.’ In this it becomes quite clear that this outlook was governed by 
principles o f public expenditure derived from Smith, Mill and C.F. Bastable, which had 
reached their high point o f influence by 1880—95. This Treasury outlook is further 
elaborated, albeit for a subsequent period, by Peden in his studies o f the economic 
controversies relating to Keynes’ theories in the inter-war years.33
The related and important subject o f the Gold Standard is well served by Fetter in 
Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy, 1797—187i 34 which traces its evolution and 
implementation. The main features o f the system were clear. That the gold standard was 
inviolate was a decision o f Government. The task o f  maintaining [it] was entrusted to the 
Bank o f England,... What emerged was the ‘monetary and banking orthodoxy’ that by 1914 
had in varying degrees left its impact on almost every country o f the world.’35 This has been 
further elaborated and for a later period, particularly for the evolution o f monetary theory in 
its understanding o f the gold standard and bimetallism, by Laidler. He demonstrates why the 
classical economists preferred gold: ‘they believed commodity convertibility essential to a 
sound monetary system, and they were more concerned with inflation than deflation.’36 The 
actual mechanics o f this international system, although primarily concerned with the inter­
war period leading to the Great Depression, are elaborated by Eichengreen whose
32Roseveare, p. 118.
33 G.C. Peden ‘From cheap government to efficient government: the political economy o f  public expenditure 
in the United Kingdom, 1832—1914.’ pp. 351-80, pp. 353 and 363. In Donald Winch and Patrick K. O ’Brien, 
eds. The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688—1914 (Oxford, 2002); Peden, T h e Treasury View’ 
on Public Works and Employment in the Interwar Period.’ The Economic History Review. 2nd. Series, 37 no. 2 
(1984), pp. 167-181. In this the antecedents o f  the Treasury View’ are discussed and further elaborated in the 
following, Peden, Keynes, The Treasury and British Economic Polity. (London, 1988).
34 (Cambridge, Ma., 1965).
35 Ibid., p. 282.
36 David Laidler, The Golden Age of Quantity Theoiy, 1870—1914 (London, 1992), p. 34. He also makes explicit 
the debt that a new generation o f  economists, such as Marshall, owed to Mill for their understanding o f  these 
questions. See especially ch. 6, ‘Neoclassical monetary theory and monetary institutions’, pp. 153—192.
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discussion o f the pre-1914 operations are very good.37 O f related interest is Kynaston’s 
work on the ‘City’ which makes the connection between government finance, the financial 
community and monetary policy which reinforced the orthodoxy o f “Sound Finance.”38 A  
good overview o f the economic theory behind the Bimetallic controversy is provided by 
Friedman,39 and the political (and academic) debate by Green and Howe.40 Howe has 
written a comprehensive study o f Free Trade, and in addition to Green work has been done 
on Tariff Reform by Trentmann.41
One area o f recent historical interest which is implicidy concerned with questions o f  
“Sound Finance” is the debate surrounding the costs and benefits o f the British Empire.42 
Davis and Huttenback, in a work o f massive scholarship, have attempted to work out the 
monetary cost o f Britain’s Empire. Their work suggests that the costs far outweighed the 
benefits and that there was a considerable tax burden imposed. ‘As the subsidy was funded 
in Britain, the analysis o f the incidence o f taxes in the United Kingdom becomes particularly 
important. Taxes were high, £2.40 per capita as compared with an average o f  about £1.00 
elsewhere in the developed world.’43 Friedberg sees a similar overburdening o f Britain due 
to the military costs o f  maintaining the Empire. Their analysis is based on absolute rather 
than relative burdens so it is difficult to conclude whether the costs o f Empire really were a
37Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters. The Gold Standard A n d  The Great Depression, 1919—1939 (New York and 
Oxford, 1992).
38David Kynaston, The City OfEondon. Volume I: A  World of Its Own, 1815—1890 (London, 1994).
39Milton Friedman, ‘Bimetallism Revisited.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives. 4, no. 4 (1990), pp. 85 - 105.
^see note 30, above.
41 Anthony Howe, Free Trade andUberalEngland, 1846—1946 (Oxford, 1997). F. Trentmann, *1116 Trans­
formation o f  Fiscal Reform: Reciprocity, Modernization, and the Fiscal Debate Within the Business 
Community in Early Twentieth Century Britain.’ The HistoricalJournal. 39, no. 4 (1996), pp. 1005-1048, and 
Wealth versus welfare: the British Left between Free Trade and national political economy before the first 
World War.’ Historical Research. 70, no. 171 (1997), pp. 70-98.
42L.E. Davis and R.A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: the political economy of British Imperialism, 
1860—1912 (Cambridge, 1986); P.J Cain, and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688 
—1914. (London and N ew  York, 1993); Friedberg, The Weary Titan, Sidney Pollard, Britain’s Prime and Britain’s 
Decline: The British Economy, 1870—1914 (London, 1989); Niall Ferguson, Tublic Finance And National Security: 
The Domestic Origins O f The First World War Revisited.’ Past A nd Present. 142 (1994), pp. 141-168. All o f  
these authors are concerned with what they characterize as Britain’s decline in both economic and military 
terms.
43Davis and Huttenback, p. 244.
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burden. Friedberg is somewhat trapped in a rigid international relations theory which is 
probably better suited to zero-sum analysis o f nuclear weapons deterrence. Their work has 
been questioned on these grounds by Kennedy, Offer and Hobson.44 In all o f  these, 
assumptions about the nature and extent o f the burden o f British Government finance raise 
questions about “Sound Finance”. Friedberg and Davis and Huttenback do not seem to 
appreciate the flexibility that “Sound Finance” gave to governments once they had 
committed to expenditure. The record o f the Liberals prior to 1914 is proof o f this. Nor is it 
anachronistic to question whether a maximum burden o f eight pence in the pound (3 and 
1/3%) on those liable to the income tax was really a burden at all.
Broader studies o f the Liberal party invariably touch upon matters o f finance as they 
attempt to explain its successes and failures during this period. Parry suggests that fiscal 
rectitude was a Whig inheritance while implying that Gladstone was not really a Whig or a 
Liberal but an unreconstructed Peelite.45 Tiberals were never the party o f doctrinaire 
political economy, but the party o f integration.’46 If correct the implication is that it was not 
necessary for the party to be doctrinaire on this matter as the nation, for the most part, was. 
“Sound Finance” doctrine went across party boundaries, not unchallenged but certainly 
dominant. In fact it cut across boundaries o f class as well. This point is made very clear by 
Biagini, ‘From the viewpoint o f popular success it was important that the central tenets of 
Gladstone’s finance were easy to understand. Gladstone’s stress on the need for balanced 
budgets was in tune with popular views o f financial morality...The classical principles of 
taxation which the Teople’s Chancellor’ applied were also deeply rooted in popular
44 Paul Kennedy, T h e Costs And Benefits O f British Imperialism, 1846-1914.’ Past A n d Present, 125 (1989), pp. 
186-92. Avner Offer, T h e British Empire, 1870-1914: A  Waste O f Money?’ Economic History Preview. 46, no. 2 
(1993), pp. 215-238; and Avner Offer, The First World War: A n  Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford, 1992 edition); 
J.M. Hobson, T h e Military-Extraction Gap and the Wary Titan: The Fiscal Sociology o f  British Defence 
policy 1870 -  1913.’Journal of European Economic History, 22, no. 3 (1993), pp. 461 - 506.
45Jonathan Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (New Haven, 1993), pp. 14, 18 and 
247. What he doesn’t explain is why they were never able implement this when in office, instead, like the 
Conservatives in 1887, they had to draft in an outsider, Gladstone, to do it for them. See also T.A. Jenkins, 
Gladstone, Whiggeiy A n d The Liberal Party, 1874—1886 (Oxford, 1988) for Gladstone’s relationship with the Whig 
faction.
46Parry, p. 245.
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expectations through readings and popularizations o f Adam Smith.’47 The extent to which 
“Sound Finance” found favour with the masses was an indication not just o f the success 
with which the elite were able to instil these values but also o f a widespread belief that 
tangible benefits accrued to the poorest in British society, from this would develop a 
demand for “Radical” social reform.
Even more o f a burden, although seemingly less radical than social reform, was the 
enormous increase in the cost and extent o f armaments and militarism which would 
culminate in the First World War, but which began in earnest in the mid-1880s.48 The 
struggle to come to terms with this expenditure would plague all British governments to 
1914 and Gladstone’s opposition to the cost and the militarism they entailed deserves a 
more critical evaluation than simply to dismiss it as senility. Nor was it merely naive 
principle carried to extremes in the face o f all evidence, for as Taylor concluded, ‘it is 
difficult to believe that there was ever a serious danger o f war in Europe on a great scale at 
any time between 1878 and 1913.’49
While there is much work with which to build on there remains considerable scope 
for a study o f “Sound Finance”. The radical fiscal philosophy developed by Peel in the 
1840’s had become the orthodoxy o f the 1860’s and 1870’s and would not be seriously 
challenged until the 1880’s. Yet from that time onward it was under attack from the Tariff 
Reformers and Bimetallists amongst the Conservative-Unionists and under pressure from 
the growth o f expenditure and shocks due to mostly to militarism. A thorough investigation 
o f the subject must consider three main areas: the actual practice o f government finance as
47Biagini, (1992), p.105.
48Paul Kennedy, although primarily concerned with the German threat, covers this period in a diplomatic 
history, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860—1914 (London, 1984). All aspects o f  the change in naval 
armaments and perceived threats to Britain are covered by Arthur J. Marder in British Naval Policy 1880—1905 
(London, 1940). The result o f  this increased expenditure and acquisition o f  armaments during a time o f  rising 
European militarism is presented in David Stevenson, Armaments A n d The Coming O f War, Europe, 1904—1914 
(Oxford, 1996), which does suggest some parallels to Gladstone’s arguments o f  1894.
49 A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle Tor Mastery In Europe, 1848—1918 (Oxford, 1957), p. 258.
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evidenced by the Budgets themselves, the political circumstances surrounding those Budgets 
and the economic and fiscal theories o f the day which shaped them.
The best expression o f the doctrine o f “Sound Finance” are the Budgets. The level 
o f expenditure and revenue, and the means by which the latter was raised, provide the 
evidence with which to judge Gladstone and his successors in their performance o f office. 
They can be judged on what they have done, although we will also want to know what they 
and others had to say on the subject. The Parliamentary debates, through Hansardprovide a 
view o f the field on which the battles in defence o f “Sound Finance” were fought. 
Contemporary journals give an understanding o f how government finance was understood 
in that time: The Times was conservative but independent in outlook, while The Spectator was 
partisan for the Liberals and keen on “Sound Finance”. The Economist and The Statist were 
financial journals and the standard bearers o f “Sound Finance”. Taken together they give an 
indication o f the extent to which this orthodoxy prevailed and provide a contemporary 
judgement o f Government adherence to it.
This is necessarily an elitist perspective, for high finance complements high politics 
as the context from which the field is surveyed. In this we are fortunate not only for the 
diaries and papers o f Gladstone, but for Edward Hamilton’s as well. N ot only did Hamilton 
keep a diary, but his collection o f Treasury papers is an invaluable account o f  the inner 
mechanism o f government finance and the construction o f budgets. Taken together they 
provide a crucial account for the period o f study, especially important as Goschen’s papers 
have disappeared and Reginald Welby was too much a model o f the reticent civil servant to 
leave personal insights in his papers.50 Yet in truth there is almost an overabundance o f  
financial material available, and what follows attempts to place this within a context which 
will illuminate and clarify “Sound Finance” for the reader.
50 Hamilton’s Treasury papers are in PRO T168. The Welby papers at the BLPES provide a wealth o f  detail 
on the gold standard and Bank o f  England — Treasury relations but they are far more official than personal.
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CHAPTER 2 
RETRENCHMENT
Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1880 —1882
Gladstone’s last period as Chancellor o f  the Exchequer from 1880 to 1882 was 
notable not only for his serving as Prime Minister concurrendy but also for his difficulty in 
meeting the stringent requirements o f “Sound Finance” which he had done so much to 
define in his budgets o f the 1850’s, 60’s and 70’s. Retrenchment was difficult due to foreign 
entanglements in Afghanistan and Egypt along with calls for further military expenditure, an 
increased overall expenditure, and reluctance on the part o f the nation to endure cutbacks. 
Due in a large part to his previous reforms o f the Customs and Excise, he had litde 
opportunity to reduce, eliminate or make more productive these imposts so he was ever 
more reliant on the produce o f the Income Tax, for which talk o f elimination was now litde 
heard.1 Gladstone was Chancellor o f the Exchequer at a time when “Sound Finance”, an 
orthodoxy he had done more than any other to instil, was under pressure as expenditure 
increased and Free Trade was challenged. His previous experience had been in 
comparatively easy times, when expenditure could be reduced and he had hoped to 
eliminate the income tax. This was no longer the case and adherence to the principles o f  
“Sound Finance” would require unpopular increases in taxation rather than opportunities 
for remission. But his principles did not waver. He had been trained in the [‘old Peelite7] 
‘Conservative’ school to believe in: ‘1. Economy 2. Peace 3. Sound and strict finance 
4. Anti-jobbing 5. Maintenance o f the sound traditions o f Parliament [of administration].2 
His attempts to adhere to these principles provide a test o f theory put into practice and 
foreshadow later periods o f British finance under pressure. It provides proof o f Gladstone’s
1 Gladstone felt, and not without regret, that his defeat on the income tax issue in the 1874 election meant that 
his ‘pledges o f  1853 completely lost all binding force.’John Brooke and Mary Sorensen, (eds.), The Prime 
Ministers’ Papers: W.E. Gladstone Volume I: Autobiographica (London, 1971), p. 101.
2 John Brooke and Mary Sorensen, (eds.), The Prime Ministers’Papers: W.E. Gladstone Volume TV: Autobiographical 
Memoranda 1868—1894 (London, 1981) p. 104.
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commitment to the cause for it was in this trying period that the principles o f  “Sound 
Finance” were put into practice by their greatest proponent.
The importance o f  “Sound Financial” practice was made explicit by Gladstone in his 
Midlothian speeches which served notice to the Conservative Government that finance 
would be an important issue in the forthcoming election. Gladstone raised the issue 
throughout the Midlothian campaign and his ‘Com Exchange’ speech in Edinburgh o f  
25 November 1879 was entirely concerned with government finance.3 1 do not hold, 
gentlemen, that good finance is the beginning and the ending o f good government,... [but] 
without it you cannot have good government - and with it you almost always get good 
government.4 The Conservative administration he found entirely wanting in good finance, 
not simply through incompetence but by wilful neglect in its,
Destruction or disparagement o f the sound and healthy rules which the 
wisdom o f a long series o f finance Ministers, o f  an excellent finance 
department, and o f many Parliaments has gradually and labouriously built 
up, to prevent abuse, to secure public control, to work by degrees upon the 
public debt o f the country, and to take care that people shall not be unduly 
burdened.5
This flagrant abuse o f the nation’s trust in the stewardship o f its finances was the more 
severe because the principles o f “Sound Finance” which had been abandoned ought to have 
been above any partisan considerations. It was, maintained Gladstone, a public duty to 
adhere to and maintain them. ‘What are the rules o f finance observed with almost unvarying 
uniformity until the accession o f the present Government [?]6 For the benefit o f that 
administration he made clear what those rules were:
The first o f them is, that the Chancellor o f the Exchequer shall boldly 
uphold economy in detail;... N o Chancellor o f the Exchequer is worth his
3 It was ‘one o f  the most important speeches in the two campaigns/ The assessment o f  Trevor O. Lloyd, The 
General Election of 1880 (London, 1968) p. 58.
4 W.E. Gladstone, Midlothian Speeches, 1879 (Old Woking, Surrey: 1971, reprint o f the 1879 edition), p. 132.
5 Ibid., p. 146.
6 Ibid., p. 147.
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salt who makes his own popularity either his first consideration, or any 
consideration at all, in administering the public purse.... resistance in detail 
to jobbery and minute waste and extravagance is the first o f  wholly sound 
financial rules.7 ...The second rule ... and this is perhaps the most essential o f 
them all: that once in the year, and only once, the Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer shall make his financial statement.... The efficiency o f the 
popular and Parliamentary control o f the expenditure o f the country entirely 
depends upon the maintenance o f the principle o f the annual, as opposed to 
the triennial or tri-monthly budget. It is idle to talk o f controlling the 
expenditure o f the Government unless you compel them to adhere to that 
rule. [The third rule] You are bound to estimate [expenditure] to the best o f  
your ability, and if there is a doubt, you are bound to rule that doubt in 
favour o f the larger side,... and in no case, so far as human foresight can 
avoid it, should the public revenue be placed in a deficiency.... Here is 
another rule, ...when you have not money enough you must supply the 
deficit by taxation. ... The Constitution appoints one particular man to teach 
us sound doctrine, and to nail us to that particular doctrine, and that 
particular man is the Chancellor o f the Exchequer.... One other rule [is] to 
aim at annual surplus as a main instrument for the steady reduction o f the 
public debt.8
These five severe principles removed considerable freedom from the Chancellor in 
constructing his Budget and that was their purpose. If implemented, it was thought, bad 
finance was almost impossible and even the stupidest Chancellor o f  the Exchequer could do 
litde damage to the country.
“Sound Finance” was a self-reinforcing system: economy o f expenditure in order to 
reduce that expenditure; transparency in the presentation o f government finance so that 
both Parliament and the public were aware o f the revenue requirements and the taxation 
necessary to meet it; a balanced budget so as to avoid debt finance, increased taxation 
whenever necessary to ensure that balance; and finally the application o f any surplus, and 
the budget was framed so as to produce one, towards the reduction o f the vast government 
debt which was the product o f the wars and un-sound finance o f the past. “Sound Finance” 
required discipline and austerity on the part o f  the Chancellor o f the Exchequer as well as
7 His private secretary, Edward Hamilton, believed that Gladstone had a deep conviction that ‘waste is wrong 
and unnecessary7 not just in matters o f  finance but in food as well. Dudley W.R. Bahlman, (ed.), The Diary of Sir 
Edward Walter Hamilton 1880— 1885. Volume 1 :1880—1882 [hereafter HD, i](Oxford, 1972), p. 191.
8 Gladstone, Midlothian Speeches, (1879), pp. 147—53.
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the courage to stand up to his Cabinet colleagues and insist that if they were unwilling to 
reduce their expenditure they must be willing to increase taxation to meet it. These qualities 
Gladstone possessed in abundance. The fact that the Conservative Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, had broken all o f these rules during his tenure o f  that 
office meant that he would have to make amends in his pre-election Budget o f 1880. He 
could not credibly face the electorate otherwise.
The budgets o f1880
The financial statements for the year 1880 were exceptional in that there was a second 
supplemental budget which followed Sir Stafford Northcote’s original budget o f 11 March 
1880. Gladstone was not content with the task o f First Lord o f the Treasury but felt called 
to take on the additional burden o f Chancellor o f the Exchequer as well.9 He wasted little 
time in getting to work, presenting to Parliament a Supplemental Budget on 10 June 1880. 
Gladstone felt this was necessary in order to pay for the mounting and additional expenses 
o f wars in South Africa and Afghanistan and in particular to ensure that these costs were 
met out o f the current revenue o f the government and not paid for by debt finance. He had 
little confidence in Northcote’s revenue estimates.10 There was also the negotiations for the 
renewal o f the French Commercial Treaty which, had it been successful, would have 
entailed the loss o f some revenue.11 For these reasons at least Gladstone decided to recast 
the nation’s finances so as to ensure that there would be a surplus available at the end o f the 
financial year and he had some innovative measures at hand to do so.12
9 Hamilton stated this was because ‘finance is to be given a foremost place in the programme o f  the new  
ministry.’ HD, i, p. 1. There had been a Treasury dinner o f  Welby, West and others to review the finance on  
20 April. GD, ix, p. 509.
10 GD, ix, p. 517.
11 In a letter to Lord Granville o f  4 May 1880 Gladstone indicated his own pessimism about the prospects for 
renewal. Agatha Ramm, ed., The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876—1886. Volume I, 
1876-1882 (Oxford, 1962), p. 124.
12 The Budget was decided at the Cabinet o f  5 June 1880. GD, ix, p. 533.
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Gladstone’s Budget speech began with a defence o f the negotiations with the French 
government to renew the Commercial Treaty and the changes to the wine duties which this 
involved at an estimated cost to the revenue o f £230,000.13 This was o f some concern to 
ardent Free Traders who felt that such treaties went against the spirit o f their trade doctrine 
but Gladstone defended these efforts, This country carries its produce, free from all fiscal 
restrictions, into all the markets o f the world, and by encouraging imports from its creditors 
gives the greatest possible encouragement to our own exports in return.’14 The most 
memorable part o f this Budget was not the increase in the income tax but Gladstone’s 
repeal o f  the Malt tax, which had brought in £8,000,00015 the previous year, and substitution 
of a Beer duty in its place. Gladstone had given this change considerable thought and 
effort16
It is advantageous to the Revenue because the arrangements will be 
simplified, because we shall eventually work at a reduced cost, and because, 
as I think, without any burden to anybody, we shall be able to enlarge our 
receipts from those resources. There is still a greater advantage which is, that 
if  unhappily in time o f war, or in time o f great emergency, it becomes 
necessary for any Financial Minister to ask this House for a great increase in 
the taxes o f the country,... the beer duty will stand exactly as the spirit duty 
stands... a consumer’s tax..17
It was a considerable innovation based upon principles o f “Sound Finance” but would 
require a substantial pay out o f malt drawbacks during the transition.18 This required an 
increase o f Id. to the income tax, raising it to 6d. in the pound, although technically it was an 
increase o f 2d. for half the year.19 This followed the practice he had always advocated o f  
paying for expenditure out o f the current revenue o f the state and o f utilizing the income
1310 June 1880,3 H 2 5 2 .1629.
14 Ibid., p.1628.
15 Ibid., p.1638.
16 H D , i,p.9.
1710 June 1880, 3 H 2 5 2 .1649.
18 £286,000 according to the estimate o f  27 May. GD, ix, p. 530.
19 3 H 252.1649.
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tax as an emergency tax, for which it was well suited due to its flexibility. It nonetheless 
caused Edward Hamilton, his private secretary from the Treasury, some misgivings as the 
burden in relief o f an indirect tax would be bome by a direct tax on income.20
The reaction outside Parliament to this supplemental budget was remarkably 
optimistic, favourable not so much to what Gladstone had done as to the promise o f  what 
was to come. Such was his reputation as a financier that there was a remarkable uniformity 
o f this expression in The Economist, The Times, The Spectator and The Statist. Despite the limited 
scope o f  the supplemental budget there was considerable enthusiasm for what he might do, 
his reputation as Chancellor o f the Exchequer had preceded him. This seems the more so 
curious as the journals themselves could not be accused o f sensationalism or romanticism in 
finance. The first and last mentioned were grey, sober minded financial journals while The 
Times was, well it was The Times. The Spectator was the unabashed partisan o f the four, W e 
have not another financier in this kingdom who could have accomplished all this in a 
supplementary Budget, and accomplished it with such ease and such universal confidence in 
the prudence o f his decision.... Mr. Gladstone is never more happy and elastic than when 
he deals with finance.’21 The TLconomist endowed Gladstone with seemingly super-financial 
powers which he could unleash at the opportune moment while deciding that, at the 
present,
we cannot regard them as Mr. Gladstone’s last word in finance. They 
probably form in his mind portions o f a far larger scheme to be brought 
forward on future occasions should opportunity permit, which may be 
expected to be o f  still greater advantage to the prosperity o f the country.22
20 H D , 1, p. 19.
21 The Spectator, 12 June 1880, p. 740.
22 The Economist, 12 June 1880, p. 675.
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The Times was less laudatory but did have high expectations for the immediate future and 
speculated on the relationship between Gladstone and the income tax which he had 
promised to abolish in 1874.
It is, as Mr. Gladstone said, the glory o f the income-tax that, however it may 
be open to objection in itself, it has been made the instrument for achieving 
the greatest and most beneficent fiscal reforms. If an opportunity now 
presents itself for advancing further upon the path o f scientific and equitable 
finance, few will contend that the addition o f  a penny to the income-tax is 
too high a price to pay for a large, permanent, and, probably, expanding gain. 
The income tax, it is admitted, cannot at present be removed, and even the 
keenest advocates o f its abolition must confess that, while it continues to be 
a main part o f our financial system, its amount does not affect its principle.23
The Statist was the most adulatory, attributing to Gladstone a personal capability and 
responsibility for budget making beyond that o f mere mortals. ‘Mr. Gladstone has begun 
early to show that his acceptance o f the office o f Chancellor o f the Exchequer means the 
performance o f something great in finance.’24
It is this innate courage in Gladstone which raises him, in the opinion o f these 
journals, beyond that o f other Chancellors o f the Exchequer. He has been imbued with 
qualities which others might aspire to but never attain. This is partly due to his previous 
budgetary and financial successes, and his reputation had no doubt grown beyond even that. 
It was also due to the disappointment o f  seven years o f Tory finance. Despite his close 
familiarity with Gladstonian finance and his own undoubted fiscal competence,25 
Northcote’s tenure as Chancellor o f the Exchequer was considered by many to have been a 
failure. He lacked such courage. Buxton summarized Northcote’s six years from 1874 to 
1880 as follows:
The record, as shown by an analysis o f the official figures given in our public 
returns, is distressing enough. The surplus o f six millions received in 1874,
23 The Times, 11 June 1880, p. 9.
24 The Statist, 12 June 1880, p. 326.
25 For Gladstone’s good opinion o f  Northcote see HD, i, p. 35.
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had by 1880 been turned into a deficiency o f eight. In the three last years 
heavy deficits were annually incurred. The ordinary expenditure had risen 
and risen steadily, from 72V2 millions in 1873, to an amount as originally 
estimated o f 81V2 millions for 1880, an increase o f nine millions sterling.26
Whether or not Northcote could have done anything about this is irrelevant. In typical Tory 
fashion he had presided over the nation’s fall from the grace o f “Sound Finance” and 
Gladstone was now looked to as the saviour o f  the nation’s finances.
Gladstone’s Financial Statement o f 1881
Gladstone presented the Financial Statement for the 1881 Budget, his twelfth as 
Chancellor o f the Exchequer, on 4 April 1881. It had been accepted in the Cabinet on 
2 April and was drafted with the considerable assistance o f Welby and West.27 His 
reputation had preceded him, and there was considerable expectation that this should be, if 
not a great Budget, then at least a remarkable one.28 The Revenue estimates o f the previous 
year’s Budget were run through and could satisfactorily be seen as having been modestly 
surpassed:29 realized revenue for 1880-1 was £84,041,288 and on that basis Gladstone 
projected an 1881 Budget revenue o f £85,990,000,30 an increase o f £1,184,496.
At £84,805,504, estimated expenditure for the year ahead was very high by the 
standards o f “Sound Finance”, being in fact £1,697,000 higher than 1880-1. Gladstone was 
regretful but not apologetic about this fact, ‘... the Committee will perceive that the 
augmentation is not owing to any carelessness on the part o f  the Government in checking 
the increase o f Expenditure as far as they can, and in effecting any reductions that appear
26 Buxton, p. 271.
27 GD, ix, pp. 41—44.
28 Hamilton did not share this opinion, admitting that the Budget would ‘not rank among his great financial 
feats.’ H D , i, p. 125.
29 “Financial Statement, 1881—82”, pp. 1-5; PP 1881, (169) lvii. 217 for all Budget figures.
30 4 April 1881, 3 H  260. 584.
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necessary.’31 The single largest source o f expenditure was payment o f debt which amounted 
to £31,370,000, almost double the cost o f the next largest item, the Army at £16,509,500. 
Civil Services at £16,087,504 was almost as expensive while the Navy made up the other 
significant source o f spending at a cost o f £10,845,919. These great spending departments 
and the debt service made up more than 7 /8  o f government expenditure.
The estimated revenue was sufficient to provide for the above expenditure 
comprising as it did Excise duties o f £27,620,000; Customs receipts estimated at 
£19,000,000; Stamps — £12,290,000; Income Tax - £9,540,000; Post Office - £6,800,000; 
Miscellaneous - £3,900,000; Taxes - £2,760,000; Telegraphs - £1,600,000; Interest on 
Advances - £1,200,000; and Crown Lands - £390,000. As is clear from the above it was the 
indirect taxes which raised the most revenue. An important point in the revenue was that 
the income tax had been cut from 6d. to 5d. to reduce the surplus to £294,496, as Gladstone 
felt that, *1 think if I were to ask the House to vote this sixth Id. o f the Income Tax, it 
would be said, and said with perfect justice, that it was not a continuance o f  taxation, but an 
addition to taxation.’32
Gladstone’s presentation o f the Budget was masterful in his command o f the details 
and notable for his defence o f free trade and private enterprise in a speech lasting two 
hours.33 The former is evident throughout the statement, particularly in his explanation o f  
Probate reform. While that was a technical change expected to raise £390,000 over ten 
months it was also the most complicated o f the proposals and the one area o f the Budget 
which had given him the most difficulty in formulation and with his Cabinet colleagues and 
Treasury officials.34 The most important aspect o f this Budget, aside from the diminution o f  
the Income Tax, was his attack on the National Debt. As the largest single item o f
31 3 H  260. 584.
32 At a loss o f  £1,110,000 to the Treasury, Ibid., p. 587. Gladstone had wanted to reduce it by VA d, but was 
over-ruled by the Cabinet o f  2 April. GD, x, p. 44.
33 The Times, 5 April 1881, p. 9.
34 HD, i, pp.122 and 124; BL GP, Add. MS 44765, f. 88. The technical change is described in Buxton, ii, pp. 
295—7, Gladstone describes it in a letter to C.J. Herries, (Chmn. IR) o f  29 March, GD, x, p. 42.
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Government expenditure it was a proper subject o f Gladstone’s attention, particularly as any 
savings would have a cumulative pay o ff in reducing subsequent debt charges. For 
Gladstone,
The reduction o f the National Debt is a matter in which I have always felt a 
great degree o f interest, and a great desire to see carried ou t.... The House, 
however, having refused to deal with it in what I think the best way 
[terminable annuities], I accept the second best way [a sinking fund], and 
take it as effecting, at all events, a reduction o f Debt, and am thankful for 
it.35
It was expected that this additional expenditure would lead to a savings o f £1,550,000.36 He 
was keen as always to explain how the benefits o f reduction and simplification o f duty and 
excise naturally worked to the benefit o f  British industry and consumers, explaining how in 
the case o f the repeal o f the Malt tax in favour o f a beer duty brewers had been able to 
substitute various grades o f malt and even to substitute rice and maize in its place. These 
are details, and interesting details, as to the mode in which private enterprize goes to work 
always with an ultimate benefit which is sure to reach the public when changes that tend in 
the direction o f commercial freedom are made.’37 It was also an important concern o f  
Gladstone’s to explain in Parliament the workings o f the revenue process so as to allow his 
colleagues and country to understand the important relationship between revenue, 
expenditure and retrenchment. It was with this in mind that he set himself the task o f  
explaining to the House the historical yield o f the income tax with the idea o f relating it to 
the present day economic conditions and likely effect on revenue.
During the last two years - our Revenue has actually gone back, while our 
expenditure has increased 2 1 /6  per cent per annum; and I am sorry to say
35 3 H  260. 578.
36 Ibid., p. 579.‘... it is proposed to convert £2,000,000 from four-year Annuities into twenty-five year 
Annuities terminating in 1906. By so converting them, after paying the interest on the stock into which they 
are converted, we shall have a sum o f £1,550,000 at our disposal.’
37 Ibid., p. 574.
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that when I come to make provision for 1881-2,1 shall be obliged to ask for 
further augmentation38
This left an unfavourable prospect for the British prosperity in the coming year and no 
doubt Gladstone meant it to emphasize the need for fiscal retrenchment which would allow 
for future reductions in taxation and consequent, at least so far as his fiscal theory saw it, 
increased economic prosperity. He concluded in a sober fashion,
I do not wish to colour too highly the public prospects. I fully admit I have 
had no brilliant picture to present to the Committee. I have had no dazzling 
or bewitching proposals to make. ... It is something to say that we can meet 
the demand o f the enormous Expenditure o f this country without adding, as 
I trust and believe we do not in any degree, great or small, to the burdens o f  
the country.39
This was not a striking or innovative budget o f the sort Gladstone was famous for but it did 
conform to the standards o f “Sound Finance” and the orthodoxy that was expected o f  it. 
This did not mean that it was welcomed in Parliament but at least it was treated with a 
certain respect.
The reception o f the Budget within Parliament was notable for partisan comments 
both for and against its provisions, particularly the level o f expenditure, the cost o f foreign 
affairs and entanglements, the beer tax and effect o f the new probate measures. But mostly 
for the debate which occurred, much to the Chairman’s annoyance, over the merits o f free 
trade and protectionism. Messrs. Watney and Whitbread, not surprisingly, were critical as 
they felt that the Beer tax would impose higher costs on the brewers and so was not as fair 
as it could be.40 Mr. Fowler was critical o f  the excessive, TVlilitary and Naval expenditure 
which he believed had never been reached before - namely £31,000,000’ and felt it was £an
38 Ibid., p. 582.
39 Ibid., p. 601.
40 Ibid., p. 610.
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opportunity o f showing that a Liberal Government really meant economy, as well as peace 
and reform.’41 Mr. Sydney Buxton, felt more could be done about the National Debt.42 
There were numerous comments on the revised Probate Duty but most were happy with 
the reform and wished more could be done. The area o f contention was the question o f  
Free Trade, despite the fact that nothing in the Budget itself made any changes to the 
existing system. Those against tended to complain o f foreign tariffs and unfair trading which 
demanded from the Chancellor reciprocity in response.
[Mr. Ashmead Bartlett] did not wish to directly attack what was called Free 
Trade; but he could not help feeling that, under present arrangements, it was 
not Free Trade for England, but for every other country at her expense ... In 
a short time a demand for the re-consideration o f foreign tariffs would come 
from the very classes and constituencies that he had so successfully 
represented. It was the manufacturing towns that were demanding, he would 
not say Protection, but Reciprocity 43
It was inevitable that these statements should draw a defence o f Free Trade which in turn 
caused the Chairman to redirect discussion to the actual Ways and Means o f  the Budget.
The important point was that the advocates o f Protection and Reciprocity were again 
attacking the principles o f Free Trade which hitherto had been an orthodoxy o f both 
Liberals and Conservatives. As ever in times o f economic depression and rising government 
expenditure, there were those who felt that both the discipline and yield o f Free Trade 
finance had reached their limits. But this is to anticipate the future rather than to exaggerate 
the influence and impact o f  Free Trade’s nascent critics.
The Statist scolded Gladstone for adopting Northcote’s method o f comparing actual 
expenditure to the supplemental estimates. This seemingly small point emphasizes the 
seriousness which Gladstone’s previous Budgets had encouraged the financial press to take 
the presentation o f spending estimates and the severity o f comment should actual practice
41 Ibid., p. 611.
42 Ibid., p. 615.
43 Ibid. p. 617.
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deviate from promise. Overall, it was not so bad. £What he is entitled to credit for is that, 
having to face increased expenditure, he has not hesitated to increase taxation accordingly, 
so that the expenditure o f the year is more than balanced by the receipts.’44 This then an 
expression o f respect for Gladstone’s prudence and fiscal ability while deploring the very 
high level o f government expenditure. The key is the satisfaction expressed that given such a 
level o f expenditure it was met out o f the current revenue o f the state through taxation, and 
not by any tricks o f accounting or through debt finance. A similar attitude can be seen in 
both The Times and The Economist. The former concerned with the efficiency o f  government 
control over expenditure whereas for the latter the concern is to acknowledge the resilience 
of the economy if efforts are made to reduce expenditure. The fiscal philosophy is 
consistent across all four and with Gladstone’s budget itself. This is the theory o f “Sound 
Finance”. It is important that the only dissension to it, from the Tariff Reform movement, 
deviates from the orthodoxy o f Free Trade and not from the fiscal superstructure o f  
government finance. Were it to be implemented, however, it would radically transform that 
superstructure.
The Financial Statement for 1882
The Financial Statement presented to Parliament on 24 April 1882, Gladstone’s 
thirteenth Budget, was a milestone because it was the last for which he would be responsible 
as Chancellor o f the Exchequer. N o other Chancellor before or since has equalled this 
number o f Budgets, yet it was for this reason only that it would be remembered as there was 
nothing in the particulars o f the Budget to make it memorable. Neither the state o f  the 
nation’s trade nor the pressures o f expenditure would allow for remissions in the burden o f  
taxation or severe retrenchment in outlay.45 If it did not present Gladstone with the chance
44 The Statist, 9 April 1881, p. 386.
45 Hamilton thought Gladstone had limited prospects to work with for this Budget and that the ‘cry o f  
economy is a thing o f  the past.’ H D , i, pp. 245 and 254.
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to go out with a flourish, and at this time he was looking to relinquish his Budgetary 
burdens,46 it at least offered him the opportunity o f adhering to his lifelong principles o f  
financial probity. It is also significant that he insisted that the tax increase to secure the 
surplus come from ‘property and not from labour’.47 This was to be a conventional and 
conservative budget and in this it can be seen as a triumph o f sober fiscal principles over the 
ambition to do something memorable yet possibly unsound. Or was it simply a case o f the 
man himself being over stretched?48 His responsibilities were immense and at his age 
perhaps too much for him to turn back the clock and repeat his earlier fiscal triumphs. This 
budget can be read as a eulogy to the rigid Peelite principles o f financial orthodoxy which 
Gladstone had taken to heart and made both his and the nation’s own. It was in keeping 
with its predecessors o f 1880 and 1881, but greyer. Sound but lacking innovation, prudent 
and tired.
Gladstone began, in accordance with precedent, by stating the realized revenue o f  
the 1881 financial year. He was able to report a surplus o f  £722,000 over the estimate 
despite a shortfall o f £220,000 in the produce o f the Beer Duty, 1  was certainly wrong in 
estimating the Revenue which I anticipated would be derived from the change.’49 Gladstone 
was pleased to discuss the sources o f revenue and changes in productivity. He broke down 
those due to taxes, both direct and indirect and those through other sources. It was pointed 
out that alcoholic drinks accounted for £28,444,000 o f the 1881 revenue which was a 
decline in its share o f the overall amount.
From 1874-5 to 1879-80 we levied 51 percent o f our whole taxation, except 
Income Tax, from alcoholic drinks, and 49 percent from all other sources.... 
but during the last three years re-action has begun, and the alcoholic revenue 
has gone down to 46 V2 percent, and the non-alcoholic revenue has risen to
46 Ibid., p. 257. By 1 June 1882 Hamilton had correctly inferred that his replacement would be ‘the inevitable 
Childers.’ Goschen was disqualified in Gladstone’s reckoning as a ‘City man’, p. 280.
47 Letter to Welby 6 April 1882, BL GP, Add. MS 44545, f. 119.
48 This was Hamilton’s opinion. Ibid., p. 285. Gladstone had intimated as much imploring Childers reduce the 
Army Estimates as probably his last ‘and I hope to be able to look at them with some kindly feeling.’ GD, x, p. 
185. Childers was not optimistic, BL GP, Add. MS 44129, f. 320.
49 24 April 1882, ‘Financial Statement, 1882-83,’ pp. 1-5; P.P. 1882, (155) xxrvii. 211 for Budget figures.
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53V2 percent, showing a real and serious diminution in the consumption 
o f alcohol.50
This admission provoked a subsequent debate as to whether this shortfall in alcohol 
consumption was due to the improved morals o f the populace or to the decline in the 
nation’s wealth. In any event it was an example o f the uncertainty, or elasticity, in revenue 
that those framing the Budget estimates had to deal with, and which would become the 
great taxation debate in 1885.
In presenting his estimates to Parliament Gladstone o f course had to bemoan the 
continued high level o f expenditure. ‘Some part o f that represents permanent increase, some 
part o f it represents normal increase; but undoubtedly there are portions o f it which I am 
not able to place under one description or the other.’51 Expenditure represented a slight 
decline on the previous year but was too high for Gladstone to take comfort in. He was able 
to provide a small sum to aid in the maintenance o f roads by increasing the carriage duty, 
estimated to yield an additional £247,000 if not any new friends amongst the carriage set.52 
There was little else in the way o f changes to taxation, just enough to ensure a surplus but it 
was obvious he didn’t feel that this Budget was a great success, hence his valediction.
If I am asked whether the Expenditure is deemed satisfactory, I am afraid 
my notions are too old-fashioned to allow me to view it with as much 
complacency as that with which it is viewed by others. ... but I do not see in 
the country that great desire for the restriction o f expenditure which 
characterized this country and all Parties 40 or 50 years ago. It is an evil, I 
think, that public vigilance on this subject should be diminished, and that the 
attitude o f the House o f Commons should have been so sensibly changed. I 
confess I have great doubts —  I have not arrived at any conclusion on the 
subject —  as to whether the system under which our Estimates are now 
framed up on the exclusive responsibility o f the Government, and without 
any responsibility on the part o f the House, is a good system. It is a very 
important subject for consideration. For my own part, although I have not 
arrived at any absolute conclusion, I am very dissatisfied with the working o f  
the system, especially during the last 20 or 30 years. Sir, there are three
50 3 H  268. 1288.
51 Ibid., p. 1295.
52 This tax was later dropped.
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principles, greater than all others, on which, in my opinion, all good finance 
should be based. The first o f them is that there should always be a certainty 
that whatever the charge may be it can be paid. That, I believe, is o f  vital 
importance. The second is that, in times o f peace and prosperity, the people 
o f the country should reduce their Debt; and the third point is that they 
should reduce their Expenditure. With regard to the first point, we are at 
present fulfilling that condition; with regard to the second, we ought to do 
more in the direction indicated than we have actually done; but at the same 
time we are doing a good deal more than was usually done in a long series o f  
years... With regards to the diminution o f Expenditure, I sorrowfully admit 
that the contagion and sympathy o f foreign countries necessarily affects us.53
Despite his own responsibility for thirteen years o f that expenditure he would leave the post 
disappointed. This is a remarkable statement, it is the ideal state o f  finance which he could 
not achieve and understands is unlikely to be realized again. There was some consolation in 
that, like all ideal states beyond man’s reach, there was virtue in the vain attempt to grasp it.
That tone was echoed in The TLconomist and Statist while The Times was not in the least 
impressed. The Economist remained convinced that Gladstone was uniquely capable in 
matters o f finance despite the Budget providing nothing which would reinforce that 
conviction. Gladstone’s reputation rendered him immune from criticism in that journal. ‘An 
impression exists that he had deliberated over the possibility o f a Budget on a far larger 
scale, but that he considered it advisable to postpone it.’54 The Times took an opposite tack 
and did not let past reputation temper present criticism. There was nothing in this critical o f  
Gladstone’s overall financial policy, but a willingness to take that policy on its own terms 
and question the ability o f Gladstone to live up to his own principles, in effect challenging 
his own willingness to concern himself with ‘candle ends’ and the minute scrutiny o f detail 
which in theory allowed for significant economies o f expenditure.
Mr. Gladstone, dealing with narrow and fractional margins and contriving 
unimportant readjustments, is no more able than the most commonplace o f  
financiers to produce splendid and far reaching effects.... Mr. Gladstone was
53 3 H  268.1297.
54 The Economist, 29 April 1882, p. 498.
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unable to produce a statement which will be worthy o f remembrance by the 
side o f his renowned historical Budgets.55
The Spectator continued to use the Budget to attack the Conservatives, W e are rapidly 
paying off the fine imposed upon us by an insane policy, and steadily, though only gradually, 
reducing the Debt which the last Government had increased.’56 The critique o f The Statist 
was tinged by unstated disappointment. Disappointment at the larger points culminating in a 
petty criticism o f form and the method o f setting out expenditure as it had done the 
previous year. This seemingly small point is telling in that it makes clear the expectations 
associated with government finance. N ot only must the large question o f the Budget and its 
components be got right, but it was essential for it to be presented fairly and unequivocally. 
There ought to be no room for gamesmanship or party advantage as the nation’s finances 
should be above that sort o f thing. Tolitical anxieties, more particularly regarding the 
condition o f Ireland, has prevented Mr.Gladstone, we may assume, from giving very much 
attention to the Budget which he introduced on Monday evening.’57 It was clear that 
Gladstone had lost the battle against expenditure and his reputation as an economist was 
suffering. O f course, the problem was that spending Estimates were not written in stone 
and thus were subject to revision when unexpected spending loomed. And a military crisis 
in Egypt was looming.
The crisis in Egypt and the subsequent British military expedition were a double 
blow to Gladstone as both his foreign policy and budget were unbalanced. Reflecting later 
he acknowledged the setback. ‘During the first two years o f that Government we had 
accomplished important purposes in Afghanistan, in South Africa, in the application o f the 
Treaty o f Berlin, and in the rectification o f finance. The Egyptian entanglement had begun
55 The Times, 25  April 1882, p. 9.
56 The Spectator 29 April 1882, p. 553.
57 The Statist, 29 April 1882, p. 474.
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but we did not yet know how serious it would prove.’58 If he had to retreat from his moral 
principles regarding military intervention abroad, he could at least take some solace from the 
fact that he could still uphold his financial principles by ensuring that the military adventure 
was paid for out o f current revenue. He spoke before Parliament on 24 July 1882 to secure a 
£2,300,000 Vote o f Credit for the cost o f the Egyptian expedition and to defend the actions 
o f his government in waging a colonial war.59
It is our intention to provide for it in the manner which has been adopted on 
several occasions when the House has found cause to add to the burdens o f  
the country at a time considerably after the commencement o f the financial 
year, that is to say, by making an addition to the Income Tax, which will be 
charged upon the latter half o f the year at double the rate at which it would 
apply for the whole year.60
There is no doubt that for Gladstone the most painful decision was to embark on a 
Beaconsfieldian military adventure in Egypt and not the decision to raise the taxes necessary 
to pay for it.61 This was entirely in keeping with the principles o f finance which he had
58 Brooke and Sorensen, i, p. 114.
59 This turned out to be insufficient and a further supplemental Egyptian Expedition Vote o f  Credit for 
£1,595,500 was required although further taxation was not. Buxton, ii, p. 358.
60 24 July 1882,3 H  272.1575.
61 In fact it was magnanimously decided that Britain would not charge these expenses to Egypt. ‘According to 
all the rules o f equity and o f  international precedent, Great Britain might properly claim that this expenditure 
should form a charge on the revenues o f  Egypt. Bearing in mind, however, the heavy burdens already imposed 
upon those revenues, Her Majesty’s Government are unwilling, especially at this moment, to make so serious 
an addition to them.’ Draft o f  Despatch from Earl Granville to Sir F. Mallet, 18 Oct. 1882. PRO CAB 37/9  
p .l. There has been some debate concerning British motivations for invading Egypt. R.C. Mowatt, “From  
Liberalism to Imperialism: the case o f  Egypt 1875—1887.’ The HistoricalJournal’ XVI, I (1973) pp. 109—124, 
argues that Cromer, and the British official position, moved from Cobdenite to Liberal Imperialist during this 
period, but that it was at all times a reluctant undertaking. This is completely contradicted by Alexander 
Scholch, “Men on the Spot’ and the English Occupation o f  Egypt in 1882.’ The Historical Journal, 19, 3 (1976), 
pp. 773—785, argues that the British officials in Egypt engineered the “regime change” on a contrived pretext 
o f  “anarchy” and danger to the Suez Canal. ‘(TJhey misrepresented the new order o f  1882 first as a military 
dictatorship, then as a xenophobic anarchy in order to force a military intervention.’ Alexander Scholch, Egypt 
for Egyptianshthe sociopolitical crisis in Egypt 1878 — 1882 (London, 1981), p. 312. This is certainly at variance with 
the position o f Gladstone, Rivers Wilson and Childers as they sought to untangle Egyptian finances. A.G. 
Hopkins, ‘The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration o f  the Occupation o f  Egypt, 1882 ’Journal of African 
History, 27, (1986), pp.363—391, argues that Harrington and Dilke, as proto-Liberal Imperialists, wanted to 
demonstrate that power and patriotism were not strictly Conservative virtues, and that Gladstone, ‘a leader 
who was led’, acquiesced in ‘the conscious and sustained defence o f  Britain’s expanding economic interests in 
Egypt.’ Again, this appears at variance with the financial records. Hopkins more plausibly concludes that ‘after 
Egypt there was no turning back: both parties, in their different ways, had become imperialists,’ pp. 382, 385 
and 387. Robert T. Harrison, Gladstone’s Imperialism In Egypt. Techniques of Domination. (Westport, CT., 1995),
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always enunciated and was why he had castigated the finance and foreign policy o f his 
predecessor and late rival as Prime Minister.
The difficulty which Gladstone felt in committing to an Imperial military adventure 
in Egypt was not shared by the responsible financial journals which didn’t question the 
cause but had some misgivings over the means o f the expenditure. The Times had no 
objection to the means or the end but that was not the case with The Economist. It supported 
the Egyptian war but felt that ‘...while the correctness o f the principle upon which Mr. 
Gladstone is acting cannot be questioned, we are by no means sure that the same can be 
said o f his application o f it.’ It did not approve o f voting expenditure so far in advance 
before the actual cost o f the war could be known but especially disproved o f  throwing the 
whole burden o f that expenditure ‘...upon those few liable to the income tax.’ The burden o f  
expenditure ought to be distributed throughout the nation and, in a democratic age, it felt 
the working classes were entided to share that burden. The principles o f democracy 
demanded the extension o f the tax burden to all. The beer tax was the logical source for this 
contribution and an increase o f VW./ quart, it estimated, could raise an additional £8,000,000 
in revenue. This Gladstone himself had hinted when, on repealing the malt tax, he pointed 
out the utility o f the beer tax as a source o f emergency funds in time o f war.
If it be said that Mr. Gladstone has no leisure at present to elaborate any 
new financial measures, that may be taken as a good cause why the head o f  
the Government, whose duties are so arduous as almost to overwhelm any 
man, should not burden himself with the Chancellor o f the Exchequer, but 
hardly as justifying bad finance.62
argues that from the outset Britain’s policy was ‘premeditated, blatantly aggressive, and hypocritical 
intervention’, p. 7. If  correct about the last he nonetheless offers scant evidence for the first assertion and the 
whole thesis seems to fly in the face o f  the financial realities. Sir C. Rivers Wilson, Chapters From My Official Life, 
edited by Everilda MacAlister, (London, 1916), pp. 81—90, presents a very different perspective on his 
Egyptian experience o f  that time.
62 The Economist, 29 July 1882 p. 935.
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This was a considerable about face for a journal which had implied over the past two years 
that Gladstone alone was capable o f managing the financial affairs o f the nation. The Statist 
was not so worked up on this subject, taking the line that the crisis showed up a deficiency 
in the structure o f the state’s finances.
An empire having interests to defend in every comer o f the globe, and liable 
at all times to become involved in ‘litde wars’, ought to so manage its 
finances as to have a reasonable margin of, say, five per cent, at all times, so 
that minor contingencies may be provided for without a harsh and 
oppressive levy upon a restricted class.63
The further advantage o f such an arrangement, it argued, was that if not expended this sum 
could be applied to the reduction o f debt at the end o f the financial year. Gladstone would 
no doubt have disapproved o f such an arrangement on the grounds that it would inevitably 
tempt Governments into military affrays as the money available would be considered a 
standing fund for war. The consensus seemed to favour the war and the virtuous payment 
o f its cost out o f  current revenue but in the case o f  the two financial journals to deplore that 
the burden o f this fiscal virtue fell solely upon the Income Tax paying citizens. The belief 
that there should be a balance between direct and indirect taxation was a principle o f  
“Sound Finance” but it did not override Gladstone’s concern that once a given expenditure 
had been determined on paying for it took precedence over the claims o f the Income Tax 
payer.
There is some irony in the fact that Gladstone relinquished the office o f Chancellor 
o f the Exchequer before his ministry would be brought down on a question o f finance in 
1885.64 The 1885 crisis signified a sea change in British government finance. Before then the 
Chancellor o f  the Exchequer could hope to reduce expenditure given promising economic 
conditions and the avoidance o f military expenditure due to wars large or small. After that
63 The Statist, 29 July 1882, p. 118.
64 Parry, p. 292.
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the trend was for expenditure to steadily rise and revenue sources would have to increase 
with it. For Gladstone “Sound Finance” represented much more than an efficient economic 
system, it represented a virtuous path to the moral high ground. ‘[There are] six great 
subjects which have mainly supplied the material o f my political action. The first two were 
the Church and the colonies. Freedom o f trade the third.... finance, the fourth. Then came 
the emancipation o f subject races the fifth. And finally Ireland the sixth. And so pass my 
sixty years and more.’65 If adherence to “Sound Finance” had cost him the Premiership it 
was a price he nonetheless was willing to pay.
In all three o f  his Budgets between 1880 and 1882 he scrupulously adhered to his 
own high standards in finance. His record as Chancellor o f the Exchequer was not tainted 
with deficits and he was able to reduce the National Debt by £19,689,000, more in three 
years than Northcote in seven.66 If he was unable to make any headway in reducing 
expenditure he at least was able to ensure that the revenue was raised to pay for it. On every 
occasion that required a rise in taxation to pay for increased expenditure he raised the 
income tax. The indirect taxes were not utilized and the greater part o f the British 
population did not bear the increase. It was a pattern that would be followed by Asquith and 
Lloyd George more than twenty years later. In this they explicidy confirmed what Gladstone 
had stated was the first principle o f “Sound Finance”: to ensure that “Whatever the charge 
may be it can be paid.”
65 Brooke and Sorenson, i, p. 74. He continued, ‘I am a Free Trader on moral no less than on economic 
grounds: for I think human greed and selfishness are interwoven with every thread o f  the Protective system.’ p. 
75.
66 Buxton, ii, p. 363.
CHAPTER 3 
PEACE: WAR, DEBT & TAXES, 
1883-1885
Hugh Culling Eardley Childers (1827—1896) succeeded Gladstone as Chancellor o f 
the Exchequer in December o f 1882, with just sufficient time to prepare the Budget for 1883. 
Edward Hamilton, Gladstone’s secretary, had his doubts about Childers and had hoped for 
Hartdngton to get the post but Gladstone was convinced o f Childers’ suitability.1 Childers was 
known to the Treasury from his experience at the Admiralty and at the War Office from 1880 
through 1883. Sir Reginald Welby was his former secretary.2 His tenure from 1883 through 
1885 would prove to be one o f the most eventful o f not only that Liberal Government but o f  
the two decades preceding the Boer war. It fell to Childers to secure and defend the liberal 
principles o f “Sound Finance” in the face o f unprecedented strain: the Egyptian adventure, a 
naval panic and arms race followed by a Russian threat to India, all while the Liberals managed 
the great reform and expansion o f the electorate. This period also highlights the role that 
Gladstone would continue to play in finance even though he had removed himself from direct 
responsibility for it. He would prove difficult to follow as Chancellor o f the Exchequer.
The 1883-84 Budget
The Budget for the financial year 1883—84 was unsettled by the complications associated 
with the Egyptian expedition which had still to be sorted out financially. The expectation was 
that Egypt would finance the costs o f maintaining the army in Egypt. For Egypt, finances were 
a disaster even without these charges. Childers had a hand in this administration and he could
1 Dudley W.R. Bahlman, ed., The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 1880—1885, vol. I, 1880—1882 (Oxford, 1972) 
p.368.
2 Spencer Childers, The Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. Hugh C.E. Childers 1827—1896 (2 vols., London,
1901) p. 147. He was also Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1866—7 and Very well regarded for his work 
efforts.’ Maurice Wright, Treasury Control of the Civil Service, 1854—1874 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969) p. 37.
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hope that the provisions o f 1882—83 had been sufficient to account for Britain’s liabilities. 
After all they had been determined by Childers in consultation with the Treasury.3 By 
December Childers himself was at the Treasury, so his knowledge of the situation could hardly 
have been more perfect. Welby wrote to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Leonard H. 
Courtney, suggestingc. . .we may fairly expect the Egyptian Gov’t to pay 4£  per head on 8,000 
[troops] for 6 months and if the force is reduced in the mean time the margin may go to meet 
our expense which the bringing the men home may entail.’4 It was decided that £279,668 
would be sufficient to cover the period from October to March 1883.5 Undoubtedly this 
removed a painful source o f expenditure from Childers’ concerns but it was cloaked in the 
language o f just obligations and responsibilities for Egypt.6 The British troops were there to 
maintain law and order in a society they had only just rescued from anarchy. It was only just 
that Egypt be obliged to pay for this service, like India. Yet given this imperial logic it was only 
just that Britain began to realize its obligations towards Egypt
India was also obliged to finance the Egyptian Expedition, for it was ostensibly 
concern for trade routes to India which entangled Britain in the Suez Canal and Egyptian 
affairs in the first place. The precise Indian contribution was arrived at after exacting 
negotiations with Hartington and the India Office who were keen to ensure the Indian 
taxpayers were not taken advantage of. A compromise was reached when the home 
government agreed to contribute £500,000 to the Indian expenses associated with the 
Egyptian Expedition.7
3 GD, x, p. 368,21 Nov. 1882 Gladstone to Childers.
4 PRO T l/15525 no. 2685 o f  7 Feb. 1883.
5 PRO T l/15525 no. 4070 o f  26 Feb. 1883.
6 ‘Her Majesty’s Government have undertaken to defray all expenditure incurred in the suppression o f  the 
rebellion, the date o f  the conclusion o f  which they have fixed with liberal intention at the 30th September. From 
that date accordingly they ask the Egyptian Government to repay all extraordinary expenses with the retention for 
police purposes o f  the Queen’s troops in Egypt will entail on the Exchequer o f  the United Kingdom.
.. .understand that the capitation rate represents an irreducible charge, and is presented for acceptance as such, 
and not as a basis for negotiation.’ PRO T l/15525  no. 1920,31 Dec. 1882.
7 GD, x, Letter to Hartington 15 Jan. 1883, p. 395; PRO T l/15525 no. 3776 o f  21 Feb. 1883, the India Office 
conveys its gratitude and satisfaction to the Treasury.
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1883—84Budget
Childers presented his maiden Budget speech in the House on 5 April 1883 taking up 
almost two hours o f the evening.8 He was able to report favourably on the 1882—83 financial 
year as revenue had exceeded the Estimate by £1,807,456. This was particularly due to the 
Stamps, which exceeded the estimate by £696,000, as well as the Income Tax and Customs. 
Consistent with the basis o f government finance o f the time, it was the Customs and Excise 
taxes which brought in the great bulk o f the revenue: £46,587,000 or sixty-four per cent of  
that from taxation (52% o f total revenue). Non-tax revenue provided a significant 18% o f total 
revenue and was £581,456 over estimate.
Expenditure was £88,906,278 and £676,590 less than provided for by the 
supplemental estimates for the Egyptian Expedition. In fact, aside from the Army which was 
£44,251 over estimate, every other spending department came in below estimate. As always 
Debt charges represented the largest item of expenditure, £31,221,096 being 35% of the total. 
The voted spending departments: Army, Navy and Civil Services accounted for £43,247,256 
and very nearly half o f expenditure. The greatest variable in the year’s expenditure was costs 
due to the Egyptian Expedition amounting to £1,609,500. Other military expenditure, the 
contribution to forces in India, grant to India in aid o f the Afghan War and the Mediterranean 
Vote o f Credit added another £3,900,000. Exceptional military expenditure therefore 
accounted for £5,509,500 in aggregate (6% of expenditure). All in all Childers was able to 
report a small surplus o f £98,178, not much but quite respectable given the exceptional nature 
of military expenditure during the year. In fact, given the tenets o f “Sound Finance”, this was 
exactly the outcome that should have been arrived at.
Childers estimated the Revenue for 1883—84 at £88,480,000 based on existing 
taxation; a decrease o f £524,456 on the 1882—3 Revenue which was attributed to ordinary
8 Dudley W.R. Bahlman, ed., The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 1880—1885, vol. ii, 1883—1885 (Oxford, 1972) 
p. 417. Hereafter, H D, ii.
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fluctuations. This he justified ‘as to the general principle that has been adopted in forecasting 
our income, that, considering the present state of trade and agriculture, the Estimates we have 
made it is a safe, though it is not a sanguine one.’9 O f this £73r385,000 was expected from 
taxes of which £46,650,000 indirect tax was from Customs and Excise and £26,735,000 from 
direct taxes.! Non-tax Revenue was estimated to be £15,095,000, a falling off of £781,456 
from the previous year. All of these figures had been preceded by an explanation and setting 
out of the growth of expenditure and why government in general and the Liberals in particular 
had been unable to contain it.
The Estimated Expenditure for 1883-84 came to £85,789,000, little changed from that 
of 1882—83 except that the extraordinary charges of the Egyptian Expedition were not 
recurring, allowing a year to year decline of £3,117,278. This would allow for an estimated 
Budget surplus of £2,691,000 if no changes were made to taxation. Debt charges were the 
single largest item of expenditure and Childers’ plan for terminable annuities would increase 
them by £97,904. Army and Navy votes of £15,607,000 and £10,757,000 respectively were a 
slight increase over the unadjusted charge of 1882—83 (not including the supplementary 
estimate). The Civil Services charge of £17,253,000 represented a savings of £83,001 while the 
remunerative departments of Customs, Post Office, Telegraph and Packet services would 
incur an additional £194,574 mainly due to the anticipated costs of the new parcel post service. 
So the ordinary expenditure of the year was expected to fall back to the level of 1881—2.10
This anticipated surplus allowed Childers to reduce the rate of Income Tax from 6Y2d . 
to 5d . in the pound at an estimated cost of £2,135,000. The introduction of a lower 6d. 
minimum charge for telegraphs, a reduction in the Railway duty and some trivial changes to 
the silver plate and tobacco duties would result in a further £316,000 reduction of taxes, now
9 3 H  277,1528.
t This breakdown is not precise, but for rough calculations Customs and Excise can be deemed indirect taxes and 
the direct taxation to be comprised of: Stamps, Land Tax, House Duty, Property and Income Tax. For a more 
detailed review of these classifications see Buxton, ii, Appendix L., pp. 380—83.
10 Figures are from “Financial Statement 1883—84’, pp. 1—5, P.P. 1883, (122) xxxviii. 295.
£2,451,000 and a revised expected surplus o f £240,000. So apart from the move to put the
Income tax back to its “normal” level, there were no great changes to taxation. The key
innovation o f Childers’ Budget speech was his ambitious twenty year plan to automate and
increase the reduction o f outstanding Government debt through a complex system of
terminable annuities.11 In fact the concurrent rise o f Government Debt and expenditure was a
theme for Childers as they allowed him to portray both as being the fault o f the late
Conservative Government. The Liberals were merely Paying for the Wars o f  their
predecessors’.12 The contrast between the two regimes was striking in terms o f their efforts at
debt reduction, for while the Liberals had reduced debt by £17,666,964 in three years13 the
Conservatives had only been able to reduce £2,429,00014 in their six. The plan o f terminable
annuities would remove some o f the discretion from government and thus, over time, allow
for much greater automatic reduction o f the Debt, while immediately increasing the new
sinking fund by about £250,000 per year. It was believed that the system was superior to
sinking fund arrangements, for a sinking fund could be intercepted whereas the annuities were
much more resistant to diversion.15
It is on that ground that the Government urges a renewal o f a system o f terminable 
annuities before the present system expires, confident that it is the surest method of  
reducing not only the principal but the rate o f interest on the Debt, and that they 
thereby make a double attack upon the dead weight charge which burthens the 
industry o f the nation.16
It was estimated that this plan o f terminable annuities could reduce the debt by £170,000,000
over twenty years, presumably even with a Conservative Government.
Cabinet agreed on Tuesday April 3rd before the Budget to support MP Peter Ryland’s
resolution That in the opinion o f this House, the present amount o f the National Expenditure
11 Buxton, ii, pp. 304—7, provides a dear explanation.
12 3 H  277.1514.
13 PRO T l/14717, ‘Reduction o f  National Debt’.
14 Buxton, ii, p. 363.
15 The plan was designed to cancel stock worth £173,019,000 over twenty years. ‘Treasury Minute, July 1883, on 
Arrangements under National Debt Bill’, P.P. 1883, (270) xxxciii. 359.
16 PRO, T l/15567, ‘National Debt’, p. 8; ‘Statement o f  Proposals o f  Chancellor o f  Exchequer for Reduction o f  
National Debt’, P.P. 1883, (179) xxxviii. 373.
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demands the earnest and immediate attention o f Her Majesty’s Government, with the view o f  
effecting such reductions as may be consistent with the efficiency o f the public service.’17 The 
intent was to divert pressure from the Budget expenditure and allow the Radicals to let o ff 
steam, while again exposing the Conservative record in finance unfavourably.18 The debate 
certainly fulfilled these intentions and after exposure and explanation o f the level o f overall 
expenditure Childers was able to conclude that ‘Economy,... is something like Free Trade.
We used to hear a great deal about everybody being in favour o f Free Trade, but always o f  
Free Trade with an exception.’19 So the result was exacdy what the Government intended, and 
nothing o f substance came out o f it towards reducing expenditure,20 but certainly they were 
motivated if not constrained to keep to the current level o f expenditure in 1884—85. For 
Gladstone this was a binding commitment21
Reaction to the Budget outside Parliament was in keeping with its routine nature, most 
of the measures had been expected so attention was focused on the plan for debt reduction. 
The tone o f Childers’ speech was what most exercised The Times, ‘He fell short o f  the large, 
impartial, scientific treatment suited to a subject like the state of the national finances which 
has been, even in the most excited times, an oasis o f peace in the midst o f party controversy.’22 
The specialist financial journals were more interested in the measures than the man. The 
Budget will give that satisfaction which is always experienced when a specially unpopular tax 
—  as the income tax is the moment it rises beyond a very moderate level —  has been reduced.’ 
The plan o f debt reduction was welcome but without retrenchment o f expenditure the end 
was uncertain 23 The Statist took an even broader approach, looking not just at one year’s
17 3 H  277.1644.
18 HD, ii, p. 417.
19 3 H  277.1705.
20 HD, ii, p. 419.
21 It ought ‘to give encouragement to you & to Courtney in carrying on the standing & incessant work o f  
resistance to augmentations & in looking for occasions o f  making these small savings o f  which so much in the 
aggregate depends.’ Gladstone to Childers, 5 Sept 1883, GD, xi, p. 28.
22 The Times 6 April 1883 p. 9.
23 The Economist 7 April 1883 v. XLI no. 2067, p. 394.
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finances but the larger purpose o f the Government’s financial policy. Its recommendations
were radical and prescient
The truth is, that the question o f the national expenditure cannot be properly debated 
now from the point o f view o f the advocates o f retrenchment and economy. The 
country is rich enough to pay for any object o f national desire which can be proved to 
be indispensable, or even highly expedient, for the welfare o f the masses. The one 
thing to see is that the expenditure is efficient, and the attempt merely to keep down 
the total expenditure without reference to the object to be obtained is altogether 
misdirected.24
Again it was the Spertatorwhich was the Government’s most partisan supporter, congratulating 
Childers heartily on having proved ... that he knows exactly the critical parts o f our finance, 
that he is prepared to accept all the best precedents o f his predecessor’25 The most important 
was felt to be the reduction o f the income tax back to the more moderate level o f 5d. in the 
pound. Yet this return to normality would be short-lived, retrenchment was now obsolete.
The 1884-85 Budget
The Government began its preparations for the 1884—85 Budget under pressure o f  
expenditure threatening to overturn the commitment to reduction agreed to in Rylands’ 
motion o f April 6,1883. Questions relating to the cost o f the Egyptian expedition were to 
become much more important later, as now the financial concerns overshadowed the military 
fears and left retrenchment unlikely. Hamilton noted in his diary o f 4 June that ‘Mr. G. 
launched out this morning on the alarm which he felt at the prospect o f Liberal finance in the 
future. He was evidendy startled at the financial heresies which were broached by his 
colleagues, including Childers, who is disappointing him and in whom he is losing faith.’26 
Gladstone, through thirteen Budgets and nearly forty years experience o f public finance since 
Peel, presented an awesome reputation for any Chancellor o f the Exchequer to follow. His 
name was a synonym for finance. As early as 5 July 1883 Gladstone was writing to Childers
24 The Statist 7 April 1883 v. XI no. 267, p. 378.
25 The Spectatorl April 1883 no. 2,858, p. 443.
26 The Cabinet had countenanced borrowing for the Post Office, and Gladstone noted that even in 1860 he had 
only done so as a last resort to build fortifications. HD, ii, p. 444.
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urging the need to press for economy in the upcoming estimates, especially the Navy, for 
1884—85, and this is indicative o f the close role he played in supervising the finance.27
Gladstone was particularly concerned about conforming to Ryland’s resolution o f 6 
April 1883, asking Childers on 15 September ‘what are we to do in redemption o f the pledge 
which we have substantially given to the House by accepting during the last session a general 
motion on behalf o f a reduction in the public expenditure.’28 Instead o f a reduction the 
estimates looked rather to be increasing and the urgency was such that by 7 November he was 
actually leading Childers down the path o f most effective opposition to expenditure. T. think 
you should mention ... the subject o f Expenditure, on Saturday [Cabinet meeting): please also 
to consider whether it would not strengthen your hands if we arrange that the Departmental 
results shall go before one or more Committees.’29 This was agreed to in the Cabinet o f 10 
November but the hard work o f restraining expenditure was still ahead o f them. He wrote to 
Childers on 14 January 1884 concerning the Army increase and again on the 19th as by then 
Hartington at the War Office was set on an increase o f £1,400,000, referring in his diary o f the 
22nd to ‘our grave position as to Estimates.’30 The Cabinet o f 24 January was particularly 
concerned with the estimates and he had requested o f Lord Northbrook, the first lord o f the 
Admiralty, to meet him before then to discuss the Navy’s place in ‘a situation o f extreme 
gravity which I had not at all anticipated when at our former meetings I undertook serious 
personal engagements.’31 Gladstone’s conversation must have been formidable because the 
next day he wrote to inform Childers that the Admiralty demand had ‘disappeared en blod and 
at the Saturday Cabinet on the 26th expenditure o f £86,900,000 had been pretty much arrived
27 GD, xi, p. 2.
28 Ibid., p. 28.
29 Ibid., p. 54.
30 Ibid., p. 99,102 and 103.
31 Ibid., p. 104.
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at32 N o increase in taxation would be necessary, but the naval trouble was merely stored up 
for the future as agitation for increases would continue through 1885.
It only remained for the Budget proposals to be finalized in Cabinet on 22 April for 
presentation on the 24th.33 Childers presented the Financial Statement with his usual 
confidence,34 and was pleased to report to Parliament that Revenue for the year 1883—84 had 
been £87,205,184, an increase o f £656,184 on the Estimate but a decline o f £1,799,272 on the 
previous year due to the loss o f the extra IV2 d. o f income tax. Expenditure was £819,794 less 
than the Estimate at £86,999,564; and less than in 1882—83 by £1,906,704. This mainly due to 
the non-recurring costs o f the Egyptian Expedition (so it was thought) but also to savings on 
Civil Services and the Navy.35 ‘The Committee will not fail to notice the successful struggle for 
economy which these figures exhibit.’36 This was said with some understatement.
He could be even more pleased with the Estimates for 1884—85 as they came in at 
over a million less than agreed to in the January 26 Cabinet. Revenue was expected to be 
£85,555,000, a fall o f £605,184 on the previous year mostly a result o f a cautious estimate 
based on the unusually large return from the income tax o f 1883—84. Estimated Expenditure 
was £85,291,825 a decrease o f £662,739 in 1883—84 and due more than anything else to 
holding expenditure constant, and to the falling off o f £750,000 in the Afghan War Grant in 
Aid to India which was now only £250,000. Taken together these left a most modest 
anticipated surplus o f £263,000, far too small for anything radical and so Childers allowed 
himself only a trivial remission o f carriage licenses which reduced the surplus to £241,000 for
32 Ibid., p. 105.
33 GD, xi, p. 137.
34 HD, ii, p. 601, ‘Mr.G. thought Childers acquitted himself extremely well. He is certainly very handy with 
figures.’
35 ‘Financial Statement 1884-85’ pp. 1-5, P.P. 1884, (139) xlvii. 223.
36 Childers in 3 H  287. 505,24 April 1884.
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the 1884—85 financial year.37 1 am bound to say that considering the possibility o f other claims
arising, this is not too large a surplus.’38
Childers’ proposal to reduce the interest on the National Debt was closely related to
the assault on the Debt Gladstone had initiated in 1880 and which culminated in the
terminable annuities scheme o f 1883. W e not only had in view the mere reduction o f the
Capital o f the Debt upon a self-acting system, but we contemplated also that it would render
more easy, at an eady date, the reduction o f interest on the three categories o f Three per
Cents.’39 That plan had already reduced the Debt by £8,048,000 in 1883—84 and by
£25,198,000 since April 1880.40 To be a success Childers’ scheme required the holders o f 3 per
cent Debt to convert into new issues o f 23A or 2'A per cent stock at £102 or £108 per £100 o f
3 per cent stock tendered. Although the Debt could be paid off through a compulsory process
o f redemption, Childers was ‘desirous to make our first step in this matter one o f agreement
rather than o f compulsion.’41 Had the conversion plan succeeded there would have been a
great savings on the interest charge on Debt o f from £1,170,000 to £1,800,000 per year, albeit
with an increase in the nominal capital outstanding, which Childers proposed to pass on to the
taxpayers. The plan was not a success.
“The City” did not receive the scheme kindly —  a Liberal Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer is not persona grata in the City —  foreign politics, and affairs in the Soudan, 
gave rise to anxiety, and the conversion failed. Only £4,650,000 o f 23A stock was taken 
up, and but £19,230,000 o f 2Vi stock was issued, o f which £12,000,000 was taken up 
by Government Departments. The whole net annual savings on the operation 
amounted to no more than £46,700 a year.42
37 ‘Financial Statement 1884—85’, pp. 2 and 4, P.P. 1884, (139) xlvii. 223.
38 3 H  287. 515.
39 3 H  287. 521.
40 Ibid., p. 506.
41 Ibid., p. 522.
42 Buxton, ii, p. 307; ‘Account, to Nov. 1884, for United Kingdom o f Amounts o f Three per cent Annuities 
converted into two and three-quarters and two and one-half per cent Annuities; Amount Added to Capital o f  
Public D ebt by Conversion; Amount o f  Terminable Annuity created as Sinking Fund for Redemption o f  
Additional Capital.’ P.P. 1884-85, [C. 4311] xlv. 315.
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It would be for Goschen to make a success o f the conversion in 1888, and besides the 
favourable conditions prevailing, he would offer a commission to brokers which Childers had 
pointedly refused to do.43
Reaction in and out o f Parliament, except to the proposals for re-coinage and conversion 
of debt, were as understated as the Budget itself. Northcote was polite in pointing out that he 
would need further time to consider the proposals for conversion and re-coinage, while most 
others with an opinion on the subject should perhaps have followed his example before 
confirming the opinion of the Statist that ‘there is no more dangerous subject for popular 
discussion than the currency.’44 Outside the House opinion tended towards faint praise. The 
Statist found the plan for conversion ‘a little doubtful whether at present prices the option to 
exchange would be taken advantage o f to any great extent ... successful or not, it is an 
experiment worth trying.’45 The Times was most sceptical, not just about the Budget proposals 
but also o f  the Government. ‘The danger to good finance lies in bad policy. Mr. Gladstone’s 
most ingenious financial plans were brought to nothing in 1854 because the Government o f 
Lord Aberdeen would not recognize its duties and assert its rights, and, through its passion for 
peace, “drifted into Var”.’46 A truism, no doubt, but for the Government it would prove too 
prophetic.
1885—86 Budget
The whole of the Government’s commitment to its financial philosophy would be 
subject to question during the preparations for the Budget o f 1885—86. Foreign policy 
disasters would lead on to financial ones as further crises in Egypt due to Gordon’s mission in 
the Sudan would serve as a catalyst for opportunistic Russian aggression on the Afghan
43 For Goschen’s conversion see C.K Harley, ‘Goschen’s Conversion o f the National Debt and the Yield on 
Consols.’ The Economic History Review. 29 (1976): 101—6, and Jan Torre Klovland, ‘Pitfalls in the Estimation o f  the 
Yield on Consols, 1850—1914'. The Journal of Economic History. 54, no. 1 (1994): 169—187; Childers, ii, n. 2, p. 162.
44 3 May 1884 no. 323 p. 401.
43 26 April 1884 no. 322 p. 463.
46 25 April 1884 no. 31,117 p. 9.
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frontier which the Gladstone government simply could not ignore. The unavoidable necessity 
of strengthening and making a public and explicit commitment to the military required an 
unprecedented financial resolve. This in turn would cause it to examine its own principles o f  
“Sound Finance”, especially with respect to war taxation, deficit finance and the balance 
between direct and indirect taxation. The root o f all these problems was Egypt, and soon 
everyone would know where Khartoum was on the map.
At the end o f May Gladstone was writing to Childers concerned that Gordon’s 
expedition would cause The finance o f the year to be overset.’47 He repeated his concerns in 
June and they resolved that £300,000 could be had without the need for new taxation, and this 
was the basis for the Vote o f Credit in August48 This was agreed to in Cabinet on 2 August 
1884 and formalized on the 5th.49 The disturbance to finance was still within bounds when 
Childers reported to Gladstone the poor state and prospects o f the year’s finance.
There are two disturbing elements in the year’s account o f a very serious character.
1. Egypt ought to pay us £600,000 on account o f her military contribution, and the 
interest on the Suez Canal loan. So far we have not exacted, and she could not pay, 
anything. ...
2. The vote o f credit for £300,000, which exceeded my original estimate o f surplus, 
will certainly have to be largely supplemented; and I think we shall be very fortunate if 
the Naval and Military expenditure o f the year is less than £1,200,000 beyond the first 
estimates. ... we must look forward to a probable deficit on the year’s account o f a 
million and a half,... But in addition to this we must be prepared for the heavy 
onslaught on the Treasury that is now being organized in connection with the Navy.
... I presume that you would wish, if  possible, to provide, during the year, all the 
revenue required to meet the expenditure.50
Gladstone suggested in reply a plan dealing with the year’s deficit by ‘Consol. Fund Bills to
throw it over into April and then providing fresh resources by an early Budget in February?
These are loose & little digested ideas.’51 He was prepared to accept a deficit on the year and
redeem it in the next with additional taxation. To do this the spending would have to be well
under control.
47 GD, xi, p. 152.
48 Ibid., p. 156 and BL GP, Add. MS 44131 f. 84.
49 Ibid., pp. 183-84.
501 Oct. 1884, Childers, ii, p. 166.
51 GD, xi, p. 218.
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In addition to the uncertain costs in the Sudan the Government would have to 
contend with a Naval “scare” worked up by W.T. Stead at the Vail Mall Gazette in September. 
Stead claimed that the Navy was losing its superiority in numbers and construction as 
compared to the French, in particular, and that excessive economies had diminished its 
efficiency.52 Stead was right on the last point, as to the first, it was pure nonsense53. In both the 
Navy and Army spending had been ruthlessly squeezed in order to reduce estimates,
. .approved proportions o f reserves o f both gun and ammunition had been deliberately 
postponed by the Admiralty, in order to reduce the Votes for 1882—83;’ and in consequence 
that which was spent was not necessarily spent well as ‘for want o f funds, the provision o f 
armaments for works long completed was hopelessly deferred.’54 A report prepared by 
Campbell-Bannerman, the Secretary to the Admiralty, showed a deficiency o f £500,000 —  
£1,000,000 in naval expenditure for which his government was responsible.55 Childers 
accepted, with minor reservations, the recommendations o f the report and duly communicated 
this to Gladstone on 7 November, effectively sanctioning the increase. It is an indication of the 
ferocity o f the battle with the Admiralty that the First Sea Lord, Lord Alcester, threatened to 
resign.56 This same tactic was used by Gladstone with some success in resisting the full naval 
demands in the Cabinet o f 2 December —  he had postponed the discussion a number o f  
times in order to resist them57 —  where he was in the minority pressing for restraint. His
52 Matthew, ii, p. 159. Stead was merely a front for H.O. Arnold Forster, Alfred Milner, and Captain John Fisher, 
the last so conspicuous during the 1893 ‘scare’. W. Mark Hamilton, The Nation and the Navy. Methods and 
Organisation of British Navalist Propaganda, 1889—1914. Ph.D. thesis, University o f  London, (1976) p. 47. ‘It was 
[W.H.] Smith who turned the Stead crusade into a party political issue, and, as later events showed, party was his 
main concern.’ Steven P.B. Smith, Tublic Opinion, the Navy and the City o f  London: The Drive for British 
Naval Expansion in the Late Nineteenth Century.’ War and Society, v. 9, no. 1, May 1991. pp. 29—51.
53 ‘British shipbuilding resources were so vastly superior to those o f  any would-be rival that any attempt to engage 
in a building race would have been futile to the point o f  foolishness.’ John F. Beeler, British Naval Policy in the 
Gladstone—Disraeli Era, 1866—1880 (Stanford, 1997), p. 253.
54 PRO W O 112/13 pp. 3—4 in Explanatory Statement, Army Estimates 1883-84; Vote 12.
55 HD, ii, p. 699. The total combined Army and Naval increase over five years o f  £10,725,000 was set out in PRO 
CAB 37/13 1884 no. 47, ‘Additional Naval and Military Expenditure’.
56 Childers, ii, pp. 168-9.
57 Matthew, ii, p. 160.
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allusion to retirement seems to have moderated the demands o f his colleagues, and the
expenditure agreed to was £5,525,000 instead o f £10,725,000.58
Childers’ failure to support Gladstone in this ‘disappointed Mr. G.’ and led to friction
between them over the next few weeks, no doubt increasing the strain on Childers.59 A flurry
o f correspondence followed from 14 December60 through the 18th, when Childers’ upset
seems to have been assuaged as he pointed out ‘that for years I had been at work to reduce the
enormous demands made and threatened by the ... Naval and Military authorities, and that I
had succeeded in boiling them down to the comparatively small amount now insisted upon.’61
The Prime Minister treated him quite gently when next giving instruction on the estimates
while at the same time seeking to stiffen his resolve.
I fail to see why the apprehension o f opposition from others should be a reason 
against your making arguments in the Cabinet which you believe to be sound, & to be 
material. A voice is a force, even if overruled or out-voted. Without doubt you hold 
the most invidious office in the Cabinet and one o f the most difficult. I have reason to 
know it from experience, for in 1859—65 the Estimates were ordinarily decided at the 
sword’s point; and the anti-economic host was led on by the Prime Minister.62
Such tact and diplomacy, suggesting the iron fist in a velvet glove, indicates just why Gladstone
was personally so important in holding this Ministry together. Yet they had not even reached
1885 and finance would get even more calamitous.
The Army and Navy estimates were coming home to roost in February and it was now
time for the junior service to shine, its estimate increased by £3,425,000 to £19,355,000.63 By
the 2nd o f February 1885 Gladstone found the amounts ‘appalling’ and suggested they might
require ‘indirect as well as direct taxation to be touched.’ Childers’ response could not have
been what he wished to hear, prescient though it was. ‘You ask me whether we shall not have
58 Resolution in House and Lords 2 Dec. 1884. GD, xi, p. 255; HD, ii, p. 746, goes on to record Gladstone’s 
assertion after the Cabinet, ‘Had he been 25 years younger, nothing would have induced him to assent to the 
increase’.
59 H D, ii, p. 747.
60 BL GP, Add. MS 44131, f. 233 These are small increases compared with what Ld. Palmerston’s Gov’t adopted 
in 1859—60; and, I cannot say that they are extravagant!’ Childers to Gladstone 14 Dec. N ot the last time 
Gladstone would have to revisit that precedent.
61 Childers, ii, p. 170.
62 GD, xi, p. 262,21 Dec. 1884.
63 Ibid, p. 285.
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to touch indirect as well as direct taxation in the Budget o f 85—6 .1 have no doubt that we 
must. My suspicion is that we ought to increase the Beer duty, and to deal with finally the 
Death duties, making good what will be short with the Income Tax.... But I should not be 
surprised o f an assault on the Sinking Fund.’64 A more than bold step in a Gladstone ministry. 
For this reason and to relax the strain on Childers he suggested his tactic o f postponing the 
estimates.65 And the pressure was getting to Childers, he wrote to Hamilton later that he was 
‘much better, having had 10 hours continuous deep sleep last night My heart is not quite right, 
but much easier. The mischief is purely muscular, I believe.’66 It is no wonder he was unwell, 
the Cabinet o f 9 February decided on increased estimates o f £1.5 and £1.25 million for the 
Navy and Army respectively, which would be presented to Parliament without delay and so 
necessitate the Vote o f Credit. This Gladstone sought to delay, as the ‘disadvantage to us of 
producing at once the Vote o f Credit is enormous,’ bringing with it questions o f Parliamentary 
supervision o f expenditure.67 The next day’s Cabinet resolved the matter. ‘Decided to lump 
the whole o f 85—86 charge in one Vote o f Credit.’68
The strain was not limited to the Chancellor o f the Exchequer, the Ministry itself was 
unwell. Incredibly, the first item on the Cabinet agenda was whether to continue in office. The 
same day as deciding to carry on —  28 February —  the Cabinet considered developments on 
the Afghan frontier.’69 The next week Childers was predicting a cumulative deficit on the two 
years o f £8,800,000.70 On 20 March the Budget date was set for 16 April and the Vote o f  
Credit for the 9th preceding it.71 The additional charge was estimated at £9,300,000 and it had
64 BL GP, Add. MS 44132, f.55—6. Sir Charles Dilke would write to Gladstone on 2 March opposed to any 
increase in the Beer duty, arguing that the taxation o f  the working classes was already proportionately higher than 
on the upper and middle classes and that it would be foolish to raise the price o f  beer immediately before an 
election when many agricultural workers would be voting for the first time. Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. 
Tuckwell, eds., The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Part., ALP. (2 vols, London, 1917), v. i, p. 113.
65 GD, xi, p. 288.
66 BL HP, Add. MS 48624b, f. 10, Feb. 1885.
67 Letter to Childers 16 Feb., GD, xi, p. 297
68 Cabinet minutes 17 Feb. 1885, Ibid., p. 298.
69 Matthew, ii, p. 149.
70 £500,000 o f which was from 1884. BL GP, Add. MS 44132, f.86 dated 6 March 1885.
71 GD, xi, p.309.
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become necessary to abandon the principle o f paying for expenditure with taxation in the same 
year.
Mr. G. talked a little this morning on the financial difficulty ahead. He admitted that to 
raise the whole additional charge by taxation would be impossible. There will have to 
be a partial suspension o f the Sinking Fund (say) to the amount o f £4,000,000; and the 
other £5,000,000 will have to be raised partly by income tax and rearrangement o f  
death duties, and partly by raising the duty on beer with some remissions in respect o f  
other necessaries o f life as a set off.72
This in effect was the Budget. The Vote o f Credit had determined it, change would only be for
the worse and there would be worse to come. The internal divisions would not be over
suspension o f the Sinking Fund and the abandonment o f strict “Sound Finance”, but the
decision to resort to indirect taxation to balance the great increase to the income tax.
Gladstone wrote on 5 April to Childers who was on his way home from a
convalescence in Paris to review the Cabinet business for him and to explain that the Budget
was likely to be postponed a week. The postponement was confirmed at the next Cabinet on
the 9th where the Budget was set for 23 April.73 The following Saturday’s Cabinet determined
that the Vote o f Credit would be in two parts for ‘a) Soudan b) military preparations. Will be
occasion o f unfolding policy.’74 However, the closer they got to the proposed Budget debate,
the further away they got from consensus on the Budget provisions and dissension grew
alarmingly in the Cabinet. The Cabinet on Monday 20 April was reserved for the Budget, and
while it was just about realized in final form, agreement to that form was not. The £11,000,000
for the Vote o f Credit was approved but the exact nature o f tax increases to pay for it and the
other record expenditure was not Additional taxation including increases to the Income Tax
of Id. and to the Beer and Spirit duties o f 1 and 2 shillings respectively would, it was hoped,
raise £4 million.
Dilke would not agree to the increase o f indirect taxation on Beer so that no 
agreement could be arrived at and the decision was put over to Tuesday. Hamilton believed
72 HD, ii, p. 818-9.
73 GD, xi, pp. 318—320. Childers agreed, writing from Paris 7 April 1885, Childers MS 5/166.
74 GD, xi, p.320.
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that Dilke spoke for Chamberlain as well (though he doubted their sincerity and suspected
they only sought a way of safely abandoning the Ministry), and felt the matter serious enough
to ‘have made an appeal to Dilke mainly on personal grounds: I mean for Mr. G.’s sake.’75
Gladstone wrote to Dilke that Tuesday as well, and met Chambedain on Thursday the 23rd.76
Gladstone confided to his diary ‘I have never known (I think) political anxieties or more
crowded, or more complicated. I feel as if I could never have strength for the day.’77 That
Cabinet could resolve only to postpone a decision, employing Gladstone’s tried and true tactic
o f delay. This meant the postponement o f the Budget for a week to the 30th, to which Childers
agreed. T have been Mr. Gladstone’s faithful servant for 20 years, and I would do anything in
my power to help him. ... But as to the Budget, if the principle is debated today, I see
comparatively no objection to the statements being deferred later the 30th.’78
Gladstone exercised his usual mastery to reel in his straying colleagues, ‘Mr. G. had an
interview last night with Chamberlain. It was not unsatisfactory. He worked upon Chamberlain
by making a great deal o f Childers’ proposal to increase the Death Duties on real property.
Today Dilke consents to swallow the Beer pill with a wry face, which means that he and
Chamberlain will remain.’79 The wry face may very well have been due to the letter he received
from Gladstone that very day to persuade him to turn his battle against class inequalities from
the Beer to the Death duty. It was, Gladstone argued, a moral question, and would, for a
Gladstone at least, remain vitally important through 1894.
The very great importance o f the proposal to establish equality in principle between 
realty and personalty as to the death duty. This must in all likelihood lead to a very 
serious struggle with the Tories for it strikes at the very heart o f class-preference, 
which is the central point o f what I call the lower & what is the now prevalent,
75 HD, ii, p. 842—3. This suspicion is confirmed in David Nichols, The Lost Prime Minister. A  Life of Sir Charles Dilke 
(London, 1995). He suggests Dilke did wish to abandon the government in anticipation o f a new Radical ministry 
following the election, p. 166.
76 GD, xi, p. 327,21 April 1885.
77 GD, xi, p. 326 for Cabinet minutes o f  20 and 21 April 1885 and diary entry 20 April. Dilke again told Gladstone 
on 21 April that he ‘could not agree to the increase o f  taxation on beer.’ Gwynn and Tuckwell, p. 118. His ally, 
Chamberlain, also argued against increases on indirect taxation. ‘He thought the Budget feeble though unpopular.’ 
J.L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (4 vols, London, 1932) p. 608.
78 BL HP, Add. MS 48624b, f. 50 note to Hamilton, 21 April 1885.
79 HD, ii, p. 847.
62
Toryism. I have a lively hope that you & [Chamberlain] will feel a strong obligation 
as well as desire to join in the struggle which will require all our strength.80
The matter and the Budget were resolved Saturday afternoon in Cabinet.
The lines o f the Budget were settled, Chamberlain and Dilke have given way about the 
Beer duty. The large additional sum which has to be provided for is to be found by 
means o f an 8d. income tax, an increase o f the Spirits and Beer duties, the addition o f  
30% on ‘Death duties’ affecting realty (which will practically equalise the duties on real 
and personal property) and a partial suspension o f the terminable duties [annuities].81
So settled in fact that the Budget was not even discussed at the Cabinet on the 28th only two
days before presentation.
Expectations for the Budget were running rampant in the months before it would be
tabled, as the prospect o f war was well understood and the revenue requirements anticipated.
The question in the public mind, as for the government, was how to pay for it all. The Economist
dismissed the notion o f a suspension o f the sinking fund and expected the usual resort to the
income tax and Death duties, at least as a start.
Whatever the deficit may be, it will, we think, be sought to be covered by fresh 
taxation,.. .But over and above all these, there must be some addition to the taxes 
which fall upon the working classes, who have now the predominating voice in the 
direction o f the national policy, and who must be prepared to pay their fair share o f  
the expense which carrying out that policy involves. ... it comes to be a question o f 
taxing beer, tea, or sugar, the first it appears to us, is certainly to be preferred.82
As the Budget approached speculation mounted and intensified ‘. . .the forthcoming Budget
promises to be much more exciting than any that has been introduced o f recent years, and will
be awaited with much more than the usual interest.’83 That interest was certainly not
undivided, for the opinion o f The Statist was diametrically opposed to that o f The Economist for
dealing with the huge increase in expenditure.
Although it may be quite proper that the charge o f such a war as is in prospect should 
be paid by the generation which wages it, it does not follow that the whole expense 
with any propriety should be paid in the one or two years while the war may actually
80 GD, xi, p. 328,24 April 1885.
81 HD, ii, p. 849; 25 April 1885; Cabinet minutes note Dilke and Chamberlain’s objections. GD, xi, p. 328. From 
the other side this precedent unnerved J.M. Carmichael, “The disciples o f  the principle o f  throwing the whole 
burden o f taxation on property or debt would be able hereafter to quote the new departure as having been 
initiated & proclaimed by the great master.’ To Hamilton, 24 April 1885, BL HP, Add. MS 48624b, f.52.
82 The TLconomist, 7 March 1885, v. xliii, no. 2,167 p. 280.
83 Ibid., 4 April 1885 v. xliii, no. 2,171 p. 408.
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last ... it is quite reasonable, therefore, that the expense should be spread over at least 
ten, or perhaps twenty years. .. .The practical course we should recommend, even if  
there is to be no war with Russia, would be to increase the Income-tax at once to 
eightpence or ninepence, ... and for the rest, to provide for any expenditure that may 
be necessary by suspension o f the Sinking Fund and by borrowing, leaving the whole 
question o f new taxes to be determined later on.84
Nothing could have been worse so far as The Economist was concerned, and it made a last
effort to champion the orthodox course in finance just before the Budget came down. ‘Any
attempt to interfere with these annuities would, therefore, it seems to us, be a grave mistake,
and we trust that the Government will resolutely set their faces against i t ’85 There was to be a
very rude awakening.
The first formality o f die finance o f 1885 to be played was the Vote o f Credit, which
Gladstone introduced as a resolution in the Commons on the 21st and presented in full on 27
April.
We have before us a case, Sir, for which in a material point there is no precedent 
known to me. We propose a Vote o f Credit amounting to £11,000,000; £6,500,000 
being likely to be spent in what we term “special preparations,” and being secured 
from being spent for any other purposes; £4,500,000 being likely to be spent in and in 
connection with the Soudan, but being in a degree that I cannot at present define 
capable o f being spent for another purpose —  that is to say, the same purpose as our 
special preparations.86
His statement was met with uncharacteristic support from all sides o f the House and took 
aback Hamilton who recorded, lie  took the whole House with him. The effect was electrical.
... The result, much to the astonishment o f Mr. G. himself, was that the Vote was immediately 
carried nem. con. It was certainly one o f his grandest triumphs.’87 The special purpose was to 
deter Russian aggression and to demonstrate to all o f Europe that Britain would not shrink 
from war to secure the Afghan frontier, so if the Vote o f Credit achieved its purpose the 
expenditure it secured need not be spent in full. Gladstone’s speech and Parliament’s reaction 
were a set piece o f diplomatic theatre. ‘This may be an infraction o f the strict principles o f
84 The Statist v. x v , no. 373,18 April 1885 p. 427.
85 The Economist 25 April 1885 v. xliii no. 2,174 p. 500.
86 3 H  297.848.
87 HD, ii, pp. 850-1.
64
Parliamentary finance ... but practically it was welcomed as augmenting the weight o f the Vote 
o f Credit in the scales o f European opinion/88 In this the strategy was successful, but the 
deterrence o f Russia served only to encourage the opposition.
The Financial Statement which Childers presented on 30 April 1885 was extraordinary: 
extraordinary expenditure requiring extraordinary measures to meet it. The review o f the
1884—85 financial year was unique in itself as it was the first in which Gladstone’s Government 
had presided over a deficit. Revenue o f £88,043,110 was exceeded by expenditure of 
£89,092,883 leaving a deficit o f £1,049,000.89 The increase in revenue over the original Budget 
estimate was due to an xhd. increase in the income tax to 6d. in the pound in November, along 
with greater efficiency in collection o f the £12,000,000.90 Otherwise revenue was nearly as 
estimated with the notable exception o f an £199,000 shortfall o f Interest on Advances due to 
the ‘non-payment by the Egyptian Government o f the interest on the Suez Canal loan/91 
Taxes continued to provide the bulk o f revenue; £73,796,000 o f which £46,621,000 was the 
produce o f Customs and Excise. Thus, revenue in 1884—85 exceeded the estimate by 
£1,310,110.92
Expenditure included Debt charges o f £31,027,652 which contributed to a diminution 
in total outstanding Debt o f £4,947,000.93 This was the only item not in excess o f its estimate, 
all o f the Voted services were over estimate. In most instances this was marginal but military 
expenditure was well in excess: the £  18,655,000 for the Army by £2,724,000, and the 
£11,427,064 o f the Navy by £615,000. Additionally, a £300,000 credit for the relief o f General 
Gordon in Khartoum and the £250,000 Afghan war grant in aid completed the military 
expenditure. All told, military expenditure was £3,138,319 more than in 1883—84. Childers 
insisted on pointing out that the he had ‘now paid off the whole o f the War Charges
88 The Times, April 28, 1885 p. 9, no. 31,432.
89 Financial Statement 1885—86, pp. 1—5, P.P. 1885, (174) xlv. 245.
90 3 H  297.1134-5.
91 Ibid., p. 1136.
92 Financial Statement 1885—86, p. 1, P.P. 1885, (174) xlv. 245.
93 3 H  297.1137.
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bequeathed to us by the late Government —  namely, £7,850,000, and all but £250,000 o f the 
£5,000,000’ o f the Afghan war grant in aid.94 But this was rather whistling in the dark in the 
face of the estimated expenditure for 1885—86.
Childers based his estimated revenue for the year on an income tax rate o f 5d. in the 
pound. This had the effect o f exaggerating the deficit but he justified it as being, since 1880, 
‘the uniform rate, except when it has been disturbed for a special purpose, as it was twice for 
War Credits and once to enable the Malt Tax to be converted into a Beer Duty.’95 As 
compared to the last year’s estimate he would ‘not take quite so hopeful a view.’96 £85,140,000 
was the estimate, £2,903,110 less than 1884—85 or about £2 million less when the difference in 
income tax rates was removed. This diminution he distributed in proportion across all the 
revenue heads. Estimated expenditure was truly extraordinary, amounting to £99,872,000 and 
including the Vote o f Credit for £11,000,000. Otherwise the only really excessive items were 
Army and Navy charges o f £17,750,700 and £12,386,500 respectively. The former included 
£500,000 for the Bechuanaland expedition and so with the Vote o f Credit a staggering 
£41,387,000 was marked for military expenditure. The result was ‘the largest deficit which has 
been placed before the House o f Commons since the Crimean War,’ £14,932,000.97 That left 
the question o f paying for it.
In coming to the new measures to meet the deficit Childers was governed by two 
considerations: In  the first place, it appeared to me that it would be overstrained adherence to 
a sound general rule that we should raise, in a year like the present, taxes for the whole o f the 
deficit,... The second proposition ... is that the whole of the additional taxation which we 
have to raise on such occasions ought not to fall upon property.’98 This in spite o f his 
statement two years previous. To this end he had worked out the burden on direct and indirect
94 Ibid. Buxton provides a breakdown o f these military charges in, ii, p. 311.
95 3 H  297.1142.
96 Ibid.
97 3 H  297.1144. This amount includes /200,000 for anticipated supplemental estimates.
98 3 H  297.1145.
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taxation since 1858 and found that former had grown 57 per cent while the latter had only
increased by 11 per cent in yield, justifying further indirect taxation." The next question then,
just what (or who) to tax? Again, principles limited the options and politics encouraged him —
he could attack Fair Trade.
I will have nothing to do, except in the last emergencies o f war, and, indeed, hardly 
then, with the imposition o f taxes upon raw materials, or on the necessities o f life or 
on the means o f  providing warmth and light, or with any duties o f a protective 
character; and, therefore, I am limited to a much smaller number o f alternatives.100
The first and most anticipated alternative was to increase the income tax to 8d. from its
hypothetical norm of 5d. (6d. since November), to yield an additional £5,400,000. The next
items o f direct taxation Childers availed himself o f were the Death duties, which he changed
and adjusted so that ‘an equal tax will have been imposed, as far as possible, on all successions
to property by death, whether the property be real or personal;’ this to produce £200,0004
There would be a duty o f 5 per cent per annum imposed on the Income o f Corporations
which was expected to yield £150,000 and also an increased Stamp duty o f lCb. per cent on
transfers o f bearer securities for a further £100,000. All told, the increases in direct taxes were
£5,850,000.101
Indirect taxation could not be expected to produce such a sum but the point for 
Childers was both practical, in getting some increase, and symbolic, in distributing the burden 
throughout the electorate following the June 1884 Reform Act. His first move was to increase 
the spirit duties by 2s. per gallon, good for £900,000 it was estimated. Next, and most 
controversially, to raise the Beer duty Is. on each 36 gallon barrel and so raise £750,000 and 
fulfil Gladstone’s prophecy o f 1880 when introducing it —  that it could be a source o f  
emergency war taxation. The last change was to the wine duties, but not so as to increase their
99 Ibid., p. 1147. O f course the increases to direct taxation had been from a much lower base as a proportion o f  
total taxation compared to indirect taxation.
100 Ibid., p. 1148.
t For the first year, as duty was payable in four equal instalments annually it would yield about £850,000 after the 
fourth year.
101 3 H  297.1145-55.
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yield. In connection with the Commercial Treaty with Spain, due to take effect in the fall, the 
limit for the Is. duty on wine would be raised from 26 to 30 degrees and was not expected to 
have an effect on the revenue.102 The increase o f indirect consumption taxes to yield 
£1,650,000; with the direct taxes some £7,500,000 in additional taxation, or a little less than 
half o f the deficit to be made up.
For the balance Childers proposed, in the popular parlance, to raid the Sinking Fund 
which would otherwise be devoted to a reduction o f the capital o f the Debt. In this he limited 
his raid to ‘intercept this year the principal o f the terminable annuities created in 1883, 
extending for a year the operation o f the Act; and the difference between this sum o f  
something over £4,600,000 and the [£7,432,000] will be borrowed temporarily ... in 
Unfunded Debt.’ The last would be repaid in the same way during 1886—87.103 In this manner 
the deficit would be dealt with, half through additional direct and indirect taxation and the 
other half through the diversion o f his terminable annuities over two years.104 Childers and the 
Government had no doubts about the sound nature o f their proposals but there was no 
question that the Conservative opposition would look upon the financial crisis as a gift.
Much o f the most obvious criticism in Parliament came from Irish and Scottish 
members alleging an injustice in the 2s. imposed on spirits compared to only Is. on the English 
beverage through the Beer duty. This, it was lamented, did little to ameliorate the injustice o f 
increased taxes on beer and spirits when the wine o f the rich man went untouched. The most 
effective criticism and the strongest polemics came from Lord Randolph Churchill who clearly 
relished feeding the Government its own words on finance.
102 3 H  297.1155—57. See Howe, Free Trade and Liberal England, pp. 182—3, noting the problems that the revenue 
shortfall presented to free trade diplomacy. An Anglo-Spanish Treaty was negotiated in 1886.
103 3 H  297.1159.
104 ‘Copy o f  a Minute o f  the Treasury dated the 11th Day o f  May on the Suspension o f  Part o f the Sinking Fund’, 
P.P. 1884—5, (192) xlv. 335. The suspension o f  £4,672,978 ° f  annuities payment would leave a deficit o f  
£2,750,000 for 1885 and £1,050,000 deficit on 1884 as the uncovered sum o f  £3,800,000 to be met in 1886. 
Accordingly, provision had been made to suspend it in that year ‘to the extent’ necessary, p. 3. See Buxton, ii, pp. 
314-5.
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They had had a Liberal Government in Office for five years; necessarily on that 
account they had had applied to the finances o f the country all the cardinal principles 
of exact finance, with the clear result that there was now a deficit o f £15,000,000 and 
an Expenditure o f £100,000,000, leaving £3,000,000 to be provided for it was 
impossible to say how.105
He wondered if Childers had submitted the Budget to the ‘Prime Minister before he submitted
it to the Committee? ... how it was that the Prime Minister had sanctioned a Budget which
neglected entirely that cardinal principle which [he] had lain down,’ that current expenditure
should be paid out o f current revenue.106 Churchill continued in turning the fiscal tables on
the Government in pointing out that Conservative expenditure was only £83,000,000 in 1880
and the deficit £7,000,000 compared to £15,000,000. He ended by congratulating Childers
‘from the bottom o f his heart on the extraordinary success with which he had supplied his
opponents with arguments for conducting the political campaign ... and for having enabled
them to prove to the country beyond all possibility o f doubt the absolute superiority o f  Tory
finance.’107 If this last statement was open to challenge it was also true that Liberal finance was
a subject o f debate, and that debate was not confined to Parliament.
Reaction to the Budget was to a remarkable degree concerned with financial principles,
or the failure to apply them. While not condemning the Budget itself, The Times reflected that
I t  will hardly be reckoned ... among the courageous and logical achievements in finance, ... it
did not escape observation that it illustrated with a curious irony, the instability o f doctrines
proclaimed a few years ago as sacred and immutable.’108 Elsewhere it was not enough to point
out the contradiction between principle and practice, because The TLconomist was the standard
bearer o f “Sound Finance” it felt sharply the sting o f betrayal, and did not shrink from
sharpness in denouncing it.
For a Government which has always piqued [sic] itself upon being able to pay its way, 
this Budget is a sad downfall, and it is worse than useless for the too pliant friends o f 
the Ministry to attempt to excuse it on the grounds that it is a War Budget. ... it is too
105 3 H  297.1220-21.
106 Ibid., p. 1222.
107 Ibid., p. 1226.
108 The Times, 1 May 1885, no. 31,435 p. 9.
69
chickenhearted to ask the taxpayers, especially on the eve o f a general election, to 
provide the money. For this timidity we hold there is no excuse, for the country is well 
able to pay its way, and ready to pay if called upon.109
At the same time the Budget was being assailed from exacdy the opposite side, because it had
gone too far in imposing taxes and attempting to pay the expenditure in the current year.
The true financial policy o f the Government is to spare the taxpayer as much as 
possible, and to so arrange that the cost o f the war may be spread over a period o f  
years. ... Ministers and their predecessors have failed in their duty to the country. They 
have not kept the Army and Navy in that state o f efficiency which the interests o f the 
Empire required, ... However we look at the question, then, it seems to us that the 
proposals o f the Government are ill-advised. Pedantic adherence to doctrinaire 
principle is at all times unstatesmanlike, and in finance it is especially so.110
This was very close to Northcote’s position.
The fact o f the matter was that the theories underpinning “Sound Finance” had been 
undermined by an unprecedented fiscal situation which the reflexive application o f straight - 
forward financial rules could not contain. They were not designed to do so in any event, as 
adherence to the principles was designed to avoid just such military entanglements in the first 
place. The question in a nut was just how much expenditure was extraordinary requiring war 
measures o f taxation and how much was normal and could be accounted for in the year. By 
any analysis the year 1885—86 was somewhere between the two, for in spite o f the suspension 
o f the sinking fund by way o f terminable annuities, that did not impose fresh taxation but 
rather diverted taxation from the redemption o f past debt to the prevention o f new 
indebtedness. The estimated deficit was in any event highly contingent, for if the Vote o f  
Credit succeeded in its purpose much o f that expenditure would not be required at all and 
there might not, after all, be any deficit. O f course, the key to this was Russia’s behaviour 
towards Afghanistan and until it could be settled peacefully the Budget must serve two ends: to 
secure the funds for the military preparations a Russian war might involve and at the same
109 The Economist, v. xliii, no. 2,175,2 May 1885 pp. 529—30.
110 The Statist, v. xv, no. 375,2 May 1885, p. 482.
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time to act as a diplomatic message to deter Russia.111 Childers and his Budget were both 
hostages to fortune.
The three weeks following the Budget statement were very trying for Childers. His 
health was poor and he was under pressure to revise the Budget.112 The perceived inequity o f  
raising spirit and beer duties while leaving wine untouched was threatening to embarrass the 
Government. Gladstone was hinting at abandoning the Spanish treaty or retreating on beer 
and spirits.113 Childers’ response was reluctant, 1  would really regret altering the Spirit or Beer 
duties.’114 Yet the Cabinet on the 9th following discussed exactly that, and in an exchange o f  
letters with Gladstone the following week he was becoming exasperated at the uncertain and 
unsettled state o f the Budget measures which he felt were encouraging disaffection and 
opposition to the beer and spirit duties. ‘As I have said I will gladly make any reasonable 
compromise [to meet] Dilke & Chamberlain; but I cannot be responsible for the Budget if  this 
delay is to be insisted upon.’115 The delay was insisted on, for the Russian dispute had not yet 
been resolved and it was considered premature to show any lessening o f their will to impose 
war taxation. Childers was going through the motions o f resigning, after his new proposal to 
replace after one year the beer duty increase with an increased rate o f wine duties from 2s. 3d. 
to 3s., but Gladstone (or at least Hamilton) seems to have known he wouldn’t follow through 
with it.116 On the 16th, concerned almost entirely with the Budget, Gladstone noted wryly, Very 
fair Cabinet today — only three resignations.’ It was here that the eventual Budget revisions
111 The Russians came to a tentative agreement on 2 May, Shannon, ii, p. 355. They agreed to arbitration on 4 
May so that the Russo-Afghan line was settled on 10 Sept 1885, Taylor, p. 301.
112 BL GP, Add. MS 44132, f. 122,7 May 1885: His doctor permitted him to attend Cabinet even though he was 
‘not quite well.’
113 GD, xi, p. 336 Letter to Childers 7 May 1885.
114 BL GP, Add. MS 44132, f. 130, 8 May 1885.
115 BL GP, Add. MS 44132, f. 145, Letter to Gladstone 15 May 1885. Gladstone had written on the 14th *1 have 
entered further into the question o f  the Budget with several members o f  the Cabinet, & find it to be quite clear 
that any attempt to setde the final form o f  the financial proposals now would result in disaster.’ GD, xi, pp. 
339-40.
116 Childers, ii, pp. 222—3; and H D , ii, p. 865. Dilke records that the Cabinet were unanimously against the 
Chancellor o f  the Exchequer, who left the room in resignation and despair only to be talked back in by 
Gladstone, Granville and Harrington. Gwynn and Tuckwell, p. 143.
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were approved: to reduce the spirit duty by Is. and to make the beer duty for one year only.117 
The strain was getting to Childers, ‘I regard this decision as a terrible blow to the Budget & 
consequendy (if that is worth a thought) to myself/ But he withdrew his resignation.118 The 
same day Hamilton thought Childers was ‘unwell and looks rather like breaking up.’119 The 
same could have been said o f the Government.
Childers announced his revisions to the Spirit and Beer duties in Parliament 5 June 
1885. The former was to be reduced from a 2s. to a Is. increase and the Is. per barrel increase 
on the latter was to expire at the end o f May 1886, now a temporary war tax only.120 Three 
days later on the 8th the Customs and Inland Revenue Bill incorporating these changes had its 
second reading. The Opposition moved an amendment that ‘this House regards the increase 
proposed by this Bill in the Duties levied on Beer and Spirits as inequitable in the absence o f a 
corresponding addition to the Duties on Wine, and declines to impose fresh Taxation on Real 
Property/121 There was no doubt what was at stake, I t  is quite on the cards that the 
Government will be defeated tonight over Hicks Beach’s amendment to the Budget’122 That 
amendment was accompanied by a repetition o f Churchill’s criticisms from the mouth o f 
Hicks Beach. He pointed out that the outcome of forty years’ pursuit o f free trade had created 
a dilemma for the Chancellor o f the Exchequer. ‘Either he has to propose new indirect 
taxation, which is always odious, or else he has to make an almost impossible choice from the 
few articles on which taxation can be increased.’ He challenged the fairness o f placing the 
burden o f indirect taxation on spirits and beer without recourse to wine or tea, culminating 
with the rhetorical charge that ‘the Radical teetotaler may fairly be said to be the principal 
controller o f ... the military policy o f the Government’ Wine’s exemption from additional tax 
and the equalkation o f the Death Duties were really an attack on property and the agricultural
117 GD, xi, p. 341. This met part o f  the Celtic grievance.
118 BL GP, Add. MS 44132, f. 147,18 May 1885 letter to Gladstone.
119 H D , n, p. 866.
120 3 H  297.1338.
121 Ibid., p. 1421.
122 HD, ii, p. 878. According to Rosebery, Gladstone warned that day’s Cabinet o f  the possibility. GD, xi, p. 353.
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interest.123 Northcote joined in the attack, directing his fire at ‘the whole financial career o f  the 
Government,... [which had] never proceeded on broad principles; they have all along been 
fidgetting, and their fidgetting has generally resulted in failure/124 He recapitulated his defence 
of Conservative finance: ‘you ought to raise the money which you have to raise in a form that 
is most for the advantage and least for the disadvantage o f the country; and that you ought, as 
far as possible, to keep your taxation steady. ... there is nothing so important as steadiness in 
taxation/125 This had not much to do with the amendment but it did, with the full realization
of what was at stake, provide a fitting alibi for bringing down the Government on its Budget.
Gladstone dismissed Northcote’s system of finance as truisms and platitudes and 
pointed out his ‘habitual finance when he got rid of the surplus with which he was originally 
provided was a finance o f annual deficits/126 After making it perfecdy clear that the 
amendment would be treated as vote o f confidence, Gladstone launched into a vigorous 
defence o f his Government's financial policy o f  suspending the Terminable Annuities and 
raising both direct and indirect taxes. His most impassioned effort was to maintain the
consistency and soundness o f the 1885—86 Budget with his financial philosophy.
It has been said that I have laid down the doctrine that we should always pay our way, 
and that consequendy it is most inconsistent on my part not to ask for the whole o f  
this sum from taxation. ... it is not so very important whether £1,000,000 or 
£2,000,000, more or less, are spent by the nation in its own free will and judgment, 
even if in error —  that is much less important than that the principle “Pay your way” 
should be adhered to. But when we come to a year o f extraordinary demands —  to a 
year when £15,000,000 or £13,000,000 are wanted for some special Imperial service 
—  it would be a pedantic strain o f a sound financial principle to hold that the whole of 
that sum ought to be paid by taxation.127
He then charged that the real target o f the amendment was the Death Duties which had
‘invaded the sanctuary o f landed property/128 The wine duties, it was pointed out, only brought
in £1,213,000. To bring in an extra £200,000 they would have to be raised well in excess o f the
123 3 H  2 9 7 .1422-1436.
124 Ibid., p. 1493.
125 Ibid., p. 1495.
126 Ibid., pp. 1496-7.
127 Ibid., pp. 1499-1501.
128 Ibid., p. 1502.
73
addition to beer, while £at the same time raising serious risks with regard to our foreign 
trade.’129 The amendment called into contrast Liberal and Conservative finance, and involved a 
choice between taxing beer and spirits or tea and sugar. "That is the issue before us. That is the 
issue before the country. ... It is a question o f life and death. As such we accept it, and as such 
we do not envy those who if they gain the victory will have to bear the consequences.’130 In the 
subsequent division the Government lost by twelve. As Gladstone recorded in his diary, ‘This 
is a considerable event’131
The fall o f Gladstone’s Government was a considerable event, and it was fitting that it 
should be defeated on finance. Five years o f Liberal Government had seen a thorough test of 
its commitment to “Sound Finance” and o f its ability to conform practice to theory. The year 
1885—86 was as severe a shock to finance as appeared likely, short o f a European war, and 
Gladstone’s Liberal Government had weathered it without having to abandon its fiscal 
philosophy. There had been adjustments, but what remained was “Sound Finance”, even at 
the cost o f the Government. It was the principle for which Gladstone and his Liberal Ministry 
sacrificed their Government, confident o f electoral approval.
The Reform Act o f 1884 was the political time bomb that didn’t explode. Due in part 
to the Redistribution Act o f 1885, it was nonetheless a striking confirmation o f Gladstone’s 
own conservative-liberal embrace o f the new “democracy”.132 Roland Quinault argues 
convincingly that he was content to let Salisbury have his way in the redistribution because in 
the first place, he didn’t believe Reform should be a mere quest for party advantage, and,
129 Because o f  the proposed Commercial Treaty with Spain. Ibid., p. 1506.
130 Ibid., p. 1511.
131 GD, xi, 8 June 1885, p. 353. Shannon noted that many Liberals were mysteriously absent from the vote, 
Gladstone, ii, p. 362. It is claimed that 6 Liberals voted with the Tories and 76 were absent Gwynn and Tuckwell, 
Life ofDilke, i, p. 144. This is confirmed and explained by Garvin as a willingness by Dilke and Chamberlain to let 
the government fall, confident o f Radical gains in any subsequent election on the new franchise. Thus the real 
cause o f  the downfall was the complete moral disarray created by the deadlock between the Whig and Radical 
Ministers on Irish Reform.’ Life of Joseph Chamberlain, i, p. 619. Peter T. Marsh suggests likewise, Joseph Chamberlain, 
Entrepreneur in Politics (New Haven and London, 1994) p. 197.
132 T he “fear o f  numbers” was “ungenerous and unmanly”, he claimed, for “the class which possesses the 
preponderance does not act for itself but for the country.” Gted in F.D. Parsons, ‘Ignis Fatuus v. Pons Asinorum. 
William Gladstone and Proportional Representation, 1867—1885.’ 'Parliamentary History, v. 21, p t  3 (2002), pp. 
374-85; p. 383.
74
second, that he was himself desirous o f ensuring that local influence was maintained, despite 
his hostility to special electoral arrangements.133 Despite this the fear or courting o f  
“democracy” — and however much it fell short o f full suffrage for men (40% without the vote) 
and women (completely unenfranchised) contemporaries understood it as such — drove 
political calculation and especially political economy to an even greater degree than hitherto. 
The great concern was how to tax the people without losing their votes. Fear o f electoral 
bribery versus faith in the fiscal virtue o f the masses dominated the political economy debates 
in the financial journals, and taxation was at the very heart o f the issue, especially the balance 
between direct and indirect taxation. Gladstone’s confidence in the masses would be 
vindicated but with a qualification. The masses proved to be no worse than the classes and 
spoliation was a bogey — but neither were they possessed o f greater fiscal virtue or resistance 
to jingoism than their (more affluent) betters. Reform, yes, Peace, maybe and Retrenchment 
no more. This would prove the test o f courage for Liberal and Conservative finance for the 
next ten years.
133 Roland Quinault, ‘Gladstone and Parliamentary Reform.’ pp. 88-9. In David Bebbington and Roger Swift, eds., 
Gladstone Centenary Essays (Liverpool, 2000), pp. 75—93.
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CHAPTER 4 
REFORM
1885—86: Unsound Finance?
1885 was a bleak year for Government finance, and 1886 was little more promising. 
Despite the fact that the Conservatives were back in office, from 23 June, and responsible 
for the finance o f 1885 there was remarkable continuity between the two budgets as Hicks 
Beach’s Conservative effort was really Childers’ with minor changes to form. In fact it could 
be said that Childers was the spectre haunting both, for he would be intimately involved in 
Harcourt’s budget as well. O f course the key point in common with both budgets was an 
excess o f expenditure and shortage o f revenue which would call into question the very 
assumptions which Gladstonian Sound Finance had made regarding Indirect Taxation. And 
it was this point which most sharply divided the two year’s finance, but only because the 
Conservatives welcomed these questions whereas for the Liberals such a challenge to fiscal 
dogma was most unwelcome.
Sir Michael Hicks Beach’s Financial Statement o f 9 July 1885 represented, in an 
emasculated form, the Conservative critique o f Gladstonian Sound Finance. In defeating the 
Childers Budget and bringing down the Gladstone Ministry they had made their negative 
stand on finance. The Conservative rejection o f increased Indirect taxation on beer & spirit 
duties [£1,650,000] and the proposal to increase the Succession Duty [£200,000] were both 
opportunistic and idealistic.1 In the case o f the former it helped to ensure Irish support and, 
indeed, support from renegade Liberals to defeat a government and budget. In the case o f  
the succession duties they were keeping true to form in defeating what they saw as a Radical 
Liberal attack upon property. It was the contention o f  Hicks-Beach and the Conservatives 
that the Liberals had reached the limits o f  Indirect Taxation, with one exception, and that 
what was required was an unspecified overhaul o f taxation to make up for it. The one
13H 2 9 9 .128.
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exception, the tea duty, was ruled out by a ‘belief that such an additional duty would be so 
unpopular that Her Majesty’s late Government could not propose it.’2 The logical 
alternative, direct taxation, was impossible for the party o f property to advocate. In fact, he 
could not even justify the present Income tax o f 8d. except by ‘the simple but very cogent 
argument that we cannot do without the money.’3
Having turned his back on what Childers had estimated as £1,850,000 o f revenue 
Hicks-Beach could count on the Navy to make matters worse, for the Admiralty had 
exceeded their Estimate o f £2,800,000 for the Vote o f Credit by £850,000: ‘incurred with an 
absence o f  method and supervision, to say the least, which is far from creditable to such a 
Department as the Admiralty.’4 In the tried and true manner o f Conservative governments a 
deficit would have to be met through debt finance, as it would have been had Childers’ 
Budget passed and the Liberals remained in office. By raiding the New Sinking Fund for 
£622,000,
the deficit will then amount to £2,827,000, to which must be added the deficit o f last 
year o f £1,050,000, leaving an accumulated deficit in prospect o f £3,877,000, 
supposing the Vote o f Credit to be taken at £9,850,000, and supposing also that 
Parliament agrees to suspend the New Sinking Fund for the current year as I have 
suggested.
The remaining deficit was to be covered by the issue o f ‘Exchequer or Treasury Bills to the 
amount o f not more than £4,000,000.’5 By such means the year’s finance was at least 
muddled through, although not in a manner putting principles before expediency. Political 
circumstances would not allow o f any other course and the Conservatives had not the 
support to attempt anything bolder depending as they did on the Irish nationalists for their 
Parliamentary life. It was in fact stated that there was an understanding between Gladstone
2 Ibid., p. 131.
3 Ibid., p. 134.
4 Ibid., p. 136.
5 Ibid, p. 138.
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and Salisbury that ‘as much as possible o f Mr. Childers’ Budget should be adopted by the 
new Ministry.’6
As such, Childers restricted his criticism to defending his reputation with respect to 
the Admiralty over-run, much to Gladstone’s subsequent annoyance.7 It was left to H.H. 
Fowler, subsequently Financial Secretary to the Treasury, to make the telling point: ‘That 
[the Tory] principle was the practical exemption o f real property from its fair share o f  
Imperial taxation’, which ‘...from[Pitt’s] time to this ... had not paid its fair share o f the 
taxation o f the country.’8
The reaction in The Times to the first Conservative Budget in over five years was 
positive, approving the manner in which Hicks-Beach had dealt with the deficit by floating 
debt. ‘When we cannot pay our way it is only right that we should recognize the fact fairly, 
and throw no dust in our own eyes.’ The most significant and sobering outcome from the 
Budget was what it indicated about the future o f  government finance if  the limits o f  indirect 
taxation had been reached.
If these are the opinions accepted in practice by politicians on both sides a grave 
question will confront the reformed Parliament. The protest against taxation without 
representation has become an anachronism; what we have to consider is the 
manifest danger o f representation without taxation.9
Concluding, it suggested that some sort o f a poll tax might be required for the right to
exercise the franchise. The Economist had little to praise or criticise because o f what it
regarded as the contingent nature o f the budget, due to a transitory government, which
would otherwise have had ‘no chance o f acceptance.’ It was similarly concerned about the
distribution o f the tax burden and the recourse to debt finance.
6 The Statist 11 July 1885 p. 34, v. XVI no. 385. An understanding extorted from a reluctant Gladstone by
Salisbury via the Queen. Roberts, p. 324.
7 GD, xi, Letters to Childers o f  16,21 and 25 July 1885 pp. 371, 375 and 376.
8 3 H  299.143,144.
9 The Times 10 July 1885, no. 31,495 p. 9.
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It is most unjust that o f all classes o f the community the income tax payers alone 
should be compelled to contribute to the heavy war expenditure, and it is not to our 
credit that we should exhibit ourselves to the world as a nation either unable or 
unwilling to pay its way.10
This was a significant criticism o f “Sound Finance” whether in a Liberal or a Conservative
guise because it raised the question o f balance and fairness in taxation. Noteworthy is the
fact that the Conservatives had rescinded the increase to the spirit duties while even earlier
Childers had abandoned plans to utilize an increased Beer duty. Regardless o f  blame for
expenditure, there was now a very real problem that any increased expenditure would, it
seemed, have to be paid for out o f direct taxes. The obvious alternative, o f course, was
simply to reduce expenditure but no government now seemed capable o f doing so. It was a
policy which seemed no longer to have any constituency.
The fall o f the Conservative government on 26 January 1886 was not unexpected given 
the results o f  the November election11, but it did put Gladstone through what was for him 
the wrenching process o f forming a Cabinet. In the difficult and delicate juggling o f factions 
and personalities the suitability o f people for post had often to be compromised. There was 
this problem in the search for a suitable candidate for Chancellor o f the Exchequer in the 
new Liberal ministry.12 Speculation was the easy game, and Hamilton had played it two 
months before the election ruling out Childers and harnessing Hartington into the post.13 
Later, when the game was being played for real, both Hamilton and his fellow Treasury 
man, Sir Algernon West, had put forward Chamberlain. The former in his diary and the
10 The Economist 11 July 1885 p. 839.
11 The Liberals narrowly beat the Conservatives but were dependent on Irish Nationalist support following a 
record turnout o f  4,638,235 under the new A ct Colin Rawlings and Michael Thrasher, eds., British Electoral Facts 
1832—1999 (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 12—21. I t  is sometimes assumed that in 1885 the electoral system was 
simplified into an instrument o f  universal male suffrage,... This is far from being the truth; in fact, after 1885, 
as before, the franchises were highly complex, and plural voting was still permitted on a considerable scale, 
although about two out o f every five adult males were still denied access to the polling booth.’ Henry Pelling, 
Social Geography of British Elections 1885—1910 (London, 1967), p. 6.
12 Lord Wolverton had even suggested that Gladstone resume the office. Matthew, ii, p. 241.
13 4 September 1885. Dudley W.R. Bahlman, The Diary of Sir Edward Hamilton, 1885—1906 (The University o f
Hull Press, Hull, 1993), pp. 3-4, hereafter H D , iii.
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latter in response to a query from Gladstone, both men felt that, while he was 
unquestionably an unorthodox choice, there were few suitable candidates available. As 
Hamilton noted,
Childers cannot go back. Chamberlain would be a strong man and a short experience at 
the Exchequer would probably knock out o f his head all the ‘ransom’ nonsense and all 
his heterodox financial doctrines; but would not his appointment produce a perfect 
scare among the propertied classes.14
This was the fear shared by Gladstone as well. Although he didn’t share Hamilton’s
antipathy towards Childers, he didn’t support a return to the Exchequer for him either,
preferring instead that Childers go back to the War Office. In fact this and a return o f
Granville to the Foreign Office were made all but impossible by the Monarch’s objections,
necessitating much cabinet shuffling and making the always difficult allocation o f posts even
more awkward. Chamberlain did in fact want to be Chancellor o f  the Exchequer, and was
yet more awkward after being passed over. Harcourt wished for the Woolsack but had to
take consolation in his Radical colleague’s disappointment as he was the surprise choice as
Chancellor o f the Exchequer which he accepted 2 February the same day it was put to
him.15
Harcourt as Chancellor o f  the Exchequer was a surprise, one which afforded 
Hamilton the chance for some good natured raillery which Harcourt accepted and returned 
in kind.
He has always denounced the Treasury as the incarnation o f obstruction. It a little 
shocks the Treasury mind; but personally I am glad. I have always got on with him; and 
he has always been very kind to me. I have told him we shall all do our best to prove to 
him that the Treasury is not quite the useless institution which he has made it out to 
be.16
It was not that the leopard intended to change his spots, but that the peculiar disciplines o f  
the new office would allow him to serve and further his adopted Radical cause. ‘Sir W.
14 Ibid., p. 18 and see Sir Algernon West, Recollections 1832-1886 (2 vols., London, 1899), v. 2, p. 261 for West’s 
conversation with Gladstone o f  2 Feb.
15 A.G. Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt (2 vols., London, 1923), v .l, p. 565.
16 HD, iii, p.23.
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Harcourt is pleased at the prospect o f assuming the Chancellorship o f the Exchequer.... He 
already regards Lingen as a profligate spendthrift.’17 Harcourt would very soon have the 
tiger o f military expenditure by the tail.
On the surface, the Irish Land Purchase Plan was only exceeded in financial 
recklessness by its political recklessness. It was the key to Gladstone’s plan for Irish home 
rule and he considered it to be far too important to involve his Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer. While Harcourt worked on his Budget Gladstone worked on this. Perhaps only 
the scheme’s unlikelihood o f being adopted allowed him to contemplate such an addition to 
the Debt18, or perhaps it was his conviction that only the Irish would have to pay for it.19 
The experience o f governing Ireland from 1880—5 had provided convincing evidence o f the 
failure o f coercive measures to bring either stability or respect for the law. Tn fact in March 
1885 Gladstone accepted the moral case for Home Rule: that self-government should be 
conferred on Ireland as an act o f  atonement for decades o f misrule under the Union.’20
The election results on the new franchise confirmed the Nationalists’ legitimacy as 
the representative voice o f the Irish people.21 The problem was such as to be above mere 
party politics, at least in Gladstone’s initial conception o f it, and he sought to co-operate 
with the Conservative government to effect a solution. When this proved impossible it 
cleared the way for Gladstone to frame his own solution, and he lost no time in pursuing it, 
convinced ‘that Ireland was on the verge o f massive social disorder [this] had a determining
17 Ibid., p. 25.
18 £113 V2 million at an annual charge o f  £3,400,000. ‘It involves a vast financial operation, in all likelihood the 
largest ever known in this country.’ 11 and 14 Feb. 1886, BL GP, Add. MS 44771 ff. 72-4.
19 Welby and Hamilton had argued that on the basis o f  population an Irish contribution o f 1 /20 was not 
unreasonable, and that 1/16 or 1/15 ‘a fair adjustment between the two countries’ compared to Gladstone’s 
1/12*. They concluded: *We venture to point out the risk; but consideration o f  the policy may render it 
advisable to incur that risk without adequate guarantee for a remedy, in case the Irish authority plays us false or 
endangers our claim by financial ineptitude.’ 17 Feb. 1886, BL GP, Add. MS 44771 ff. 77-102.
20 James Loughlin, Gladstone, Horn Rule and the Ulster Question 1882-93  (Dublin, 1986), p. 36. This was also Mill’s 
argument: ‘The English nation owes a tremendous debt to the Irish people for centuries o f misgovemment.’ 
Bruce Kinzer, Ungland’s Disgrace? J.S. M ill and the Irish Question (Toronto, 2001), p. 65.
21 ‘The Irish electorate was increased from approximately 222,018 to 737,965. The effect was to create a vastly 
enlarged Catholic electorate comprising not just die better-off classes but also a substratum o f cottiers and 
agricultural labourers.’ Alan O ’Day, Irish Home Rule 1867—1921 (Manchester, 1998), p. 93.
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influence in setting the pace with which he would deal with the question once having 
decided that it was ‘ripe’ for settlement.’22 Gladstone was convinced not only that the time 
was ripe but that his government must be the agent o f settlement, whether the Liberal party 
agreed with him or not. He made Home Rule the raison d’etre for that government and, 
insofar as it was possible, attempted to impose it on his Ministers as a condition o f office. 
‘His procedure for the formation o f this government was unusual and perhaps 
unprecedented: each o f those being invited to join the Cabinet was read the memorandum 
[on home rule] ... so that he accepted office having accepted the specific policy o f enquiry 
into the practicability o f Home Rule.’23 That enquiry would be conducted not by the Cabinet 
or a committee but by the Prime Minister alone.
Repressive measures having failed, Gladstone constructed his plan to bring stability 
and impose responsibility on Ireland according to a two-fold plan combining Home Rule 
and Land Purchase. The land purchase bill he hoped would solve ‘the problem o f agrarian 
violence in Ireland.’ The land bill was not simply ‘... an ancillary measure to the Home Rule 
bill b u t... a vitally important and integral element o f the scheme for Ireland as a whole.’24 It 
was believed that the key to social order and stability in Ireland was to be arrived at through 
removing the inherent conflict and antagonism between the native Irish peasantry and the 
Anglo-Irish landlord class by buying out the latter in order to transform the peasantry from 
rebellious nationalists into a conservative proprietor class with a stake in maintaining 
stability. In the same way, it was believed, Home Rule would necessarily impose a collective 
responsibility upon the whole Irish nation, transforming the peasant proprietors into 
responsible citizens.25 The problem o f course was how to finance these measures, and so 
Gladstone began his plan with ‘a consideration o f those aspects o f the Irish question in
22 Ibid., p. 45
23 Matthew, ii, p. 240.
24 Loughlin, p. 80.
25 Again, Mill shared this thinking, convinced ‘that only a definitive settlement o f  the land question could avert 
irreparable damage to the moral and body politic.’ Kinzer, p. 175.
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which he felt most competent, “namely, land and finance”.’ He did not move onto the Irish 
form o f government until mid-March and then the ‘main provisions were established by 1 
April.’26 Gladstone was ‘working daily on Ireland through February and early March 1886, 
assisted by Welby and Hamilton o f the Treasury and Sir Robert Hamilton, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary at Dublin Casde, who had urged on Carnarvon the need for Home Rule.’27
There were considerable financial obstacles to be overcome for both the Land 
Purchase and a workable form o f Home Rule. In the former case the problem was inherent 
in the nature o f the finance, for it was proposed to extend the Imperial credit to buy out, on 
a voluntary basis, the Irish landlords based on a twenty years’ purchase. This could require 
up to £160,000,000 and such an enormous sum would be sure to provoke an extreme 
reaction in Britain. In a memorandum o f 20 March 1886 ‘Gladstone put the view that 
£60,000,000, rather than the previously discussed £120,000,000, would be a better amount 
to begin the process o f land purchase.’ The reason being that it could always be increased 
and the lower sum would be far less incendiary to public opinion. The bill o f  22 March cut 
that down to £50,000,000 for tactical parliamentary considerations. To no avail, ‘The 
Purchase bill proved from the first to be an almost intolerable dose. Vivid pictures were 
drawn o f a train o f railway trucks two miles long, loaded with millions o f bright sovereigns, 
all travelling from the pocket o f the British son o f toil to the pocket o f the idle Irish 
landlord.’28
The problems o f financing Home Rule, while less colourful, were equally difficult. 
Gladstone envisaged that the rental o f  Irish property would not only pay the bonds o f the 
Irish landlords who opted to be bought out but also would effectively finance the Irish 
Home Rule government. This was to be the guarantor o f the British taxpayer, for the 
customs and excise taxes would be collected Imperially and not remitted to the Irish
26 Ibid., p. 59.
27 Matthew, ii, p. 242. Harcourt did not see a draft o f  the Land Bill until 25 February (he was sworn to secrecy), 
and only saw the Home Rule proposal for the first time on 7 March. O ’Day, p. 108.
28 Loughlin p. 89 and Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (2 vols, London, 1908 edn.), v. 2, p. 424.
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government until the obligations on those bonds had been paid. It first had to be agreed
upon as to what the Irish contribution to Imperial affairs should be, and then to determine a
ratio for that contribution.29 This was a difficult task partly because there was such a paucity
o f reliable data but also because the stakes, as Parnell realized, were so important.
All questions o f this [constitutional] kind, however, interested him much less than 
finance. Into financial issues he threw himself with extraordinary energy, and he 
fought for better terms with a keenness and tenacity that almost baffled the mighty 
expert [Gladstone] with whom he was matched. ... To the last he held out that the 
just proportion o f Irish contribution to the Imperial fund was not one-fourteenth or 
one-fifteenth but a twentieth or twenty-first part. He insisted all the more strongly 
on his own more liberal fraction, as a partial compensation for their surrender o f  
fiscal liberty and the right to impose customs duties.30
This Gladstone realized as well, and he believed that the financial terms he was offering to
the Irish were generous for he calculated that the ‘contribution by Ireland to imperial
expenses [was] in the proportion o f 1:11.5 ... He measured the taxable capacity o f the two
countries by a comparison o f income tax returns, the amount o f property falling under
death duties, and the valuation o f land.’31 There was also the problem o f Irish representation
in the Imperial parliament and powers o f taxation that the Irish assembly would have if
customs and excise were left in the Imperial sphere. None o f this was enough to deflect
Gladstone’s determination to force Home Rule on Parliament and his party and the
disastrous outcome was, in hindsight, unavoidable if  understandable.32 In the meantime it
was to take precedence over all other government business, including the Budget which was
giving Harcourt such a hard time while Gladstone was preoccupied with strictly Irish
29 The Cabinet o f  31 March decided the Irish charge should be 1/14, but this was reduced to 1/15 on 6 April.
GDt xi, p. 521. See also Irish Finance (Draft Bill]’, PRO CAB 37 /18/33  o f 31 March 1886, pp.1-3.
30 Morley, ii, pp. 408—9. Parnell had been determined to obtain the Customs tariff, and for his part found in 
negotiations that ‘the old gentleman, when it comes to a question o f  cash, is as hard as a money lender.’ Frank 
Callanan, The Vamell Split 1890-91 (Cork, 1992), p. 293.
31 Loughlin, p. 71. I t  is unfortunate that Gladstone’s taste for finance led him to prepare this part o f  the Bill 
himself, without any formal Irish assent, for there was no part o f  the Bill on which it was more important to 
reach conclusions that would stand; conclusions, that would seem just to the Irish not only at the time but 
afterwards.’J.L. Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish Nation (London, 1938), p. 505.
32 T h e chief irony is that o f  all those involved in the crisis o f 1884—6, Gladstone most dreaded the onset o f  
the politics o f  welfare,... Yet it was his failure, not his success, that delayed the advent o f  such politics. The 
settlement o f  Ireland in 1886, if  achieved, would have both shown that the Lords ‘did not dare’, and would 
have cleared the way for the development o f  the Liberal party as the party o f  positive social welfare.’ Matthew, 
ii, p. 257.
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financial measures. It was soon made clear that the Budget and, therefore, the expenditure
incorporated within it were to be subsidiary to these Irish measures.
The fiscal oudook which the Liberals inherited was much the same as they had
bequeathed to the Tories in July 1885. Harcourt, however, was determined to reduce the
Army and Navy estimates. It was a matter o f economic principles and personal philosophy.
It was a task which appealed to him in many ways. He had imbibed from Cornewall 
Lewis a passion for public economy, his experience o f office had convinced him o f the 
enormity o f departmental waste; above all, he had long groaned under the ever- 
increasing exactions o f the war services, and the opportunity o f  coming to grips with 
those devouring monsters had a special attraction for the most pugnacious pacifist that 
ever drew his sword in the cause o f brotherly love.33
The military demands were indeed exacting, almost £30 million in 1885—6, and the services 
were demanding yet more for 1886—7. The battle over the estimates was initiated on 10 
February 1886 with the following exchange between Harcourt and Lord Ripon at the 
Admiralty. 1  have made up my mind there is nothing in the state o f affairs which calls for 
increased expenditure on armaments, and the conditions o f the country will not justify 
exceptional taxation.’ Ripon replied, in a manner befitting the First Lord of the Admiralty. 
‘It is a mistake to begin firing your big guns at the commencement o f an action. I shall 
reserve mine for closer quarters.’34 The bluster was typical o f Harcourt, but the motivations 
were sincere. For there were real pressures on him to reduce the Estimates, and they were 
far more compelling than Cornewall Lewis as motivating factors.
Gladstone’s plan for Irish Home Rule depended upon a successful plan for Irish 
Land Purchase. This was his prime Ministerial ambition and he took complete responsibility 
for its conception, planning and drafting. Intimating his fears to his son Herbert in a letter 
on the 12th that his Government would be a shorter one than Salisbury’s he boldly
33 Gardiner, i, p. 569.
34 Ibid.
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proclaimed ‘but the important thing is to be right’.35 Gladstone was certain that on Irish
issues he was right. Resolution o f the Irish problem through Home Rule and an Irish Land
Purchase Plan were the whole focus o f Gladstone and his Government.36 All other matters
o f Government were to be subservient to it, a point made crystal clear in a memorandum he
prepared for Harcourt to pass on to the Admiralty and War Office.
‘...if we are to cherish a rational hope o f dealing effectively with the huge mass o f the 
Irish question, we must found ourselves on an operation as to land, calculated on a 
scale which will exceed that o f any former transaction o f this country, even those 
before the close o f the great war.
I am the last to desire any unnecessary extension o f demands on our 
financial strength. But I am morally certain that it is only by exerting to the uttermost 
our financial strength (not mainly by expenditure but as credit) on behalf o f Ireland, 
that we can hope to sustain the burden o f an adequate Land measure; while, without 
an adequate Land measure, we cannot either establish social order, or face the 
question o f Irish Government....
To sum up. Irish emergency at the present moment dominates and 
overshadows every other emergency....
I therefore hope that these augmentations will be either wholly waived or at 
the least very greatly modified, at least for the season o f the Irish crisis.
The case appears to be one altogether exceptional, in which purely 
professional reluctance ought not to be allowed to weigh.37
This Harcourt duly communicated to Ripon and Campbell-Bannerman, along with a memo
o f his own in which he sought to demolish the arguments for increased estimates on their
own merits.
There can be no increased expenditure without increased taxation. In my judgment 
the country is not in a condition to bear and ought not to be asked to bear increased 
taxation. The Navy and Military Estimates o f 1884-5 and 1885-6 have reached the 
sum o f / ’30.000.000 a high level mark never attained before even in the time o f Lord 
Palmerston’s panics. This has been due partly to the Egyptian muddle, partly to the 
Vail Mall scare got up by the Services.... I do not believe in Pall Mall scares and I 
am hostile to a prolonged occupation o f Egypt. I can therefore be no party to an 
increase o f war expenditure founded on either o f these elements.
.. .It would be in my opinion unjustifiable in a time when the resources o f  
the country were flourishing. In the present condition o f its finances it would be not 
only unjustifiable but I am glad to think also impossible.
The various sources o f revenue are failing. All classes o f  the country are 
distressed. In such a situation there is only one resource for sound finance — magnum
35 GD, xi, p. 493.
36 The defeat o f  the proposal, and government, on 7 June made this dear, but by no means did it resolve the 
question o f  Irish finance, which would have to be painfully re-examined in 1893.
37 MS Harcourt dep. 10, ff. 22—3, dated 12 Feb. 1886.
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est vectigal—parsiminonia. It is the only finance for which I can make myself personally 
responsible.38
The plan o f attack had been laid out: on the one hand the Irish question took precedence
over military considerations and on the other the arguments in favour o f increased Army
and Navy Estimates were rejected as unfounded and because the country could not, in its
present state, afford to pay them.
Harcourt estimated that the increased cost o f  these Estimates, now £34,000,000,
would require an additional 2d. on the income tax, which at 8d. was already considered
extortionate — and such an increase Harcourt would not be a party to.39 The next day
Hamilton noted that Harcourt ‘is proving as good as his word in “out-Treasury” —ing the
Treasury. He is prepared to arm himself with the weapon with which Mr. G. holds that
every Chancellor o f  the Exchequer ought to be ready — the weapon o f resignation.’40 At this
point Hamilton was in full agreement with his Minister’s belligerence as Harcourt was
writing to Gladstone that,
It is not therefore at all with me a question o f details or to how much or how little 
they are to be increased, but my position is absolute that they shall not be increased 
at all. That is the only sound and intelligible ground to take — and I at least must 
stand or fall by it.41
Over the next two days Gladstone, although fully supporting Harcourt’s efforts at economy, 
was urging consultation with the military Ministers and that Harcourt make his case before 
the Cabinet. Harcourt had difficulty co-operating with his collegial adversaries at the War 
Office and Admiralty. He was given rather to ultimatums than to argument and although the 
Cabinet o f the 15th agreed with him that the £30 million estimates o f 1885—6 should be the 
limit for 1886—7 it was in a general sense only.42 The tough battles with Ripon and
38 BL GP, Add. MS 44200 f. 48, dated 12 Feb. 1886.
39 Letter to Gladstone o f  12 Feb. Gardiner, i, p. 571.
40 HD, iii, p. 27.
41 Gardiner, i, p. 571,13 Feb.
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Campbell-Bannerman had still to be fought, vote by vote, and this hard slogging Harcourt 
was reluctant to undertake.
Bad news from the Treasury was providing him with further ammunition if less
actual money because revised forecasts showed a ‘deficit on the closing year o f nearly
£3,400,000 instead o f an estimated deficit o f £2,800,000.’ Harcourt proposed in rough draft
o f the budget sent to Gladstone on February 14 to suspend the debt payment o f £5,200,000
to meet this deficit.43 It was his contention that because he had informed the Admiralty and
Army that their estimates were too high and his treasury too bare he had no more to do than
offer his resignation should they not comply. By the 16th Gladstone was again urging
Harcourt to argue by persuasion rather than ultimatum, requesting that he show his
estimates papers not only to Ripon and Campbell-Bannerman but also to Granville and
Childers. These formed a sort o f Cabinet sub-committee on the estimates and the
significance o f Childers’ inclusion would not have been lost on the new Chancellor o f  the
Exchequer. Gladstone, again displaying the diplomacy and tact Harcourt seemed to lack,
sought to reassure him o f his confidence. ‘I agree with you that under the circs, o f today 1.
There can be no new taxes. 2. We cannot both arrest the Sinking Fund and have the deficits
unprovided for. 3 .1 hope Ripon will be able to meet his building contracts by retrenchment
in other directions.’44 This still left to Harcourt the responsibility to negotiate the estimates
down to an acceptable level.
By 19 February Gladstone was again reassuring Harcourt as to his support,
‘Beyond all doubt the Cabinet have decided that the Naval & Military estimates 
taken together are not to exceed sensibly the charge o f last year as it was reported to 
us in Cabinet.... Moreover it was referred to the heads o f the two Departments 
together with you & Childers to consider and decide, not whether this should be 
done, but how it could best be done.
42 GD, xi, p. 496-7. BL GP, Add. MS 44200 f. 50-4,13 Feb.
43 BL GP, Add. MS 44200 f. 55.
44 MS Harcourt dep. 10, f. 47.
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I have used the phrase ‘sensibly’ and o f this term I am not sure but o f the 
meaning quite sure. It is elastic to a moderate extent — it might be construed to 
admit only tens o f thousands, it might be more largely taken to admit hundreds of  
thousands but if the latter then undoubtedly very few o f  them.45
For Harcourt, this was not good enough, he demanded Gladstone’s personal intervention in 
the estimates dispute and, when that was not forthcoming, tendered his letter o f  
resignation.46 It is impossible for the historian to take this resignation any more seriously 
than did Gladstone and probably had more to do with Gladstone’s delegation o f Childers to 
oversee the estimates than it did the Prime Minister’s reluctance to intervene himself. 
Gladstone, apart from any questions o f Ministerial responsibility and Cabinet equality, was 
simply too caught up in questions o f finance on the Irish Land Purchase plan to spare time 
for the Budget. He was in meetings with Welby and Hamilton on this subject both the 18th 
and 19th o f  the week attempting to hammer out the details.47
What Childers and Harcourt had in common, besides the Treasury, was a mutual 
contempt. Even before the Government was formed and he had a place in it Harcourt 
proclaimed to Hamilton that if  he joined the Cabinet he might have one satisfaction:
‘hearing Childers make up his mind in the Cabinet which he (Childers) was always going to 
do, but never could do.’48 For his part, after five days o f working with his successor at the 
Exchequer Childers was writing to Gladstone o f his doubts as to Harcourt’s competence for 
that office.
Estimates are not to be reduced by strong language but by patient and searching 
enquiries; not o f course into details, but into such large questions as liabilities for 
many hundred thousand pounds under contract. It was by such patient enquiries... 
that as Cof E in 1884,1 brought down Hartington’s & Northbrook’s Estimates to 
their final figures, and also cut several millions off their demands in the autumn of  
that year 49
4519 Feb. 1886. GD, xi, p. 500.
4619 Feb. 1886. Ibid., n. 4, Gardiner, i, p. 572.
47 GD, xi, pp. 499 and 500.
48 HD, m„ p. 19,30 Jan. 1886.
49 BL GP, Add. MS 44132, ff. 212—214. Childers also utilized this letter to blame Harcourt and Chamberlain for 
the defeat o f  his 1885 Budget
89
In a second letter to his Chancellor o f the Exchequer on the 20th Gladstone tactfully gave 
explicit instructions as to what was expected o f him. The mode o f operation I think is that 
Childers, with his knowledge o f particulars should cut down the Estimates & then you two 
jointly propose this as the fulfilment o f the commission intrusted to the four/50 He had 
already written to Childers the same day exhorting him to help sort out the mess. ‘I rely on 
you with your great knowledge o f the Departments to suggest the means o f retrenching 
particular votes better than any other man.’51 But none o f this would satisfy Harcourt and he 
was again demanding Gladstone’s personal intervention with Ripon and Campbell- 
Bannerman.52
There was a Cabinet on the following Monday 22 February which did not discuss
the estimates but that did not spare a confrontation with Harcourt where Gladstone was
again implored to intervene with Ripon and Campbell-Bannerman. T he experience o f the
past shows that these attempts to [examine?] the Estimates in detail have utterly failed and
the Defendants have invariably broken the Exchequer ...I feel I stand alone and I will fall
alone.’53 This seems to have been enough for Gladstone, and in an “Immediate” letter o f the
same day he instructed his Chancellor o f  the Exchequer as to his duties.
I am most willing to see C. Bannerman and Ripon: but pray remember I have no 
authority above or beyond that o f the Cabinet. In one point I think you are hardly 
aware o f the duties o f your own position o f Chancr. o f the Exchequer. It is beyond 
all doubt one o f the duties o f his great office to enter upon particulars with his 
colleagues o f War and Admiralty. Again & again I have done this as C. o f E., with 
Somerset and Cardwell for example. The difference in your case is that you have the 
advantage o f an expert at your back [Childers] who agrees with you & will work for 
your end.... When once I know you will use all your efforts in this sense, I will put 
all the pressure I can upon the two colleagues.54
This emphatic declaration seems to have worked, for over the next three days the estimates
were indeed sorted out and without recourse to Gladstone’s pressure on the two colleagues.
50 GD, xi, p. 501.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., n. 5; BL GP, Add. MS 44200 f. 65, and MS Harcourt dep. 10, f. 67.
53 BL GP, Add. MS. 44200 ff. 69-72.
MGD,xi,p. 503.
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Although as late as the 24th Hamilton records that Harcourt was still threatening 
resignation55 most o f the efforts to bring the opposing sides together had succeeded and so 
he felt that [Harcourt] ‘is a little unreasonable, as Lord Ripon and C. Bannerman have made 
great concessions; and I am able to show him according to my latest estimate a very decent 
balance sheet for next year after allowing for some increase under the head o f military 
expenditure ...,5<s In fact it was at this point that Hamilton took it upon himself to bring the 
dispute to a resolution. He communicated to Harcourt himself and by combination o f  
flattery and thorough review o f the numbers was able to bring him round to a belief that he 
had won the battle.
In the forecast which I was able to give him he sees a fair amount o f elbow-room. 
The increase on Army and Navy estimates has been reduced from 4 millions to 1 
million; and he appears to be willing to swallow an one-million pill. ...[cf. Gladstone 
in 1862] Without such leverage the present Chancellor o f the Exchequer has 
achieved a still greater feat and he may well be content to rest on his oars. It is highly 
gratifying to find this former financial heretic converted so suddenly into an apostle 
o f economy.57
That same day, February 25,1886, Gladstone was able to record in his Cabinet minutes: ‘4.
Estimates — fixed. Harcourt announced result increase 1 [million] more or less. Accepted.’58
An increase o f £1,000,000 on Army and Navy estimates o f £30,000,000 in time o f peace 
leading to a third deficit in as many years had not the Sinking fund been raided was seen as 
an acceptable victory for the standard bearers o f “Sound Finance” at the Treasury. Given 
the distraction and subsequent disruption caused by the financial plans for Irish Land 
Purchase it is perhaps understandable that the traditional vigilance had wavered. For the 
heresy o f a £1 million increase in expenditure was nothing to that contemplated in 
extending over £100,000,000 in Imperial credit on behalf o f the landlord class o f Ireland.
55 ‘He has his resignation pistol at full cock, and swears he will discharge it if  the War Office and Admiralty 
cannot meet to the full his requirements HD, iii, p. 29. Also, Harcourt to Gladstone 24 Feb., BL GP, Add. 
MS 44200 f. 79.
56 HD, iii, p. 29.
57 25 Feb. 1886, Ibid. Hamilton’s memo to Harcourt is in MS Harcourt dep. 118, f. 22 dated 24 Feb.
58 GD, xi, p. 504.
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Harcourt presented his maiden Budget speech in the House on 15 April 1886 and 
was able to report that the 1885—86 financial year’s Revenue was less than the Estimate by 
£1,208,699. This was particularly due to the £74,927,000 from the tax revenue o f which 
only Stamps exceeded their estimate, by £140,000. Consistent with the basis o f government 
finance o f the time, it was the Indirect taxes which brought in the great bulk o f the revenue: 
£45,287,000 or sixty per cent o f that from taxation (and 51% o f total revenue). Non-tax 
revenue amounted to £14,654,301, being 16% o f total revenue and only £5,699 under 
estimate.59
Expenditure was £92,223,844 and £1,393,327 less than provided for in the estimates 
for 1885—86 with every spending department below estimate except for the Navy, £207,009 
in excess. Debt charges represented the largest item o f expenditure, £25,088,065 and 27% 
o f the total. The voted spending departments: Army, Navy and Civil Services accounted for 
£47,413,357 more than half o f expenditure although an additional £9,701,000 was due to 
the Vote o f Credit and the Afghan War Grant in Aid. Exceptional military expenditure 
accounted for 11% o f expenditure. Harcourt was, therefore, obliged to report a deficit o f  
£2,642,543.
Harcourt estimated the Revenue for 1886—87 at £89,885,000 based on existing 
taxation; an increase o f £303,699 on that o f  the previous year. O f this, £75,450,000 was 
expected from taxes o f which £45,410,000 was indirect tax from Customs and Excise and 
£30,040,000 from direct taxes. Non-tax Revenue was estimated to be £14,435,000, a falling 
off o f almost £220,000 from the previous year.
The Estimated Expenditure for 1886—87 came to £90,428,599 This would allow for 
an estimated Budget deficit o f £543,599 if  no changes were made to taxation. As always 
Debt charges were the single largest item o f  expenditure. Army and Navy votes of
59 3 H  304.1637-60.
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£18,233,200 and £12,993,100, respectively, were a slight increase over 1885—86. The Civil 
Services charge o f £18,008,691 represented an increase while the remunerative departments 
o f Customs, Post Office, Telegraph and Packet services would incur an additional £532,269. 
So the ordinary expenditure o f the year was expected to fall back to the level o fl8 8 4 —85.60
This anticipated deficit, ‘not a very satisfactory result in a time o f peace , and when
the Income Tax is 8d. in the pound,’61 required Harcourt to reduce by £800,000 the
provision for Debt reduction. This was done by raiding the ‘new Sinking Fund, £613,000,
and the Sinking Fund o f 1881, £205,000’62 and putting the year into surplus. This small
surplus allowed the one remission from which the Budget got its name, the elimination o f
the £8 cottage brewers licence at a cost o f  £16,000 so as to leave a net surplus o f £258,771.
Harcourt had no great claims to make for his Budget other than to emphasize its prudence.
We are paying our way, and doing something more. We are discharging Debt to a 
moderate degree. We are still able, like a prudent parent, to lay up something for the 
future for his children who come after h im .... We cannot lay fresh burdens upon the 
people. What we have to do ... is to have patience, to exercise prudence, and to 
husband our resources for better times. If these are sound principles o f finance, and 
if the proposals o f the Government conform to them, I trust they may receive the 
favourable acceptance o f the Committee.63
This trust was not misplaced, and his lack o f originality earned approbation by the
indifference with which it was received.
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach concentrated on two familiar themes in his reply to the 
budget: taxation and expenditure. He re-iterated that Childers’ proposals to increase the 
duties on beer and spirits had been ‘financially unsound’ and that it proved the ‘condition o f 
our system o f indirect taxation is hardly satisfactory when, even in a normal year, we are 
unable to do without an 8d. Income Tax.’ As he saw it the expenditure problem was one o f
60 Figures are from the Financial Statement 1886—87’ pp. 1—5, P.P. 1886, (123) xxxviii. 223.
61 3 H  304.1653.
62 3 H  304.1656
63 3 H  304.1659-1660.
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prioritization and legitimacy, £I should be very sorry indeed if, on the plea o f mistaken 
economy and foolish parsimony, ...[we] should ever refuse the Government... any 
Expenditure upon the Army or the Navy which is really necessary../ Whereas the root 
problem in the growth o f expenditure was to be found in the liberal party itself ‘... they 
might do their best to teach their followers ... that it is extravagant to the last degree for the 
State to attempt to make everybody happy and comfortable at the public expense.’ The 
expansion o f the role and activities o f the state into “illegitimate” areas were robbing the 
military o f its traditional prerogative over government expenditure.64
The “Cottage” Budget o f 1886—7 thus conformed exactly to its two predecessors o f  
1885—6 despite the Conservative responsibility for the one actually adopted that year. This 
was because all three were shaped by the circumstances o f their time and in the case o f the 
Conservative Budget the excuse o f a sudden and transitory Government had little bearing 
on its construction. In spite o f their arguments to the contrary, once they had modified the 
spirit duties and rescinded the change to the Succession Duty, Hicks-Beach had no ideas o f  
his own for finance except perhaps for a more straightforward honesty in recourse to Debt 
finance. He could afford such honesty, given the Liberal responsibility for the expenditure, 
whereas Harcourt as a Minister in a Gladstone government felt compelled to justify the 
indebtedness by the complicated operation o f the sinking fund. Left unstated was the fact 
that for two years now the deficit was resolved by operations on the debt side through 
interception o f the sinking fund rather than by augmenting revenue because it was believed 
taxation had reached its limits. The 8d. income tax was at a psychological limit for peace 
time and the indirect taxes seemed to have been stretched to a point o f inelasticity. It 
appeared as if the possibilities o f Sound Finance had reached their limits.
It is a great paradox that Gladstone seemed willing to over-turn “Sound Finance” 
for Irish Home Rule, as if  perhaps in compensation for the abandonment o f  retrenchment
64 3 H  304.1664-7.
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as a feasible policy after the experience o f the 1880-5 ministry and the implications o f the 
Reform Act o f 1884. Home Rule at least represented Reform, and if Peace was not 
forthcoming in a new Imperial age, Ireland might yet be pacified. Even in this, however, 
Gladstone did not abandon “Sound Finance”, his hard bargaining with Parnell and his 
determination to make the scheme pay for itself demonstrates this, he merely extended its 
parameters to encompass a great moral issue, a great question o f state. If this sacrificed the 
minimal state it was for a great cause, and one for which the new electorate might 
demonstrate their virtue as citizens, eschewing selfish pecuniary calculations and shouldering 
the financial burden o f doing what was right. Gladstone still believed he was capable o f  
leading the masses, in a righteous cause, against the classes.
The further paradox is that his mande o f “Sound Finance” would be taken up by 
Lord Randolph Churchill, who would sacrifice himself in a bid to return to that abandoned 
Gladstonian fiscal virtue o f retrenchment by way o f a peaceful foreign policy to capture the 
reformed mass electorate against, it would turn out, his own Conservative party.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE FINANCE
Apostate: Randolph Churchill as Chancellor o f  the Exchequer
Lord Randolph Churchill became Chancellor o f the Exchequer in Lord Salisbury’s 
Conservative Ministry on 27 July 1886. He had been made leader in the Commons and the 
Exchequer followed naturally, but only because Hicks-Beach had declined both posts to 
become Irish chief secretary. Churchill was thirty-six years old, the youngest man since Pitt 
to hold both these offices, ‘Brilliant places which [he] could not refuse as unworthy and 
which seemed to endorse his claims to a status o f effective parity with Salisbury.’1 Lord 
Randolph was the coming man in British politics and seemed to exercise a political power 
well beyond his years. But this was illusory. ‘How was Churchill to pressure Salisbury into 
making a Cabinet in 1886 which would reflect faithfully Churchill’s Tory Democratic 
ascendancy in the Conservative party? The short answer is that Churchill failed.’2 He failed 
at the outset, he failed in his office and he failed, ultimately, in forcing his vision o f “Tory 
Democracy” upon the Conservative party. But he came close.
July o f 1886 was the zenith o f Churchill’s influence and power within the 
Conservative party and in the country. His relationship with Salisbury, although outwardly 
placid and cordial was really an unresolved and ongoing trial, for they each had different 
conceptions o f not just the Conservative government but o f the party, and these frictions 
were in a state o f unresolved abeyance. ‘Salisbury did not respond to Churchill’s challenge in 
1884 either with the tactical skill he was deploying against Gladstone over the Reform Bill or 
with the determination which the incompatibility between their brands o f Conservatism, so
1 ‘Churchill was taken aback to find Beach already setded as Irish chief secretary.’ Richard Shannon, The Age of 
Salisbury, 1881—1902: Unionism and Empire (London, 1996), p. 214.
2 Ibid.
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apparent in retrospect, would lead one to expect.’3 Salisbury was now forced into a situation
with respect to Churchill not o f his own choosing,
He did not relish the prospect o f placing Lord Randolph in high office,... [his] 
doubts about Lord Randolph’s temperament as a Cabinet colleague were not eased 
by the new tone which had entered Churchill’s letters. Hitherto he had written as 
lieutenant to master; now the tone was definitely that o f master to master. Lord 
Randolph’s suggestions for appointments in the new Ministry arrived at Arlington 
Street by every post.’4
Nor was Salisbury the only one made uneasy by Churchill’s presumption and responsibility
in the new Ministry. The Queen recounted a conversation with Salisbury on 25 July, lie
feared Lord Randolph Churchill must be made Chancellor o f the Exchequer and Leader,
which I did not like. He is so mad and odd and has also bad health.’5 The simple truth was
that Churchill owed his political power and respect not to love but to fear. ‘[His] supreme
asset was the extreme difficulty people had envisaging the possibility o f a Conservative
government without him.’6 Within five months Salisbury would not be able to envisage the
possibility o f a Conservative government with him.
To say that the Treasury was apprehensive about the new Chancellor o f the
Exchequer is an understatement. ‘They regarded him, we are told, as “an impossible man,”
as “one whose breath was agitation, and whose life a storm upon which he rode.’”7
Hamilton had very mixed feelings, regretting Hicks Beach’s reassignment but contemplating
his new Master as a test o f his own professionalism.
I am afraid he would regard one with some suspicion; but I daresay one would be 
able to get on with him. Arthur Godley found him pleasant enough to work with at 
the India Office; and to have to work for a man with whom one is not in political 
accord, and whom one has never been able to esteem, is calculated to put one on 
one’s mettle. Loyalty towards one’s political masters should be the first object o f a 
public servant;... Moreover, it is always interesting to be brought in contact with a 
man possessed o f some genius; and certainly R.C[hurchill] has his sparks o f that 
powerful but dangerous possession.8
3 Peter Marsh, The Discipline of Popular Government: Lord Salisbury’s Domestic Statecraft, 1881—1902 (Sussex, 1978), 
p. 49.
4 Robert Rhodes James, Lord Randolph Churchill (London, 1959), p. 249.
5 Ibid.
6 Marsh, p. 226.
7 Winston Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (2 vols., London, 1906), ii, p. 180, quoting Sir Algernon West.
8 H D , iii, p. 44.
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Even some o f Lord Randolph’s friends were unconvinced o f the wisdom o f his double 
burden. Lord Justice Fitzgibbon wrote with uncanny prescience to him almost immediately 
on 27 July:
Can Goschen by any means whatever be induced to take the Exchequer?... if I were 
you I would rather not be obliged to carry as Leader the financial reputation o f the 
State in addition to the rest o f the load. The English are your sheet-anchor, and 
finance is their pole-star; and a middle aged commercial Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer would make them easy in their minds, when you could not.9
In spite o f these misgivings it was vital to Churchill’s political strategy and personal ambition 
that he take on and succeed in both offices, the one giving him control over the House o f  
Commons and the other (so he thought) giving him control over the government itself. 
What nobody seemed to realise was that Randolph Churchill had formulated for himself a 
political philosophy and programme in which government finance was absolutely 
paramount.
The first and most vital interest o f the nation is finance. Upon finance everything 
connected with government hinges. Good finance ensures good government and 
national prosperity; bad finance is the cause o f inefficient government and national 
depression.10
Why now this adherence to “Sound Finance”, what had changed his outlook? In a word, 
office. He had more than a simple ambition to power, he wanted to succeed in power. It 
was for this that he ‘wished dramatically to appropriate Gladstonian principles o f severely 
pared governmental expenditure. It had served the Liberals well for half a century. He 
wanted to nail it to the Tory mast.’11 This was an ingenious and rather revolutionary 
proposition, splendidly conceived in an era o f democratic reform to appeal to the newly 
enfranchised electorate and overturn their association o f “Sound Finance” with Gladstone 
and the Liberal party. There was genius in this conception, it was an insight which had 
everything going for it, everything except the support o f the Conservative party and its
9 Churchill, ii, p. 132.
10 Ibid, p. 132.
11 Marsh, p. 100.
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Prime Minister. It was typical o f Churchill that he knew this and did not care. Genius is 
wasted on details.
Churchill was not an entire newcomer to “Sound Finance”, although he came at it in
his own inimitable and roundabout way. He had been one o f  the champions o f Fair Trade
back in 1882 when it ‘was still a nebulous doctrine, and reached its culmination in his
Blackpool speech in January [24], 1884, thereafter to gradually disappear as [he] moved
closer to the fiscal conventions o f his day.’12 It was perhaps the fear o f the Treasury and the
presumption o f the Conservative party that he viewed this situation with complacency,
whereas the truth was that he meant to do something to change it. And Lord Randolph
Churchill was not a man to content himself with half-measures when he could go to
extremes. Nor was he short o f encouragement in this direction. In the Times ‘he was adjured
to remember how utterly fatal to the Unionist alliance any departure from “sound principles
o f finance, understood and acted upon by successive Administrations, Conservative as well
as Liberal,” would inevitably prove.’13 The Treasury itself was a great influence, more
particularly in the case o f a man like Churchill whose self-confidence was perhaps not so
great as was suggested by his public image.
N o school o f thought is so strong or so enduring as that founded on the great 
traditions o f Gladstonian and Peelite finance. Reckless ministers are protected 
against themselves, violent Ministers are tamed, timid Ministers are supported and 
nursed. Few, if  any, are insensible to the influences by which they are surrounded. 
Streams o f detailed knowledge, logic and experience wash away fiscal and financial 
heresies; and a baptism o f economic truth inspires the convert not merely with the 
principles o f a saint but — too often — with the courage o f a martyr.14
Churchill, however, was nobody’s cipher. ‘He was not a man who formulated long-term 
projects or setded himself down to pursuing a particular course. His politics were mainly
12 James, Churchill,\ p. 118. James asserts that ‘It was by reading Randolph’s speeches that the seed o f  Tariff 
Reform was sown in Chamberlain’s mind,’ p. 117.
13 Churchill, ii, p. 131.
14 Ibid., p. 180. T h e Treasury at that time was staffed with officials o f  the old Cobdenite type, and they stuffed 
him with their theories, which he swallowed with gusto; he became at once a most violent economist and 
Free-trader.’ Lord George Hamilton, Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, 1886—1906 (2 vols., London, 
1922), ii, p. 41.
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intuitive.’15 Nonetheless he latched onto and continued to pursue the concept, pregnant 
with political possibility, o f Tory Democracy. “He perceived two political realities with great 
clarity; the weakness o f the Liberal party in the Whig-Radical rift, and the vital importance 
o f the new electorate created by the Reform Act o f 1867.... Tory Democracy reached its 
culmination in the “Hartford Programme’ in 1886, but it was constantly being developed 
from 1882.’16 The Reform Bill o f  1884 and companion Redistribution Act o f 1885 
reinforced the wisdom o f this policy which was amply confirmed by the elections o f  1885 
and 1886. The question for the Conservative party was whether the Tory Democracy was a 
matter o f substance or mere cynical manipulation o f a naive and inexperienced electorate. 
‘The great thing to be said for Lord Randolph is that the stand-off he negotiated in July 
1884 was pretty much on the borderline between those two standpoints. The great thing to 
be said against him is that he was thereafter very incompetent at consolidating and 
advancing his position.’17 But the circumstances o f his tenure at the Exchequer leading up to 
his resignation would prove that it was because he approached this programme with 
sincerity and firm conviction rather than mere electoral cynicism that led him to try to 
realize his goals rather than simply consolidate and advance his own position.18 O f course, 
had he achieved his goals his own position would have been immeasurably advanced and 
consolidated beyond any doubt. ‘The indications are that Churchill was preparing himself 
for a decisive offensive to make a reality o f  his apparent party ascendancy.’19 This involved 
what Salisbury and his Cabinet colleagues would soon perceive to be an intolerable 
meddling by Lord Randolph and his Treasury into all aspects o f government, including even 
the hitherto sacrosanct precincts o f the Prime Minister’s foreign policy. It was at this point
15 James, Churchill\ p. 121.
16 Ibid.
17 Shannon, Salisbury, p. 58, is sceptical about the achievements o f  Tory Democracy although he concedes it 
ultimately changed the party’s view o f  what use could be made o f  the masses.
18 ‘Contrary to past and present orthodoxies, [Churchill] did not favour tory democracy either as part o f  a 
crusade against aristocratic reaction or as a convenient cloak for his own ambition. ... He did so largely in 
response to popular demand and in order to further the fortunes o f  the conservative party.’ R.E. Quinault, 
Lord Randolph Churchill and Tory Democracy, 1880—1885.’ The HistoricalJournal, 2 2 ,1 (1979), p. 163.
19 Shannon, Salisbury, p. 222.
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that the Chancellor o f the Exchequer and Leader o f the House’s political star began to 
move from its zenith towards its nadir.
From the very outset Churchill was determined to make his colleagues realize the 
importance o f economy, and he succeeded in getting his message across. Cranbrook noted 
in his diary on 13 August after a Cabinet meeting: TLC. alarming on economy.’20 He 
complained to Salisbury the next day about Iddesleigh’s handling o f foreign policy, ‘It will 
place us in great peril in the House o f Commons, politically and financially.’21 The pattern of 
his complaints were to be repeated so long as Iddesleigh remained alive, and continued even 
after Salisbury had resumed the Foreign Office. T lie problem o f creating that favourable 
balance o f power within the Cabinet, one which would hedge in the Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer and restrict the Treasury’s capacity to upset a rational foreign policy, faced 
Salisbury most acutely during 1886—V.’22 This upset continued through September, with 
complaint after complaint from Churchill to Salisbury about Iddesleigh, ‘Really if  it was 
from not wishing to cause you any annoyance I would put such a spoke in old Iddesleigh’s 
wheel when I speak on Saturday as would jolt him out o f the F.O.’23 Salisbury’s reply on 1 
October should have given the Chancellor o f the Exchequer pause for thought, for it clearly 
indicated that Salisbury did not displace Gladstone with any intention o f substituting a 
“Cobdenite” foreign policy. ‘A pacific and economic policy is up to a certain extent very 
wise: but it is evident that there is a point beyond which it is not wise either in a patriotic or 
in a party sense — and the question is where we shall draw the line.’24 The net result was that 
Salisbury’s ‘careful calculations were continually upset by Churchill’s maverick private
20 James, Churchill,’ p. 266.
21 4 September, James p. 272.
22 A.N. Porter, Lord Salisbury, Foreign Policy and Domestic Finance, 1860—1900’, in Lord Blake and Hugh 
Cecil, eds., Salisbury. The Man and his Policies (London, 1987), p. 161.
23 James, Churchill\ p. 272.
24 Andrew Roberts, Salisbury. Victorian Titan (London, 1999), p. 400.
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diplomacy.’25 This interference into Salisbury’s own sphere was made the more galling 
because it was interference for its own sake, because Churchill had his own ideas o f what 
Britain’s foreign policy ought to be. When Churchill insisted on interference because foreign 
policy had to be made subordinate to Treasury requirements it was more than galling, it was 
intolerable. ‘After two months’ experience o f his ways in this government, he thought him 
“capable o f all kinds o f monkey tricks.’”26
From the outset Churchill was determined to meet the spending departments head 
on in order to impose his demands for economy. On 10 September Hamilton set out for 
Churchill ‘our present financial position, which, what with the largest Peace Estimates on 
record, the large demands for advances under the Irish Land Purchase Act, and our 
dependence so much on the income tax, the bulk o f which only comes in during the March 
Quarter, is not a pleasant one.’27 There was no way in which it could have been, for the very 
same problems which stymied Childers, Hicks Beach and Harcourt had still to be resolved. 
Military expenditure was at record levels for peacetime, the civil service expenditure was 
steadily increasing while the mainspring o f indirect revenue, the alcohol duties, were 
stagnant or falling at a time when the income tax continued at a war-time level o f  Sd in the 
pound. Two years o f political instability had done nothing to encourage decisive action or 
effective remedies. Lord Randolph Churchill was determined to change this. 14 September 
saw a request for a ‘Royal Commission to inquire into the establishment and organization o f  
the great spending departments.’28 The culmination o f this fiscal and economic aspect o f  
Tory Democracy was reached October 2nd in Churchill’s Dartford speech, ‘probably the 
most important o f his life.’ In this he outlined a number o f measures designed to appeal to 
the “masses” and not necessarily to the “classes”. It reached the following crescendo.
25 Ibid., p. 402.
26 David Steele, Lord Salisbury. A  Political Biography (London, 1999), p. 206.
27 H D , iii, p. 46.
28 Churchill, ii, p. 185.
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I will not conceal from you that my own special object, to which I hope to devote 
whatever energy and strength or influence I may possess, is to endeavour to attain 
some genuine and considerable reduction o f  public expenditure and consequent 
reduction o f taxation. I shall be bitterly disappointed if it is not in my power after 
one year, or at any rate after two years, to show to the public that a very honest and 
a very earnest effort has been made in that direction.29
The implication to be drawn from this, by both the government and the opposition, was for
the hegemony o f Lord Randolph Churchill and the Treasury over all aspects o f government
expenditure, that is, practically all aspects o f government. ‘From Salisbury’s point o f view
Churchill’s programme meant the worst o f  all possible worlds.’30 But for Harcourt, the
former Liberal Chancellor o f the Exchequer, he thought his party
ought to rejoice at this whole conversion o f the Tories to their own creed. What can 
be a more complete vindication o f Liberal policy than this clear proof that the 
Tories cannot dispense with it? [He] is ready to assure R. Churchill o f his support in 
carrying the closure and in effecting a reduction o f naval & military expenditure.31
Churchill might need that help, because it was looking as if  his supporters were all on the 
wrong side o f the House, for his efforts at economy had made no new friends at the 
Admiralty or the War Office, particularly the latter.32 £W.H. Smith had grown increasingly 
irritated by the flow o f memoranda from the Treasury on War Office economies, and as 
early as 24 October he had protested that he saw little chance o f a reduction in the 
estimates.’33 Smith was being realistic, for in spite o f the inexorable rise in military 
expenditure in the preceding five years, that expenditure had been compressed and cut back 
as much as possible for the sake o f reducing the estimates, much o f the rise being due to 
exceptional expenditure to meet increased demands and fulfil heightened responsibilities
29 Churchill, ii, pp. 163—165. He wrote his mother on the 4th, ‘I hope my speech was not too advanced and 
that members o f  the government will not all resign.’ CP 9248/16/1890.
30 Porter, p. 162.
31 25 October 1886 conversation with Hamilton. BL HD, Add. MS 48645 f. 16.
32 A rather scathing account o f  the Navy’s ships in commission o f  23 Oct., CP 9248/16/1951, and the *War 
Office Deficit’, CP 9248/16/1954.
33 James, Churchill' p. 281, the letter from Smith is printed in Churchill, ii, p. 226.
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imposed on the army and navy in an age o f growing militarism and war anxiety.34 The 
Conservative party was at the forefront o f these demands. Salisbury was no militarist but his 
diplomacy demanded a greater military profile for Britain than Gladstone had provided. ‘He 
saw the necessity these tendencies created for a particular kind o f diplomacy, one which 
would not only avoid crises and the expenditure attendant upon them, but also keep the 
general level o f expenditure to a minimum.’35 Unfortunately for his government this 
minimum o f expenditure was well in excess o f what his Chancellor o f the Exchequer 
considered acceptable, and this disagreement led inevitably to a fundamental dispute about 
the very presumptions and goals o f their foreign policy. The stage was set for confrontation 
as the Estimates, military and civil service, had to be in place before the Budget for 1887 
could be constructed. Such a confrontation could not but make clear three things: whether 
the Treasury would dictate foreign policy, who would really lead the government, and the 
nature o f that cabinet government — consensus or capitulation.
The first phase o f  the Estimates battle began with a Treasury offensive, a Minute o f 
3 November requesting ‘that the Army and Navy Estimates should be considered by the 
Cabinet before Christmas. Will you therefore kindly direct that the estimates decided upon 
by the War Office should be ready by the first days o f December?’36 Thus began the annual 
give and take between Treasury and Spending departments, the same toing and froing as 
would occur every year. What was exceptional in the autumn o f 1886 was that the 
Chancellor o f the Exchequer was perhaps unusually isolated from and antagonistic towards 
his colleagues.
Only the closest sympathy and support from the Prime Minister can sustain him. He
is one against many, and must otherwise submit or resign. But on this occasion,
34 Speculation about the likelihood o f  a greater or lesser European war is a constant factor in Hamilton’s 
diaries 1886 through 1890. BL H D , Add. MS 48645-48652.
35 Porter, p. 158. T o  diplomats he continually emphasized the interaction between Conservative hegemony at 
home and a peaceful foreign policy abroad (the connection he was to gamble upon in his budget at the end o f  
the year).’ R.F. Foster, hord Randolph Churchill: A. PoliticalUfe (London, 1988), p. 285.
36 Churchill, ii, p. 227. Lord George Hamilton’s cautious reply o f  the same: CP 9248/16/1968.
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when there should have been the most intimate alliance, there opened vast and 
comprehensive differences; and the Chancellor o f the Exchequer became continually 
more isolated and from that very cause more combative.37
This combative nature was not really calculated to push his colleagues towards compromise, 
it resembled too much the dictat approach that Harcourt had utilized the previous year. 
Worst o f all, if  possible, he employed even less good humour than Harcourt had when 
arguing his brief. Charm was not a weapon he included in his arsenal. So it was that ‘from 
this time onwards the Cabinet was hopelessly divided on almost every major issue’ and that 
cby November 8th the Chancellor o f the Exchequer was in despair.’38 This despair was 
manifested in a letter to Salisbury o f 6 November, in which he spared neither hyperbole nor 
importunity whilst overtopping both with his presumption that the Prime Minister shared 
his goals.
I see the Dartford programme crumbling into pieces every day. The Land Bill is 
rotten. I am afraid it is an idle schoolboy’s dream to suppose that Tories can legislate 
— as I did, stupidly. They can govern and make war and increase taxation a merveille^  
but legislation is not their province in a democratic constitution.... I have certainly 
not the courage and energy to go on struggling against cliques, as poor Dizzy did all 
his life.39
Salisbury replied at great length the following day, expressing perfectly his own philosophy
o f Conservative government and hinting at his own impatience with Churchill’s methods.
I think the “classes and the dependents o f class” are the strongest ingredients in our 
composition, but we have to so conduct our legislation that we shall give some 
satisfaction to both classes and masses. ... Our Bills must be tentative and cautious, 
not sweeping and dramatic.... Your role should be rather that o f a diplomatist trying 
to bring the opposed sections o f the party together, and not that o f a whip trying to 
keep the slugs up to the collar.40
37 Churchill, ii, p. 228.
38 James, Churchill' p. 275.
39 Churchill, ii, p. 223.
40 Churchill, ii, p. 224-5.
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It was his last ‘soothing and sympathetic’ reply on these subjects.41 Churchill did not take 
the hint and ‘proceeded to dig himself just such a grave as Salisbury had described.’42
In framing his Budget Churchill did not defer to any o f his Prime Minister’s
suggestions, instead he recklessly pursued the ideal set out in his Dartford programme on
behalf o f “Tory Democracy”. By 11 November he already had in mind a considerable part
o f his eventual Budget, and it was carefully balanced so as to appeal to both masses and the
classes, but its appeal to the latter would depend on his over-turning the spending plans o f
his military colleagues.
He has got his eye on the Sinking Fund; and has evidently slap-dash ideas. He holds 
that it is absurd to be paying off debt at the present rate when we are subject to an 
8d. income tax. The income tax ought to come down to Ad. in times o f peace — at 
least the Imperial income tax. (He evidently has in contemplation a local income tax 
to relieve the rates.) The income tax over Ad. should be reserved as an engine o f  
war... He hopes to get a good deal more out o f the Succession Duty; and I believe 
the reduction o f the tea duty enters into his calculations.43
Hamilton’s diary sounded a prematurely triumphant note on 28 November, for as he gained
confidence in his master’s financial soundness he failed to grasp that Churchill had not to
answer to the Treasury for his policies but to his own party.
The Chanc. o f the Exchequer has given fresh proof o f his intention to be financially 
orthodox. The doctrines he expounded so soundly on constitutional, economical & 
financial grounds to the old Vestrymen [declining to renew the coal octroi duty] 
have exploded like a bombshell in the Conservative camp. “Lord Salisbury must at 
once disown such heterodox opinions”; but it is a matter o f fact they had been first 
submitted to the Cabinet; and the sooner the old “high & dry” Tory recognizes that 
his creed is dead & buried, the better for his peace o f mind.44
41 James, Churchill’ p. 276.
42 Marsh, p. 99.
43 H D , iii, p. 49.
44 BL H D , Add. MS 48645, f. 3 5 .1  like its audacity, but the succession duties are a ticklish thing for any Tory 
Chancellor o f  the Exchequer to touch, especially i f  he cannot give some relief to real property from local 
rating.’ 21 N ov., Lord George Hamilton, CP 9248/17/2045. Salisbury wrote to Cranbrook on 23 N ov. that 
Churchill ‘is wholly out o f sympathy with the rest o f  the Cabinet, and, being besides o f  a wayward and 
headstrong disposition, he is far from mitigating his resistance by the method o f  it.’James, Churchill, p. 277.
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Perhaps it was because he was so intent on burying ‘high and dry Toryism’ that he
redoubled his efforts against expenditure and especially that o f Smith and the War Office.
I was flabbergasted this morning at learning that an intimation had been received at 
the Treasury from the W.O. that the latter would present a supplementary estimate 
o f £560,000!!!!... I can’t go on at this rate. Whether on foreign policy or home policy 
or expenditure I have no influence at all. The Govt are proceeding headlong to a 
smash and I could be connected with it; the worst feature o f all is this frantic 
departmental extravagance.45
Smith’s reply was hard headed, sensible and to the point: ‘the cake was eaten before I got 
here.’46 This was the expenditure that the Conservative party had demanded when in 
opposition and insisting that Gladstone’s efforts were insufficient. Army (and Navy) 
Estimates for existing establishments could not be got down by shouting at them, and Smith 
knew this from his time at the War Office in 1885, and nothing had changed in the interim. 
The only means o f substantial reduction would be to cut back on the number o f troops, and 
this would o f course require a concurrent roll-back o f  commitment in the face o f  what both 
government and party perceived as an escalating climate o f European military tension. The 
most tempting source o f funds available to Churchill was Northcote’s New Sinking Fund 
which represented the difference between the interest and management charges for the debt 
and the annual appropriation o f £28 million. This was the temporary recourse resorted to by 
Childers and Hicks Beach in 1885 and by Harcourt in 1886, and which was now to be made 
permanent.
[Churchill] has many schemes in his head o f a drastic nature. He is bent on great 
changes as to the Debt charges. He can make out a good case for reducing the 
charge & reducing it very appreciably; but he must not go too far; however much he 
may declare he would be as soon hung for a man as a sheep, otherwise he will find 
himself in great difficulty.47
The main difficulty which Churchill believed himself to be in was that creeping growth in 
expenditure would not permit him to deliver the blockbuster budget he was intent upon. It
45 James, Churchill, pp. 281—2.
46 Churchill, ii, p. 227.
47 BL H D , Add. MS 58645 f. 38, 28 Nov. 1886.
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was not just personal ambition that dictated this course. If he were to raid the Sinking Fund 
he had better have a great purpose in doing so, or his challenge to financial orthodoxy 
would never be forgiven. To raid it as part o f a great and comprehensive programme was 
one thing, to raid it in order to cover spending increases and to remit taxation would be seen 
as craven expediency in the service o f profligate Toryism. He would do better to borrow the 
money in such circumstances. But if he could reduce the expenditure so as to be able to 
remit taxation and present a “Tory Democracy” Budget he would have achieved something 
to compare with Gladstone’s effort in 1853. It would be especially impressive when 
compared to the last two Liberal Budgets o f Childers and Harcourt. If he did this his 
reputation within the government and the Conservative party would be unassailable, and so 
would the reputation o f the Conservative party for democratic, popular and sound finance.
He had settled most points o f his Budget by the beginning o f December, although
he would still need the co-operation o f the spending departments if it were to succeed.
Hamilton’s diary records both the settled nature o f Churchill’s plan and his own foreboding
as to the probable consequences o f the Chancellor’s great ambition.
He insists on reducing the Debt charge by 4 V2 millions; and but for my ‘obstinacy’ 
(as he calls it) he would like to help himself to more. He indeed questions the 
expediency o f paying off debt. He attaches great importance to simplifying the debt 
account. This can be done; but the complication has been in great measure the safety 
of the provision for redeeming debt. He has great ideas in his head. He evidently 
wants to make a coup by a popular Budget — a general remission all round: a great 
reduction o f  the income tax, also a reduction o f the tea and tobacco duties (with an 
increased duty on manufactured tobacco as a small sop to his ‘fair trade’ friends); an 
uniform death duty on all property, real as well as personal; a graduated House Tax; 
and a reform o f local taxation towards which certain Imperial taxes are to be 
appropriated. I expect he will ‘fly too high’.48
It was a great scheme for an ambitious budget, and it had been worked through in thorough 
detail. There were two thrusts to the plan: an £8,400,000 reduction o f expenditure and an
48 H D , iii, p. 50.
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£4,500,000 addition to taxation. The reduction was to consist o f the £4,500,000 raid on the 
Sinking Fund, abolition o f the £2,600,000 local grants in aid and an unspecified £1,300,000 
diminution in expenditure which would together bring total expenditure down to 
£82,000,000. The additional taxation was to be comprised of: £1,400,000 death duties, 
£1,500,000 House duties49, £204,000 extra stamps, £315,000 Corporation duty, £500,000 
horse tax, £300,000 o f sundries, and £250,000 from wine for a total revenue o f 
£94,500,000. The great end sought from these savings and additions was to be able to 
reduce the income tax from 8d. to 5d. at a cost o f £4,870,000; take 2d. off the tea duty, 
£1,400,000; a Ad. remission o f the tobacco duty and to remit £5,000,0000 to local bodies in 
relief o f rates. The net result was calculated to yield a surplus o f £780,000. O f course, 
without the unspecified savings o f £1,300,000 on expenditure that surplus would be turned 
into a deficit o f £520,000.50 It was a “democratic Budget,” bold in a number o f areas such as 
the departure from strict principles o f “Sound Finance” in order to diminish debt 
repayment; radical in others like the graduation and equalization o f the death duties; while 
thoroughly orthodox in its proscription o f extravagant expenditure. There is no doubt, as 
Churchill intended, that it was a sensational Budget.51
Nor was there a shortage o f detail and smaller measures, chief amongst which were 
the alterations and additions to the Stamp duties. He planned a major overhaul: revising the 
patent medicine duty to extract an additional £100,000 {£50-70,000 in the financial year 
1887}; 2s. per cent stamp duty on the share capital o f joint-stock companies: £100,000 
{£58,000}; repeal o f the exemption o f Municipal corporations from the 5% corporate
49 This was justified by the Treasury as a most legitimate application o f  graduation, in contrast to graduation o f  
the income tax. ‘A great house, like a carriage, or armorial bearings, involves an expenditure on luxury, and is a 
good object for augmented taxation, above the rate o f  a small one.’ 24 Nov., CP 9248/17/2055. The Cabinet 
thought otherwise, ‘it was unanimously disapproved’, but nobody would stand up to Churchill. Ld. G. 
Hamilton, ii, p. 43.
50 From the facsimile reproduction o f  Lord Randolph Churchill’s Budget in Churchill, ii, following page 192.
51 Although by no means as sensational as it might have been: ‘I have considered in the night your idea o f  
putting a duty on all imported goods and I believe it would destroy your budget for you would, I think, make 
opponents o f  all the Commercial classes and would unite every free trader against you. May I add that he 
would be a very dull free trader who did not see that such a tax was only the thin end o f the wedge o f  
protection.’ A.E. West, 7 Dec., CP 9248/17/2122.
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income tax: £315,000; a l i  revenue stamp on shotgun shells: £280,000; taxes on pistols and
pistol dealers along with a 5/. annual licence on brokers: £100,000. To which must be added,
A group o f proposals comprising an extension o f receipt duty to sums between lOr. 
and 2/.; the repeal o f certain exemptions ... acknowledging receipt o f consideration 
o f money therein expressed; a duty on tickets o f admission to places o f amusement 
... and vouchers, a duty on certificates o f proprietorship o f shares, and upon letters 
o f application for stock; and an assimilation o f the duty on transfers o f debenture 
and ordinary stock.... estimated to produce an additional 150,000/ a year.52
These were, to a not inconsiderable extent, to be not just a source o f revenue but to 
discourage reckless speculation and gun-play. In the case o f the Death duties Churchill had 
‘the double object o f obtaining a larger revenue by a simpler method. He wanted more 
money and less machinery, fewer taxes and an increased return.’53 The Chan, o f the 
Exchequer’s proposals are o f a startling character.... He must beware o f not following too 
closely the footsteps o f Dizzie [Disraeli] this first Budget.’54 Such was Churchill’s Budget to 
champion and consolidate “Tory Democracy”, and to secure the future for the Conservative 
party. But it was not a Conservative Budget. When he presented it to the Cabinet on 17 
December the reaction was not what he had expected. “They said nothing,’ he told Lord 
Welby, ‘nothing at all; but you should have seen their faces!”55
That his Cabinet colleagues were taken aback by proposals which had startled 
Hamilton should not surprise, in fact the complexity o f the proposals would quite naturally 
take some time to digest, particularly as Churchill had made his presentation verbally. It 
‘called into question some o f the central purposes o f a Conservative government as 
conceived by Salisbury, and thereby raised issues which went far beyond minor
52 Churchill, ii, pp. 199—202. These were discussed in detail with the Chairman o f  the Board o f  Inland 
Revenue, A.E. West 15, 21 and 23 Nov., CP 9248/17/2016, 2039 and 2040.
53 Churchill, ii, p. 192.
54 Referring to Disraeli’s abortive Budget o f  1853. BL H D , Add. MS 48645 f. 56,16 Dec. 1886.
55 Churchill, ii, p. 212.
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compromises over figures.’56 The trouble began soon enough. In fact, it had never abated,
for the spending estimates were still in the air and the £1,300,000 o f savings were as yet
theoretical rather than actual. The three days leading up to the Budget had seen an exchange
o f letters between Smith and Churchill. The War Office Estimates were met by a Treasury
request to further review the expenditure, and Smith replied on the 14th demurring.57
Churchill appealed to Salisbury for savings on the Army Estimates. The Cabinet, happily,
not I will have to decide the controversy between you and Smith,’ but he then proceeded to
throw his own support behind Smith by weight o f Foreign Office argument to show the
need for a strong military. ‘It was the clearest possible warning to Churchill not to press that
particular matter at that time. ... Now, Salisbury was making patently clear ... was no time to
stint on defence.’58 Lord George Hamilton, First Lord o f the Admiralty, had warned
Churchill on 25 November that ‘Salisbury is getting to the position where he will be pressed
no more.’59 Churchill too had reached the end o f a rope, for the pressure had exhausted him
physically and mentally to the point where ‘fatigue and exasperation distorted his tactical
sense.’60 He lost all sense o f balance at the worst possible time, for his battle with Smith
over the Army estimates had reached the decisive moment. His Cabinet colleagues had
made requests for clarification and further information about the Budget proposals, Smith
had gone so far as to ask for a printed statement which set o ff the following explosion.
How can you be so unreasonable as to require me to write a ‘short’ memorandum 
on the Budget proposals? Changes so large cannot be set out in ‘short’ documents;
... I have neither the time nor energy to do that... Really, considering your frightful 
extravagance at the War Office you might at least give me a free hand for ‘ways and 
means’. If the Cabinet want further information on the proposed budget I am ready 
to be cross examined, but I could not possibly produce the document you demand. I
56 Porter, p. 163. Foster notes that by the end o f  November ‘a powerful element in the government had 
coalesced against Churchill’, meaning Salisbury, p. 299.
57 Churchill, ii, p. 231. On the 16th they exchanged offers o f  resignation, Smith to Churchill: 1  will go into 
figures with you if  you like — but it is out o f  the question for you to talk o f  retiring. I f  one o f  us goes I shall 
claim the privilege.’ Ibid., p. 232.
58 Salisbury told the Queen on 16 Dec. that the Cabinet ‘was not a happy family.’ Roberts, p. 405.
59 James, Churchill, p. 280.
60 Marsh, p. 99.
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assume for all practical purposes that the Cabinet have consented to the outline o f  
the budget.61
Smith and Churchill had arranged a meeting for the morning o f  the 20th at which, after two 
hours, nothing was resolved, except further mutual offers o f resignation and the end o f  
Smith’s patience.
He gave me to understand that it was not simply on Estimates or expenditure that 
he should go but on general policy — a bad programme and an undecided Foreign 
Policy. It comes to this — is he to be die Government. If you are willing that he 
should be, I shall be delighted, but I could not go on, on such conditions.62
Salisbury was not happy at what he had calculated as ‘an extra burden o f ninepence in the
pound’ on land and was especially concerned by the plan to equalize the death duties as to
realty and personalty, ‘a graduated death tax’. 63 The Chancellor took the time to reply to
Salisbury that ‘the country gentlemen, like the farmers, always think they are being
plundered and ruined’ but under his scheme would be getting a £5  million rather than a £3
million present from the Exchequer.64 Later that night when he wrote again to Salisbury
from Windsor castle, it was his resignation.
There can be nothing so straightforward as the letter o f  resignation, except that 
letters o f resignation from Chancellors o f the Exchequer to Prime Minister were so well 
established a part o f the annual game o f Budgeting the next year’s expenditure that they 
represented a sort o f transparent ambiguity. A matter o f form rather than substance. 
However in this instance they were no longer playing on the same team, in which case 
Churchill’s resignation may be considered a reckless challenge for which a sending-off was 
the inevitable and appropriate result. The letter itself sets out clearly and precisely the exact
61 18 Dec., James, Churchill' p. 284.
62 20 Dec., Smith to Salisbury, Roberts, p. 407.
63 18 Dec., Salisbury to Balfour. Salisbury included with this a memorandum arguing the net effect on land 
would be ‘an extra succession duty o f  five percent’, less the proffered 3d. relief a net 9d. Robin Harcourt 
Williams, ed., The Salisbury —Balfour Correspondence. Letters exchanged between the Third Marquess of Salisbury and his 
nephew Arthur Balfour, 1869—1892 (Hertfordshire Record Society Publications, volume 4,1988), pp. 166-7.
64 19 Dec., Churchill, ii, p. 233.
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nature o f the conflict between the Chancellor o f the Exchequer and his party and 
Government.
... The Army Estimates thus swollen show an increase o f about 300,000/. The total 
31 millions for the two Services, which will in all probability be exceeded, is very 
greatly in excess o f what I can consent to. I know that on this subject I cannot look 
for any sympathy or effective support from you, and I am certain that I shall find no 
supporters in the Cabinet. ... I am pledged up to the eyes to large reductions of 
expenditure, and I cannot change my mind on this matter. If the foreign policy o f  
this country is conducted with skill and judgement, our present huge and increasing 
armaments are quite unnecessary, and the taxation which they involve perfectly 
unjustifiable. The War estimates might be very considerably reduced if  the policy o f  
expenditure on the fortifications and guns and garrisons o f  military ports, mercantile 
ports and coaling stations was abandoned or modified. But o f this I see no chance, 
and under the circumstances I cannot continue to be responsible for the finances.65
Salisbury’s letter accepting this resignation was written and delivered on the 22nd, and gave
no ground whatsoever. ‘I have no choice but to express my full concurrence with the view
o f Hamilton and Smith, and my dissent from yours.’ Both he and Balfour accepted the risk
o f losing the government if they lost Churchill and his Budget, especially the death duties.
‘He has not resigned as leader o f the “Tory Democrats.” He has resigned as a thwarted Ch.
o f the Exchequer: — and not only that, but as a Ch. o f the Ex. thwarted on a point which he
will, I believe, carry with him none o f the party.’66
His bluff having been called Churchill could only reiterate and amplify his criticisms
exactly as Smith had summarized on the 20th.
...it is not niggardly cheeseparing or Treasury crabbedness, but only considerations 
o f high state policy which compel me to sever ties... A careful and continuous 
examination and study o f national finance, o f the startling growth o f expenditure, o f  
national taxation resources and endurance, has brought me to the conclusion from 
which nothing can turn me, that it is only by the sacrifice o f a Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer upon the altar o f thrift and economy which can rouse the people to take 
stock o f their leaders, their position and their future.... The foreign policy which is 
being adopted appears to me at once dangerous and methodless; but I take my stand 
on expenditure and finance, which involve and determine all other matters.67
65 20 Dec., Churchill, ii, pp. 234—5.
66 Salisbury to Balfour 22 Dec. I f  we are to break up it should be before we are committed to any radical 
principles which will hopelessly embarrass us in the future, we cannot turn Radical even to preserve the Tory 
party!’ Balfour to Salisbury, Harcourt Williams, pp. 168-9.
67 22 Dec., Churchill, ii, pp. 238—40.
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Having nailed his personal political standard to the mast o f expenditure and finance 
Churchill would run out his political career on it, but all questions o f personal ambition and 
character are overshadowed by the absolute sincerity o f his conviction on this issue. “Sound 
Finance”, a “Tory Democrat” variant but still at heart the same Gladstonian doctrine which 
overshadowed his whole career in politics, was the altar at which he deliberately and 
willingly sacrificed his career and ambition. The fact that he miscalculated in matters o f  
gamesmanship with Salisbury does not detract from the fact that he was convinced he could 
force the government, in the end, to come round to his way o f thinking. His failure 
mirrored almost exactly the political circumstances o f the time, for he was not a 
Conservative o f the Salisbury mould68, and his fall made explicit that in matters o f finance 
the Conservative party would have to draft in another outsider if  their claims to financial 
competence and adherence to “Sound Finance” were to be made credible. To do this almost 
brought down the government and when they finally obtained in Goschen this outsider, it 
was a Unionist Government with a Liberal Unionist Chancellor o f the Exchequer.
68 ‘Why should it ever have been supposed that he would have abandoned forthwith all his liberal views, 
would have repudiated or ignored all his pledges o f  economy and would have settled down to the adroit 
manipulation o f  a Parliamentary majority for strictly Conservative ends ... But they were Tory Ministers; and 
they did not intend, whatever happened, to be dragged out o f  their own proper sphere and committed to large 
reforms and democratic Budgets.’ Churchill, ii, p. 217—8.
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Renegade: Goschen andLiberal-Unionist Finance
George Joachim Goschen, arch-Whig Liberal-Unionist, former Cabinet minister,
and City financier, seemed to have struck everyone as an inevitable component o f the
Salisbury Ministry. This despite the fact that he was still nominally a Liberal and didn’t have
a seat in Parliament, having lost his Edinburgh constituency in the election.69 Gladstone told
Hamilton on 24 July 1886 that ‘from every point o f view Goschen would do well to join the
Tories: he would make a good Foreign Secretary for them: he would keep them straight on
financial questions.’70 Goschen, remarkably, had anticipated such a role for himself a year
earlier than this. Except then his anticipation had been to step in and save a Gladstone
Ministry from the Radicals.
I should be able to act and come forward in defence o f Moderate Liberalism; as one 
o f the joint heirs o f Gladstone and his “sound economic school” instead o f a 
malcontent and outsider. Gross Conservative profligacy almost drives me to this 
course, and Gladstone’s comparative moderation makes it possible.71
At the same time as Churchill was writing to acknowledge Salisbury’s acceptance o f his 
resignation, Goschen was being urged by Milner that he had to accept the vacant 
Chancellorship o f the Exchequer.72
The next day, 24 December, ‘Queen Victoria begged Goschen... to join Salisbury if  
Hartington were to refuse [the Premiership and a coalition].’73 Hartington was indeed 
offered, for the third time, the Premiership and re-called for this purpose and to his 
considerable chagrin, from his holiday in Rome.74 There was a Cabinet meeting on 28 
December at which the Estimates were approved and the resignation crisis discussed. It was
69 Churchill and Salisbury corresponded 7—23 Nov. about finding Goschen a safe seat if  he would consent to 
run as a Unionist. Salisbury found ‘Goschen is rather hard to please’. CP 9248/17/1977,1979,2006 and 2043.
70 H D , iii, p. 43.
71 This, o f  course, was before Home Rule. Goschen to Grey 20 Sept. 1885, Cooke and Vincent, pp. 100—1.
72 Thomas J. Spinner, George Joachim Goschen. The Transformation of a Victorian Liberal (Cambridge, 1973), p. 131.
73 Spinner, p. 133. Roberts, p. 417, claims that the Queen’s letter was sent at Salisbury’s request.
74 According to Hamilton once Hartington realized the actual political situation he felt ‘that indeed his journey 
expenses ought to be paid (whether by Lord Salisbury or Randolph Churchill was not so clear).’ 30 Dec. 1886, 
BL H D , Add. MS 48645 f. 70.
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at this point, apparently for the first time, that Salisbury put Goschen forward as a possible
replacement for Churchill.75 By the 30th the rumour had reached Hamilton.
He has so long been at loggerheads with the bulk o f the Liberal party that it would 
be much less difficult for him than for Hartington to join the Gov’t. Indeed it would 
be a good thing from a public point o f view if  Goschen were to join the 
Conservatives body & soul, but in any case Liberals have no right to be “dogs in the 
manger” about him.76
The day before the New Year was when the fate o f the Government and its Premier was 
decided. Hartington again declined to take the lead, but agreed ‘that Goschen might be 
asked again, with Salisbury offering him a Conservative seat in the Commons.’77 This was 
the formal offer o f the Exchequer to Goschen and was, according to Marsh, the real 
beginning o f the Unionist alliance as it put in place ‘a narrow, naturally conservative alliance 
o f Salisbury and Hartington, in place o f the broad, ideologically amorphous alliance of 
Salisbury and Churchill with Hartington and Chamberlain.’78 Goschen was the key to this 
understanding and was himself the ‘Liberal Unionist most akin to Salisbury in political 
philosophy.’79 As o f  1 January 1887 Goschen was effectively in the Salisbury Government, it 
only remained to negotiate the finer details, and the Queen was again urging him to accept 
office.80 After a suitable hesitation and the polite request o f necessary but minor conditions 
Goschen formally accepted Salisbury’s offer 3 January, and again Hamilton’s intelligence 
was impeccable. ‘He will however enter the Gov. still nominally as a Liberal and as such 
cannot well be entrusted with the leadership o f the House o f Commons which will most 
probably fall to the lot o f W. H. Smith.’81 5 January he received another letter from his most 
pushing supporter, ‘The Queen rejoices to see Mr. Goschen her Chancellor o f the
75 Roberts, p. 417.
76 BL H D , Add. MS 48645 f. 72.
77 Roberts p. 420. Goschen, unfortunately, did not take up the offer o f  the safe seat.
78 Marsh, p. 117.
79 Ibid.
80 Spinner p. 134. She sent an unciphered telegram, which Roberts again insists was at Salisbury’s request, p. 
420.
81 2 January 1887, BL H D , Add. MS 48645 f. 73.
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Exchequer.’82 By 16 January, Goschen had kissed hands and was invested as Chancellor o f  
the Exchequer, ‘the “Cavendish footman dressed up in Cecil livery.”’83
Goschen took great pains to emphasize that he joined the Salisbury Ministry as a
liberal Unionist. He delayed joining and imposed conditions for the sake o f  form rather
than conviction, in the way that a widow must serve an appropriate period o f mourning
before her next betrothal. He insisted that Hartington made him do it. ‘I joined as a Liberal
Unionist, not as a Conservative. There is no abandonment o f Associations or o f principles;
and I act on Harrington’s advice.’ ‘I have never had a more difficult choice to make; but I
am glad now that I have acted as I have done; and I may say that Hartington urged it on
me.’84 His most decisive act towards this end was to refuse the Conservative offer o f a safe
seat and instead to contest the Exchange Division o f Liverpool, vacant on the death o f the
Gladstonian incumbent who had won by less than 200, in December.
He apparently disliked the idea o f taking a safe Conservative seat. That would 
tarnish the halo o f Liberal Unionism which he hoped would brighten the 
Conservative cabinet and save him from the charge o f political apostasy.85
‘His defeat [26 January] was rather an annoyance and a mortification than a disaster,... for a 
fortnight afterwards he was returned for the safe Conservative seat o f St. George’s Hanover 
Square,... the last electoral contest in which Goschen was ever engaged.’86 Mortification it 
wis, he had lost by just seven votes, but he was in the service o f a higher cause: the 
pieservation o f the Union, keeping Gladstone and the Radicals out o f office, and keeping 
the Tories true to “Sound Finance”. This last was not least o f  his motivations. Goschen 
seemed to be the personification o f “Sound Finance” and a champion o f Gladstonian fiscal 
reetitude, and these were crucial to the Liberal Unionist claim to relevance and the key to
82 Vrthur D. Elliot, The U fe of George Joachim Goschen, First Viscount Goschen, 1831—1907 (London, 1911), p. 108. 
Tlere is no indication that Salisbury requested this.
83'6 Jan. 1887, BL HD, Add. MS 48645 f. 83.
84 illiot, Jan.3 to A.L. Bruce (his Scottish manager for Edinburgh East) and to Elliot, 5 Jan., both p. 107.
85Jpinner, p. 136.
86 iilliot, pp. 112-3.
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the otherwise inexplicable leverage o f their numbers in Parliament to political power and 
influence. If “Sound Finance” had not such a stranglehold on elite opinion, both in and out 
o f doors, would they have mattered nearly so much?
It was not until the end o f February that Goschen tackled the Budget in earnest,
having made up his mind not to attempt a showy budget... The only things he can touch
are the debt charge and the income tax and perhaps the tobacco duties.’87 His options were
limited: to do nothing, do little or take up Lord Randolph Churchill’s bold schemes for
retrenchment and wholesale restructuring o f the finances. The first was ruled out once the
Estimates were constructed along the lines insisted upon by the Admiralty and War Office.
The War Office was particularly keen to take advantage o f a Conservative government and
the new attitude towards military expenditure which looked at it as necessary rather than a
necessary evil. Smith’s successor, Sir Edward Stanhope, emphatically restated this new
attitude in a War Office memorandum o f 28 February in which he justified the need for a
supplementary estimate in 1886 due to the cost o f the Egyptian occupation, a cost which
necessarily would run into 1887. In fact £292,000 o f the estimated increase was due to the
pressing need for Naval armaments (which were accounted for in Vote 12 o f  the Army
Estimates) which the previous Liberal ministry had decided to postpone, much to its
subsequent embarrassment.88 This dispute over retrenchment he made the most of.
It is sufficiently notorious that reductions o f  Army expenditure, while maintaining 
our existing establishment, have largely been effected in past years by drawing upon 
our reserve o f stores. There have been occasions when considerations o f economy 
have reduced this to a dangerously small amount. But indiscriminate reductions, 
effected for such an object, are neither safe nor altogether honest. ...Manufacturing 
and engineering departments necessarily enter into contract engagements extending 
over several years, and that a sudden curtailment o f Estimates may often mean not 
only the stoppage o f a particular work, but the loss o f a large part o f the money 
already expended , or it may involve a breach o f faith.... To suspend it for a single
87 H D , iii, 27 Feb. p. 56.
88 ‘[Ripon] got the necessary money for the new quick-firing breechloaders, but at the last moment Harcourt 
crossed his pen through the provision o f  ammunition for these guns.’ Ld. G. Hamilton, ii, p. 18.
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year is to cause great waste o f public money, or to inflict losses upon the trade only 
to be satisfied from pecuniary compensation.89
This point having been carried by the War Office, the Treasury approvals were forthcoming,
albeit grudgingly, from 10 February through 4 March.90
Goschen thoroughly investigated the revenue prospects on 4 March, cross 
examining West and Hamilton, but was informed ‘there is an utter want o f elasticity’ and so 
no hope o f a surplus could be entertained. The following day he had determined his 
eventual course.
He has made up his mind not to go beyond a reduction o f one penny in the income 
tax. He holds, and righdy so, that there cannot be any material remission o f taxation 
when there is no natural surplus and when relief can only be obtained by reducing 
the debt charge. With his financial reputation to maintain, he cannot afford to go in 
for a popularity seeking Budget.
This decision had not been arrived at easily, for Hamilton was complaining within a 
fortnight about Goschen’s indecisiveness. ‘I am all for his doing nothing or doing a good 
deal.’91 This just underlines the drastic nature o f what was contemplated, for a raid on the 
Sinking Fund was to follow in the footsteps o f Churchill away from strict Gladstonian 
orthodoxy. Reduction o f the Debt had been the over-arching object o f Gladstone’s last term 
as Chancellor o f the Exchequer and Goschen would have to choose between Gladstonian 
orthodoxy or Northcote’s Conservative response. The closing o f accounts at the end o f  the 
financial year helped to steel his determination to follow the less rigid Conservative school. 
Revenue in 1886—87 had exceeded its estimate by £750,000 and would result in a surplus o f  
almost the same, and this promised some cushion in 1887.
89 PRO WO 112/20 pp. 4 and 6.
90 PRO WO 112/19 p. vii and in T 5 /15  pp. 587—672, passim. For example, Navy Vote 11 for Works. Tt 
seems to be occasioned by works o f  various kinds at Haulbowline which my Lords would have thought might 
have been postponed until a period o f  less pressure, or have been covered by reductions elsewhere.’ It was 
nonetheless approved, p. 647, 28 Feb.
91 H D, iii, p. 56.
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Goschen is beginning to make up his mind, and in the right direction. We shall have 
a surplus o f revenue over expenditure next year, on the present basis, amounting to 
£600,000. A reduction o f the Debt charge by about 2 millions (which I believe 
under the circumstances to be amply justified) will with that surplus enable [him] to 
take Id o ff the income tax, to reduce the tobacco duties from 3 /6  to 3 /2  and to give 
the agriculturists some small boon.92
This was, effectively, the Budget. A significant but not extravagant reduction o f the income 
tax for the classes was balanced, in class consciousness if  not in strict balance sheet 
numbers, by a reduction o f tobacco duty for the masses. Hamilton’s diary for 13 April 
confirms the somewhat reluctant acquiescence o f the Exchequer in the course he had 
committed to.
He is somewhat uneasy about the general basis o f  our fiscal system, taxation being 
now derived from a few heads; and o f those heads the income tax is too high & 
stamps are stationary. The Irish revenue is falling off rapidly; & the tobacco duty is 
exorbitant in its rate.93
The Budget was approved in detail and principle at the Cabinet o f 16 April,94 and so the loss 
o f Churchill the Tory Apostate was made good by Goschen the Liberal Renegade.
The first o f Goschen’s six Budgets was presented to Parliament on 21 April 1887 in 
a speech o f two-and-one-half hours to a House which was less full than usual for such an 
occasion.95 He could happily report that the Revenue for the 1886—87 financial year was 
£903,75896 over the estimate, in spite o f a £444,000 shortfall in Excise, due mainly to similar 
increases in Customs and Stamps. The much smaller £386,523 increase o f Expenditure over 
estimate left a surplus o f £776,006 on the year. The Estimated Expenditure for 1887—88 
was a slight increase o f £183,459 on an admittedly high base which Goschen blamed on the
92 H D, iii, p. 58.
93 BL H D  Add. MS 48645, f. 17.
94 Ibid., f. 18.
95 Hamilton attributed this to Goschen’s prior intimation that it would be a “humdrum” Budget, Gladstone 
was conspicuously absent. H D, iii, p. 59.
96 All figures, unless otherwise noted, are found in or derived from the 26 April 1887 ‘Financial Statement 
1887-88’ pp. 1-5, P.P. 1887 (126) xlix. 249.
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temporary phenomenon o f the Naval scare o f 1884, and the more permanent increase in the 
Civil Service Expenditure which was the result o f new functions and responsibilities o f the 
State and which ‘has added 80% in less than twenty years to [its] cost’.97 The Revenue was 
an even less satisfactory estimate, the increase o f  £382,242 not keeping pace with the 
increase o f population. Goschen attributed this not ‘to the diminished consuming power o f  
the people, but rather a change in the habits o f  the working classes.... Precisely what we 
should expect would occur during a period o f commercial and agricultural depression such 
as has existed during the last few years.’98 The result, based upon existing taxation, would 
indicate a surplus o f £975,000 for the year ahead. A satisfactory outcome if he had no 
ambitions for his Budget beyond avoiding a deficit, but he had far more in mind to mark his 
debut as Chancellor o f the Exchequer.
There were a combination o f major and minor changes which would call upon far 
more than the estimated surplus for 1887—88. Reform o f Local Government and its Finance 
was in store and it would begin with the provision for Loans to local government. 1  
propose to discontinue the system o f borrowing on Treasury Bills for local loans purposes’ 
and to replace it with a new three-percent Local Loans Stock. In anticipation o f the changes 
to come he would also transfer the yield o f  the Carriage Tax, equivalent to £560,000, to the 
reconfigured Local authorities.99 Far more radical than this, however, was his plan to raid 
the Sinking Fund on a permanent basis, effectively to undo the work o f the last 
Conservative Chancellor to have delivered a Budget.
Goschen justified this innovation on two grounds: firstly that when Northcote 
increased the permanent charge on the debt to £28,000,000 in 1878 ‘we were at the end o f a
97 3 H  313.1425-27.
98 They were moving away from consumption o f  heavily taxed items such as beer and spirits to a greater 
consumption o f  tea and other non-taxed articles o f  consumption. Ibid., pp. 1432—3.
99 A  relief on rates and “agriculturist’s” boon. 3 H  313. 1443 and 1454.
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period o f great prosperity’; secondly, both Childers and Harcourt had had to suspend its
provisions during 1885 and 1886 (and Hicks Beach too had acquiesced in this operation).
Goschen proposed, therefore, ‘in the interests o f sound finance’ to reduce the permanent
charge to service the Debt.
Under the new proposals the total Debt Charge will be £26,000,000 ... as against a 
statutory charge o f £28,037,000. The apparent saving to the Exchequer being ... 
£2,037,000. But the net loss to the Chancellor o f the Exchequer by the Local Loans 
arrangements above mentioned amounts to ... £333,000. Therefore the net relief to 
the Exchequer on National Debt and Local Loans is ... £1,704,000.100
‘The Sinking Fund, I maintain, is not in a strong position; it has been proved to be in an
unsafe position while it continues as heavy as it is at present.’101 Such an extraordinary step
he meant to justify by two important remissions o f taxation. The first and most substantial
was to reduce the Income Tax from 8d. to Id. at an estimated cost o f £1,560,000. This he
balanced by a remission o f indirect taxation for the “masses”, reducing the Tobacco Duty
from 3s.6d. to 3s.2d. per pound. This was a moral balance only, the £600,000 cost to the
Treasury far below the gain to the “classes”, as the direct taxpayers were styled, on the
Income Tax. The sum o f these changes was to reduce the Revenue to £88,135,000 and the
Expenditure to £87,846,294 for an estimated surplus o f £288,706. Goschen concluded by
confessing that he was ‘perfectly aware that there are much larger tasks before us — much
larger tasks either for ourselves or those who may follow us.’102 Those tasks he was satisfied
for the time being to leave as hostages to the political fortunes o f the Unionist cause.
Harcourt was first to speak on behalf o f the Liberal Opposition, rejecting outright 
Goschen’s assessment o f the economy: ‘the truth is that no great falling-off has occurred, 
and that the resources o f the country are well maintained.’ The real problem was not a 
shortfall o f  revenue, itself due to healthier habits o f the working classes and so a falling o ff
100 P R O  T 171/85, ff. 521-522.
101 3 H  313. 1452.
102 3 H  313.1452-1459.
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o f  alcohol revenue, but an excess o f expenditure due in no small part to the Tories’ 
contrived Naval scare. ‘So long as the House o f  Commons and the British Public will allow 
itself to be made the victim o f these newspaper scares, so long will the Expenditure o f this 
country outrun the Revenue o f the country.’ Harcourt saw deliberate obfuscation in the 
presentation o f the accounts, mainly as a result o f changes to the amount o f Debt service 
and the new scheme for local loans, and defied ‘any ordinary mortal to ascertain what is the 
real Expenditure or Revenue o f the country’ from the Treasury returns. The biggest 
criticism was, o f course, reserved for the reduction o f the permanent annual debt charge, ‘a 
fatal blow to any attempt to discharge Debt.’ The argument on behalf o f this reduction as 
put forward by Goschen was, furthermore, a fatal argument which would always find favour 
with taxpayers and be applicable at any time now or in the future. It would not only 
encourage reckless expenditure but also fund it. ‘The only check there is upon this 
expenditure is to make it felt in taxation.’ This, above all, being the point which divided 
Liberals and Conservatives on finance. The ultimate result would be borrowing, “having 
broken down the provision for the liquidation o f the Debt which I consider one o f  the 
fundamental provisions o f sound finance.’103
This line o f attack was carried on by Churchill, who made sarcastic reference to 
Goschen’s fiscal reputation. ‘How great is the worldly worth o f reputation ... if  I had made a 
proposal o f that kind,... I should have raised the indignation o f every person in the country 
who considered himself sound and orthodox in all the doctrines o f  finance.’ He wondered 
that the Chancellor had ‘not said one word on the subject o f economy and retrenchment’, 
despite the fact that the Army and Navy Estimates had increased £6,000,000 over 5 years. 
The real danger, according to Churchill, was that by not increasing taxation they would lose 
the best guarantee o f retrenchment: the inevitable pressure o f the taxpayers upon members
103 3 H  313.1459-1473.
123
o f Parliament for relief from the taxation necessary to pay for that expenditure. The
reduction o f the Debt charge was unpardonable.
I regret... that the great principle o f the repayment o f the National Debt has been 
interfered with for so light, so trivial, and so unsound a case. I regret that a great 
weapon has been tampered with, blunted and spoiled for future use in a period o f  
emergency.... He has put out o f court all the financial principles in which he has 
been trained, which he has heretofore proclaimed, and which he hoped, when he 
acceded to Office, he would be able to impress upon Parliament and country.104
Unstated was the ill-concealed secret that his own plan to raid and reduce the Debt charge
was, in his own estimation, for a weighty, serious and sound case o f fiscal restructuring.
Churchill, having nailed his colours to the mast o f “Sound Finance” with his
resignation in December, was showing every proof o f his intentions to stay with the sinking
ship. He kept to it in January when he spoke before Parliament in defence o f his
resignation105 and had even gone so far as to intrigue with Labouchere in February,
as to how some way could be devised in which he could support Gladstone against 
Salisbury.... [He] was attempting to devise a situation in which he would tell the 
House that Gladstone and home rule were a lesser evil than Salisbury and unsound 
finance.106
So it is no surprise that he took this opportunity to assail Goschen’s finance and courage, 
despite his own fruitless schemes to reduce the Debt charge and slash the Income Tax. But 
when he claimed that Goschen had ‘dashed all my hopes’ on the subject o f economy; when 
he warned Goschen that ‘When you embark in unsound finance you pay dearly for it’; and 
when he charged Goschen with having succumbed to ‘a temptation which has strongly 
assailed every Chancellor o f the Exchequer and every one up to now has been strong 
enough to resist it’ he was not merely engaging in hypocritical rhetoric. Churchill really 
meant it. He felt his own Budget would have been a political triumph for the Conservative 
party which would have boldly restructured the finances and so could have justified a
104 Ibid., p. 1496.
105 3 H  310. 57-67.
106 Cooke and Vincent, p. 78.
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reduction o f the Debt charge. His was a Budget designed to steal from the Liberals the
mantle o f fiscal responsibility and to establish with the newly enfranchised electorate the 
Conservative party’s (and Lord Randolph’s) reputation for low taxation and responsible 
Government.
All the hopes I had that the Tory Party would have taken up, and would have 
identified themselves with a policy o f sound economy, finance and retrenchment are 
shattered.... A golden opportunity for showing the country what our policy was has 
gone.... I only make these remarks because o f my intense and earnest desire that the 
present Government... may embark upon the paths o f financial stability.107
Although he may well have been naive in his assumptions o f  the power o f the Chancellor o f  
the Exchequer in imposing his will upon the Government and unrealistic in the scope for 
economies and retrenchment in the existing military establishments, he was undoubtedly 
sincere in his belief that “Sound Finance” was the key to the Conservative party establishing 
its credibility with the new mass electorate. On this point he would in the long run be 
proven correct, but in the immediate time Goschen had no intention o f  conceding any o f  
these points.
Goschen welcomed the opportunity to answer his critics and refute their 
interpretations o f “Sound Finance”. He took the chance to gently mock Churchill ‘a late but 
very brilliant recruit to the financial corps.’ He rejected outright the Liberal justification o f a 
punitive Income Tax in order to reduce extravagance, especially in light o f the unfair 
distribution o f the burden o f taxation on the Income Tax payer in favour o f the indirect 
taxpaying “masses”. With ‘the Income Tax at 8*/., you are not simply putting a burden upon 
the wealthy classes, but upon classes where there is much pinching penury.... I say that on 
an income o f  £500 a-year, £16 a-year is a large sum to pay in the shape o f Income Tax.’ 
Furthermore, he argued, it was the Income tax paying classes who had been paying for the
107 3 H  313.1831-1837.
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reduction in the National Debt through Income Tax and Death Duties. This was an
‘abnormally high tax upon one particular class o f the community’, and it was no longer
reasonable in the face o f present trade and revenue conditions, so very much less thriving
than the 1874—76 period when Northcote initiated the present Sinking Fund, to continue
forcing this class to carry the entire burden o f reducing the Debt. The underlying economic
conditions had changed. In any event he rejected the Liberal-Churchillite calls for economy
as not only unrealistic but as dangerously wrong-headed.
It is not my idea o f combining efficiency with economy, that when we have paid for 
the ships to be built, we should not provide the guns with which to arm those ships, 
or that when we have provided the guns with which to arm those ships we should 
not provide the ammunition for the guns.108
The central problem as Goschen saw it was how, in a democratic age, could the demands o f  
the electorate for expenditure be reconciled with their unwillingness or refusal to pay for it. 
The income tax-payer could not legally avoid payment, but in the ten year period since 1877 
his obligations had increased two and two-thirds times just as the revenue from alcohol had 
been falling off. Hamilton certainly believed this to be the essential feature o f  the Budget. 
‘[It] is not that the consuming power o f the community has diminished but that the habits 
of the masses have changed. They formerly spent their money on excisable articles; they 
now spend it more on untaxed commodities.’109 The main indirect tax sources o f revenue 
could be avoided or reduced: alcohol, tea and tobacco were to a certain extent voluntary 
taxation.
It is no use pointing to the aggregate population if  9—lOths o f that population are 
free from the obligation to contribute.... I feel very strongly and deeply that, 
considering the fact that the whole o f our taxation rests on so narrow a basis and so 
small a number o f taxes, I am not prepared to abandon any single tax without the 
gravest reflection and the most anxious study,... but until I have been able to see 
more clearly into the whole o f our fiscal system, I shall hold onto every tax we now 
have, making such remissions from time to time as may be calculated to render them 
more endurable to those who have to pay them.110
108 3 H  313.1837-1852.
109 HD, iii, p. 59.
110 3 H  313.1915 and 1918.
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The great task for the Chancellor o f the Exchequer in the new democratic age was to tax the 
new voters without losing their votes.
There was another point o f view which reacted to the Budget and this debate, that 
o f the Treasury. There is no better expression o f this than Hamilton, o f whom it can fairly 
be said that he worked both sides o f the street, confidant o f both parties and so invited to 
the best parties, all the while upholding the famous impartiality o f the British civil servant. 
His assessment is illuminating.
There was a very useful debate last night on the Budget proposals. Mr. Gladstone’s 
purist susceptibilities were gready injured. He regards any invasion o f the provision 
for reducing debt as an invasion o f the financial sanctum of the country. It is no 
doubt a perfecdy legitimate point o f attack, but he is not aware o f the rude shock we 
received last autumn. The Sinking fund has no friends outside the limited circle o f  
financial purists; & the more feeling he can exert in its favour, the better from the 
point o f view o f sound finance. A  man like Chamberlain would as readily as R. 
Churchill run a tilt against the whole o f the Sinking Fund. Accordingly, our object is 
to place the Debt Charge on such a footing as will secure it, at any rate for a time, 
from further encroachments.111
It was not that “Sound Finance” was under siege, but rather that the doctrine now found 
itself with fewer friends amidst more testing times. It would remain to be seen how this 
paradigm o f Gladstone’s Liberal governments would survive the change to a 
Conservative—Unionist regime.
111 BL HD, Add. MS 48645, 26 April 1887 ff. 28-9.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONVERSION AND REDEMPTION
1888: Conversion
The finance for 1888 was unusually complicated by the ambitious plans which 
Goschen hoped to achieve. He was ‘displaying immense activity’ according to Hamilton on 
4 January, planning a conversion o f the national debt and also the relief o f local taxation as 
part o f a Local Government measure.1 Such an ambitious program depended on both good 
luck and good planning, a sufficient revenue to see things through, and on there being no 
crises that would upset the financial markets or impose unexpected expenditure. Goschen 
would prove fortunate in this respect, but insofar as it was possible he made his own luck by 
insisting on realistic, cautious and sensible policies. There was also the advantage he began 
with, for the revenue estimates for 1887—8 had been continuously exceeded, and he knew 
that he could look forward to a healthy surplus at the close o f the year.2 If this trend 
continued he would have further fiscal room to manoeuvre in 1888. Yet there were further 
complications in store, particularly on account o f the Navy.
There would be a reduction o f £679,453 on the combined Army and Navy estimates 
for 1888—89, yet this time, after a long time, the Navy was beginning to get the upper hand 
in the negotiations. The Treasury had a tendency towards arrogance when dealing with the 
military spending departments, and the mid-winter battles with the Navy showed this at its 
fullest. One approval came in spite o f Treasury sarcasm, ‘my Lords fear the former prison 
has hitherto been peopled only by its officers.’ The provision for stores was likewise 
approved but not before noting that ‘although clothes are matters o f vital necessity, only 
dire extremity can justify their ever being regarded as victuals.’3 It was this attitude and line
1 HD, iii, p. 71.
2 By August Revenue was already £320,000 over the estimate for that period and by the end o f  September it 
was already dear where the increase was coming from. “1. Beer remarkable. 2. Spirits steady. 3. Stamps very 
good.” PRO T168/16.
3 PRO ADM  181/98. The latter comment was a source o f  some contention when it became necessary to 
provide a memorandum explaining the change to the form o f Navy Estimates. In response to a question from
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o f  attack which made Treasury control so intolerable to the Navy. The great change had 
come to the Army and Navy in the face o f the Lord Randolph Churchill’s accusations o f  
profligacy and inefficiency, and the Navy in keeping with Nelsonian tradition, had decided 
this time to “steer for the sound o f gunfire”.
They had come up with a strategy to “Copenhagen” the Treasury. The Navy had
made commendable efforts at efficiency, and these tended to increase savings. The
Estimates were framed ‘to give a direct interest to responsible officers in the Economical
administration o f  their different departments and the work placed in their charge.’4 The one
area where efficiency brought about the greatest return was in shipbuilding, and particularly
the Navy’s own dockyard work. Better supervision by both the Navy Controller’s office and
those responsible for the actual dockyard work had brought forward significant savings on
new construction, while concurrendy there had been reductions and reorganization o f the
dockyard labour force.5 Having cleaned its own house the Navy felt confident to take the
offensive against what it perceived to be the worst aspects o f Treasury control.
N o course can be more injudicious as regards the actual cost o f building ships, or 
more likely to put their efficiency out o f date when built, than to commence a large 
shipbuilding programme with insufficient funds.... If real financial control is to be 
exercised over shipbuilding and dockyard expenditure, it is essential that the control 
should be in the hands o f men who understand the nature o f work they supervise 
and o f the expenditure they check. No official, whatever may be his aptitude, who is 
a purely accounting officer, can with advantage undertake, or have imposed on him, 
such duties.6
the Admiralty Welby decided to have it printed. “I cannot resign myself to putting out the only laugh that 
shines a little light on this dreary discussion.” PRO T 1 /8 2 5 2 c /12179.
4 PRO ADM  181/98, memorandum o f 13 Dec. 1887.
5 Memorandum — Navy Estimates 1888, 3 H  323. 910-912. More than 2,000 had been let go and it had been 
decided to reduce the full-time establishment and supplement it with increased casual labour when necessary. 
See also Ld. G. Hamilton, i, p. 302.
6 Ibid., pp. 913—14. Delays and cost over-runs were ‘largely due to the Treasury declining to give the annual 
sums necessary for their rapid and economical advancement.’ Ld. G. Hamilton, i, p. 299.
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Having dealt with the micro-economic aspect o f their case the macro-economic was no less
worthy o f statement. While the vital necessity for efficiency was acknowledged the need for
retrenchment, in fact the desirability o f retrenchment, was questioned and rejected.
In the revision and preparation o f our present Estimates we have made provision 
for all immediate requirements, and we have not hesitated in every direction to cut 
off extraneous and questionable expenditure. But new works may more than 
counterbalance future economies, and it would, therefore, not be safe in our 
judgment to attempt hereafter to place it at a lower total than the aggregate sums to 
be spent this year upon naval objects, the future annual expenditure o f the Navy.7
The Navy had every intention o f maximizing the utility to be derived from a Conservative 
government, a sympathetic Prime Minister and a Chancellor o f the Exchequer who was at 
least not openly hostile, despite the traditions o f his department. Besides, Goschen had an 
opportunity to achieve the fiscal equivalent o f a Trafalgar.
The need for a conversion o f the National Debt to a lower rate o f interest had 
become compelling on at least two counts. The first and most obvious was that a successful 
conversion would result in substantial savings to the Exchequer on the permanent debt 
charge. Such a reduction o f expenditure would clear the way for equal remissions o f taxation 
or at the least allow for painless increased expenditure if  necessary. The Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer had o f course a fiduciary duty to secure for the country what would in any way 
be in his own best interest. Secondly, but o f more fundamental importance, was the 
evidence that Britain’s National Credit was undervalued in comparison with not just that o f  
other states but also other forms o f safe securities such as railway debentures.8 In fact recent 
economic studies have confirmed econometrically the anecdotal evidence that convinced 
Goschen o f this fact. Consols were trading above par but had reached a ceiling in price due 
to fear o f conversion.
7 Ibid., pp. 927-930.
8 Goschen used this argument in presenting his plan to Parliament, illustrating the decline in the yield o f  
Dutch, American, Swedish and British colonial stocks compared to Consols. 3 H  323. 708—712, 9 March.
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The opportunity for a conversion was also clear, the decade o f the 1880’s was one o f  
historically low interest rates, both short and long-term. Harley and Klovland both argue 
that the market effectively priced conversion into the Consol price from at least April 1881 
until the actual conversion and redemption was completed in 1889.9 There is clear evidence 
that the yield difference between Consols and Railway debentures was converging, 
particularly after Childers’ unsuccessful attempt at conversion in 1884.10 In fact that failure 
had at least one positive effect, for Childers established that the market would accept a 2 Vz 
percent Stock, even if  not the terms o f his conversion offer.11 It was also the case that short­
term interest rates were at a record low point in 1887 and 1888. Hamilton records this 31 
January 1888.
I was at the Bank to day, raising £200,000 in Treasury Bills. We got our money on 
wonderfully low terms. The lowest on record for this time o f year, Three Months 
Bills averaging only about £l/3r.O, and six months bills about £ l / l r  .0 per cent per 
annum.12
This gave encouragement to the Treasury on two fronts: that the time was indeed right to 
reduce the interest rate on Consols and that it would be possible to fund a cash payout to 
dissentients with cheap money by tapping these very low interest rates. The Treasury had 
further evidence from the Local Loans Stock, a three percent stock which it had been 
careful to introduce in order to establish a market for it. ‘[Goschen ] underrated the value 
which was certain in these days to attach to a Government stock the interest on which was 
guaranteed at 3 per cent for 25 years.’ There had been a greater demand than supply, the 
result being complaints about the way he had handled the issue but which nonetheless
9 C.K. Harley, “Goschen’s Conversion o f  the National Debt and the Yield on Consols,” Economic History 
Review, 29 (Feb. 1976), p. 102 and Jan Tore Klovland, “Pitfalls in the Estimation o f  the Yield on British 
Consols, 1850—1914,” The Journal of Economic History, 54 no. 1, (1994), p. 171. Both articles are concerned with 
the effect o f  the conversion on the Consol price as a reliable indicator o f  long-term interest rates rather than 
with the process o f  the conversion itself.
10 Harley, p. 105. Klovland, p. 184, shows that the Consol yield reached a historical low in March 1888, 
coinciding with Goschen’s announcement o f  the conversion offer.
11 Both Harley and Klovland utilize the trading prices o f  the Childers 2 Vz stock as an indicator o f  the actual 
long-term rate o f  interest, the fact that Childers’ attempt at conversion failed does not diminish its utility as an 
indicator and in fact its subsequent success as a traded stock goes some way to vindicate his effort.
12 BL H D, Add. MS 48647 f. 136.
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further established that the interest rate for Consols was too high.13 This was irresistible 
evidence that the time was ripe for a conversion.
Goschen in fact needed little convincing o f this, and he began the year with plans
for ‘either a limited or large conversion.’14 Childers wrote to him on 10 January to encourage
him that a compulsory plan was both feasible and necessary in light o f his failure to achieve
it voluntarily.15 Within a day they had the basis for a new attempt.
He might attack ‘reduced” and New Threes”; and probably the best way o f  
proceeding would be to give holders the option o f being paid o ff at par, or o f having 
half in 2 Vz per cent stock and half in a new three per cent stock, the interest of 
which would be guaranteed for (say) 20 years. By this means an increase to the 
nominal capital o f the debt might be avoided. A holder o f £200 Reduced would be 
given £100 in 2 Vz per cents valued at 95, & £100 in “irreducible Threes” valued at 
105.16
There was now no doubt that the plan would be put forward on a compulsory basis, but 
tvo huge questions remained. Would a brokerage commission be paid and would the plan 
encompass a small, large or complete conversion? The “New Three” per cent stocks were 
the obvious target as they could be, since 1874, redeemed at par and without notice. The 
other two classes o f Consols, the “Three per cents” and “Reduced Three per cents” 
required a twelve months notice o f redemption and accounted for more than double the 
anount o f stock held by the public.17 To attempt to convert all classes o f stock would be a 
vster undertaking but there were very sound reasons for wishing to do so. It would 
maximize the interest savings and result in a simplified, uniform and highly liquid class o f  
seurity more attractive for the market. This latter consideration grew more important as the 
pin gestated.
13 ft also impressed on Hamilton that I t  is no use nowadays to attempt to take any financial step without 
giing Brokers which are such a powerful body an interest & without taking the financial “big wigs” into 
confidence.’ 7 Jan. 1888, BL HD, Add. MS 48647, ff. 116-7.
14 HD, iii, p. 70, 4 Jan. 1888.
15 Elliot, p. 146.
161 Jan. 1888, BL H D, Add. MS 48647, f. 119.
17rhe public held the following amounts o f  stock in 1888: Three per cent Consols, £289 million; Three per 
ceit Reduced, £59  million; and N ew  Three Per Cents, £152 million. Harley, p. 102.
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The plan for Conversion was delivered in Parliament on the morning o f Friday 9 
March, timing being determined in part by the need to ensure maximum publicity and notice 
to bondholders. Goschen made a great effort to emphasize Parliamentary precedents for his 
scheme, citing at length the five successful and two failed attempts at conversion between 
1822 and 1884. This was important for two reasons: first, to ground his own plan firmly in 
established parliamentary precedent and, secondly, to appeal to influential members o f  
parliament (namely Gladstone), to support his measure. The string o f successful conversions 
of mosdy Revolutionary and Napoleonic war debt in the more than twenty year period o f  
the 1820s and 1840s provided the template for Goschen. The first o f these was Vansittart’s 
1822 conversion o f Navy and other 5 per Cents, amounting to £152,000,000 o f  stock. The 
terms provided that assent to the Government’s terms would be assumed unless a formal 
notice o f dissent was given, in which case Parliament was empowered to pay o ff the 
dissentients ‘at such periods and in such manners as Parliament may direct.’18 This 
conversion was a great success, only £3,000,000 o f stock notifying dissent and they were 
paid o ff at once, and in cash. Only two years later, Robinson was able to convert 
£75,000,000 o f stock from 4 to 3V2 per cent and on nearly identical terms as Vansittart, 
excepting a longer six months notice being required. Goulbum in 1830 converted “New 4 
Per Cents” to 3V2 Per Cents guaranteed for ten years o f which £154,000,000 assented and 
£3,000,000 dissented. Again dissentients were paid o ff in cash, and assent was presumed 
unless notice o f dissent was formally given. Althorp in 1834 enacted a minor operation 
which converted £10,600,000 o f Four Per Cents into 3V2 Per Cents, again on the above 
terms although in his case dissent was significant: £4,000,000 worth paid off in cash at once. 
The most important precedent was that o f Ghoulburn’s 1844 ‘conversion o f £249,000,000 
of Three-and-a-Half per Cents into an equal amount o f Three-and-a-Quarter per Cents, 
guaranteed for 10 years, and then falling automatically to Three per Cents, guaranteed for 20
18 3 H, 323. 714, 9 March.
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years/19 This was again utilizing the successful precedents as to notice and method o f  
payment o f dissentients, and it achieved a remarkable success as only £103,000 declined the 
terms offered. This was the model for Goschen’s conversion.
He was unapologetic in citing these precedents at length.
Remember that in all these cases these eminent men faced the same problem that 
you have to face now. They faced gigantic sums; they took great powers, and the 
result was successful, notwithstanding the largeness o f the sums.20
This he felt important to note by way o f contrast with the two unsuccessful attempts at 
Conversion: Gladstone’s o f 1853 and Childers’ o f 1884. In both examples the terms offered 
were optional rather than compulsory, and were to some extent doomed by the 
circumstances o f their timing. Goschen did concede the benefit o f Childers’ ‘creation o f  
those testing machines o f public credit’ in allowing him confidence to go forward with his 
own plan. Above all these precedents had provided him with proof o f the conditions 
necessary for success, ‘assent should be presumed in the absence o f an expression o f  
dissent, that the time allowed for the expression o f dissent should be strictly limited, and 
that the power should be taken to pay o ff the dissentients in such a manner as Parliament 
would direct.’21 All three o f these conditions were satisfied by the terms o f Goschen’s 
scheme, and he had two other provisions in addition. That the reduction o f the interest rate, 
like the 1844 Goulburn precedent, would be gradual, and that the outstanding capital o f  the 
Debt would not be increased as a result o f  the Conversion operation. Most important o f  all, 
Goschen wanted to ensure that all three types o f  Three per Cent stock were converted and 
amalgamated into only one new type o f stock.
This parliamentary statement served far more than a strictly legal purpose for 
Goschen. It was the first and critical stage in a shrewd publicity campaign to compel and
19 Ibid., p. 716.
20 Ibid., p. 715.
21 Ibid., p. 719.
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persuade all holders to convert their stocks, and it was also important to impress upon them
the tremendous power o f the state to ensure a successful conversion. Goschen went out o f
his way to emphasize the resources available to the Government to fund any cash payment
as became necessary for dissentients, although he reiterated that it was for Parliament to
determine in what “manner, order and period” it would be paid. ‘The Exchequer at the
present moment is infinitely stronger than it was in 1844.522 It had at its disposal
£60,000,000 o f Savings Bank Funds, and also had the option o f borrowing on Exchequer
Bills or even o f issuing new Stock. Most importandy, dissentients would have to invest their
money somewhere and would have no choice but to buy the very stock, on less attractive
terms, that they had dissented from accepting. This outcome he did not think likely,
surely it would also be in the interest o f the Consol-holders were the Market in the 
largest sense to be relieved from that constant apprehension which we felt if  there 
was a likelihood o f their being paid o ff by degrees, and from that uncertainty which 
has so long prevailed.23
Holders o f  New Threes had until 29 March to express dissent, while for Consols and 
Reduced Threes holders would receive the bonus, and brokers the paid commission, if  they 
assented to the conversion terms before 12 April. According to Goschen’s calculations the 
advantages accruing to the State through the savings on interest would be substantial, 
£410,000 each year from April 1889 and £820,000 from April 1903 on the New Threes 
alone. If the conversion were to have the maximum success and the whole o f the stock was 
converted the savings would be £1,400,000 and £2,800,000 respectively.
February then had been incredibly busy at the Treasury, with the Conversion work 
overshadowing the preparations for the Budget and the annual estimates. The good news 
had continued on the Revenue front and a surplus o f £1,740,000 was now anticipated.24 At
22 Ibid., p. 727.
23 Ibid., p. 730.
24 6 Feb., PRO T168/16.
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mid-month Goschen was hard at work on the Budget, despite incessant Conversion 
concerns.
What he wants to do is to take off a penny in the income tax as well as hand over in 
relief o f local taxation about another million and a half. He cannot however do this 
without imposing some fresh taxation, which is the most difficult o f all tasks. He 
thinks he sees his way to getting something more out o f stamps; but I doubt his 
being able to get sufficient to enable him to carry out his intentions.25
It would be a good while before the work on Conversion allowed the Budget to again take
precedence, and any elation over their handling o f the debt would have been foreshortened
by the problems o f coming to financial terms with the requirements for Local Government
finance.
This second Budget must have been a joy for Goschen to present, as he had good 
news all around from the last fiscal year. 1887—8 had exceeded the estimated Revenue by 
£1 ,454,000 whereas Expenditure fell £422,650 short o f the estimate. This left a handsome 
£2,165,356 surplus which, when added to that part o f the fixed charge for the reduction o f  
Debt, allowed him to pay off £7,293,000 o f Debt. ‘The largest sum which has ever been 
paid o ff out o f the moneys o f  a single year since 1872—3.’26 The largest items o f Revenue 
contributing to the increase were Stamps (mainly Death duties) and alcohol taxes, ‘the first 
time for many years, there has not been a decline in the revenue from drink.’27 The estimates 
for the year ahead were similarly promising, Revenue to decrease by £302,000 to 
£89,287,000 with Expenditure o f £86,909,944 was expected to yield a surplus o f £2,377,000 
on the existing basis o f taxation 28 However, changes to the basis o f taxation would 
necessarily rearrange these figures, and Goschen had some considerable changes to make.
25 HD, iii, 13 Feb., p. 73.
26 3 H  324. 278,27 March 1888. ‘Financial Statement 1888—89’ pp. 1-10, P.P. 1888, (97) lxv. 235 for figures.
27 Ibid., p. 274.
28 Ibid., pp. 285-6.
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The need to fund the Local Government Finance required that £1,400,000 o f the
Probate duty was diverted from the Imperial Exchequer. Goschen’s simultaneous desire to
remit Id. o ff the Income Tax inextricably linked the two measures. It became for him not
just a question o f finding the Revenue but o f developing a revenue philosophy to justify his
choice. T have a strong opinion that Income Tax falls very severely upon professional men
and the lower middle class. They, perhaps, feel the burden o f taxation as severely as any
class o f the community.’29 Moreover, ‘the Income Tax payers are certain victims o f every
extraordinary emergency; and although they may not be able to escape a high tax even in a
time o f profound peace, they ought, nevertheless, to be able to have immunity from an
amount above 6<7.’30 But these losses had to be made up, and Goschen took a scattergun
approach towards his revenue target. A Cart and Wheel duty was to provide £300,000 and
various Horse taxes another £540,000. Stamp Duties on “fugitive” foreign securities and
almost innumerable obscure objects known only to the City, if  indeed to them, were familiar
enough to Goschen that he anticipated an additional produce o f £410,000.31 Finally, and
this was a somewhat punitive gesture towards French trade recalcitrance, he imposed a tax
on bottled wines, chiefly champagne, intended to secure £125,000 and the attention o f the
French customs officials.32 The cumulative effect o f these measures was to bring the Budget
back into an estimated surplus o f  £212,000 and, most importantly, to redress and bring into
better balance the sources and burdens o f taxation.
I would wish to lay down certain propositions with regard to the mode by which 
[£1,400,000 loss o f probate duty] ought to be m et.... It must not be met by any 
increase o f duties which rest upon the industrial class. It must not be met by any 
increase o f duties resting upon the earnings o f  the mass o f the people. It must not 
be derived from duties contributed by professional men, by industry, and by skill. 
But it must be met by duties on property or the result o f property, or from that 
promising item o f stamps, from which I have already reaped a certain advantage, but 
which is by no means an exhausted field.33
29 Ibid. p. 290.
30 Ibid., p. 306. The loss on the Probate duty would only have to be made up in the 1889—90 fiscal year.
31 Ibid., pp. 297-300 and 308.
32 Ibid., p. 313.
33 Ibid., pp. 314-5.
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Although his concern for the interests o f  the working and consuming “masses” may have 
afppeared disingenuous, given that all o f the relief in his Budget was applied to the “classes” 
piaying Income Tax; and it was certainly true that his “club man” was at the sharp end o f a 
lesson in civic fiscal responsibility which was equally if not more often applied to 
“tteetotalling, non-smoking, working-class radicals”; it was and that was the point. Although 
hte had spared the newly enfranchised working-classes from his taxation, he had not spared 
them from his oblique arguments in support o f their present and continued responsibility to 
stupport the Exchequer. For Goschen the dilemma continued to be how to tax them without 
miaking them aware o f it, thereby losing their votes.
There was a curious postscript to the Budget, although it had been foreshadowed in 
Tihe Economist's attack on the wheel and van tax and by Goschen himself when he had 
wrarned that ‘if  in the conflict that will take place between the ratepayers and the users of 
horses and vehicles, these taxes are not passed, there will be so much less relief to the rates. 
We should not feel it our duty to substitute other taxes in their place.’34 Yet this was exactly 
the conflict which took place, with the Chancellor o f the Exchequer himself becoming the 
most noteworthy casualty. ‘The agitation proceeded in the main, and was throughout largely 
sustained by, the wheelwrights and carriers.’ It was attacked as a tax upon locomotion which 
would hamper trade, and ‘it was asserted that the tax was against the working man.’ The 
agitation gained sufficient popular support that ‘a strong feeling grew up amongst the 
supporters o f the Ministry that it would be better to abandon it.’35 It is important to note 
that the more important horse tax was also lost, so that the final arrangement for Relief o f  
local Taxation England and Wales were to receive 4 /5  o f one-third o f the Probate Duty, 
amounting to £1,136,000, and to lose the £260,000 grant in aid o f  roads. The new total was
34 3 H  324. 825,9 April.
35 The Ministry announced its withdrawal on 29 Nov. PRO T171/185, Budget Statement for 1888, ff. 64—66.
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now £876,000 instead o f £1,716,0000, due to the loss o f the Horse duty and the Van and 
Wheel tax.36
It was a remarkable example o f how a popular agitation in a newly democratic 
society could, in an age before opinion polls and “on-message” focused spin doctors, not 
only gain the attention o f their Parliamentary representatives but persuade them to apply the 
necessary pressure to change the policy o f the Government. It seems not to have occurred 
to anybody to denounce this popular protest as anti-democratic, in fact it was presumed to 
be a manifestation o f the popular democratic will to which Parliament was, ultimately, 
responsible. It is also a clear example o f the extent to which Salisbury’s Ministry was fearful 
o f provoking the working-class democracy, even at the expense o f its own “propertied” 
rate-paying natural constituency. O f course the pecuniary loss to this special interest was 
short-lived, and Goschen would make up the money, in spite o f his pledge. For a 
Conservative-Unionist government had a duty to property.
36 Ibid., f. 68.
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1889: R edem ption
There were three over-arching themes which shaped Goschen’s financial policy for 
1889: military expenditure, the completion o f the Consol conversion and the need to make 
up the revenue from the Probate duty which was being diverted towards Local Government 
financing. In combination all three would exert severe pressure on the revenue, necessitating 
fresh taxation, and this in turn would fuel the flames o f a debate on the nature o f the 
taxation necessary to meet it. This was the fiscal situation which Goschen found himself in 
at the close o f  1888. He would have been especially mindful o f the failure o f the wheel and 
van tax which had been finally dropped at the end o f  November, much to his disgust. This 
had taught both him and the Treasury important lessons. Goschen had learned something 
of the power o f popular agitation in a democratic society, and would have to bear this in 
mind when considering just which sections o f society to target for additional revenue in his 
Budget. Hamilton had learned that ‘there will always be the greatest difficulty in imposing a 
new tax; and the worst way o f going about it is to hang the measure up for an indefinite 
time and allow every conceivable objection against it to be raised. The only chance o f  
passing such a measure is to rush it.’37 These lessons were not necessarily complementary 
but they could provide a justification for expediency over sound financial policy. For two 
years good fortune had smiled on Goschen’s Budgeting, but 1889 would prove to be the 
true test o f his convictions.
First and foremost o f these was the anticipated rise in military expenditure, and 
particularly naval expenditure. There was a renewed agitation to create another Naval panic 
on the lines o f 1884. Gladstone was disgusted at ‘so early a recurrence o f a naval scare’ but 
Goschen had already capitulated, in the face o f severe and concentrated pressure from his 
Prime Minister, although he insisted that there must be a five year programme that
37 HD, iii, 29 Nov. 1888, p. 84.
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Parliament would have to agree to.38 Salisbury, as much as anybody else, was responsible for 
the Naval Defence Act o f 1889. He had helped in November 1888 to contribute to the 
agitation and it was he who had pushed Smith, Stanhope, Lord George Hamilton, and 
especially Goschen to support the expenditure and the measure. In fact he had made a 
commitment to the Queen to secure the naval expansion on 11 December 1888.39 It was a 
considered plan from the outset. The Admiralty had stated the need for a five year building 
plan ‘in order to place this country in a position to meet with undoubted success a 
combination o f France and Russia in a naval war.’40 Programme and panic all in one. It then 
evolved into a scheme for ten batdeships and cruisers to be built by contract during 
1889—1893/4 at a cost o f £ \  8,000,000.41 Salisbury had deliberately restricted proposals for 
Government expenditure in order to smooth the way for this project,42 although from the 
first the intention was to finance the building program by borrowing. His motivation was 
not simply to please the Queen, because lie  needed the stiffening for his foreign policy 
which the programme offered.’43 The battles between Treasury and Admiralty were as fierce 
as ever, but it was now the forces for financial control which found themselves on the back 
foot.44
There had been a dispute between the two over the Navy’s utilization o f money 
from unexpended Votes to make purchases which had not received Treasury sanction, the 
Admiralty arguing that this action had been taken in the interests o f expediency and
38 BL HD, Add. MS 48650 f .5 ,14 Dec. 1888.
39 Roberts, p. 539.
40 T h e Requirements o f  the British Navy.’ PRO CAB 37 /22 /24 , p. 5 o f  July 1888.
41 ‘Special Programme for N ew  Construction, 1889 to 1893-94.’ [of 31 O ct 1888] PRO CAB 3 7 /2 2 /3 8 ,9  
Feb. 1889 [printed].
42 Roberts, p. 540.
43 Shannon, Salisbuiy, p. 303.
44 Hamilton conceded ‘something will have to be done to allay the present scare.’ BL HD, Add. MS 48650 ff. 
15—16, 30 Dec. 1888. The ordinary Naval Estimate for 1889 had itself increased £1,297,000 by 10 Nov., PRO 
CAB 37 /22 /36 , p. 6.
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efficiency. Despite having incurred the wrath o f Sir Reginald Welby,45 the outcome was that 
the Navy seemed to have won its batde against what it considered excessive Treasury 
oversight. The whole point o f the Naval Defence Act was to free the Navy from that tight 
and vigilant scrutiny which characterized the annual Navy Estimates, as well as Parliament’s 
theoretical responsibility over i t 46 Henceforth they would have a five year funding plan and 
be allowed to shift unspent Votes from one year to the next. Yet the real enemy was the 
Treasury, not France. The Admiralty, both political and service lords, made clear their 
contempt for the French menace. ‘I was able without much difficulty to show that 
[Beresford in 1888-9] had gready exaggerated the French threat.’ In the very same memo 
arguing for the Naval Defence Act the Admiralty noted that the French ships, because o f  
construction delays were ‘half obsolete before complete’, whereas ‘the exceptional building 
power o f this country enables’ a large new programme ‘with comparative ease.’47 Indeed, the 
navalist propaganda was successful even in carrying the historiography, until recently. John 
Beeler’s thesis is that the post 1889 navalist assumptions o f  Marder et al, are ‘ripe for 
reappraisal’; that ‘there exists neither conclusive proof nor even ambiguous indications’ that 
Britain’s maritime supremacy was ever under threat; and that given the extraordinary pace o f  
technical change in shipbuilding during the 1880s Britain’s limited construction was 
pragmatic and sensible.48
45 “I think this is a case which justifies the strong line taken by Sir R. Welby. To have to justify its action 
before the P A . Comm will act as a wholesome deterrent against the recurrence o f  such irregularities.” 
Hamilton’s notation, 5 January 1889 in PRO T l/8385a/20490.
46 ‘A big building programme contained in an Act o f  Parliament under a time limit has this great advantage: 
the building authorities are sure in advance o f  the money they require and at the time they want it: under 
annual estimates they are always subject to the vagaries o f  those for the time being in control o f  the Treasury.’ 
Ld. G. Hamilton, i, p. 301. Throughout he is scathing in his contempt for both Treasury control, Welby in 
particular, and for the supremacy o f  Parliament via the executive. ‘Goschen, who knew [Gladstone’s] unfailing 
propensity to starve Navy and Army expenditure, was most anxious that our naval policy should be so 
protected by an Act o f  Parliament as to prevent the future Prime Ministers from smothering it.’ Ibid., ii, p.
205.
47 Ibid., i, p. 106 and PRO CAB 3 7 /22 /40 , ‘Naval Estimates 1889-90’ 1 Dec. 1888 demanding now  
£20,000,000.
48 Beeler, pp. 253, 257 and 259. The role o f  the Admiralty, and especially Fisher, in getting up the panics has 
been elucidated in W. Mark Hamilton, The Nation and the Navy: Methods and Organisation of British Navalist 
Propaganda, 1889—1914, unpublished LSE Ph.D. thesis, 1976.
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The Naval Defence Act was not really a defeat for Goschen but it was a triumph for
Salisbury. He was advising that no ministers should take part in the public demonstrations
for increased building as that might expose Lord G. Hamilton’s plan and ‘the accusation o f
trying to stoke up a panic would do our project more harm.... The scheme which at present
seems agreed upon is to spend £20,000,000 in four years upon new ships ... I hope they
have also agreed to authorizing the whole cost o f the ships by statute from the first.’49
Salisbury had calculated the financing o f the scheme as carefully as the building programme.
I should propose in addition to George Hamilton’s present ideas to build a dozen 
cruisers at a cost o f about £5,000,000.1 should distribute them among a certain 
number o f private yards — leaving them a good deal o f liberty as to specifications; 
but o f course under certain conditions with regard to speed, stability, thickness o f  
armour, accommodation for men, number o f guns. I should borrow this money on 
Exchequer bonds, repayable in five years.
The effect which this proposal would have on the public mind would enable 
you to defer a portion o f G.H.’s programme, or, which I should like better, to raise 
by manipulating the house tax the requisite balance. But without such taxing 
programme I fear that G.H.’s proposal may seem unsatisfactory, & you would get 
lukewarm support for any new taxation.50
The naval plans were no great secret and in early February A.J. Mundella was able to
correctly discern that there would have to be considerable work sent to private yards if an
ambitious building scheme was to go forward, while at the same time declaring that
borrowing would not be welcomed by his side.51 By this time the intention o f the proposal
was clear, ‘they are going to submit a cut-&-dry programme o f ship-building which will be
embodied in a separate Bill & which will be in addition to the Navy Estimates.’52 The reason
for this was to ease finance and relax control. This was worrying for Hamilton, as in the
Queen’s speech
increased armaments are foreshadowed. They may be & probably are necessary; but 
if  the Gov’t don’t look out it will be their finance which will bring them to grief. It is
49 Salisbury to Balfour, 10 Jan. 1889, Harcourt Williams, p. 274.
50 Salisbury to Goschen 26 Jan. 1889, Salisbury MS, Goschen corr., B /85-7.
51 3 February 1889, BL HD, Add. MS. 48650 £46. This was timely as the private yards wanted the work. A.J. 
Arnold, ‘Riches Beyond the Dreams o f  Avarice? Commercial Returns on British Warship Construction, 
1889—1914.’ Economic History Review, LIV, 2 (2001), pp. 267-89.
52 Ibid., f. 49, 7 Feb.
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very likely that Goschen will wreck his financial reputation, which will have to be 
sacrificed to political expediencies.53
As the proposals became more developed, and less sound, Hamilton’s sense o f Treasury
outrage grew.
I have written today a remonstrance against the proposals o f the Government... It 
will be the ruination o f Mr. Goschen’s financial reputation. There is absolutely no 
precedent for charging to capital account such expenditure when we are at peace 
with all the world, when the income tax is only at 6d. in the £, when the revenue is 
on the rise, and when there is a general increase o f  prosperity and distinct signs o f a 
revival o f trade. Moreover a precedent set by a man o f Mr. Goschen’s financial 
authority is a most dangerous precedent, and one which heterodox financiers o f the 
future ... will not be slow to follow.54
It was, however, Salisbury whose political instincts were determining the financial policy, 
and who saw in this issue the opportunity to attach to the Conservative party the 
approbation for a huge increase in the size o f the Navy55 whilst simultaneously pinning the 
opprobrium o f the cost onto the Liberals for their neglect o f the Navy while in office. It is 
absolutely clear that the Naval Defence Act was his creation, he had even elaborated a set of 
financial principles which he believed would achieve this end.
1. That this temporary exigency should not make a permanent change in our system 
o f taxation.
2. That this financial operation should be kept separate, not affecting the rest o f  the 
Budget.
3. That the burden should fall on the two interests mainly concerned in augmenting 
our navy—viz. the fixed property and the sea going commerce o f the country.
... £10,000,000 to be borrowed ... As soon as the Bank certifies that the loan is 
repaid the defence taxes will cease to be payable. [The defence taxes to consist o f an 
addition to the death duties over £10,000 and a new ship tax o f 2d. per ton on 
steamers and Id. per ton on sail.]56
These principles were immediately embodied in Goschen’s financial provisions for the Act, 
although he was reluctant to embrace them as enthusiastically as Salisbury.
53 BL HD, Add. MS 48650 f. 58, 22 Feb.
54 HD, iii, 24 Feb. p. 91.
55 The plan called for the construction o f  seventy new ships over the five year period 1889—90 through 
1893—4:10 batdeships, 38 cruisers, 18 torpedo boats and 4 fast gunboats. Roberts, p. 540.
56 The detail is remarkable. Salisbury to Goschen 26 Feb. 1889, Salisbury MS, Goschen corr., B/89-91.
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The Chancellor o f the Exchequer is beginning to realize the danger o f  not making 
proper provision for paying his way; and he is now thinking o f ear-marking certain 
taxes to be levied for a certain number o f years, which are to constitute a fund for 
meeting the extraordinary naval expenditure. The expenditure is to be in the nature 
o f a naval programme laid down in a Bill; and the special taxation is most likely to 
take the form of increased death duties. A tax on shipping tonnage is also projected; 
but I doubt if there would be the least chance o f carrying such a proposal.57
It was extraordinary that Salisbury should become so involved in dictating a financial 
measure but it was not extraordinary that the measure was one which he considered vital for 
his foreign policy. The Naval Defence Act ‘signalled a clear awareness o f Britain’s 
determination to defend its capital wodd interest,... its command o f the oceans and 
guarantee o f freedom for its sea-borne commerce.’58 This was something for which 
Goschen, with his own past Admiralty experience, did have some sympathy, but he had 
more than his own financial reputation to consider. He was also responsible for Britain’s 
financial reputation, which goes some way to explain the convoluted nature o f  the plan as it 
was finally proposed.
The Naval Defence B ill... is nearly ready. It is to bind Parliament to a programme of  
ship-building, to be carried out in the next 5 years at a cost o f 21 V2 millions. Eleven 
& a half millions is to come out o f the ordinary ship building vote, involving an 
increase in that Vote o f about £600,000, and the remaining 10 millions is to be 
provided for out o f a special Fund — “Naval Defence Fund” and to be paid for out 
o f taxation in the course o f the next 7 years. This is a sufficiently heroic step on the 
part o f the Chan o f the Exchequer; and I am very glad o f it. But it is a very 
complicated arrangement. I believe it would be far better simply to make the 
requisite addition to the Navy Estimates with a power to carry over the surplus o f  
one year and supply them to the shipbuilding service o f another year.59
This assessment was certainly prescient, and it is a clear indication o f the measure and its 
Parliamentary weak points. In its complexity were the hidden roots o f the financial 
expedients which would subsequently come back to haunt Goschen’s finance. ‘The only use 
o f the so-called Naval Defence Account is to disguise the real expenditure, and to give
57 HD, iii, 26 Feb., p. 91.
58 Shannon, Salisbury, p. 292.
59 BL HD, Add. MS 48650 ff. 68-9, 5 March.
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greater freedom in the spending o f the money.’60 Hamilton’s last word on the subject was 
surely correct considering the subsequent debate before passage o f the Act. ‘The 
Government would have done much more wisely, had they simply increased the Naval 
Estimates by the required amount.’61 It remained now to find the Ways and Means to fund 
the forthcoming fleet.
The estimated deficit to be made up for the 1889—90 financial year was roughly £1.5 
million. A number o f possibilities had been considered including a graduated house tax and, 
in light o f  the combined demands o f Salisbury and the Navy, the death duties again. They 
were in fact the key to solving this equation, as they did indeed fall on the category o f “fixed 
property” specified by the Prime Minister, and rather boldly at that as a scheme o f  
graduation was in mind. A  suitable tax on shipping interests proved much more difficult, 
and Goschen eventually fell upon the idea o f reviving ‘a small ad valorem registration duty 
on imports & exports.’ Hamilton, as he had been since it was first mooted, was hostile to 
the idea. I t  is a great improvement upon Mr. G.’s proposal o f 1860; but still is cognate to it; 
& I don’t like the idea o f  his making such a proposal to Parliament.’62
31 March brought the end o f the 1888—89 financial year and the out-turn was 
spectacular, a surplus o f  £2,798,000 o f revenue over expenditure although this was reduced 
by the £2,010,000 o f expenses associated with the Consol conversion. By now, 2 April, all 
Goschen’s efforts were concentrated on the Budget, and it was known that the deficit to 
make up was £1,100,000. The idea o f the “registration duty” had, to Hamilton’s relief, been 
dropped and in its place a new Estate duty and a change to the existing Beer duty. The
60 The Economist, v. XLVII, no. 2,377, p. 328,16 March.
61 BL H D, Add. MS 48650 f. 72, 9 March.
62 BL H D , Add. MS 48650. The graduated house tax had been floated in mid-February (f. 54) before the naval 
program and deficit were known; by 13 March (f. 75) they were and the death duty was to be called upon. The 
registration duty was considered 26 March, (f. 84).
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Estate duty was a graduated duty o f 1% on all estates o f a value over £10,000 while the plan 
for the Beer duty was to return to Gladstone’s complex proposal o f 1881. The former was 
estimated to yield £800,000 and the latter £300,000 thereby making up the deficit but not 
with any sort o f comfortable margin. A  proposal on 11 April to tax the landlords’ ground- 
rents, for a yield o f perhaps £50,000, might have provided that margin but there was really 
no chance o f a Salisbury Cabinet countenancing such a tax. TEe Cabinet today would not 
hear o f the Chancellor o f the Exchequer’s proposal to get at the ground-landlords’ when it 
was presented on Saturday 13 April.63 The rest o f that day and Sunday Goschen and 
Hamilton spent finalizing the Budget for the Financial Statement to Parliament on the 
Monday, 15 April. It was destined to find favour in the House, but Goschen would be 
somewhat embarrassed by his support.
Goschen reported that the Revenue for 1888—89 was £88,473,000 and exceeded the 
estimate by £1,646,000; Expenditure o f £85,674,000 had fallen £941,000 below estimate 
and produced the surplus noted above. There was no such happy prospect forecast for 
1889—90, Revenue being estimated at £85,000,000 due to the transfer o f funds to the Local 
Governments and Expenditure rising to £87,000,000 on account o f the vast increase in 
Navy and Army expenditure. Fortunately the Chancellor o f the Exchequer had methods in 
hand to meet this deficit. The conversion o f the Consols had resulted in an annual interest 
savings o f £1,500,000 on the national debt, and Goschen proposed to use £1 million o f this 
savings to reduce the fixed charge for debt from £26 to £25 million, the remaining 
£500,000 would continue to operate for capital reduction o f debt through operation o f  the 
sinking fund. The revision to the beer duty was to bring in an additional £300,000 by 
calculating ‘the duty o f 6s. 3d. on 36 gallons o f beer o f the specific gravity o f 1.055, instead
63 H D , iii, pp. 92—3. W.H. Smith was the only other member o f  the Cabinet to support the ground-rent tax.
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of, as now, on 36 gallons o f the specific gravity o f 1.057.’64 The final measure, the Estate 
duty, was ‘an additional tax o f 1 per cent on all estates o f more than £10,000, whether they 
consist o f realty or personalty.’65 This was expected to raise £1,000,000 annually but only 
£800,000 during 1889—90. All told this left a balance o f  £183,000 in the Exchequer’s favour, 
a small margin in itself but given Goschen’s caution in framing revenue estimates it was 
ample.
The most interesting and unusual feature o f Goschen’s Budget statement was the 
debate it ignited over the question o f the balance between direct and indirect taxation and 
the inseparably related subject o f taxation and representation. There had been, he noted, a 
decline in the revenue from indirect taxation over the past five years o f 1 per cent per 
annum, whereas over the same period the direct tax revenues (the income tax, death duties 
and general stamps) had increased 5 per cent. From this he drew the conclusion that ‘the old 
policy o f relying upon a very small number o f articles o f general consumption is one which 
it is questionable whether we can trust to in the present state o f things.’ Changes in fashion, 
morality and even the “physical accidents” affecting the strength o f tea and tobacco had 
combined to decrease and make uncertain the revenue which the state could derive from 
them. This approach was now obsolete. ‘Those were the days o f great simplicity o f taxation. 
To trust to a few great articles o f consumption was our fiscal ideal.’ But the recent past had, 
for Goschen, demonstrated the poverty o f  this ideal.
Due to the falling off o f indirect tax revenue, the income taxpayer bore a 
disproportionate burden o f taxation. In a veiled criticism o f Gladstone’s last Ministry’s fiscal 
management, it was pointed out that ‘whenever there came an emergency, recourse was had
64 PRO T171/185 f. 591. This ‘being the amount o f  beer which 2 bushels o f  malt, or 841bs. o f  malt or com, 
or 561bs. o f  sugar, have been estimated as capable o f  producing. The duty is levied either upon the malt, & c., 
or on the specific gravity o f  the worts, according as the one or the other method o f  levying it is more 
favourable to the Exchequer.’
65 3 H  335. 527,15 April. ‘Financial Statement 1889—90’, pp. 1-5, P.P. 1889, (116) xlvii. 237 for figures.
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to the income tax.’ This was the case for all emergencies, great and small, which put pressure
on the revenue. This ‘constant reckless use o f the income tax’ was patently unjust.66
I have rejected and I am anxious that the Government should continue to reject, the 
plan o f constandy having recourse to the income tax, in order to save trouble to any 
Chancellor o f the Exchequer who may be too timid to resort, when necessary, to any 
other source o f taxation.67
It was a further source o f injustice that the income tax fell so heavily on ‘small and
struggling tradesmen and clerks who feel [it] with such peculiar weight’. It was their further
misfortune that they were a ‘quiet people’ who didn’t ‘agitate or demonstrate’ and so led to
an inevitable outcome.
He has few champions, and thus it has happened that on every occasion it is the 
income tax payer who has had to meet whatever exceptional demands may have 
arisen.... I do not think that it is safe, I do not think that it is just. ... It is better 
service to the State to increase the number o f sources o f Revenue than to attempt to 
find simplicity.68
He similarly rejected graduation on the grounds that the principle was unsettled while the 
practical problem o f levying and collecting it was immensely complex. This led inevitably to 
the related theme o f the justice o f taxation and representation.
Goschen rejected entirely the ‘broad doctrine’ that large proportions o f the
community should pay ‘nothing whatever towards the taxation o f  the country.’69 Taxation
and representation went together.
It was desirable that all those who took part in the government o f the country, as the 
great body o f the people now do more largely than ever before, should in some 
small measure, according to their ability — and I do not wish them to do it beyond 
their ability — contribute towards the expenses o f the State.70
66 3 H  335. 512-3 ,15  April.
67 Ibid., p. 565.
68 Ibid., pp. 513-4.
69 Ibid., p. 564.
70 Ibid., pp. 564-5.
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Towards this end beer, tobacco and spirits could be considered optional luxuries, whereas
the Tea duty could be considered ‘a poll tax on a very low scale. If we abolish the Tea duty
we shall have the result, which I think is unconstitutional, that a large proportion o f the
population will pay nothing whatever to the public revenue.’71 He had no intention o f giving
up any o f  the few remaining sources o f revenue left to the Exchequer.
Gladstone picked up the theme o f graduation when he spoke on the Estate duty on
2 May. He thought it the ‘introduction o f a great novelty into our taxing system.’ The danger
was that there was no ‘absolute rule by means o f which that graduation is to be kept within
bounds’ and stop it from becoming not graduation but confiscation.72 Although Goschen
argued that the limitation to estates over £10,000 was the equivalent o f  an income o f  £400
pounds and so the graduation was comparable to the income tax, Gladstone was not
convinced. In fact, he was rather ominous in his warning. ‘What I wish to point out to the
House is the likelihood, nay, the moral certainty, that proposals o f this character will
produce in future similar proposals in the same direction and going beyond the scope o f the
present proposal.’73 This line o f argument was carried on by Harcourt, who took the
principle to its logical extension.
The proposals o f the Budget open up in the future a great number o f very important 
questions, such as graduated taxation, applicable equally to the income tax, and to 
the Succession and Probate and other Duties. The great question at the bottom of  
graduated taxation is, whether or not people with enormous means shall contribute 
in a greater ratio to the necessities o f the State than people with humbler means. 
This was established to a certain extent some years ago in reference to the income 
tax; it was afterwards extended, and now it has been established in reference to the 
Death Duties by the Chancellor o f the Exchequer. It is a characteristic o f  stones o f  
this kind that when set rolling, they acquire the peculiar property o f rolling faster 
and faster. These proposals also open up the question why property should only pay 
on accident o f death, and why it should not, as in other countries, contribute 
annually to the necessities o f the State.74
71 Ibid., p. 565.
72 3 H  335. 1001,2 May.
73 Ibid., p. 1004.
74 Ibid., p. 1019.
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If Goschen had known to what conclusions his graduation innovation could be drawn, 
would he not have preferred a half-penny on the income tax?
Goschen’s third Budget was a triumph o f compromise, and probably more than any 
o f  the other five showed his mastery o f finance and ability to improvise and adapt to 
pressing circumstances. It was also the first time he had experienced any real financial 
pressures such as the small colonial wars which had so plagued Gladstone in 1880—82. His 
desire to protect the income tax payers, if  principled, was also dangerous given that the 
precedent o f graduation he established in its place could, and would, be turned against them. 
It is also evident that in this Budget Goschen’s finance was a distincdy Liberal-Unionist 
finance. In this Budget he was tom between notions o f  “Sound Finance” and Tory fiscal 
expediency. His concession to borrowing for the Naval Defence Act was balanced by his 
willingness to call upon property and the “beer barons” to make up his deficit. It was an 
awkward balance and it made his Tory allies uneasy and undoubtedly contributed to his not 
gaining the leadership o f the House on Smith’s demise.75 He did not look back.
75 Hicks Beach ‘was much troubled in his mind by the idea that you had proposed the N ew  Estate tax as a 
permanent addition to the taxing machinery o f  this country. I ventured to him that this was an entire 
misapprehension: and that the Bill would provide that the tax should only last until the cost o f  the present 
addition to the Navy had been defrayed.’ (It would indeed prove to be not just a permanent addition but the 
starting point for Harcourt in 1894, as if  in retaliation for the NDA). Salisbury to Goschen, Salisbury MS, 
Goschen corr., B.96, 24 April 1889. Even heavier criticism followed: ‘... successors to real property will 
actually be in a worse position than if  Mr. Childers’ Budget had been accepted.’ ‘Memorandum submitted to 
the [Ch. o f  E] on the Increased Charges upon Realty arising out o f  the Budget Proposals o f  1888-89 and 1889- 
90’. PRO CAB 3 7 /2 4 /2 4  o f 11 May 1889 [printed]. Goschen replied to Henry Chaplin: TSfow I am denounced 
for asking what is but a small contribution from realty towards the cost o f  Imperial defence.... I contend that 
my policy throughout my three Budgets has been favourable to the landed interest, and will prove to be so, 
when regarded as a whole. ... Even if  I had not done this—and I have only done it to a very limited extent—it 
would have been done the first moment the Opposition came into office... We cannot permanently resist the 
cry o f  inequality in the treatment o f  land and personalty with respect to Death Duties, hollow as you may 
believe the cry to b e . ... May I ask you to think whether it is or is not to the advantage o f  the landed interest... 
should be settled by a Conservative Government, instead o f  being left to the tender mercies o f  Radical 
successors...’ PRO CAB 3 7 /24 /25  o f  9 May 1889 [printed].
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CHAPTER 7 
SALVATION
Goschen 1890-92
By the summer o f 1889 Goschen had achieved a near mastery over the Treasury. He 
had by then delivered three successful Budgets and very nearly completed an unprecedented 
Consol conversion. There were, however, frictions within the Department itself between 
Goschen and his most senior subordinates. He was frustrated at the Treasury delays which 
were attributed to Sir Reginald Welby and for which he had to answer to his Cabinet 
colleagues.1 Hamilton refers to his “donnishness” and “gaucherie” but at the same time 
Goschen was making an effort to get on and in fact had both Welby and Hamilton over to 
his country house, Seacox Heath, for a long weekend in November. ‘He certainly is a very 
agreeable talker and being less suspicious o f us than he appeared to be at one time he is 
quite open in his conversation.... He is evidently rather shy at attempting any big measures.’2 
In fact Hamilton had grown considerably in his respect for the Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer, and saw in him an example o f  ‘the mistaken estimate which Mr. Gladstone has 
often made o f  men.’3 This was high praise from a Gladstonian. But fate, cruelly or kindly 
depending on one’s interpretation o f the Chinese curse, was to provide Goschen the 
opportunity to display to the full his knowledge and skill.
Hamilton did not wait for the end o f 1889 to begin his work on 1890 and 31 
December found him reviewing the likely outcome o f the year. There have been real “good 
times’’ — a greater volume o f trade than there has ever been, a slight rise in prices, better 
wages, & every prospect o f a thumping surplus.’4 In fact the prospective surplus o f £3
1 HD, iii, p. 102.
2 HD, iii, 23 Nov. 1889, p. 103.
3 HD, iii, 6 Dec. 1889, p. 106.
4 BL HD, Add. MS 48652, f. 19.
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million would likely allow Salisbury to fulfil his pledge o f “freeing” education and ensure
another unpressured budget for the spring. This early speculation was soon confirmed. The
Customs now looked likely to exceed their estimate by £474,000, and the Excise to beat its
estimate by a staggering £1,250,000, while the Income Tax would be left to pick up the rear
at a mere £50,000 over estimate. These were o f course forecasts based upon the revenue
and expenditure o f the first three quarters.
On the other hand the calculations from the receipts o f the current Quarter are 
based on the increase or decrease per cent during the whole o f the first nine months 
o f the present year; and as each o f the first three Quarters has shewn an 
improvement on the preceding Quarter, it may be fairly assumed that the yield for 
the last Quarter has been somewhat under-estimated.5
Even with that caveat, prospective Expenditure was likely to contribute to the good news, as 
they indicated a decrease on estimate o f £155,000. The result looked to be astonishing. ‘The 
probable Exchequer Receipts being taken at £89,274,000, and the probable Exchequer 
Issues at £85,812,000, there will be a surplus o f £3,462,000. Say 3 Vz millions.’6 1889—90 had 
been a very good year.
It was in March that the Budget was built, for Goschen had in mind pretty much the
whole o f the Budget at the beginning o f the month.
His present ideas are to take 2d. o ff the Tea duty, to repeal the silver-plate duties, to 
reduce the duty on currants in order to purchase some commercial concessions 
from Greece, to cheapen somewhat the colonial postage, to take off from the beer- 
duty what he put on last year, and to ease the income tax by some extension o f the 
abatements.7
Goschen was also under pressure to do some more for the relief o f Local Taxation after the 
miscarriage o f the wheel and horse taxes in the 1888—89 Budget. With the approach o f  
Budget day caution overtook the Chancellor o f the Exchequer. The forecast o f surplus was
5 PRO T168/19 ,10  Jan. 1890.
6 Ibid.
7 HD, iii, 5 March 1890, p. 111.
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revised further downwards, ‘he does not wish to be too sanguine with his Estimates; so the 
account will not be quite as brilliant as has generally been expected.’8 The victims were the 
Income Tax payers, although this was really more a case o f Goschen maintaining his own 
consistency on the policy o f exemption and abatements. He had spoken against Northcote’s 
proposal to do so in 1876, and so the relief was transferred instead to the Inhabited House 
Duty.9 The next day, 28 March, the Budget proposals were submitted to the Cabinet and 
accepted, ‘en blot. The increased Beer duty o f 1889—90, amounting to 3d. per barrel and an 
additional tax o f 6d. per gallon o f spirits, were to be transferred from the Imperial 
Exchequer in relief o f Local Taxation. ‘Out o f this further grant to Local authorities, it is 
proposed to constitute a compensation fund for licensed victuallers — rather an ingenious 
way o f dealing with the vexed licensing question by a side-door.’ The great worry was in fact 
the reaction o f these powerful groups, brewers and licensed victuallers, but ‘fortunately, they 
are Government supporters, and in such roaring good times for them they are fair game.’10 
Goschen began his statement by expressing his gratitude that there were no ‘costly 
expeditions or small wars’ to have deranged his finances over the past three years before 
going on to justify his Revenue estimates. ‘It is discreditable, unless there are unforeseen 
circumstances, that you should land the credit o f the country in a deficit.’ His estimates were 
necessarily cautious but he had also enjoyed the benefit since taking office o f ‘an ascending 
curve o f  prosperity’ which had also tended to swell the revenues in a way no Chancellor o f  
the Exchequer would have been justified in counting on. Most importantly, there had been a 
reversion towards alcohol consumption which had contributed £2.3 million o f his surplus.
8 BL H D , Add. MS 48652 f. 88,15 March 1890.
9 H D, iii, p. 112, 27 March 1890. ‘He wanted to raise the exemption and extend the abatement, thus making a 
concession to graduated or degressive taxation, which is making decided advances’. In fact this had been the 
very subject o f  a debate at the Political Economy Club a few weeks previous. ‘G. Murray who raised a debate 
on progressive or graduated taxation. He did it with much ability; & in the discussion which followed his 
statement the principle o f such a system o f  taxation was more accepted than rejected. Courtney who took the 
Chair spoke with extra-ordinary lucidity, as was to be expected. We have already recognized the principle in 
our system; & it is really a question o f  how far it can be carried, which the main objections to extending it are 
the practical difficulties that stand in the way, the fact being that the “Death duties” alone offer a field for its 
extension.’ BL H D, Add. MS 48652 f. 78, March 8,1890.
10 H D, iii, pp. 112-3.
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‘All classes seemed to have combined in toasting the prosperity o f  the country in largely 
increased quantities o f alcohol.’ The balance o f the surplus he attributed to the £700,000 
windfall on the seigniorage o f silver, a sum which he would put to use in the recoining of  
the gold currency.11 More than anything, Goschen was most proud o f his prodigious feats 
o f debt reduction. In 1889—90 there had been a reduction o f £4,758,000 o f funded and 
unfunded debts while a further £3,510,000 o f terminable annuities had been reduced, 
bringing a total o f £8,295,000 for the year. *1116 amount o f Debt which we have reduced in 
three years is £23,323,000 — the largest amount that the Debt has ever been reduced in three 
consecutive years.’ He had also the privilege to report the successful Conversion o f the 
remaining £41,000,000 o f Consols, £24,378,000 o f which had been paid off in cash.12 This 
was the most successful conversion o f debt in history and Goschen drew particular 
attention to the role o f  the Bank o f England in facilitating the whole operation. It had been 
a very good year indeed.
The prospect for the year ahead was not as encouraging. Expenditure was estimated 
to rise by £544,000 to £86,827,000 and he made ‘no apology whatever to the fact’ that 
almost all o f this would be on account o f  the army and navy. It was on the Revenue side 
that he was most apprehensive, and he cautioned the House on that account. ‘I think that it 
would be an error to say that we can prudently count upon a continuance o f that progressive 
prosperity which I trust we may continue to enjoy, and o f that speculative activity which has 
characterized a part o f the past financial year.’ This was the sum o f his economic forecast on 
the state o f the nation, it meant that he would once more continue to be ruled by caution in
11 T h e  Seignorage accrued on Silver in the past year is far the largest that has ever accrued within twelve 
months. The large profit derivable therefrom, amounting to no less a sum than £774,000, is due to the 
exceptional demand for silver coins, at a time, moreover, when the metal was cheap to buy, and consequendy 
the rate o f  seignorage very high — as high, indeed, as 54 per cent.’ PRO T171/185, f. 608.
12 T h e total amount o f  Stock dealt with under the Conversion Act, 1888, and the Redemption Act, 1889, was 
£590,824,407./ 7 /1 0 .1 . There was converted into N ew  Stock 565,684,464./14/9, 2. There was paid o ff in 
money 25,139,942.13/1; total: 590,824,407.7/10.’ PRO T171/185, f. 618.
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his estimates. The year’s Revenue he put at £90,406,000 for a surplus o f £3,549,000. From 
this he could make significant remissions.
Harcourt’s criticism was concerned with two broad fronts, a defence o f free trade
and an exploration o f the possibilities opened up by graduation. For the first he asserted
that the Revenue returns were proof that country had recovered its elasticity in both
consumption and prosperity so that there was no need to pay any mind to ‘quack remedies’
such as bimetallism. “We may rely upon its continuance if  we do not tamper with the
commercial principles upon which the wealth and prosperity o f the country are founded.’13
The principle o f  graduation in taxation was not one in which he took issue with the Budget,
rather he pointed out its implications for the future.
The rate at which the tax should be levied should be less in the case o f persons with 
small incomes. That is a very important principle o f finance, and is the one which 
the Chancellor o f the Exchequer has adopted as his basis in dealing with the 
Inhabited House Duty. This may only be a small beginning but it opens up a large 
prospect in the future. I believe that it is a sound principle o f finance,... I thought it 
necessary to take notice o f this because the principle itself is far more important 
than the application o f it.14
Harcourt would not only be proved right in this, but he would be the one to put the 
principle into practice. Graduation was a fiscal principle which had found its hour, in both 
economic theory and politics.15 It would, in the next twenty years, prove the most important 
innovation in government finance.
This was not what Goschen had wanted to emphasize. Again this year he pointed 
out that,
13 Ibid., 738-9.
14 3 H  343. 1093,20 April. Financial Statement 1890-91’, pp. 1-6, P.P. 1890, (138) xli. 221 for figures.
15 From  the mid-eighties onwards, we find that the principle o f  graduation, side by side with other 
distributional principles, was gaining more and more adherents.’ Chamberlain’s 1885 “Radical Programme” 
had recommended a graduated income tax o f  10 percent. F. Shehab, Progressive Taxation (Oxford, 1953), pp. 
190-1.
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representation and taxation ought to go together. But, if  so, the reverse is true also, 
namely, that taxation and representation should be combined and that every person 
who exercises the franchise should contribute in some degree to the Revenue.... I 
believe it to be the general opinion that some small portion o f every man’s earnings 
should be contributed to the maintenance o f the country. I would defend that 
principle before any working class audience.16
The two were inextricably linked. Graduation o f taxation in a new age o f near democratic 
representation. Goschen was the first Chancellor o f the Exchequer to come face to face 
with the great conflict, still o f course in embryo form, o f property rights versus democratic 
rights; o f the question o f the responsibility to be demanded o f representation and a 
determination o f just what was the responsibility o f property. In this he was fighting a 
rearguard action, whereas Randolph Churchill had wanted to initiate a bold offensive. It was 
Goschen who would prove the truer Conservative.
The Barings crisis in November was preceded by a month o f volatility in the money
market, with Treasury Bills costing £4.12 and Consols trading under 95.17 Goschen’s diary
records for 7—13 October the uneasiness in the City.
Financially the Revenue is going fairly, but money is very tight in the City. Consols 
lower than they have ever been since I have been in office, and the Treasury Bills 
bear a higher interest — not very comfortable. Went to the Bank, things queer! Some 
of the first houses talked about. Argentine, etc., have created immense 
complications. Uncomfortable feeling generally. Money, the Governors say, not 
likely to get cheaper.18
Similar entries about the rumours and uneasiness continued in October, although nothing 
concrete. More than a month later, 7 November, Hamilton’s suspicions were aroused as the 
Bank rate was 6 per cent and the Treasury was paying 5 per cent, T>y far the highest rate we 
have ever yet paid and a very high rate for the British Government to pay in any
16 3 H  343.1090.
17 H D, iii, p. 124.
18 Elliot, p. 169. Barings had arranged before October to borrow £500,000 from each o f  Glyn, Mills, Currie & 
Co. and Messrs. Martin & Co., such were its difficulties as a result o f  Argentine speculations. Philip Ziegler, 
The Sixth Great Power. Parings 1762—1929 (London, 1988), p. 249 and George Chancellor, Four Centuries of 
Banking (2 vols., London, 1964), i, p. 330.
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circumstance.’19 The following Sunday the Chancellor o f the Exchequer received a 
‘mysterious’ letter from the Governor o f  the Bank o f England and he was informed on the 
Monday that Barings was in ‘such danger that unless aid is given, they must stop.’20 In all o f  
his own City experience he had never faced anything like this crisis.
The Bank made it clear that it was looking for solid and substantial help from the
Government but Goschen did not feel he could do anything o f the sort without
Parliamentary sanction 21 He informed Salisbury o f the crisis that evening and in a letter the
next day, after discussions with W.H. Smith, informed the Prime Minister.
I saw Smith and discussed possibilities and impossibilities with him. We agreed that 
any direct intervention on the part o f the Gov’t would be impossible under any 
circumstances. Tremendous pressure may be brought down on us to help but I 
think it will be absolutely necessary for la haute finance to find its own solution. The 
Rothschilds are sure to put the screw on, but it won’t do, as Smith will explain.’22
On Wednesday, the 12th, the Treasury provided the Bank with £2 million in Treasury Bills
‘in a roundabout fashion’ and Nathan Rothschild, acting as an intermediary for the Bank,
saw Salisbury for an undertaking to suspend the Bank Charter Act, if necessary 23
I answered Rothschild in this way, as far as agreements on our side went.
1 .1 said that if the Bank made advance to B.[arings] and was hard pressed in 
consequence we would authorize the suspension o f the Charter Act.
2. That if, in contravention o f their charter, they lent to B. on Argentine securities, 
we would join in a bill o f indemnity provided they obtained Gladstone’s consent.
3. That the plan o f inspection o f  Argentine finances, though I saw no objection on 
the surface, was so new to me that I reserved any definitive opinion till I knew more 
o f it and could consult others.24
19 H D , iii, p. 125. Hamilton acquiesced in this rate partly to support the Bank, and inquired o f  the Governor, 
William Lidderdale, if  the rumours o f  big banks in trouble had any foundations, but he was put o ff with the 
confidence that it was only “Muriettas”.
20 Elliot, p. 170.
21 Goschen offered a Chancellor’s letter to suspend the Bank Act which Lidderdale refused; but Lidderdale did 
ask Goschen to arrange through Rothschild’s for gold from the Bank o f  France. Sir John Clapham, The Bank 
of England. A  History (2 vols., Cambridge, 1944), ii, p. 329.
22 Goschen to Salisbury, 12 Nov. 1890, Salisbury MS, Correspondence from Goschen, v. 2,1889-90, f. 223. 
Elliot, p. 173. ‘Goschen and W.H. Smith have come to the conclusion, and rightly so, that any guarantee on 
the part o f the Government is out o f  the question. They never could justify such assistance to Parliament.’
H D, iii, 11 Nov., p. 127.
23 Lidderdale did not want to see the Government officially. H D, iii, 12 Nov. 1890, p. 127. The Bank had 
borrowed £3,000,000 o f  French gold and bought £1,500,000 o f  Russian gold on the sale o f  Exchequer bonds, 
Clapham, p. 330. There was a further request for a Treasury Bill on Friday morning to cover an additional 
£1,000,000 o f  French gold. So the Treasury was using its limited fiscal powers to aid the Bank. BL H D, Add. 
MS 48654, f. 37.
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‘After the meeting, Salisbury proposed to the Cabinet that an Act o f Indemnity be passed to 
help the Bank o f England lend to Barings on Argentinean securities, but only if  Rothschild 
obtained cross-Party support from Gladstone.’25 At this point Goschen left the scene for 
Dundee and a number o f speaking engagements, convinced that failure to show might ignite 
a panic. The resolution o f the crisis which followed is ambiguous. It was left to Salisbury 
and W.H. Smith to keep a watch over the rescue for the Government. But they did more 
than this, it is alleged. At lunchtime Friday 14 November, they ‘agreed to bear half o f any 
losses on Barings bills taken on by the Bank o f  England in the twenty-four-hour period after 
2 p.m. that day.’26 The following day the crisis was ‘practically settled by guarantees’ from 
the private banks amounting to more than £7,000,000.27 Yet in January Hamilton reviewed 
the affair with Lidderdale and was astounded to learn from him that the Government had 
promised to ‘strengthen [the Bank’s] balances if  he called upon them to do so, up to the 
extent o f 9 millions... I must clear this point up; for I am sure that either the Governor 
misunderstood Lord Salisbury and Mr. Smith, or else they misunderstood him.’28 When he 
discussed this with Goschen he found the Chancellor o f the Exchequer incredulous, ‘How
24 Salisbury to Goschen, 12 Nov. 1890, Salisbury MS, Goschen corr. [typescript 1886-99], C. 123. Rothschilds 
were much more interested in preventing a banking crisis than in rescuing Barings. ‘Though he believed that a 
catastrophe might be averted, he spoke with the utmost certainty that the house [Barings] must disappear.... 
This certainty made him dismiss as impossible your suggestion that they should be saved by a syndicate.’ [this 
was the eventual solution] Salisbury to W.H. Smith, 12 Nov. 1890, Salisbury MS, W.H. Smith corr., C. 260-3. 
This letter illuminates clearly that the Government were only offering a suspension o f  the Bank Charter, and 
that Rothschild told Salisbury: ‘He thought Mr. Gladstone would assent to a Bill o f  indemnity being passed. ... 
[Salisbury qualifies his promise] I said I can freely promise that if  Mr. Gladstone assents to such a Bill o f  
indemnity before hand, we will support it.’ Ibid. Gladstone’s diary gives no indication that Rothschild or 
anyone else had raised the indemnity issue with him. GD , xii, pp. 334—5.
25 Roberts, p. 552. This, Kynaston argues, as the result o f  ‘discreet pressure’ on Salisbury by Rothschild for a 
more active intervention on the part o f the Government, but this is contrary to Salisbury’s letters to Smith and 
Goschen. David Kynaston, The City of Condon. Volume I: A  World of Its Own, 1815—1890 (London, 1994), p. 431.
26 Roberts, p. 552. ‘What the Governor asked o f  [Salisbury and Smith] was, first, an increase o f  the 
government’s balance at the Bank, and second, the assumption by the government jointly with the Bank o f the 
risk o f  loss on Baring’s liquidation, pending the raising o f  a guarantee fund.’ Salisbury and Smith agreed to the 
first request but held out against the second, at which Lidderdale threatened to immediately return to the Bank 
and stop accepting Barings’ paper. That was enough to secure the government’s support, Clapham, p. 332. In 
this Lidderdale was balancing the Bank’s public duty as lender o f  last resort against his own responsibilities to 
his shareholders. ‘It may have recognized a general responsibility to the money markets but it was not as 
uninhibited a responsibility as might be exercised by a modem central bank.’ Michael Collins, Monty and 
Banking in the UK: A  History (London, 1988), p. 189.
27 H D, iii, p. 128, Elliot, p. 173 and Kynaston, p. 433.
28 H D, iii, 8 Jan. 1891, p. 134.
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could I have undertaken to find ... [it] without breaking the Bank Charter at least?’29 By such 
a muddling through the panic was averted and Barings saved to collapse again in another 
hundred years time.30
Goschen’s penultimate Budget was the one which required the least effort or worry
to construct, or at least that should have been the case. He and Hamilton discussed at length
the Budget prospects in mid-December, and the prognosis did not much change over the
following four months. The forecast was especially important for the year’s finance, as lower
margins meant greater uncertainty for the year ahead. Goschen was particularly interested in
the Customs, spending almost all o f the day and night o f 7 January going over the Customs
with the Secretary to the Treasury, Jackson.31 There was a margin o f some £1 or £1.5
million which was likely to be consumed by the provision for education. At an estimated
cost o f some £2,000,000 education was the most ambitious item in the legislative agenda,
but it was ambition bom o f expediency rather than conviction. It served two purposes,
firstly to ‘minimize the expected defeat’ in an ensuing election and secondly to anticipate
possible Liberal reforms which might interfere with the Church o f England schools to a
degree intolerable to Salisbury.32
So there will be neither room nor necessity for taxation changes; and he said he 
would be rather glad to have a plain Budget next spring. The only fiscal matters 
which he would care to touch are the income tax, which he can’t touch because he 
has not the means, and the death duties which he can’t touch because he would 
never get the time 33
29 Ibid., 9 Jan. 1891, p. 135 and Elliot, p. 178.
30 I f  none the less England developed central banking, truly she did so absent-mindedly.’ L.S. Pressnell, ‘Gold 
Reserves, Banking Reserves, and the Barings Crisis o f  1890’, in C.R. Whitdesey and J.S.G. Wilson, eds., Essays 
in Money and Ranking (Oxford, 1968), pp. 167—228. A  lucid yet very technical account which places the 
foremost emphasis upon Bank o f  England gold reserves. Pressnell argues there was a government guarantee, 
but his evidence is not definitive, pp. 203-4.
31 Elliot, p. 178.
32 Roberts, p. 556. ‘Although Salisbury ... tried to portray [it]... as one o f  his long-term policy objectives ... it 
was in fact nothing o f  the sort.’
33 H D, iii, 18 Dec. 1890, p. 132.
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It was at this point that Hamilton became very ill, and we are deprived o f him as a source o f
information about the budget-making; just as Goschen was deprived o f his very great
abilities in budget-crafting.
Goschen was consoled with a surplus of £1,756,000 to announce to Parliament on
23 April 1891, the fortunate result o f £87,733,000 o f Expenditure on Revenue o f
£89,489,000. The former £356,000 in excess o f the estimate and the latter a more
substantial increase on estimate o f £1,879,000, for once more the Chancellor o f the
Exchequer had found relief in the bottle. More precisely, alcohol and tobacco, the latter
accounting for some £474,000 o f  this increase and alcohol £900,000. The increase was
chiefly in spirits and, he was keen to make clear, not just or mainly in Ireland and Scotland,
which had increased their consumption by 7 V2V0; but in England as well. ‘The consumption
of home made spirits was over 18,000,000 gallons ... the highest consumption in England
since 1880.’ This was an important economic indicator.
Although this increase in the consumption o f alcoholic beverages may be viewed 
with some disappointment and regret, there is at the same time in that consumption 
one element o f satisfaction. It shows that the powers o f consumption o f the 
working classes, owing to the increase o f wages, has been on the increase during the 
last year.34
Lastly, he had the great satisfaction in being able to state that the increased consumption o f  
currants had been matched by a twenty-two per cent increase in Greek imports o f British 
goods.
For the financial year 1891—92 Goschen was, again and as usual, very cautious in 
framing his estimates. He allowed for an increase o f £950,000 on Expenditure for 
£88,319,000 because ‘the public itself is urging us and is responsible for a great part o f this 
increased expenditure.’ The estimate o f Revenue was essentially a forecast o f economic 
conditions, and in estimating £90,430,000 he wanted to make clear that he was taking into
34 3 H  352.1181,23 April. Tinancial Statement 1891—92’, pp. 1-6, P.P. 1891, (200) xlviii. 217 for Budget 
figures.
his considerations the fact that the income tax was calculated on a three year average, in this
case three prosperous years; and the lucky fact o f there being no Good Friday or Easter
Monday in the financial year they would have the benefit o f two additional business days.
On the basis o f  this last fact he put down a one per cent increase on Customs and Excise.
1890 has been a brilliant year in many respects. I speak particularly as to trade and 
wages; but there are many people who believe that we may find ourselves upon the 
top o f the curve o f prosperity, and that we have not so good a year before us as the 
past.35
This would leave a prospective surplus o f £1,986,000, and so had to be accounted for.
The freeing o f education would, as o f September, account for £900,000 o f the 
surplus (and a full £2,300,000 in the 1892—93 financial year), for which reason the 
continuing claims o f the Income tax payers would have to be ignored. I t  is impossible for 
me, looking to the future to mortgage that £900,000.’ He would spend £500,000 on barrack 
building which would otherwise have been funded through loan finance as part o f the 
Imperial Defence Act o f 1891. His last measure would be to put aside £400,000 towards the 
cost o f withdrawing light gold from circulation.36 His surplus, or balance for contingencies, 
was now £166,000. It was a Budget with no changes to taxation and he apologized for his 
lack o f ambition.
The reconstruction o f the Death Duties could not be undertaken without the 
reconstruction o f some features o f the Income Tax. The reconstruction o f the 
Death Duties involves an increase in the taxes on real property; and, if  so, you 
would have at the same time to consider whether a change in the Income Tax ought 
not to be balanced by a corresponding change in the House and Land Duties.
35 3 H  352.1181.
36 ‘Mr. Goschen took the amount o f  light gold in circulation as being about £30,000,000. It was found that the 
degree o f  lightness per sovereign was 2.57d., and per half-sovereign, 2.65d.; and on this basis he estimated that 
the cost o f dealing with the £30,000,000 o f  light gold would be £400,000. The whole o f  this sum will not be 
spent in 1891-92, as the operation will extend over several years; but as Mr. Goschen estimated that the entire 
£400,000 could be spared out o f  the surplus revenue o f  the year, he preferred that it should all be issued 
within the year for the purpose o f  the Coinage Act, such portions as should not be expended during the year 
being invested and retained as a distinct fund for expenditure in subsequent years for the purposes o f  the Act.’ 
PRO T171/185 f. 670.
162
He also warned off any changes to the Stamp duties. ‘There is no field more dangerous, in 
which there are more pitfalls and snags for the unwary, o f which I have had experience 
myself.’37 He had by now exhausted both his subject and his audience. Gladstone, 
‘considering that there is no question o f new taxation’, had no comment. Nor were any 
others, at that time, disposed to make any substantial criticism.38 That was left for the 
second reading.
The financial journals did not share this indifference. There was a reluctant
acquiescence in The Times towards the funding o f education as well as reassurance at the
continued growth o f ‘the consuming power o f the masses’ which it juxtaposed against the
sad lot o f the income tax payer 39 The Economist turned its analysis into an unrestrained
assault upon Goschen’s finance, finding fault in almost all aspects o f his efforts. The whole
scheme o f advance provision for army and navy expenditure ‘has already proved a failure.’
N ot even his considerable efforts towards debt reduction were beyond abuse.40 The theme
o f the sinking fund was continued by The Statist which, after expressing its ‘disappointment
that the income tax payers are to receive no relief condemned the accumulated neglect by
the Government to provide an adequate provision for the repayment o f  Debt.
Surely the country can as well afford 28 millions a year now as it could when 
[Northcote] revised the charge to that amount.... it would have been no more than 
prudent to have exerted ourselves to the utmost to reduce our debt while times were 
prosperous and peace was maintained 41
These criticisms would be, quite literally, taken up when discussion resumed for the second 
reading o f the Budget on 27 April.
37 3 H  352.1210.
38 ‘The Budget proposals seem to have taken most people by surprise. They believed free education had been 
dropped.’ H D, iii, 24 April, p. 141.
39 The Tims, no. 33,307, 24 April, p. 9.
40 The Economist, no. 2,487, 25 April, pp. 523—4. In fact this phrase was quoted by Harcourt, to which Goschen 
replied, ‘When I read the Economist o f  Saturday, I said to myself “I know now the exact speech which will be 
made by the right hon. Gentleman.’” 3 H  352.1496 and 1512.
41 The Statist, no. 687, 25 April, p. 473.
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There were good reasons for this renewed intensity o f debate, for ‘an opposition
with a general election coming at last into sight could not afford to weaken its attitude, and
in the absence o f fresh contentious matter in the budget speech a general attack developed
on Mr. Goschen’s financial policy.’42 This attack was led off, with great enthusiasm and
vigour, by Sir W. Harcourt, and he ranged far and wide in his criticisms. The Debt had not
been reduced to the extent advertised by Goschen, in fact if  a fairer time period was chosen
for comparison it would show that four representative Liberal years exceeded his best four
year effort by £3,600,000, and that without the benefit o f such contrived surpluses as had
been utili2 ed in Conservative finance. In fact what was proved most emphatically was that
Goschen had put on £8 million more in taxes than was wanted or necessary 43 Even worse
were the dubious innovations which had been introduced into the Budget. Here Harcourt
echoed Gladstone’s Midlothian attack on Disraeli.
The new patent system o f finance which has overthrown all the old English 
traditions.... Three Budgets, — first, what may be called the old English Budget; 
next, the new-fangled Continental “Extraordinary” Budget; and lastly, the Local 
Subsidy Budget. ... The great security for economy and sound financial 
administration has always in this country been that you ... closed the account, and 
began a fresh account the next year. That was the great security o f English finance, 
and it was one which had carefully been built up by great masters in finance. [Peel, 
G.C. Lewis and Gladstone].44
This confusion and opacity had allowed Goschen to produce artificial surpluses from 
borrowed funds and the reduction o f the new Sinking Fund, all o f which were ‘ingenious 
shifts to make people believe that the finances are in a very flourishing state.’ The Naval 
finance was based on a pretext now discovered, in the unexpended construction fund, to be 
‘utterly unfounded’. Goschen’s method o f taking the House into his confidence as to the 
reasoning behind his revenue estimates, based for the most part on growth o f  population
42 Mallet, p. 49.
43 3 H  352.1491—1493, 27 April. Harcourt’s numbers showed that Goschen had applied towards the reduction 
o f  debt £5,225,000 in 1887—8, £6,428,000 in 1889, £8,200,000 in 1890, and £6,100,000 in 1890—1 for a total 
o f  £25,953,000. The Liberal effort had been £6,940,000 in 1881-2, £6,776,000 in 1883, £8,900,000 in 1884, 
and £7,273,000 in 1884-5, which amounted to £29,889,000.
44 Ibid., 1494.
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and projections o f trade and output, was derided as an ‘unheard o f  innovation. The only 
remote justification for this criticism would have been the fact that these ‘unheard o f  
innovations had consistently under-estimated the revenue throughout Goschen’s tenure. Yet 
this was at the heart o f the criticism: ‘extraordinary innovation ... in the financial business o f  
this country’, ‘extreme revolution ... in all those safeguards which have been considered 
most essential to secure the solidity o f the finance o f  the country’, and an overall ‘financial 
policy o f shifts and devices’ to obscure the true state o f affairs from Parliamentary scrutiny. 
This was, indeed, an election critique to which the Chancellor o f the Exchequer would have 
to answer.
Goschen did so in an extraordinarily pugnacious manner, trying from the outset to 
draw Gladstone into the fray,45 before coming to grips with Harcourt. This he did, in 
debating terms at least, for he went over them point by point, easily refuting the charges 
relating to the unfunded debt and the price o f Consols. In defending the Naval program he 
was satisfied with stating that ‘we have raised from the people as much as we thought 
necessary for the purpose, throwing the expenditure over a limited number o f  years and 
arranging that the balance shall be so carried forward’ as to complete the building. After his 
going over once again the Debt reduction numbers Gladstone concluded that the whole 
subject was now in ‘inextricable confusion’, and Fowler that the Budget is ‘now worse 
confounded than when [Goschen] sat down on Thursday night.’46 Things were moving now 
towards an election footing, at least as far as rhetoric was concerned. It had been conceded 
by the Liberals that they did approve o f the ‘application o f the surplus to the abolition o f
45 Gladstone advised him that he ‘need not go far afield, for there is pretty tough business before him in 
meeting the statements o f  [Harcourt].’ Ibid., 1501.
46 3 H  352. 1522 and 1523. In fact Goschen had considerable trouble with his initial Budget statement. There 
is no doubt that the Budget was not well delivered. Goschen twice got his papers mixed and got into 
confusion.’ 26 April 1891. Hamilton on the 28th received a letter from Goschen. ‘He did not consider his 
Budget statement at all a success. He had conceived it in too wide a plan and could not get the whole into the 
necessary limits o f  tim e.... He is good enough to say that he missed my ‘help and experience very much 
indeed’.’ H D, iii, pp. 141-2.
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school fees.’47 The issue was overall financial policy and there was a sense from the Liberals 
that Goschen had gotten too close to the Tories on property, and so strayed too far from 
“Sound Finance.” This would make them vulnerable on finance as an election issue, and 
already these lines had been drawn in 1891.48 Harcourt would make it a key to their election 
strategy,49 and an election was already starting to be discussed.50
In spite o f the anticipation and distraction o f an impending election there was still a
Budget to be constructed, and the usual process was in full swing through January and
February. The outlook was barely satisfactory, predicting a small surplus on the financial
year just ending but raising severe doubts about the 1892—3 financial year being balanced
without additional taxation, taxation which would be very hard to put on in the face o f  a
probable election campaign.51 There was some improvement a fortnight later, although the
conclusion seemed even more inescapable.
Goschen has been in Town this week budgeting, and has managed to cut down the 
War Office & Admiralty requirements for next year. By this means and by further 
paring down o f the Civil & Post Office estimates, we are getting ends to meet 
approximately. One thing is certain, & that is that it is impossible to put on taxation 
just before a General Election.52
After another two months’ revenue returns a respectable surplus o f £750,000 had come in. 
<But for next year ends won’t meet, even after putting the estimates o f revenues on perhaps
47 Sydney Buxton, 3 H  352.1534.
48 In fact, they had been drawn by the autumn o f  1890 when it was asked ‘after the lapse o f  four years, what 
has been the result o f  these unequalled opportunities. Have we advanced public economy? Have we made the 
financial future o f  the nation more secure? Have we rectified injustice in taxation? Have we placed local 
taxation on a proper basis?’ The polemical answer was, no. Sir Thomas H. Farrer, Bart ‘The Imperial Finance 
o f  the Last Four Years.’ Contemporary Review, v. LVIII, O ct 1890, p. 482.
49 ‘The weak joints in Goschen’s financial armour are the excessive complication o f his financial arrangements, 
the establishment o f extra Funds, the wide introduction o f  “Extraordinary expenditure”, and the reduction o f  
the Debt charge, which however I am prepared to defend. If Harcourt would confine his attack to these 
points, he would attack with much greater effect. But the discipline is too academical & technical either to be 
followed generally or to interest people. Finance does not interest the public as it formerly did; for the best o f  
all reasons that the taxation necessary to meet the expenditure, huge though that is, does not really press 
heavily on any class.’ 30 Oct., BL H D, Add. MS 48656, f. 125.
50 Hamilton in conversation with Harcourt on 22 July. On 12 Sept. Rosebery and Hamilton had gone so far as 
to ‘amuse’ themselves by drawing up an imaginary Liberal Cabinet. H D, iii, pp. 144—5.
51 H D, iii, 6 Jan. 1892, p. 152.
52 22 Jan. 1892, BL HD, Add. MS 48657 f. 38.
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too sanguine a scale, by several hundred thousands.’53 Goschen would have to draw upon all 
the Treasury’s artifice in order to present a respectable Budget. ‘I think, by dint o f a little 
financing — holding back some o f this year’s revenue, quite legitimate under the 
circumstances, we may be able to make ends meet next year; but it will be a tight fit.’54 
Which indeed it was, the Cabinet on 5 April reviewed the Budget proposals, rejecting the 
wheeze to obtain £210,000 by charging local authorities for the cost o f collecting revenues 
on their behalf by the Imperial Treasury. ‘So it is a question o f just making ends meet: no 
more and no less, and but for good luck connected with the Misc. Revenue, we should have 
had a small deficit.’55 The Goschen era o f finance was to end without clamour or 
excitement. Prudence, this time as always, proving to be the overwhelming characteristic o f  
his tenure.
There had been an Expenditure o f £89,928,000 in the 1891—2 financial year, a 
savings on the estimate o f  £336,000, which in combination with the realized Revenue o f  
£90,995,000 had produced a surplus o f £1,067,000 on the year and compensated for the 
misgivings o f January. There had been, again, an increased consumption o f tea and tobacco 
but the alcohol had not continued its staggering progress. From this Goschen could ‘see 
some reason to hope that wages have not fallen, and that there is still a widely diffused 
prosperity amongst the working classes o f the country.’56 Death duties, thanks to an 
influenza epidemic, were £8,239,000 and £689,000 over estimate. This led Hamilton, on the 
occasion o f W.H. Smith’s death, to the gloomy conclusion that ‘budgeting work certainly 
conduces to hardness o f heart and immorality; for the more deaths there are and the more
53 H D , iii, 4 March 1892, p. 154.
54 March 16, BL HD, Add. MS 48657 f. 93.
55 H D , iii, 5 April, p. 155. T h e surplus o f  the financial year expiring today is larger than I anticipated lately: it 
amounts to £1,067,000! We shall make ends meet next year with the help o f  retarding some o f  the payments 
on account o f  Miscellaneous Revenue — a perfecdy legitimate expedient in my opinion to avoid the necessity 
o f  imposing fresh taxes, but one to which Parliamentary purists would take exception if  they knew about it.’
31 March, BL HD, Add. MS 48657 f. 106.
56 4 H 3 . 1139,11 April. ‘Financial Statement 1892—93’, pp. 1-5, P.P. 1892, (162) xlviii. 213 for Budget figures.
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intoxicating drinks are consumed, the more one feels gladdened from a fiscal point o f  
view.’57 Stamp duties were the first indicator o f a possible recession, showing ‘a considerable 
decline ... mainly in what may be called City transactions. The usual business o f the country 
has not fallen off to the same extent.’58 The Income Tax, partially because o f  the three year 
averaging calculation, showed a record return o f  £13,810,000 which was within £60,000 o f  
the £500,000 estimated increase. It was here that Goschen paid tribute to the long and 
valuable service o f Sir Algernon West, who had tendered his resignation and would soon 
take over duties as personal secretary to Gladstone. The Chancellor o f the Exchequer, it 
seems, was not a man to hold a grudge.59
Expenditure for 1892—3 was estimated at £90,253,000, an increase o f £325,000 on
that o f last year.60 On the Revenue side Goschen saw ‘ground for caution, but I see no
ground for alarm.’ So the estimate was for £90,477,000 which, after taking o ff £25,000 for a
reduction in Patent Fees, left a contingency surplus o f £200,000.61 In between these
predictions he had made a searching statistical enquiry into the consumption and wealth
components o f the Revenue which he shared with the House.
The working man it seems, if his wages should diminish, first reduces the amount o f  
his beer and spirits, he clings longer to his tobacco, and as regards the tea for 
himself and his family, he does not reduce it at all.... We had a great time o f  
prosperity in 1874 and again in 1890. We must study the events which followed 
1874 to see on what articles we must expect a fall in consumption if we are really 
entering upon the descending curve after 1890.62
So in this way Goschen was trying to gauge both where in the business cycle the economy 
was and just what the implications were, based on past experience, for the Revenue.
57 W.H. Smith’s estate had left £1,750,000 in personalty. HD, iii, 16 Feb., p. 154.
58 4 H  3. 1145.
59 N or was Salisbury. Welby was his pet peeve at the Treasury, yet he agreed to an honour. I f  it is a poor 
man’s destiny to work the Treasury system, it is not fair to blame him for doing it industriously and 
conscientiously. I have sent his name for a G.C.B.’ Salisbury to Goschen 6 Aug. 1892, Salisbury MS, Goschen 
corr., C.168.
60 4 H  3. 1153.
61 4 H  3. 1167.
62 4 H  3.1158.
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Likewise his investigation o f the Income Tax, and just who was contributing their wealth for 
the benefit o f the State. ‘It is astonishing how many quiet callings keep up the average, and 
how large a proportion is contributed under Schedule D  by persons and professions who do 
not figure as bloated monopolists or rich men in the ordinary sense o f the word/ To this 
end he was attempting to get beyond the banalities o f rule o f thumb calculations towards a 
much more precise understanding o f the underlying economy and how it affected the 
Income Tax under assessment.63
The basis o f the criticism, when it came, was over Goschen’s treatment o f the 
National Debt over six years. So it was very much preparing the way for making this a 
substantial election issue. Sydney Buxton took the lead in taking the Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer to task.
Mr. Lowe once said that the Sinking Fund was a thing made to be robbed, and he 
has on two occasions reduced the effectiveness o f  that Fund, and evaded the 
principle that within the fixed charge every farthing o f savings should go to the 
future reduction o f Debt.64
Harcourt, at his turn to speak, converted the above into a slogan. ‘Sir Stafford Northcote 
raised the Income Tax in order to maintain the Sinking Fund, [Goschen] destroys the 
Sinking Fund in order to lower the Income Tax.’ Had this not been done an additional 
£10,000,000 o f the National Debt would have been paid down, ‘you have ruined the system, 
because you have broken down the cumulative principle upon which it was founded.’65 He 
wasted no subtlety in his criticisms and they were not wasted on Goschen, whose response 
was even better constructed sarcasm than that o f the year before. ‘Half o f [Harcourt’s] 
speech was delivered last year, a portion o f it during the year before, and a very large
63 4 H  3. 1163-4.
M AHA.  991,16 May 1892.
65 4 H  A. 998 and 1006. Hamilton did not appreciate this argument. ‘I have been having much correspondence 
with Harcourt on sundry points connected with the Budget. I have taken great pains to try and make one or 
two things clear to him; but in spite o f  his quickness at criticizing he is most difficult to convince, partly from 
not sufficiendy wishing to understand & grasp the difficulty in question. He thinks everything ought to be 
“understandable” straight away, never admitting that National finance is a science and requires many years 
study if  the if  the invariable intricacies o f  it are to be mastered. His letters to me are always friendly but they 
generally contain a sneer at the Treasury & its w ays/ 2 May 1892, BL HD, Add. MS 48657 f. 125.
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number o f the arguments which he put forward today have been submitted during every 
Budget Debate since I have had the honour to hold my present office/66 There was nothing 
for it but to let the electorate decide, aided as they would be by the various commentators 
and newspapers which would endeavour to guide them in their judgement and 
interpretation o f the Government’s financial conduct and the Budget.
The Times found the Budget Statement ‘interesting and instructive’, and noted with 
no little satisfaction that In  a year when trade has been stagnant, profits declining, and the 
labour market disturbed’ that a small surplus was still possible.67 The Statist found itself in 
agreement with one point at least, ‘that the depression began towards the end o f 1890, that 
it has been going on now for nearly a year and a-half, and that it is likely to continue for a 
considerable time.’ In such conditions Goschen ‘would have been safer to have exercised a 
little more caution’ in framing his Revenue estimates,68 The Economist questioned the basis o f  
the change in treatment o f part o f the Miscellaneous revenue which reclassified £925,000 o f  
it as appropriations in aid which no longer had to be treated as revenue, nor as voted 
expenditure. It did, however, congratulate him on the completion o f the conversion, ‘a 
lasting testament to [his] financial ability and resource.’69 It was and it remains so.
Goschen’s importance to Salisbury’s Unionist “project” developed and increased 
over time, notwithstanding that he was vital from the outset. Initially it had been a case o f  
simple expediency, the need to find a credible (and credible to both Liberal Unionists and 
financial “purists”) alternative to Churchill. It was because no one within the Conservative 
party could fulfil that role that Goschen entered the Government as a Liberal Unionist. The 
whole period o f panic and confusion following Lord Randolph’s resignation demonstrates
66 4 H  4.1021.
67 The Times, no. 33,610,12 April 1892, p. 9.
68 The Statist, v. XXIX, no. 738,16 April 1892, pp. 435-6.
69 The Economist, v. L, no. 2,538, pp. 505—7.
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the desperate situation Lord Salisbury felt himself to be in. “Sound Finance” was vital to the 
Government, particularly because it was not one o f the Prime Minister’s strengths. Salisbury 
has been described as being an undogmatic adherent o f laisse^Jaire economics70 whereas a 
more recent biographer actually questions even this commitment, citing the Prime Minister’s 
unOrthodoxy on the question o f fair trade.71 Yet this was not a point o f  contention between 
him and Goschen. They had in common not just the Unionist purpose o f preserving the 
Union, but also the defence o f the principle o f  property in a new more democratic age 
‘which most invidiously subjected that principle to direct and popular challenge.’72 Churchill 
had wanted to embrace and harness this popular challenge, and he lost his position in the 
Government and his party because o f it. Although their difference was in both outlook and 
approach, with Churchill embracing and attempting to take advantage o f the change while 
Goschen was, from the outset, on the defensive; there really was a conjunction o f  thinking 
between the two. Both wanted to achieve respectability for Tory finance, although 
Churchill’s failure meant that Goschen would serve an explicitly Unionist cause. In this 
Goschen was more than a qualified success, and in doing so he vindicated Churchill, whose 
program he substantially implemented. Salisbury would prove to be the more ambiguous 
factor. He was much more pragmatic than a “sound financial” Chancellor could afford to 
be, but this did not become fully apparent until his subsequent Ministry.
Goschen’s tenure at the Exchequer was “held by contemporary critics to have fallen 
somewhat short o f the great expectations which his reputation encouraged.’73 This, it was 
argued, was because his caution didn’t allow him to take bold, decisive steps; instead his 
approach was ‘tentative, partial, and piecemeal.’74 This is certainly true in the case o f his
70 Marsh, p. 159.
71 Steele, p. 148.
72 Shannon, Salisbury, p. 280.
73 Mallet, p. 59
74 Ibid.
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treatment o f  the currency, the Barings crisis and the whole question o f broadening versus 
narrowing and simplifying the basis o f taxation. This view is shared by Lord Jenkins in his 
unsympathetic assessment o f Goschen as a ‘stolid, and uninnovating Chancellor’ whose 
failure to understand the underlying components o f the Revenue led him from the true 
church o f Peel and Gladstone’.75 But in this Lord Jenkins was simply wrong.76 The whole 
experience o f the Consol conversion belies this interpretation. It was a bold and 
comprehensive move in the face o f considerable political risk. However, the fundamental 
risk to the country (and the financial markets) had been precisely calculated and correctly 
assessed by Goschen and his Treasury. This was why he was so confident o f  being able to 
tackle it in a bold and resolute manner. In any event, a certain amount o f caution znAgravitas 
in a Chancellor o f the Exchequer is no bad thing. Yet, over six Budgets, Goschen’s financial 
achievement is remarkably close to what Churchill had hoped to achieve in 1887. The 
annual Debt charge was reduced by £3  million instead o f £4Vz million, the Income Tax 
reduced to 6d. instead o f 5d., Tea and Tobacco duties were reduced, and revisions were 
made to the Death duties (although not as radical as Churchill’s plan for a uniform rate on 
all property), and a beginning made to the reform o f local taxation. The great difference 
between them was that Goschen did not reduce expenditure through retrenchment (except 
for the Savings on the Debt charge from the conversion and raid on the sinking fund), and 
that he took six Budgets to accomplish what Churchill had intended to do in one. The more 
measured and reasonable assessment o f Goschen is better left to Mallet than Lord Jenkins:
75 Royjenkins, The Chancellors (London, 1998), p. 81.
76 He makes much o f  the superficial change o f  1.5% between the ratio o f  direct to indirect taxation during 
Goschen’s tenure, from 54.4 to 55.9 per cent indirect, without taking any account that the change in the level 
o f  the income tax, which Goschen went some way to redress, had been considered by the three Liberal 
Chancellors o f  the Exchequer responsible for it (Gladstone, Childers and Harcourt), as a temporary and 
extraordinary war measure. Gladstone had reduced it in 1881, at his first opportunity, from 6d. to 5d. When he 
criticizes Goschen for not repealing in its entirety the tea duty he verges on the ridiculous, and may just as well 
demand that the Income Tax should have been repealed in its entirety, for he makes no effort to explain 
where the money was to be made up. Jenkins, p. 82.
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‘in the unavoidable collisions which arose between finance and politics, finance in his hands 
suffered less than might have been expected.’77
Despite the certainty o f  an election in 1892, Goschen had not delivered a “popular 
election” Budget. It could not have been, there just wasn’t the fiscal room for manoeuvre to 
allow it, the most that could be done was nothing: to make no changes to taxation. In any 
case, Goschen was not the man to court popularity, even had he known how to. But he did 
achieve one crucial objective. The financial reputation o f the Tory (Unionist) party had been 
rehabilitated, if not to the heights o f Peel and Gladstone, it had at least been raised from the 
dismal level where Disraeli had left it. They could even use it as a positive election issue,78 
although both Marsh and Shannon argue that Salisbury was looking for no more than a 
close defeat and considered the election result a success.79 From the Tory point o f  view, 
even more than from a Unionist perspective, Goschen’s finance had served its purpose.
77 Mallet, p. 67.
78 M. Pugh, The Making of Modem British Politics 1867—1939 (Oxford, 1982).
79 Marsh, pp. 220—1, and Shannon, Salisbury, p. 309.
CHAPTER 8 
HOBSON’S CHOICE
On their return to office in the general election o f  1892 the Liberals faced three 
serious and one overwhelming financial crises: naval expenditure, the pressing need to 
increase government revenue, the monetary question o f silver and bimetallism; and a 
financial constitution for Irish Home Rule. In light o f these Sir William Harcourt’s 
reappointment as Chancellor o f the Exchequer in mid-August 1892 ought to have reassured 
anyone wishing for strength and stability in this near most important o f all ministerial posts. 
Unfortunately, Irish Home Rule finance and Harcourt could not co-exist, yet the Liberal 
party could not remain in office with Gladstone without it. The Navy could not be increased 
without the increase to the Revenue, but Gladstone could not live with an increased Navy. 
All that the Ministry could agree upon was that to meddle with bimetallism was madness.
Bimetallism had come again to the economic forefront with the Salisbury 
Government’s commitment to participate in the proposed International Monetary 
Conference, mainly at the request o f the United States government, to discuss the fall in the 
value o f silver relative to gold and to consider official support for silver.1 Even this 
concession was heterodoxy in the minds o f Treasury officials sworn to the gold standard 
such as Hamilton.2 O f course there were also British groups interested in promoting the 
Conference and its goals, particularly in agriculture and manufacturers such as the 
Lancashire cotton merchants who had seen the fall in silver values affect their own markets.
1 Ted Wilson believes that India was the key to this. W ere it not for India’s perceived currency problems, it is 
doubtful if  Britain would ever have participated at all in any o f  the monetary conferences o f  the period.’ 
However, he ignores the 1892 International Monetary Conference completely. Hatties for the Standard. 
Bimetallism and the spread of the gold standard in the nineteenth century (Aldershot, 2000). The American position is 
discussed by Angela Redish, Bimetallism: A n  Economic and Historical Analysis (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 232—238, 
but again, the 1892 Conference is not mentioned. The background to the political debates in Britain over 
bimetallism is in E.H.H. Green, ‘Rentiers versus Producers? The Political Economy o f  the Bimetallic 
Controversy, c.1880—1898’, English Historical Review, 103, (1988), pp. 588—612 and A.C. Howe, ‘Bimetallism, 
c.1880—1898: A Controversy Re-opened?’, English Historical Review, 105 (1990), pp. 377—391.
2 BL HD, Add. MS 48657 f. 131,12 May 1892. Hamilton disapproved o f  Salisbury and Goschen’s receiving a 
deputation o f  Lancashire bimetallists, ‘It may all be very well in theory; but it is absolutely impossible in 
practice.’
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In general these were those same interests which promoted inflation, or soft money. Having 
inherited the commitment to participate, Harcourt and the Gladstone government set out to 
ensure that their delegates would undermine the conference and uphold the gold standard.
Having thus grudgingly consented to continue with Britain’s participation in the
Conference, Harcourt had to go about ensuring that the right people would participate as
British delegates. This was a delicate task, especially for someone whose personal diplomacy
tended to the Palmerstonian rather than the subtlety o f a Mettemich, Hamilton persuaded
Harcourt to meet Goschen to discuss, amongst other subjects, the International
Conference.3 Their discussion did nothing to mollify Harcourt’s hostility towards either the
Conference or bimetallism.
Anybody who did not know him would have been amused, if not shocked, by the 
fulminations against it in which he indulged while pacing up and down the room. It 
was the most immoral proceeding he ever knew; it was holding out the most idle 
hopes; merely a dodge to catch the Lancashire Votes. He would sooner die on the 
floor o f this or any other House than be a party to any step which was calculated to 
endanger our gold standard system.... He would not see Goschen’s instructions to 
the Delegates, and left to Welby and me the responsibility for issuing them. His idea 
was to increase the number o f Delegates representing this country in order that 
there might be a strong mono-metallic majority which would make it clear to the 
other powers that they might discuss as much as they pleased and devise as many 
plans as they liked, but that nothing would induce the British Gov’t to entertain any 
silly financial proposals. The conference at any rate should not be held in London. 
Indeed Goschen had already refused this.4
Given these preconceptions, and Gladstone shared in them,5 it was then necessary to find
delegates who would advance them at the Conference. Welby was proceeding along similar
lines, thinking o f Currie, Lubbock, Rivers Wilson, and Farrer.6 Gladstone wrote to Bertram
Currie on the 26th and Hamilton prepared the ground for the entrapment o f a Rothschild
over the next few days, writing to Natty Rothschild on the 28th hinting that he might be
3 H D, iii, 17 Aug., p. 172.
4 BL H D , Add. MS 48658,20 Aug. 1892, f. 116.
5 W e cannot put ourselves in the position o f  receiving a report more or less Bimetallistic signed by a majority 
o f British Commissioners.’ Gladstone, 21 Aug. 1892, Kynaston, ii, p. 71.
6 BLPES Welby Papers, v. 5, MF 373 f. 6.
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asked to attend the conference. By the 30th ‘Harcourt is going to insist on a Rothschild 
going to the Conference. He says they can’t refuse. “England owes something to the 
Rothschilds; but the Rothschilds owe a great deal more to England.’” Hamilton seems to 
have netted his quarry at dinner that evening with Alfred and Natty Rothschild, who 
acknowledged they could hardly with propriety refuse Harcourt’s request.7 On the 1st o f  
September it was setded, after two more dinners with Hamilton, that Alfred Rothschild 
would be a delegate to the Monetary Conference.
In an exchange o f letters 28 and 29 August Harcourt and Gladstone ensured that 
what the latter called “sane” men would dominate the British delegates. While the outcome 
o f the conference was to be a foregone conclusion it was not to appear that the Liberal 
government had determined it.8 It didn’t have to, government bureaucracy would to ensure 
that nothing would be allowed to subvert the gold standard. Sir Arthur Godley, permanent 
secretary o f the India Office, wrote Welby to express his hopes that if the British 
government would not withdraw its participation from the Conference, it should at least 
inform the Americans that ‘under no circumstances would HM Government agree to any 
bimetallic arrangement’ so that they might ‘think it not worth while to proceed.’9 Harcourt 
o f course was more emphatic. In  these days o f contagion I can’t have London infected by 
an incursion o f insane bimetallists. It would be too embarrassing to have to treat them as if  
they were compos mentis.’10 Nor did he.
7 BL HD, Add. MS 48658, 30 Aug. f. 126. Natty Rothschild wrote to Harcourt 31 Aug. to assent to Alfred’s 
representing the family firm. Kynaston, p. 71. N ot everyone was so enamoured at the Rothschild presence, 
Bertram Currie wrote to Welby on 31 Aug. ‘[He] bears no doubt a name o f  weight but that is about a ll.... but 
if  you secure Farrer, one or more dummies may be tolerated. I doubt whether Lord R. has any strong 
convictions on the question to be discussed.’ BLPES Welby Papers, v. 5, MF 373, f. 8.
8 A.G. Gardiner, The Ufe of Sir William Harcourt. ii, p. 205. GD, xiii, p. 67.
9 He concluded W e had resolved not to give any instructions to our delegates, but in present circs. I should be 
inclined to send them a copy o f your instructions and say they must govern themselves accordingly.’ BLPES 
Welby Papers, v. 5, MF 373, f. 5 ,27  Aug.
10 BL HP, Add. MS 48615A, f. 155,2 Sept.
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Hamilton wrote to Harcourt on 15 October to apprise him o f preparations for the 
Conference. ‘I am communicating with Welby about appointing formally the UK delegates 
and communicating to them our instructions. He has kept the matter in his own hands, and 
he is most jealous o f interference, as you will find.’11 This must have been agreeable to 
Harcourt, for within a week he was taking time out to indulge in some bimetallist baiting, 
and at the behest o f Gladstone was replying to Henry Hucks Gibbs’ query about the 
upcoming conference. After first assuring Gibbs that he had not changed Goschen’s 
instructions to the conference delegates, Harcourt went on to argue his pragmatic 
philosophy in favour o f the gold standard. First he favoured sound money against 
inflationists, ‘people who believe cheapness and low prices the greatest o f human evils and 
that the proper cure for them is to debase the currency.’ The role o f London as the 
international centre for finance was paramount and inseparable from the gold standard, ‘All 
nations come to London to settle their accounts, because it is the only country the stability 
o f whose currency can be relied on.’ At the same time gold supported capital which in its 
turn employed labour. ‘The cheapness o f commodities is therefore not only a special benefit 
to the consumer, but it is the main source o f the accumulation o f capital.’ So the great 
financier and humble working man both prospered because o f the gold standard.12 This is a 
clear statement o f Liberal orthodoxy with respect to the Gold Standard, hilly consistent with 
Mill’s monetary economics.13
11 Hamilton to Harcourt, 15 Oct. MS Harcourt dep. 62, f. 84.
12 Gardiner, ii, pp. 612—15,21 Oct.
13 Mill noted o f  bimetallism that ‘with most o f  its adherents, its chief merit is its tendency to a sort o f  
depreciation, there being at all times abundance o f  supporters for any mode, either open or covert, o f  
lowering the standard.’ Bk. Ill, Ch. x, p. 509. A more polemical statement was that ‘profligate governments 
having until a very modern period seldom scrupled, for the sake o f  robbing their creditors, to confer on all 
other debtors a licence to rob theirs, by the shallow and impudent artifice o f  lowering the standard;’ Bk. Ill, 
Ch. vii, p. 486. John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (London,1929).
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The Conference was in session from 22 November through 18 December,
producing much talk, few ideas and no action.14 This o f course was Harcourt’s intent. Alfred
Rothschild’s plan was one o f the few ideas, a compromise to bring together international
agreement to support the price o f silver through agreed purchases, but it was acceptable to
nobody.15 Above all it was unacceptable to Bertram Currie, ‘our worst enemy’ as
Rothschild’s assistant Carl Meyer described him. It was soon rejected by the Americans, but
not before first alarming Harcourt (who was simultaneously thundering at Welby that in
essence the United States proposed ‘that we should pull out their chestnuts for them’), and
who had to be reassured by Rivers Wilson and Mabington Smith (via Welby) that events in
Brussels were under (British) control.
Sir William Harcourt need be under no misapprehension as to our having 
committed ourselves to Alfred Rothschild’s plan.... We have shown a willingness to 
examine any plan put forward and to send to our Government for consideration any 
proposals (not at variance with orthodox principles, i.e. mono-metallism) which 
received a large and influential measure o f  support in the Conference.16
The Conference dragged on until the 18th, apparently with only Bertram Currie’s outrageous
gold monometallic chauvinism to keep it interesting. Although officially adjourned until
May, it was over. British interests would prevail, and Britain was the gold standard bearer, as
succinctly put by Hamilton when he reviewed the Conference. W e hold the key to the
monetary position o f the world; and so long as we remain mono-metallic, as we
undoubtedly shall do, the case o f bi-metallism is a hopeless one and the Americans
recognize this.’17
14 This was the early indication from Henry Mabington Smith, formerly Goschen’s private secretary, to Welby, 
BLPES Welby Papers, v. 5, MF 373, f. 14,25 Nov. 1892.
15 Kynaston cites Welby’s reaction: V e  are much amused at the Rothschild proposal.’ Alfred Rothschild made 
his proposal on 28 N ov. but himself realized by 5 Dec. that it was unacceptable and so withdrew it. Kynaston, 
ii, pp. 73—4. Hamilton described it as ‘a proposal to do on a smaller scale in Europe what the United States 
have failed to do on a large scale by forced purchases.’ BL HD, Add. MS 48659, f. 49, 8 Dec. 1892. It is 
outlined in Ferguson, ii, pp. 349—50.
16 Rivers Wilson to Welby, 6 Dec., BLPES Welby Papers, v. 5, MF 373, f. 17.
17 BL HD, Add. MS 48659, f. 63, 23 Dec. 1892. His argument is shared by Michael Bordo and Finn Kydland 
whose hypothesis is that the gold standard acted as a commitment mechanism in the late 19th century, ‘to 
reassure the public that the real value o f  debt [would] not erode in the future as a result o f inflationary policy.’ 
This is why most o f  the industrial world had moved to the gold standard by 1890, bimetallism a last reaction 
to salvage a silver standard. The British advantage was ‘the use o f  sterling as a reserve asset and the location in
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The Death duties (comprising probate, account, legacy, and succession)18 were long, 
long overdue for reform. The ball had been started rolling by Northcote in 1880, Gladstone 
in 1881 and Childer’s still-bom attempt o f 1885. Lord Randolph Churchill had intended to 
deal with them in his abortive budget for 1887. Goschen had taken up this challenge in 1888 
and again in 1889 when he introduced a graduated estate duty. The Liberals had never 
agreed with the Goschen reforms, feeling that they were really just another dodge in favour 
o f landed property, although they did applaud certain aspects o f the estate duty, particularly 
its introduction o f the principle o f graduation. Goschen had opened Pandora’s box, and 
Harcourt and his advisers were determined to see what was inside. So as early as January 
1892 Harcourt had determined on ‘the reconstruction — simplification and equalization — o f  
the Death Duties.’19 That determination was emphatically endorsed by Fowler, Harcourt’s 
financial secretary to the Treasury in 1886, in conversation with Hamilton. ‘If he had a voice 
in the finance o f the future, the two principle measures at which he would aim would be (1) 
an increase o f the death duties — probably an uniform scale, and (2) the raising o f the 
income tax exemption.’20 Thus it is clear that the Death Duties were to be an important 
component o f the Liberal party’s financial aims, in combination with adjustment o f the 
income tax and against what they perceived as the unfair advantages to realty and the 
landed interest o f  Goschen’s 1888 adjustments.21
London o f the world’s key asset and commodity markets.’ T h e Gold Standard As a Rule: An Essay in 
Exploration.’ Explorations in Economic History, 32:1995, pp. 423—464.
18 Buxton, ii, p. 292. The later “estate” duty was Goschen’s 1889 innovation.
19 ‘One o f  the first measures ... that the Liberals would have to take in hand, whenever they came into power,’ 
Hamilton added, ‘I don’t envy them that task; though I should like to see the question dealt with.’ HD, iii,
p. 152,10 Jan. 1892.
20 BL HD, Add. MS 48657, f. 101, 24 March 1892.
21 The best accounts are M.J. Daunton, T h e Political Economy o f  Death Duties: Harcourt’s Budget o f  1894’, 
in Negley Harte and Roland Quinault, eds., Land and Society in Britain, 1700—1914. Essays in Honour of F.M.L. 
Thompson (Manchester, 1996), and Avner Offer, Property and Politics, 1870—1914: landoumership, law, ideology and 
urban development in England (Cambridge, 1981).
179
This was by no means an attitude confined to the Radical wing o f the Liberal party. 
Gladstone saw it as one o f the key planks o f an English program to counter-balance the 
attention on Irish measures, and he was writing to Harcourt on 14 July 1892 to recommend 
it.
I have a hankering after legislation which shall be at once concise and decisive, to 
help the British part o f the bill of fare. [Sir Algernon E.] West told me he thought 
you were inclined more or less to entertain his scheme o f the Death Duties. This I 
think for the present purpose could be made to fulfil the two conditions. There is 
also a question o f taxing ground rents.22
Gladstone included it in his sketch o f a legislative program for 1893, under the headings:
Finance. Budget. ‘I. Tax ground-rents. 2. Abolition o f Death Duty Acts from a distant day:
impose uniform duty.’23 Harcourt was even more insistent on a Radical programme to
satisfy the British constituencies, and over dinner with Hamilton ‘hinted at financial
measures such as the reform o f the Death Duties.’ His son, Lewis Harcourt, was even more
insistent that what Gladstone proposed was not enough. W e must have a ‘revolutionary’
Budget next year. Graduated Income tax if possible and further reduction o f the Inhabited
[house] duty, and if it can be managed, something more off tea and cheap tobacco.’24 The
point was reinforced when Hamilton dined with Harcourt “en familli’ after work on 25
August. ‘He wants to take up the Death duty question next year; but he will find it a terribly
difficult one to tackle.’25 It did indeed prove to be so, but not for the expected reasons. It
simply transpired that the anticipated yield o f the reformed Death Duties would be
insufficient to cover the forecast financial deficit for 1893—94 and a more immediate fiscal
fix was required. The Death Duties would have to wait. Finance would continue to be at the
very heart o f Liberal political strategy, but in the Budget o f 1893—94 the Death Duties
would not, as Home Rule overshadowed everything.
22 GD, xiii, p. 42. He wrote again on the 18th to say ‘My two points o f  finance were only meant as those parts 
o f a policy which might specially fall to your consideration.’ p. 44.
23 GD, xiii, p. 47 ,20 July 1892.
24 BL HD, Add. MS 48658, f. 60, 21 July and Lewis Harcourt, 21 July, cited in Daunton, Death Duties, p.156.
25 H D  iii, p. 173.
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There had been in the intervening period no great re-thinking o f  the question, and 
this was especially the case insofar as finance figured. Irish Finance had been rather 
curiously circumnavigated, in spite o f the emphasis which the Liberal party continued to 
place on Irish Home Rule. Once in office the financial aspects were entrusted to Harcourt’s 
Treasury department, but under the direct supervision o f Gladstone. The key figures were 
Sir Reginald Welby, Edward Hamilton and Alfred Milner.26 To this end Hamilton had 
begun working on the problem at the start o f October, assisted by Alfred Milner 27 There 
were three conflicting proposals about how to resolve the financial relationship between 
Britain and Ireland under the Home Rule Bill. First and favoured by Gladstone was his own 
plan o f 1886, in which a quota system would fix the Irish contribution for a set period o f  
years: ‘unalterable (except downwards) for thirty years: £4,236,000per annum, plus £360,000 
per annum to service the Irish share o f the national debt.’28 There were opposed to this 
Harcourt’s plan for a “dole” to cover the cost o f Irish administration and what would 
become the Treasury plan in which Britain would retain the Irish Customs revenue and 
Ireland would be given over her Excise revenue. Meanwhile, Harcourt was still fighting a 
rearguard action in raising objections against the overall scheme, let alone the financial 
provisions.29 It was a three-cornered fight. Gladstone was confident o f Irish capacity to 
manage their Home Rule finance and so willing to concede power and responsibility, but 
stern about the amount he was willing to give them. Harcourt was contemptuous o f Irish 
ability and so determined to give them a “dole” but no financial power or responsibility. The 
Treasury point o f view was pragmatic, that if  the Irish were to have any power and 
responsibility then the financial provisions must be generous if they were to have any hope 
o f being workable.
26 Gladstone wrote to Alfred Milner on 20 Aug. 1892 ‘asking him, with Welby and Hamilton, to make an 
examination o f  the financial relations o f  Britain and Ireland; Milner agreed.’ GD , xiii, p. 62, n. 2. Sir Algernon 
West, Gladstone’s private secretary, records forwarding a memo on Irish finance written by Welby for John 
Morley to the Irish Viceroy, Lord Houghton, on 16 Aug.
27 HD, iii, p. 176, 5 Oct.
28 Matthew, ii, p. 251.
29 GD, xiii, p. 149, 22 Nov.
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The key to the Treasury view can be derived from the report o f 14 December 1892,
“Irish Finance” which was prepared and signed by Welby, Hamilton, and Milner.30 It was an
exhaustive overview o f the Irish financial provisions proposed by Gladstone in 1886 and
updated to account for changes to both the Imperial and Irish finances. The Treasury plan,
had the benefit o f simplicity, for under it,
the Imperial Government should retain the collection o f the customs duties in 
Ireland, and the collection and control o f the Irish excise, stamps, and income-tax 
should be handed over to the Irish Government, together with the Irish non-tax 
revenue; but the collection o f excise duties on beer and spirits should be confined to 
the duties actually paid by Irishmen on the dutiable articles which they consume.
The key to this scheme was that Irish revenue and expenditure were nearly balanced,
£5,584,000 versus £5,649,000 (including the full charge o f the Irish Constabulary,
£1,500,000). Likewise the Irish Customs revenue o f £2,358,000 almost offset the
£2,367,000 Imperial contribution. The problem was the deficit o f  £74,000,31 but this
problem was common to both schemes, insofar as there was little or no working balance left
for the Irish Parliament. In conclusion it was stated that the plan had seven advantages: less
complication than the 1886 plan; the Irish Imperial contribution would be the same as it was
actually now paying; the Customs duties, difficult to differentiate between Irish, Scottish and
English claims, were left in Imperial hands; minimal interference o f Imperial officers in
Ireland (and that in Customs ports where they would have the support o f the Navy);
reduction o f friction between the Irish and Imperial Governments; that Ireland’s fiscal
freedom would be enhanced without unduly hampering that o f the Imperial Government;
and finally that the proposed fiscal arrangements for Ireland were no more than an
extension (admittedly considerable) o f the precedent ‘made by recent legislation with local
authorities in England and Scotland.’32 So in this the Treasury had stated its views and made
its bid to supersede the Gladstone plan.
30 PRO CAB 37/32  no. 51,14 Dec. 1892.
31 Ibid., p. 39.
32 Ibid., p. 40. This last referred to Goschen’s 1888 scheme o f grants-in-aid for Local Government finance.
182
Gladstone had other ideas, and set them out in a paper o f 14 January. It began with 
a statement o f first principles: that taxation was only justified in meeting those public 
charges deemed necessary or o f high utility for which government must determine both the 
amount o f  charge and means o f raising it. In the case of Home Rule the task for his 
government was to fix an equitable charge for Ireland’s contribution to the Imperial 
expenditure ‘as a matter o f  primary necessity.’ The key Imperial concerns in this regard were 
the national Debt, Defence, and the inevitable charge o f Imperial government. In this the 
government was to be guided by the consideration that ‘the contribution o f Ireland to 
Imperial expenditure should be governed by an equitable consideration o f comparative 
resources.’ From this he concluded that the best charge was a quota ‘rising or falling with 
the increase or decrease o f the Imperial charge.’ After deducting Imperial obligations from 
the revenue assigned to Ireland there appeared to be left a surplus o f  only £48,000, 
compared to a requirement o f £400,000. I t  follows that under the new arrangement a sum 
o f £350,000 and upwards per ann. has to be provided at the expence o f Great Britain for 
the pecuniary benefit o f  Ireland.’33 This was not the least o f concerns for Harcourt.
Harcourt’s objection’s were mainly a reiteration o f the questions raised in the 
Treasury report o f 14 December 1892. The fatal objections were that it would be necessary 
for customs and excise duties to be identical for Britain and Ireland, otherwise free trade 
between the two islands would be interfered with. Given that, the Irish Parliament would 
only have control over Stamps and direct taxes at present amounting to £1,251,000 and one- 
fifth o f  its revenue. The complications of the Irish members sitting in the Imperial 
Parliament and their rights and responsibilities with respect to the British Budget raised 
seemingly insoluble problems. It was also feared that in the event o f some future need for 
emergency or war finance there would be no means to ensure that Ireland contributed her 
share o f  the Imperial obligation, except through ‘an enormous increase o f the indirect
33 BL GP, Add. MS 44775 ff. 14-18.
183
taxation upon the people o f Great Britain and Ireland alike.’ Harcourt concluded that the 
scheme as Gladstone envisaged it would lead to a loss o f control by Great Britain over her 
Imperial financial policy.34
Harcourt was not content with being merely a destructive force, and presented his 
own plan at the Cabinet o f the 18th, recorded by Gladstone as ‘3. Harcourt’s plan— to give 
them 5 Vz [million] & taxing [?] power other than Customs and Excise.’35 It was much more 
than this, for in it Harcourt attempted to surmount the objections to the plan from the 
Chancellor o f the Exchequer’s point of view, albeit at the expense o f the Irish perspective, 
for it was his old idea o f  making the Irish legislature content with a dole from the Imperial 
Exchequer.36 In fact, Harcourt’s proposal was a breakthrough, for it caused Gladstone to 
consider alternatives to his own plan and to accept that other ideas were open for 
consideration.37
Gladstone had prepared another memo on Irish Finance. This was very nearly the 
Treasury plan: T. All Irish Revenues except the Revenue o f Customs to be collected by the 
Irish Government.’ It did not concede taxation power over the Customs and Excise to the 
Irish Parliament, only collection o f the latter (and allowed Ireland a 25% interest in any gains 
on these), but all other taxation was devolved to Ireland. The Constabulary charges were still 
a sticking point but Gladstone envisioned that there would be a positive working balance o f 
£360,000 from the arrangement: T. The present Irish Revenue being taken at £8 [,000,000] 
and Great Britain undertaking a charge o f £6 [,000,000] will retain from Irish sources an 
annual sum o f £2[,000,000] available for Imperial Expenditure.’ Crucially, he also held out 
the possibility that Ireland could augment that surplus from c4. All future economies on any
34 ‘Memorandum by the Chancellor o f  the Exchequer on the Financial Arrangements proposed in the 
‘Government o f  Ireland Bill”, MS Harcourt dep. 160, ff. 144-67,16 Jan. 1893.
35 GD, xiii, p. 183.
36 MS Harcourt dep. 160 ff. 18—22,18 Jan.
37 Ibid., ff. 36-8.
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o f the existing heads o f charge.’38 This, for Hamilton, was progress. Gladstone was shifting
towards his position and so it was only necessary to win over Harcourt.
Both Hamilton and Welby prepared memos for Harcourt on the 20th, the former a
brief critique which sought to point out the virtues of the Treasury plan39 and the latter a
more formidable criticism and restatement o f Harcourt and Gladstone’s Irish finance.40
Hamilton proffered a solution: give Ireland an interest in the collection o f the Excise duties,
better still, let Ireland collect it.
That revenue amounts on the present basis o f taxation to £3,316,000 and if  to this 
be added the Irish (1.) misc. receipts £262,000 (2.) crown lands £65,000 [subtotal] 
£327,000 [=] 3,643,000. Which would very nearly amount to the proposed Imperial 
subvention o f 3,750,000 Would it not under the circumstances be more simple to 
hand her over the collection o f her own Excise[?]41
That Excise would be fixed at the present rate cin order that the Chancellor o f  the
Exchequer’s hands may be kept free’, an addition to the rates o f duty would accme to the
Imperial Exchequer although any reduction would have to be made good to the Irish
Legislature. ‘The C. o f E. would thus be free to raise or lower the Excise duties as well as
the Customs duties just as he can now.’ As with the Harcourt plan, the Irish revenue o f
£5,593,000 and expenditure o f £5,087,000 would leave a working balance o f £406,000.42
Once again it was the Treasury plan put forward, and in the face o f this relentless advance
the opposition collapsed.
The following day, Saturday the 21st, Gladstone wrote Harcourt and met with
Hamilton. Harcourt had begun by restating his proposal that
the rate o f taxation for the whole Kingdom would be settled as now by the Imperial 
Parliament, the proceeds as now would go to the Imperial Exchequer, the only 
change introduced by Home Rule would be the important one that the Irish 
Parliament would have the disposal and control o f the sum total o f Irish 
expenditure...43
38 BL GP, Add. MS 44775 f. 40 ,20  Jan.
39 MS Harcourt dep. 160, 20 Jan. ff. 26—9. The Treasury plan was really a Hamilton-Milner plan.
40 Ibid., ff. 30-3.
41 Ibid., f. 27-8.
42 Ibid., ff. 28-9.
43 MS Harcourt dep. 13, ff. 32—48.
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Gladstone’s letter o f reply indicated that he had changed over to the Hamilton horse in mid­
stream. 1 think Hamilton’s new manipulation carries us altogether past all or nearly all the 
objections to your plan or to my suggestions. I hope it will have your favourable 
consideration.’44 It did, Harcourt replying that it was ‘the best “Arrangement in Home Rule” 
we have yet reached.’45 Hamilton’s diary is, unsurprisingly, triumphant.
It is at any rate the simplest, because we get rid of the quota o f Imperial expenditure 
which would infallibly have led to an immense amount o f wranglings and 
complications. Under it, the Irish Government has to pay her own administrative 
expenses; and to enable them to do so the Stamps, Income Tax and Excise licenses 
are handed over to them bodily, and they will be credited with the Irish proceeds o f  
the Excise beer and spirit duties at their present rates.46
And so, for better or worse, the Treasury plan for Irish Home Rule Finance had been
reluctantly agreed upon, it was a compromise accepted by the Gladstone and Harcourt only
because they couldn’t stand each other’s plans. This paternity would be much discussed in
the coming months as the Government o f Ireland Bill made its way through the Commons.
Harcourt spent his holidays working on the Death Duties, the Budget and Irish
Home Rule Finance at his Malwood home. His natural optimism, based on the six months
revenue returns, had yet to be rudely interrupted.
Goschen estimated a loss o f  £556,000 as compared with the last year. In the third 
quarter there is a gain o f £300,000. So that we have a margin o f £800,000 to meet 
the next quarter. I do not find A. Milner an alarmist as to the Income tax for the 
next quarter. What is good about the return is that each successive quarter is an 
improvement on the preceding.
Harcourt wanted to spend £100,000 on the Recoinage fund and do everything else possible
to use up this surplus.47 In fact it was slowly being whittled away, as Hamilton constructed
the forecasts for 1892—3 and the preliminary estimates for 1893—4. The nine months
Customs receipts indicated that the fall had not been counter-acted, although the forecast
44 GD, xiii, p. 188.
45 Ibid., p. 188, n. 2.
46 HD, iii, p. 187.
47 BL HP, Add. MS 48615B, ff. 2 -3 , Harcourt to Hamilton 2 Jan. 1893.
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for the year was now for the Excise to exceed its estimate and total Revenue to beat the
estimate by £1 40,000 so as to provide a surplus o f £215,000 on the year.48 After
congratulating himself on the accuracy o f his estimates Hamilton recorded that,
Goschen’s estimates will be well vindicated; and ends will meet comfortably. Next 
year will be a very different affair; and I am afraid there will be a very appreciable 
deficit to meet. Harcourt writing yesterday says Mr. G. is ... not a little concerned at 
the menacing amount o f the Estimates for next year; but he hopes that Lord 
Spencer and Campbell Bannerman may be able to hold their own against the 
professionals 49
This forecast was duly sent to Harcourt at Malwood, who remained at work on the Death
Duties with Alfred Milner. Finding that Milner concurred with Hamilton’s figures Harcourt
had some minor comments for Hamilton.
I would like a little less shrinkage on the Income Tax and a little more on Stamps 
than you do. As regards Revenue this year’s income is good enough but for extra 
Expenditure is it decent? It leaves the surplus somewhat thin ice to skate upon. 
However I hope we may be able to impound £100,000 o f  it for Coinage. As to the 
future, that will very likely not be my affair.... I am not alarmist at the prospect o f a 
Deficit next year, as I intend my hand to deal with Death Duties it is better to be 
made compulsory.50
Not much compared to Goschen’s surpluses, but at least something, and especially useful if 
they could spare the finances for 1893—4.
This, however, was wishful thinking. The serious budgeting o f February provided 
the death by a thousand cuts for this surplus, on the 2nd o f February it was reduced to 
£197,000, on the 15th expenditure was increased by £65,000 and a week later on the 22nd 
Customs could only forecast a shortfall o f £100—150,000 on its estimate. 27 February still 
showed a hopeful surplus o f £185,000 but by 21 March it had shrunk to a mere £4,000,
48 PRO T168/27, 5 Jan.
49 H D  iii,p .l 82, 5 Jan.
50 BL HP, Add. MS 48615B, ff. 8-10, Harcourt to Hamilton, 6 Jan.
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practically nothing.51 The Customs estimate had had to be reduced a further £50,000 
because cin some quarters there is an idea that a further reduction in the [tea] duty is 
probable.’ This had led to a fall in consumption o f stocks out o f bond from warehouses.52 
N ot by any means a disaster, it would be made up in the 1893—94 financial year, but 
significant when the existing surplus was so small. If Goschen had meant to pay back 
Harcourt for the latter’s constant criticisms o f his habitual under-estimating o f the surplus 
over the previous five budgets, he could not have cut it closer. The good times were over.
The prospects for the 1893—94 Revenue were even poorer, and when Hamilton 
prepared his Budget forecast on 7 January 1893 he had bleak prospects ahead o f him.
I am afraid I cannot put the deficit at less than a million and three quarters. Harcourt 
says he does not mind a little ‘compulsion’ to enable him to deal with the death 
duties; but that is more than he will care to have even for that purpose. We cannot 
expect anything else when revenue is at a stand-still and expenditure is steadily 
growing. Economy is gone completely out of fashion; and it is no use any longer to 
preach it or practice it.53
He anticipated a decrease o f £410,000 on Revenue versus an increase o f £1,266,000 in
expenditure which meant the prospect o f an £1,656,000 deficit (which included £200,000
for contingencies). On the revenue side it was expected that the economic stagnation o f the
1892—93 financial year would continue, particularly affecting the alcohol yield o f Customs
and Excise, but also the Income tax on account o f the three year averaging system which
would now take account o f an additional “bad” year. Stamps were expected to decline on
account o f 1892—93 being an exceptionally good year for mortality and, therefore, the death
duties. On the expenditure side the main heads o f increase were Army (£400,000), Civil
Services (£360,000) and Post Office (£250,000). Naval expenditure, remarkably, was
51 PRO T168/27, for 2 ,1 5 ,2 2  and 27 Feb. 1893, and 21 March. On 21 February Milner wrote to Hamilton 
that ‘the last week or two have been very discouraging as far as Revenue goes, but I still think we shall get 
about the total you name, though if  Probate continues to go much worse than we expected, I may have to 
turn the Income Tax screw on a bit next month.’ PRO T168/27.
52 PRO T168 /2 7 ,1 0  March. W. Pittar (Customs) to Hamilton.
53 H D  iii, 7 Jan. 1893, p. 183.
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expected to remain constant.54 These changes represented the variable range inherent in the 
nature o f the Revenue sources, that is, they reflected the changes in the underlying economy 
— moving in step with the growth or decline in economic conditions. In other words, this 
was what the Treasury meant by “elasticity.”
For Harcourt, the news was bleak55 but not without its uses. It would reinforce the 
necessity o f  reforming the Death Duties and he intended to use it as stick with which to 
beat the spending departments. He put on a brave face in replying to Hamilton the 
following day. 1  am extremely obliged to you for your forecast for ‘93-94. You are like a 
good & wise physician who announces to his patient the presence o f a mortal disease. I shall 
have the pleasure o f announcing the agreeable intelligence to my colleagues in a few 
hours.’56 He wished to ‘mention it at the Cabinet as a warning to the great spending depts., 
e.g. War Office, Admiralty, Post Office, and Education.’57 He wrote to Gladstone in the 
morning, ‘I have a very bad financial outlook to deal with ... I am being pushed on all sides 
by all my colleagues for increased expenditure. I will ask leave at the commencement o f the 
Cabinet today just to state the figures of E. Hamilton.’58 He then lunched with him before 
the Cabinet, at which he duly presented his deficit.59
The pressure on the Revenue came from the estimated Expenditure, which was just 
about £ \  million over that o f 1892—3 and split almost equally amongst the spending 
departments. In combination with the estimated fall in revenue this amounted to
54 PRO T168/27, 7 Jan.
55 Lewis Harcourt’s journal notes: T h e final figures are most depressing and work out to a deficit o f  at least 
£ \ ,500,000 or possibly more. There is a prospect o f a steady decline in the Revenue and a steady and large 
increase in the ordinary expenditure.’ MS Harcourt dep. 389, f. 31,10 Jan.
56 BL H P  Add. MS 48615B, f. 14, Harcourt to Hamilton, 11 Jan.
57 MS Harcourt dep. 389, f. 34, Lewis Harcourt journal, 11 Jan. 1893.
58 BL GP, Add. MS 44203, f. 10, Harcourt to Gladstone 11 Jan.
59 Gladstone replied: ‘On the forecasts I will only say that they only have full authority, I think, at a later date, 
& when including the views o f  the Revenue Departments. But I quite agree that they may have their use at the 
present moment.’ GD, xiii, p. 177.
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£1,594,000.60 So the military and civil service increases were significant but not immense, 
and the whole estimated deficit was still less than the yield o f an additional penny on the 
income tax. Given this, it was not the increase on expenditure which was so important, but 
the continued high level o f overall expenditure which also threatened the ability o f the 
Government to sustain its attack on the National Debt. To these ends Harcourt was not 
averse to taking to the field o f battle against expenditure.
Military spending was still Harcourt’s bete noire, and Lord Spencer, First Lord o f the
Admiralty, was clearly in his sights. One o f his earliest efforts was to countermand
Goschen’s Naval Defence Act o f 1889, which was in its final year. In spite o f  cautious
advice from Welby and Hamilton at the Treasury as to the constitutionality o f the plan, he
was determined to abolish the loan finance and pay off the debt incurred.61 It was perhaps
unfortunate, therefore, for Spencer to catch him with his blood up, for the Admirals were
scheming to increase the peril o f the Royal Navy from the prospective fleets o f Russia and
France. Harcourt was unmoved.
The Admirals are up to their well-known “tricks and manners.” In order to swell the 
list o f foreign ships and to prove the inferiority o f the British Navy they have stuck 
into the list about thirty foreign ships which are not yet launched and will not be for 
three or four years to com e.... The table really proves what I have always affirmed 
that at this moment in armour-clads and first-class cruisers the British Navy is a 
match not only for any two Powers but for all the Powers o f the world.... We can 
build when we please four ships to their one, and we can man ten ships to their one 
with mariners who understand the work, which theirs do n o t.... I am really as great 
an advocate o f British maritime supremacy as any jingo, for I regard it as the great 
security for our neutrality, but I like to know what the actual facts are and to 
confound the panic-mongers.62
60 PRO T168/27.
61 MS Harcourt dep. 62, ff. 92—99 o f 18 (Hamilton), 7 (Jenkyns) and 16 (Welby) Oct. 1892. Welby, however, 
shared Harcourt’s disdain for this method o f finance. ‘O f course they represent the general wish o f  mankind 
to do great things without having to pay for them. The great blot in the policy is that it assumes that no one 
except the Ministry existing at the moment will have any demands which it will be convenient to meet by 
drafts upon the future.’ [f.96] Harcourt’s reply o f  19 Oct. is ff. 100—1.
62 Gardiner, ii, pp. 201—2, Harcourt to Spencer, 29 Nov. 1892. Harcourt had met with Spencer and the 
Admirals to clarify the state o f the Navy. Spencer recalling that ‘H. had every sort o f  theory, and wished to 
ignore Russia altogether. He seems to have long had a craze about ships. He was very odd and extravagant at 
times, but kept his temper admirably, and did not trample on us to any extent. He said that it was the most 
interesting 3 hours possible to him. I got rather exhausted as did the Admirals.’ Peter Gordon, ed., The Red 
Earl. The Papers of the Fifth Earl Spencer, 1835—1910 (2 vols., Northampton, 1986), ii, p. 219.
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Spencer replied with mild rebuke63 and considerable good humour, but the fact was that
Harcourt’s charges were correct. The Admiralty were overstating their case, and they were
contributing towards a panic.
I remember being told to supply their Lordships with a statement o f the combined 
strengths o f the Navies o f France and Russia, against which had to be shown, ship 
by ship, our own Navy. I was given the hint that, the object being to wring more 
money for more ships out o f the Chancellor o f the Exchequer, I was to make out as 
formidable a list as I could o f  our then probable enemies. Naturally, I did as I was 
told, and no old lame duck was too obsolete to be trotted out for the occasion. 
Personally I was convinced that the device was too transparent to deceive a child, let 
alone such an old political hand as was Sir William Harcourt, the then Chancellor o f  
the Exchequer. To my secret delight, my precious report came back with the 
Chancellor’s own annotations on it, and very much to the point they were. I felt that 
with all the knowledge o f those Fleets that I had at the moment, I could not have 
made a better selection o f the obsolete and useless vessels than did the Chancellor 
with his blue pencil.64
The state o f the Admiralty’s authorized building program was clear by 12 December, and by 
the 15th their attempts to increase it still further led to another long memo from Harcourt to 
Spencer.65 He did not spare the sarcasm. 1 think now the best thing we can do is declare 
war against all the world at once and conquer it offhand. Then we shall have no further 
trouble and there will be no minor questions o f annexations and protectorates.’66 What no 
doubt amused Spencer the most was that it was the Army which was predicting an increase 
of expenditure, not the Navy. He had on 9 December informed Harcourt that ‘the sketch 
estimate prepared by the Accountant General is about £400,000 over that o f 92—93. The 
Financial Secretary has reduced it by 200,000£ and I hope we may reduce it further. The 
amount that I think is possible (and it will be very difficult to attain that) will be to ask for 
the same amount as that in the Estimates o f 92—93.’67 On 9 November the Treasury 
estimated an increase o f about £400,000 for the Army and by 27 December that had grown
63 Gardiner, ii, p. 202, 5 Dec. 1892.
64 Sir Seymour Fortescue, Looking Back (London, 1920), pp. 193-94. He was on the staff o f  Naval Intelligence, 
responsible for France and Russia. I am indebted to Professor Beeler for this reference.
65 PRO T168/27 o f 12 Dec. 1892 and MS Harcourt dep. 389 o f  15 Dec. f. 1.
66 Gordon, ii, p. 221.
67 Ibid., p. 219.
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to £450,000 as, ‘...recruiting has been so good, during the bad times, that we have more 
mouths to feed than has been our wont.’68 Concurrendy, Harcourt and his son were writing 
memos upon that expenditure.69 *1 am glad to hear that you are making these additional 
demands & I take it to be a certain sign that you have reduced all your estimates in other 
respects.’70 They would not be the last.
January o f course saw the start o f the real business o f budgeting, and the first week 
was the most furious in the battle o f  the estimates in which Harcourt had the inestimable 
support o f his chief.
I have reflected with sorrow on the menacing prospects o f the Estimates which you 
mentioned to me. Must you altogether renounce the hope o f getting them somewhat 
restrained? Both the heads are men who I think might not dislike being supported 
against professional oppressors. The thing really to be dreaded is that we may cease 
to pay off debt. As long as the process of liquidation is continued at a tolerable or at 
least appreciable rate, the evils o f extravagance though great are within bounds.71
4 January found Harcourt questioning the willingness o f Spencer and Campbell- Bannerman
to stand up to their oppressors, or perhaps they rather found Harcourt to be their
oppressor. Harcourt, while complaining to Hamilton o f the high level o f peacetime military
expenditure, suggested that Gladstone’s support ‘would be a good deal nearer to the
purpose if he paid a little more heed to the matter himself.’72 For the Army and Navy
expenditure would require supplemental estimates, o f £225,000 and £63,000 respectively.73
Remonstrating with Spencer about his inability to control his Admiralty experts he
fulminated:
Verily in six months we have out-Heroded Herod and out-jinjoed the Jingoes. We 
have annexed more territory and spent more money than any Government that 
preceded us. The Tories are great fools if they do not do all they can to keep us in 
office, for, if  we remain in, we shall have forfeited for ever the right to criticize any 
folly o f which they should be capable.... I don’t know who is going to find the
68 PRO T168/27 o f  9 Nov. and 27 Dec. 1892.
69 MS Harcourt dep. 389, f. 23 o f  26—8 Dec.
70 Harcourt to Campbell-Bannerman, BL Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Add. MS 41219, f. 50, 31 Dec.
71 GD, xiii, p. 174, Gladstone to Harcourt 1 Jan. 1893.
72 BL HP, Add. MS 48615B, f. 6, 4 Jan. 1893.
73 PRO T168/27, 5 Jan. 1893. Harcourt communicated this to Gladstone on 4  Jan. GD, xiii, p. 174, n. 4.
192
money or ask Parliament to sanction all this. I am however acquainted with one 
person who will not.
Campbell-Bannerman was the recipient o f a similar jobation, and responded in kind, 
refuting the charge and resenting the tone. ‘Other people besides the Treasury are doing 
their best to keep down estimates, but while there is no difficulty whatever in propounding 
general principles, there is a good deal in keeping in check the actual growth o f  
requirements.’74 On the 7th an alarmed First Lord of the Treasury was commiserating this 
deplorable state o f  affairs with his Chancellor o f the Exchequer. ‘If the figures justify your 
apprehensions can we not make some expostulation with the Heads? You may depend upon 
my earnest support whatever it may be worth.’75 On the 8th Harcourt called a truce, 
conceding to Campbell-Bannerman, ‘All right. If you will keep down your Estimates I will 
keep down my bile.’76 He would renew his offensive at the Cabinet.
His strategy was simple, to brandish Hamilton’s forecast deficit for 1893—4 before 
the Cabinet ‘as a warning to the great spending depts. o f War Office, Admiralty, Post 
Office, Education.’77 Gladstone was a little more wary o f the tactic, but only because his 
concern for precedent made him hesitate at submitting revenue forecasts which were not 
officially from the heads o f the Customs and Inland Revenue. Nonetheless he agreed that 
‘they may have their use as to the present moment.’ The diary dryly records that ‘Sir W. 
Harcourt gave notice o f a probable deficit o f 1 3A [million]’78 And that was the end o f  it, 
for Treasury concerns over the Budget were swept away by much greater Treasury fears 
over the financial provisions o f Irish Home Rule. The Estimates were presented and 
accepted in a perfunctory and, for Harcourt, near agreeable manner at a Cabinet o f 23
74 Gardiner, ii, p. 227, 4 and 6 Jan. Even Spencer was being pushed to anger, and after detailing the great 
efforts he had made towards economy, gave warning that he had had enough. ‘I am not so now, and I do not 
pretend to argue against you, although I can be obstinate when I think I am right.’ Ibid., p. 228.
75 GD, xiii, p. 176.
76 BL Campbell-Bannerman, Add. MS 41219, f. 57.
77 MS Harcourt dep. 389 f. 34,11 Jan..
78 Gladstone to Harcourt, 11 Jan. 1893 in reply to Harcourt’s letter o f the same day reporting that ‘I have a very 
bad financial outlook to deal with’. GD, xiii, p. 177 and n. 3, p. 177.
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February. The Army was to be increased by £171,000 and the Navy would get no increase 
whatsoever.79
Gladstone continued that work on Home Rule, and especially finance, in preparation
for his introduction o f the Government o f Ireland Bill in Parliament on Monday 13
February.80 Yet, before that could happen, the whole thing nearly blew up in a battle
between Harcourt and Morley over the exact working and wording o f the Excise clauses. It
had been agreed that any increase in the rate of the Excise by the Imperial Parliament would
accrue to the Chancellor o f the Exchequer only, the Irish would have only that part
representing the Excise at the time o f the Home Rule agreement. Harcourt had insisted
upon this as a means by which the Imperial Government could still raise extraordinary
revenue in Ireland, such as war taxation. The Irishmen resent very strongly the provision
which will enable the Imperial Chancellor o f the Exchequer to raise the Excise duties over
their present rates for his own purposes; and J. Morley yesterday, after consulting with
Welby but not with Harcourt, altered the clause.’81 Harcourt was livid, and wrote to
Gladstone on the 12th at 10 p.m., when he learned o f it.
The proposal as stated to me is that if the Excise is lowered the whole loss in Ireland 
is to be borne by the Imperial Exchequer, and if it is raised for a great emergency 
only half the increment is to come to the Imperial Exchequer....
All this confusion seems to have arisen from the attempt to introduce the 
consideration o f the disputed and disputable question o f quota into a scheme which 
was expressly framed to exclude it altogether.82
Eventually a truce was agreed so that the issue could be discussed at special Cabinets 14 and
16 February that duly provided a forum for Harcourt’s discontent, which was relentless.
2. Harcourt. There is no plan o f a separate finance for Ireland which is not 
destructive o f the finance o f Great Britain.... Resolved at 8 P.M. to propose to Irish 
leaders through Mr. Sexton that the Clause should at present stand so as to give the
79 MS Harcourt dep. 163, ff. 15—16,23 Feb. and GD, xiii, pp. 206—7, for letter to Harcourt o f  22 Feb. and 
Cabinet notes o f  the 23rd.
80 Friday: Worked on Irish Question.’ Saturday, Worked much on Irish question ... Saw Welby & Hamilton 
on the Irish Finance.’ Sunday, Worked on Irish Financial notes’. GD, xiii, p. 200.
81 HD, iii, 13 Feb., p. 190.
82 Gardiner, ii, 12 Feb. pp. 220—1.
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whole proceeds to the British Exchequer but should be subject to reconsideration in 
the interests o f  Ireland.83
Given that treatment o f the financial provisions o f the Bill in the Cabinet its reception in the
House o f  Commons should have been no surprise.
The Government o f Ireland Bill was presented to Parliament on 13 February with
more than usual anticipation, in fact it was an event o f the highest Parliamentary theatre.84
As always for Gladstone the moral issue was inextricably bound up with the financial
question. It was this which drove him and it was this that drove the Bill.
My contention is this ... that a permanent system o f repressive law inflicted upon or 
attached to a country from without, and in defiance o f the voice and the judgment 
o f the vast majority o f its Constitutional Representatives, constitutes a state o f  things 
o f such a character that while it exists you have not, and you cannot have, the first 
conditions o f harmony and good government established in that country.... [citizens 
cannot be] brought into that sympathy with the law and that respect for the law 
without which there can be no true political stability, and no true social civilization.85
Such a state o f citizenship had to be established, and the first stage had been accomplished
with the ‘wide extension o f the franchise* in 1885, in combination with the secret ballot.
That led inevitably to the question o f representation, and it was necessary to retain the Irish
members in Westminster if there was to be a continued financial connection between Britain
and Ireland.
He did not evade the difficult question o f extraordinary taxation. ‘The quota plan by 
its elasticity meets every exigency o f peace and war. The fund plan is not quite so exact.’ 
While Gladstone himself did not think Ireland would shirk its obligations, in the event of 
extraordinary taxation the Customs was in Imperial hands while the Excise and Income Tax 
were held by Ireland. Ireland’s balance sheet, however, depended upon an Imperial grant o f  
£500,000 towards the cost o f the Irish Constabulary, which could be withheld. O f course 
that begged the question then o f who in fact paid for it? ‘Undoubtedly in the whole or in the
83 GD, xiii, p. 202.
84 See Hamilton’s description, H D, iii, pp. 190—1.
85 This same moral analysis had been foreshadowed by John Stuart Mill in the aftermath o f  the Irish famine 
when he wrote that the ‘English nation owes a tremendous debt to the Irish people for centuries o f  
m isgovem m ent... I f  ever compensation was due from one people to another this is the case for it.’ Kinzer, p. 
65.
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main it would fall on the British taxpayer. You may be shocked by that/ Gladstone,
however, contended that it was the present arrangement o f finance between Britain and
Ireland which was really shocking. ‘I am well convinced that Ireland in former days has been
most shabbily and most unjusdy treated with respect to money matters/ The proposed
arrangement would do justice to both sides, for the £500,000 charge was a Vanishing’
charge, it would fall away as the Irish Constabulary was reduced. The real benefit to Britain
was that it would escape from the present considerable, and growing, charges for Irish local
services. These would now become Ireland’s responsibility. The stakes were high but the
ends did justice to them. £It is no less in my view, than to redeem the fame and character o f
this country and its political genius from an old and inveterate dishonour, and to increase,
enhance, and magnify the strength, greatness, glory, and union o f the Empire.’86 “Sound
Finance” would be essential in reconciling these irreconcilable objects, but it was no mere
minimal government nostrum, the awesome financial resources o f  the state would be used
to deliver this great Imperial and moral end. That was the ‘greatness and glory’ o f “Sound
Finance”, it made great objects possible, while imposing a financial responsibility upon
citizenship and democracy.
The second reading o f the Home Rule bill was 6 April 1893, and Gladstone led off
again in the masterful style with which he had introduced it. His speech, emphasizing points
o f principle, was perhaps even better than that, going right to the heart o f  what a modern
democracy meant for representative government.
Then came the Reform Act, and with the Reform Act came to Ireland the 
beginnings o f political life ,... By the largest majority, perhaps, ever returned within 
these Islands for any purpose whatever—in the last and in the present Parliament 
the only elections since their great franchise has been given— the Irish people have 
pressed upon you in a respectful and Constitutional manner that you should make 
them this great final concession.
86 4 H 8. 1243-75.
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For Gladstone it was absolutely necessary that finance be at the very core o f this argument, 
both to deal truthfully with the Irish problem and to reassure Britain about that solution. In 
a restatement o f his first reading remarks on finance he admitted that 1 do not believe that 
it can be done in any manner which will be entirely free from inconvenience., 87 Gladstone 
was convinced o f the possibility and promise of Irish renewal within an Imperial framework. 
Home Rule for Ireland was in response to the legitimate, constitutional and democratically 
expressed will o f the Irish people. It was clear, and Gladstone understood this perhaps 
better than anyone, that the financial consequences o f Home Rule for Ireland would require 
sacrifice from its citizens (and taxpayers), but that was the necessary cost o f political power 
and the price o f responsible citizenship.
The Unionist response was that the Irish were irresponsible and unworthy o f  
citizenship, incapable if  not unwilling to pay that price, and ultimately, as Irishmen, unfit for 
democracy and freedom. A greater challenge was that Irish Home Rule finance had hardly 
exhausted its quota o f trouble or its fund o f mischief for either the Government or the 
Treasury, but Harcourt had first to look to the Imperial finance.
The Budget forecasts had became more elastic by the month, indeed by the week. 
Hamilton was cast in the role o f bearer o f bad news, which he tried to mitigate with useful 
remedies. TSfext year we may be worse o ff than I told you by £100,000 but, if we are all right 
as regards this year, we can slacken off payments into the Exchequer at the end o f March 
and throw a litde o f this year’s Revenue into next year, raising the Customs estimate to 
£19,750,000 or even £19,800,000.’88 A month later, on 14 February, Milner, Chairman o f  
the Inland Revenue, was inquiring o f Hamilton ‘how much do you reckon that you will want 
from the Inland Revenue to make your Imperial Budget balance? ... This is, o f course, 
stricdy entre nous I am asking for what you think as a friend, not for your instructions as the
87 4 H 10.1597-1620.
88 MS Harcourt dep. 63, Hamilton to Harcourt, 18 Jan. 1893.
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Treasury.’ Hamilton wanted £56,715,000 (he estimated that Inland Revenue was good for
£54,800,000), for his calculations now indicated a deficit for 1893—94 o f £1,910,000,
although it did make room for a contingency o f £250,000.89 He would not get it. This was
putting serious pressure onto the prospects for Government’s inaugural budget.
It is extraordinary bad luck for the Government to have to increase taxation in its 
very first year; and what is more nothing can be more inopportune than any change 
in taxation just before the Home Rule Bill is taken in Committee: all the 
awkwardnesses attending fiscal changes under a dual Budget system will be at once 
apparent. “Either,” as Harcourt said, “Home Rule will kill the Budget, or the Budget 
will kill Home Rule.”90
Milner wrote back on the 17th: ‘Without committing myself definitely, I think I may say that
your estimate is not excessive. I should vary the items by putting a little more on Excise & a
little less on Income Tax, but you may take it that, as far as we can at present judge, we are
good for £54,800,000.’91
Harcourt had now to beware o f his schemes for reform, for the Ides o f March
would indeed kill his Death Duties reform. Even at the beginning o f the month he was
faced with this prospect.
Harcourt, after further talk , is himself coming round to the conclusion that he may 
have to abandon any extensive fiscal changes, like the reconstruction o f the Death 
Duties, and for want o f being able to get time to resort to a humdrum proposal for 
bridging over the deficit by putting an extra penny on the income tax. I believe it will 
be the wisest course for him to take.92
On 7 March Milner was again writing to Hamilton to advise that the yield o f Income Tax
for 1892—93 was £13,500,000. ‘On this basis we might safely put Income Tax for next year
at £13,300,000 on the present basis and, if a penny were added, you could safely count on
£15.000.000.’ That meant the Inland Revenue forecast had fallen still further to £54,560,000
or £56,350,000 with the additional penny on income tax. Hamilton’s new balance sheet for
1893—94 now showed a deficit o f  £1,884,000 on total Revenue o f £89,580,000 against
89 PRO T16 8 /2 7 ,1 4 ,1 5  Feb.
90 H D  iii, p. 192,16 Feb.
91 PRO T168 /27 ,17  Feb.
92 BL H D, Add. MS 48659, ff. 131-2, 3 March.
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expenditure o f £91,464,000. Other sources were also being considered, the effect o f an
increase to the spirit duties was reviewed.93 With the additional £1,700,000 on the Income
tax and by drawing down the Treasury Chest Fund94 by £350,000 that could be converted
into a surplus o f £166,000. W e may be able to hold over a little Miscellaneous Revenue
(say) £50,000. Margin would then be £216,000.’95 These were tight assumptions, too tight
for an ambitious Budget.
Harcourt is coming round to the idea that anything but a humdrum Budget is out o f 
the question this year: humdrum means a Id. instead o f 6d. income tax. He can’t get 
enough money by a reconstruction o f the death duties in the first year, and that 
would mean the temporary imposition of other duties besides: such a Budget would 
take up an immense amount o f time and raise all the difficulties that can be raised in 
connection with Irish finance. It will be a disappointment to him and also to many 
o f the Radicals who are very keen for something in the direction o f appreciable 
graduation o f taxes, such as that for which his death duty scheme provides.96
Hamilton, after seeing Milner on 21 March was able to set out his near final balance sheet 
forecast for the 1893—94 budget. Having lost a further £100,000 on Inland Revenue it was 
decided to hold back £144,000 o f 1892—93 Miscellaneous Revenue so as to reduce the 
anticipated deficit to £1,834,000. With the addition o f a penny to the Income Tax and 
taking £250,000 from the Treasury Chest Fund that deficiency was converted into a small 
surplus o f £116,000.97 This precluded any populist reduction o f the Tea Duty by a penny 
from 4d. to 3d, as that would have cost £851,000 according to the Customs’ estimate.98 
Humdrum and no fun, a potentially fatal combination in these democratic times.
The Budget was approved by the Cabinet on 24 March, after Harcourt subjected it 
to what Hamilton describes as a Very “high saluting”[sic] speech and read them a strong
93 ‘Financial Effect o f  the Addition o f  6d. a Gallon to the Foreign Spirit Duty in 1890—91,’ PRO T168/26, 7 
March.
94 MS Harcourt dep. 63, “Treasury Chest Fund”, Hamilton memorandum to Harcourt, 10 March.
95 PRO T168/27, 7 and 8 March.
96 BL HD, Add. MS 48660, f. 4 ,1 0  March.
97 PRO T168/27 ,21  March.
98 ‘Memorandum as to the Financial effect o f  reducing the Duty on Tea from Ad. to 3d. per/lb’, produced by 
T.W. Pittar. 1  may just add that in 1889—90 the last year o f the sixpenny duty on tea, the produce o f  Id. o f  the 
rate was £748,000. This year the produce o f  a penny is likely to be about £862,000.’ MS Harcourt dep. 63, ff. 
21-28 ,13  March.
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lesson on the reckless extravagance o f the day’, a rehearsal for what he would subject 
Parliament to." A week later the financial year 1892—93 was complete: ‘probably by far the 
most closely balanced public account on record — 90 XU millions balanced on the right side 
by £20,000.’10° The rest was routine, the budget having essentially been determined, and the 
three weeks before its delivery was for fine tuning and polishing, not constructing. Work 
early in April101 was concerned with the figures, and it was the Customs estimate that was 
troubling Harcourt. He was reassured that ‘A Chancellor o f the Exchequer can never be 
blamed for accepting the estimates o f  the Heads o f Revenue Departments. Indeed, I believe 
in old days, the estimate was always accepted by him blindly, which moreover it was framed 
on a looser or more or less rule o f thumb principle than it now is.’ The balance sheet for the 
year ahead was now complete and a surplus o f £1 76,000 was now estimated.102 On the day 
following Harcourt was, for the purpose o f adding colour to his speech, requesting figures 
to illustrate the volume o f food imports the last two years.103 Then the ‘final rehearsal’ on 21 
April. ‘My advice to Chancellors o f the Exchequer before Budget is (1) D on’t be too long 
and bore the House with too great detail (2) Be careful not to jumble up thousands and 
millions (3) Keep clear o f all contentious points or party hits.’104 The following Saturday 
Hamilton provided a memo showing the growth in taxes during the six years o f Unionist 
government, a essential part o f a Budget speech after a change in Government.105 It only 
remained to deliver the Budget, and the evening prior Hamilton reiterated, ‘Harcourt is quite 
ready for his Budget tomorrow; and I don’t believe that any serious fight can be raised over 
it. It is completely “Hobson’s choice”.106 Indeed it was, for the state o f finance was such 
that no other choice or outcome was possible. Nothing but a penny on the income tax
99 HD, iii, p. 195,24 March. Hamilton refers to this as “Hobson’s Choice”.
100 H D, iii, p. 196, 31 March.
101 BL HD, Add. MS 48660, ff. 32-33, 2 -4  A pril.
102Hamilton memorandum to Harcourt. MS Harcourt dep. 63, ff. 52—57, 7 April.
103 Ibid., f. 63.
104 HD, iii, p. 198, 21 April.
105 MS Harcourt dep.63, ff. 67-9, 22 April.
106 BL HD, Add. MS 48660, f. 51, 23 April.
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would suffice. The spending could not be cut, so the additional revenue must be found. 
Goschen and the Conservatives would have done the same.
Harcourt’s Budget statement for the 1893-94 financial year was an unavoidable anti­
climax, none o f the bold measures could be put forward and on the whole it was 
overshadowed by the Home Rule debate, not the least on the financial implications o f  the 
latter. Nonetheless it was an important Budget and an historical milestone, and the 
subsequent debate was perhaps the most straightforward exposition o f  the choices in 
government finance which would dominate Parliament for the next twenty years. Harcourt’s 
performance was not inspired, at least not the delivery.107 But the substance was sound, and 
profound. He concentrated on two key points: the transient pressure on the revenue and the 
underlying wealth o f the country.108 The former point was an inconvenience, particularly for 
the Chancellor o f the Exchequer, but it was no cause for alarm. In spite o f a prospective 
deficit o f £1,574,000, the causes could be remedied, as it was not so much a fall in revenue 
as the increase in expenditure which had brought it about. The British public was 
responsible for it, and they would pay for it.
The nation has grown rich, taxation compared to the resources o f all classes is 
relatively light, and this is probably in proportion to its wealth the most lightly taxed 
nation in Europe at the present tim e.... I state these facts in order to say that there is 
the means to pay, if  you choose to pay, and you must choose to pay, if  you choose 
to spend. There may be temporary depression, but there is no permanent decline.
On the contrary, there is a gradual growth in the wealth and resources o f the 
country.... There is, in our opinion, only one sound and straightforward method o f  
meeting this deficit, and that is by increased taxation. This is the only policy which is 
worthy o f a solvent and wealthy nation which finds itself over-spending.109
His preferred means o f imposing taxation were the Death Duties, and he rejected J.S. Mill’s
objections to them, pointing out that in the post-Barings era it was not a deficiency o f
capital that was a problem but the employment of capital in ‘dangerous and speculative
107 GD , xiii, p. 229, 24 April Gladstone dryly noted: ‘Budget: H. largely read his speech.’
108 This had been well prepared in a typewritten section o f  his “Budget Notes, 1893”, ff. 1—10, MS Harcourt 
dep. 133.
109 4 H 11.1044—47, 24 April. Tinancial Statement 1893—94’ pp. 1-5, P.P. 1893, (182) 1. 231 for figures.
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investment in foreign enterprises/ He had in mind two main objects to reform the Death 
Duties:
all property, whether real or personal, settled or unsettled, should be brought into 
account and valued and taxed on an equal basis; and secondly, that properties of 
large amount should pay at a higher rate than those o f less considerable value; and 
for this purpose the whole o f the assets should be aggregated so that a progressive 
graduation should be applied to the total value o f the property o f  all kinds on an 
ascending scale according to the whole amount.110
He could not, however, do this. The prospective yield o f the first year o f the death duties
would not cover the deficit and, in any event, such a complex piece o f legislation would not
be able to find the time in the Parliamentary calendar. Instead, he would raise the income tax
by one penny from 6d. to Id. He made no apology, ‘The only sound foundation o f a
popular Budget is a moderate Expenditure and a buoyant Revenue/111 As to the latter, he
had neither, and nor would he the former.
The Budget debate in the Commons would touch upon all points at the heart o f
Government finance, and this in fact was done immediately, for in spite o f the tradition to
withhold substantive criticism for the second reading polemical points were raised on both
sides o f the House. When the debate resumed on 27 April Goschen led the assault, his
criticism balanced and statesmanlike, sweeping across the spectrum to encompass the vital
questions o f democracy, relative burdens o f taxation, the state o f trade, and his versus
Harcourt’s finance. His great point was that the Liberals had misled the electorate,
particularly the working classes, with false promises o f financial reform and democratic
finance which had been thrown over for Home Rule. Having tacitly accepted the Unionist’s
expenditure on Army and Navy, the Liberals were sacrificing the lower and poorer middle
class income taxpayer.
They are men and women who particularly deserve our consideration, and I protest 
against the idea that either from want o f time or from want o f financial reserve you
110 Ibid., 1047-48.
111 Ibid., 1052.
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should, as I think, commit the error o f seizing on a great engine o f national reserve, 
and at the same time o f taxing a class o f the community already as heavily taxed, 
perhaps more heavily taxed, than any other class.... The Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer has been sacrificed to the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and the British 
Income Tax payers have been sacrificed to the Nationalist Irishmen.112
He contrasted this with his own recent tenure, never having raised the income tax and
actually broadening the basis o f taxation through beer and spirit duties.113
Others followed his lead, and none more recklessly than Leonard Courtney, who
had been Childers’ financial secretary and now made it clear that whatever Liberal
sympathies he once had were not Radical but ultra Whig. He castigated the bidding for the
votes o f the new electorate as ‘a vulgar appeal to the mind o f the vulgar and ignorant
people,... simply an appeal to ignorance, and was a most corrupt and improper method o f
seeking the suffrages o f the electors.’114 He especially disliked the hints at reform and
taxation o f the Death Duties, arguing that ‘A man could have no motive for economy in
knowing that at his death such and such a sum would be taken from his estate.’ It would
involve a diminishment and destruction o f the capital available to the country for productive
investment, Tor the survivor did not feel under any obligation to make it up out o f his
income by diminishing his expenditure.’ Citizenship bore the burden o f responsibility, and it
was a good thing that it be brought home to the taxpayer his responsibility for that
expenditure, and no better method o f doing so than the Income Tax.
If the appreciation o f what he was called to pay led the taxpayer to exercise an 
influence over the expenditure o f the country, then let that expenditure be brought 
home to him as directly as possible. If they wished to evade the knowledge and 
consequent influence o f the taxpayer, then they might resort to indirect taxation.115
Sir John Lubbock pointed out that under the Home Rule scheme the increase on the
income tax would in Ireland be devoted to her own purposes so that the real burden fell
112 4 H 11. 1322-5, 27 April.
113 Hamilton thought that ‘Goschen made a capital fighting speech.’ BL HD, Add. MS 48660, f. 53, 27 April.
114 Ibid., 1336.
115 Ibid., 1341.
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only on England and Scodand. And of course the cry o f protection was heard, clamorous 
but faintly, as £the only way in which our trade and agriculture could be rescued from the 
ruin that was impending.’116
Gladstone’s speech in defence o f the Budget was an historic but unremarked
occasion, for it was to be his final participation in a Parliamentary Budget debate. He
rebuffed the advocates o f protection and bimetallism, to focus on the great issue o f fairness
and equality in taxation. Gladstone rejected the arguments for further aid in relief o f local
rates, contending that more than enough had been done by Goschen’s grants in aid o f  local
taxation ‘at the expense o f the general public by direct taxation.’ The main point was to
achieve an overall fairness and equality o f taxation, and the special pleadings o f the
agriculturists could only be considered from that point of view.
That one shall not pay the tax which another shall pay, is striking at the absolute 
root and foundation o f  the [income] tax, which loses all its warrant and justification 
when it ceases to be aimed at substantial equality between all payers.... The question 
o f the Death Duties then comes immediately into view.117
This was to state the question plainly, without attempting at a solution; for the problem now
being faced was to require a working definition o f just what was meant by “substantial
equality”? This was the controversy that was swirling all around him in the House.118
Harcourt, in contrast, jumped right into the controversy. He thoroughly refuted 
Goschen’s criticisms and justification, on the grounds that the former Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer had relieved direct taxation at the expense o f indirect taxation. W e believe that 
the proportion o f indirect taxation to direct taxation is greater when it ought to be less.’119
116 Ibid., 1344—60, Sir John Lubbock p. 1327. Hamilton writing to Harcourt dismissed Lubbock’s contention, 
MS Harcourt dep. 63, f. 70, 26 April.
117 4 H 12.1363-69, 27 April.
118 Goschen had tried to draw him into it when he doubted ‘whether the ... Prime Minister has any sympathy 
with these new developments o f  democratic finance.’ Ibid., 1321.
119 Ibid., 1333—34. The controversy turned on the point that Goschen had cut direct taxation by 2d. on the 
income tax. Goschen denied this was a benefit to direct taxpayers, claiming that a rate over 6d. was not to be
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He accepted that ‘the richer people in this country pay less in proportion than the poorer 
people towards taxation,’ but rejected the principle o f differentiation on two counts. In the 
first place I t  is a necessary consequence o f the obligations o f public credit that the funded 
debt should not be made a subject o f exceptional taxation.’ But to treat such securities 
differendy than others would raise practical problems. There was also a problem o f fairness, 
for a large income from an industrial source could support higher taxation than a small 
income from capital, and he illustrated this with a contrast between Guinness and the 
proverbial widow. There was also the practical problem of determining which part o f a 
business’ profits derived from industry and which from capital. ‘I do not see how we are to 
overcome the difficulty.’120 With respect to graduation he had no hesitation. ‘I have no 
objection to the principle o f graduation; I think it is just.’ The problem again was o f a 
practical nature.
I agree that the Death Duties ought to be altered, but the reason why I draw a 
distinction between them and the Income Tax is the different way in which they are 
collected. Under the Death Duties, you can ascertain the whole value o f a man’s 
property; but when you collect the Income Tax, you do not ask a man the value o f 
his whole fortune.... I have no hesitation in saying that if  you attempt to collect the 
Income Tax by calling upon each man to disclose the whole o f his fortune, you will 
lose a very large proportion o f the tax.121
Practicality, not principle, was the problem. This unflinching admission would frighten more
money than it reassured.
The Budget debate outside the House, at least that which took place in the financial 
columns o f the newspapers, was in uniform agreement: the Budget was unfair. It was unfair 
because it placed the burden o f increased expenditure solely on the shoulders o f the income 
taxpayers. The Statist thought this unavoidable in a plain and unsensational Budget simply
considered normal taxation. Harcourt’s figures showed the ratio o f  indirect to direct taxation was 54.4:45.5 in 
1886—7; 55.9:44 in 1890—91; and would be 54.7:45.2 after his Budget.
120 He did suggest that some relief could be obtained either through either an increase o f  the exemption limit 
or by a greater abatement on the Income Tax. 4 H 12.1828—1831, 2 May.
121 Ibid., 154-5, 4 May.
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because ‘it would be impossible so to increase the Death Duties as to supply a million and a 
half/122 The Economist could not take so philosophic a view. ‘The great bulk o f the additional 
expenditure for which provision has to be made is o f a kind to which all classes o f the 
community ought to be called upon to contribute/ It was wrong to throw the entire burden 
on the income tax, particularly when there was a likelihood o f a “free breakfast table” the 
next year. By then, however, ‘British finance will be dominated by Ireland ... at every turn 
Irish financial interests will conflict with ours/123 As to Harcourt’s method o f  adding a 
penny to the Income tax, The Times was scathing in its sarcasm. ‘Anybody could have done 
that.’ ‘The merest novice in finance is quite competent to provide for a deficit’ in that way.
It also concurred in the unfairness o f making the Income taxpayers shoulder the full burden 
o f the extra government expenditure which he neither wanted nor was responsible for. It 
insinuated that the thin Liberal majority was due to electoral bribery and that the poor state 
o f trade was their fault as well. ‘Nobody conversant with business has much hope o f seeing 
things improve so long as the present Government remains to disturb the country with 
revolutionary schemes and to discourage enterprise by coquetting with every wild proposal 
in the Newcastle programme.’124 So that while the House debated the great principles upon 
which the future o f finance would unfold, the most interested financial journals concerned 
themselves with only the minutiae o f the Budget itself. Why was this?
The great underlying questions o f government finance, constant growth o f  
expenditure and an apparent levelling off o f revenue, had been overshadowed by the 
political question o f Irish Home Rule and blurred by the rarefied theological schisms o f gold 
versus silver as monetary doctrine. The fiscal dimensions o f the new democracy, indeed the 
dimensions and definition o f  British democracy itself, had still to be determined. A
122 The Statist, v. XXXI, no. 792, 29 April p. 454.
123 The Economist, v. LI, no. 2,592, 29 April p. 502.
124 The Times, no. 33,934, 25 April p. 9.
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reckoning would have to be faced, and the politicians had recognized and taken up the 
challenge ahead o f both the broader public interest and the narrower, specialized financial 
interests. Parliament was the forum in which Britain’s fiscal future was decided, and where 
Ireland’s would be dashed.
Unfortunately for all concerned, and probably no one was more mortified
than Hamilton when it was discovered, the key argument o f Home Rule finance was that the
Irish Customs revenue represented a close proxy o f the ‘average annual contribution o f
Ireland to Imperial expenditure during the last three years.’ It was not. The £2,370,000
which Ireland was to be required to contribute towards Imperial expenditure and the
£2,370,000 o f Irish customs duties were not the same thing, because the former figure had
been made meaningless by the Irish Excise miscalculation.
It has been discovered that the figures relating to the movement o f Irish spirits to 
Great Britain, with which we have been furnished by the Excise Officers in Belfast 
are incorrect; and the error will destroy the Balance Sheet. It is most provoking, and 
I take the error much to heart though it was not our fault at the Treasury.125
By that standard neither was it the fault o f the Government, but they would certainly be
held responsible for it. This led inexorably back to the quota plan.
On the same day that the Irish Excise error was explained Gladstone had prepared a
substantial memorandum outlining in definitive form his thinking on the financial form for
Irish Home Rule.126 The two great and related issues to be dealt with were the ‘probable
growth’ o f Imperial expenditure and the implications o f a future war or other similar
emergency. How could the Irish Imperial contribution adjust to these circumstances? ‘I have
arrived at my second conclusion which is that to provide for these and for [war emergency]
in particular, by the method o f laying hold on any particular fund will entail so much
complication as will greatly increase Parliamentary difficulties.’ Gladstone held that it was
125 HD, iii, p. 200, 6 May.
126 MS Harcourt dep. 162, ff. 92—9.
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impossible to ‘limit our provisions to indirect taxes, for emergency requires the
augmentation o f direct taxes also.’ The conclusion was emphatic,
I see no method o f dealing with this difficulty except the adoption, direct or virtual, 
o f the elastic method o f quota. We might say that as regards her share in increased 
Imperial ouday she shall pay so much per cent; or she shall pay a proportion o f the 
increase corresponding with the relation between her customs revenue, and the total 
amount o f the charge deemed Imperial. This would materially simplify the financial 
part o f  the Bill, and would only require the introduction o f  a provision perfectly 
plain and workable.127
As might be expected, Harcourt did not see this perfection or workability.
Harcourt was just as busy with the problem o f the quota/Customs Fund. ‘I remain
o f the opinion I have always held that there is only one practicable course, viz. that we
should continue as now to collect the whole Revenue o f Ireland.’128 It was not sufficient to
have a purely negative approach to the problem, and Hamilton undertook from both the
Treasury point o f view and in the interest o f his Minister to provide something definitive
towards resolving it.
The Hamilton plan was based on work done by Cecil Spring-Rice and was an
attempt at last to come up with some sort o f acceptable compromise for Irish Home Rule
Finance. The principles and the revised balance sheets arose from his desire to salvage
something from the Treasury plan, to do that he had to work with Harcourt who was soon
brought into the picture.
It may be well for us to have something in the way o f a new plan to consider 
tomorrow. I understand that you wished to retain in the hands o f the Imperial 
Government the levying and collection o f the whole o f the taxes collected in or 
contributed by Ireland — in short that all taxes should as now be paid into the 
Imperial Exchequer, but in any such plan it is most desirable that Ireland should 
have an interest in the due observance o f the Excise & Customs laws and in any 
elasticity o f Revenue.
Hamilton reiterated some o f the main points which he had long been making about Irish 
Home Rule Finance, that at the present Ireland’s contribution was simply the excess o f Irish
127 Ibid., ff. 95—6. Welby had prepared for Harcourt a memo on this question which Harcourt had 
summarized as ‘Heads I win, tails you lose effect on British taxpayer.’ MS Harcourt dep. 162, f. 226.
128 Harcourt to Hamilton, 25 May, BL HP, Add. MS 48615B, ff. 22-3.
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tax revenue over Irish expenditure, despite whatever ought to be her fair contribution, and
that any quota sufficient to cover Irish expenditure would leave the balance, as at present,
available for Imperial purposes. The first question to decide is this — is the quota o f revenue
to be a quota o f the Revenue collected in Ireland or o f the revenue contributed by Ireland?’
As had been noted about Harcourt’s plan, there were drawbacks to both collection and
contribution, but Hamilton thought that this could be overcome.
What we might do, then, is to base the quota o f Revenue on contribution for excise 
spirits, and the collection for all other taxes. I submit the following scheme on the 
latest figures to hand for 1892—3: Let us credit Ireland with 2/3rds o f the amount of 
Excise spirits duty contributed by Ireland at present rates, and with 2/3rds o f  the 
amount o f all the other taxes at present rates, crediting her also with her non-tax 
revenue and licences (which are practically local taxes). Let us see how this would 
stand:
It stood at £4,299,000 o f Irish tax revenue and £1,137,000 o f additional revenue for a total 
o f £5,436,000 which, less Irish expenditure o f £5,400,000, left a £36,000 surplus. TEe 
account is thus practically balanced; and if we left it as it now stands, the Imperial 
Exchequer would be practically unaffected ...’129 The main difficulty continued to be that 
the only united and coherent strategy on Home Rule, finance and otherwise, was the 
position o f the Unionists: rejection. Those in favour continued in disarray to disagree: The 
Cabinet was split dangerously between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer, and the Nationalists were likewise divided between Parnellite and anti-Pamellite.
The basis o f  the plan continued to be the evolution o f the revised Treasury plan, 
which Welby and Hamilton calculated that ‘by crediting Ireland with 2 /3  o f her true 
Revenue, we could balance her account with a surplus o f about £500,000.... [and] that the 
one third o f her Revenue retained for Imperial purposes would represent a quota o f about 3 
V2 % o f Imperial Expenditure.’130 In his own notes Gladstone emphasized the advantages of 
this latest scheme ‘to bell the Irish’: the percentage o f contribution was low relative to Irish
129 MS Harcourt dep. 63, ff. 90—3, 30 May.
130 BL GP, Add. MS 44775, f. 157, 6 June.
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tax resources, such a favourable offer could hardly be repeated and ‘perhaps cannot be 
carried as it stands.’131
By this time the Imperial interests in Irish finance had been defined and defended as 
the finance clauses reached their final form. The considerable work and effort in this was 
both for legislation and propaganda purposes. A preliminary draft o f the 20th was refined 
and all but accepted on 22 June. The key points in the new draft were the admission and 
correction o f  the Irish Excise error with the new balance sheet and the fixing o f the financial 
arrangement itself.
1. Establish a provisional term of 6 years.
(During 6 years)
2. no change in fixing, managing, or collecting present Taxes.
3. Ireland may establish new taxes.
4. Ireland’s contribution to be 1/3 o f her ascertained revenue.
5. And whole yield o f any tax imposed on her by Parliament expressly for war or 
special defence.
(After 6 Years)
6. Irish contributions and financial particulars to be revised: Ireland to 
collect and manage taxes, except Customs, and to fix, except Customs, Excise & 
Postage.132
With this decided finally the clauses were able to go to the Commons, although the trouble 
and horrific complexity o f moving them through Committee, in the face o f avowed 
Pamellite hostility led Hamilton to speculate that ‘the result must be fiendish chaos.’ Their 
actual reception and defence in the House brought him close to genuine despair.
The new financial clauses are of course being tom in pieces by the 
Opposition. But what else can you expect when you plump down on the Table of 
the House a bran-new [sic.] scheme, which is necessarily difficult to follow, and 
about which not one word is said in defence! One can get no Minister to get it up or 
to decide small points connected with it. Everything is taken for granted; but it is 
rather an unfair responsibility to throw upon Welby and me, who have no means o f  
defending either ourselves or the scheme.133
131 BL GP, Add. MS 44775 f. 158, 7 June. In an earlier note on the Hamilton (Spring-Rice) plan Gladstone had 
listed the advantages as being that it avoided charging Ireland with the Revenue Establishments, left Ireland 
with the power to impose, independendy, new taxation, and imposed a ‘very low rate o f  contribution’. From 
the Imperial perspective the advantages included ‘checkmating’ Irish opposition to the taxation and that it 
would both ‘simplify and shorten the financial clauses.’ BL GP, Add. MS 44775 f. 159.
132 The draft o f  20 June is MS Harcourt dep. 162, ff. 308-17, and the draft and final summaries are BL GP, 
Add. MS 44775 f. 171 (20 June) and f. 176 (22 June).
133 HD, iii, pp. 2 0 4 -5 ,22  and 23 June.
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The bureaucrat’s lament. Fortunately he was able to cheer himself up by working on 
a Parliamentary brief defending the scheme, and then to console himself with the thought, 
on the 28th, that with the application o f closure ‘even the Finance Clauses will somehow or 
other now be rammed through.’134 It was a surreal situation that the greatest moral support 
for the financial clauses o f the Bill, Gladstone always excepted, came from the Treasury and 
that nobody in Parliament, either on the Government or the Nationalist sides, again 
excepting the Prime Minister, really believed in it. There was indeed nothing left for the 
finance then but to ram it through the Commons.
The debate on the financial clauses ended on the evening o f 27 July, and Hamilton’s 
summary was that no very serious points had been made against the Bill in what had been ‘a 
rather wearisome debate to listen to.’135 Home Rule would continue to occupy and 
exasperate the House for another month, before gaining a majority o f 34 on its third reading 
2 September. It was a strange triumph, for it would be rejected almost a week later in the 
Lords by 419 to 41: point taken, argument dismissed. For Shannon, ‘it remained something 
that the principle o f Home Rule had been accepted by the House o f Commons. [Gladstone] 
always insisted on the significance o f the analogy o f the case o f Catholic Emancipation 
seventy years earlier on that ground.’136 Matthew concurred in this, to a degree, seeing it as ‘a 
remarkable exercise in representative politics’, but concluding that ‘The Government o f  
Ireland Bill o f 1893 showed that a Home Rule bill could pass the Commons, but it had not 
shown that it could do so conclusively.’137 Morley, so close to the issue and outcome,
134 The draft prepared by Hamilton o f  “Summary o f  principal objections to the Finance o f  the Irish Bill.” BL 
GP, Add. MS 44775, f. 168. ‘I have revised and amplified this memo on the new Irish finance scheme in the 
hope o f  making it intelligible. I should be very much obliged if  you will look at it and tell me whether you can 
follow the memorandum through now without any difficulty. The memorandum has been drawn merely to 
explain the outline o f  the new scheme.’ MS Harcourt dep. 63, f. 96. HD, iii, p. 205, 28 June.
135 H D, iii, p. 210.
136 Shannon, Gladstone, ii, p. 547.
137 Matthew, ii, p. 338—9.
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refused even to assess their achievement, merely describing the process.138 Once again and
despite his bias, Hamilton’s is a balanced assessment.
And so here endeth the second Home Rule Bill: To have got it through the House 
o f Commons in any shape is a wonderful tribute to the genius o f Mr. G.; but will it, 
marvellous as the tour de force has been, add to his reputation? I doubt it. He will have 
unsettled a great deal and settled nothing about the relations between Great Britain 
and Ireland; and in attempting a settlement on Home Rule lines he has given to so 
many o f his former colleagues and followers an excuse to break away from him and 
the Liberal or advanced party o f the future.139
And yet there is something to be said for having established a point o f principle in a House
o f Commons elected on the reformed franchise o f 1886. If this is conceded then
Gladstone’s subsequent desire to dissolve and fight the election on the issue o f the Lords’
rejection o f Home Rule is more comprehensible.
138 Morley, Gladstone, ii, p. 557.
139 HD, iii, 9 Sept., p. 211 and cf., Ibid., p. 199 Hamilton’s diary comments o f  21 April after the first reading 
o f  the Bill.
CHAPTER 9 
DEATH AND TAXES
The year 1894 was to be the climax o f Gladstone’s Premiership and Harcourt’s 
political career; it would also, for both o f them, be their nadir. Events and decisions would 
combine in shocking but not unimaginable patterns that would lead to the final and 
paradoxical triumph o f Gladstonian “Sound Finance,” and the end o f  the Gladstonian era 
o f British liberalism defined by “Peace, Retrenchment and Reform.” The two events which 
would collide and decide this were the Naval estimates and the financial imperatives o f the 
1894 Budget. Both o f these questions had been held in abeyance since the previous financial 
year, in fact they had been essentially unresolved as soon as the Unionists departed office in 
1892. Only the legacy o f the Naval Defence Act o f 1889 and Harcourt’s postponement o f  
the Death Duties revision from his 1893 Budget had avoided the confrontation. There was 
now no more fiscal room for manoeuvre.
With the expiry o f the Naval Defence Act at the end o f  the 1893 financial year the 
question o f the future requirements o f the Royal Navy could no longer be postponed, at 
least the Admiralty were no longer content to just keep their powder dry. Three events had 
conspired to make the 1894 Naval estimates decisive: Fisher’s 1 February 1892 appointment 
as third naval Lord and Controller o f the Navy, the loss o f H.M. batdeship Victoria in 
collision with H.M. batdeship Camperdonm on 22 June 18931, and the (unwarranted, if not 
fraudulent) fears over the French programme of 1890 which had between 1890—92 begun 
with the building o f five new batdeships o f the Carnot class.2 These allowed the Admiralty to 
foment, manipulate and direct a panic over the state of the Navy beginning in the summer 
o f 1893 through February 1894. The campaign was initiated as early as 26 July 1893 when a
1 This is described in William Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy. A  History From the Earliest Times to the Death of Queen 
Victoria (7 vols., London, 1997, reprint o f the 1903 edition), v. vii, pp. 415—20. Spencer’s explanatory letter to 
Queen Victoria is in Peter Gordon, ed., The Red Earl. The Papers of the Fifth Earl Spencer, 1835—1910 (2 vols., 
Northampton, 1986), p. 224.
2 Theodore Ropp, Development of a Modem Navy. French Naval Policy 1874—1904, edited by Stephen S. Roberts, 
(Annapolis, Md., 1987), pp. 223 and 364. Ropp’s original dissertation was written in 1937.
213
provisional program o f 5 new battleships and a £1,000,000 increase in the new construction 
vote was drawn up.3 These desires had by no means been cleared by the Treasury, nor even 
Spencer, the First Lord o f the Admiralty. There was against this the likely prospect o f  a 
£1,500,000 deficit for the 1893 financial year (due mainly to a falling o ff in death duties) to 
say nothing o f the subsequent year’s finance.4
Lines had been drawn, even before the summer, between Harcourt and Spencer, 
with Rosebery prominent in his support for the Admiralty demands. These demands were 
stated in a letter o f 26 May 1893 where Spencer pointed out his disagreement with 
Harcourt’s interpretation that the Navy would be at its greatest strength by Christmas. 
Spencer pointed out that it was in 1896 that Trance and Russia will by then have more ships 
and we shall only be about equal to them in power’, and refuted Harcourt’s contention that 
Russia could be discounted as a naval power.
H. is always hinting that he expects us to cut down Estimates, but I very 
much fear that the difficulty will be not to increase them, for new and 
additional ships to the Navy mean more men, larger docks etc. e tc .... I am 
sure that it will not do to stop new construction.5
Fisher was putting pressure on to approve a large and increased programme at the end of 
July, and Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth, the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the 
Admiralty, advised Spencer that ‘it would be for you to consider whether so sweeping a 
change o f ship building policy should be mooted: it would obviously need much
3 Marder, p.191. This coincided with an article written by TA . Brassey, ‘Great Britain as a Sea Power’, The 
Nineteenth Century, v. 34, no. CXCVII, July 1893, pp. 121—30, who argued that the Royal Navy was ‘by no 
means sufficient for our needs.’ p. 130.
4 £1,540,000 according to the Treasury forecast. PRO T168 /30 ,2  Oct. 1893, see also BL H D, Add. MS 
48661, 3 O ct, f. 76. Hamilton had a month earlier complained to Ward o f The Times about their violent and 
unfair attacks on Gladstone and the Liberal Government. He was told that the new age o f  business and 
politics made such impartiality for newspapers a thing o f  the past 26 Aug. 1893, f. 42.
5 Spencer to Rosebery. Gordon, ii, pp. 223—4. Harcourt had the week before sarcastically written to Spencer 
that ‘I am glad to find that the French pessimists are a match for our own.’ MS Harcourt dep. 46, f. 77,15  
May 1893.
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consideration from many points o f view.’ Rosebery responded emphatically the next day: 
‘You must I am afraid increase your Mediterranean strength.6
These did not find Harcourt resting on his oars. He was vehement in his attacks on 
the Admiralty facts and figures to calculate the strength o f the navy and, furthermore, was 
not afraid to make his own analysis and calculations. From his efforts he was able to 
conclude that the French and Russian threat was not credible, especially as he noted the 
construction time o f French building.
If that is not an overwhelming [British] naval superiority I don’t know what 
is. The timidity o f these modern admirals and sea captains, I confess, 
dismays m e.... I am very anxious to bring your admirals to book in 
particulars, and not to let them ride off in vague generalities.7
Spencer stood behind his Admirals and their calculations, but he did send Harcourt two 
papers ‘drawn up at the Admiralty and approved by the Admirals.’8
The end o f October and beginning of November confirmed the gloomy financial 
prospects, with Harcourt fully committed to the ‘consolidation, uniformity, simplification 
and graduation’ o f the Death Duties. He was also determined to redeem the Naval Defence 
Annuity which would be treated as any other debt and liquidated by way o f the Sinking 
Fund. The problem continued to be the deficit incurred by a falling off in the 1893 Death
6 Gordon, ii, pp. 225—6, 28 and 29 July 1893. Gordon, following Marder, here asserts that Admiral Sir 
Frederick Richards, the Second Sea Lord (he would succeed Admiral Hoskins as First Sea Lord in N ov. 1893), 
was the driving force behind the large building programme and Fisher his right hand. Marder, p. 176, says o f  
Richards that Tie was from the beginning determined to quash any cheese paring tendencies’ and Svas a 
standing terror to the Chancellor o f  the Exchequer and those politicians who had too much regard for fiscal 
considerations.’ It appears unlikely that he had this effect on either Harcourt or Gladstone. I f  it is true that 
Fisher’s was only a subordinate role then he was a tool o f genius and learned his lessons brilliandy for the 
1906—10 battles with the Liberal government. Yet in the words o f  another Fisher biographer, Tisher’s 
influence in bringing this about was profound.’ Richard Hough, First Sea Lord (London, 1969), p.98. Nicholas 
Lambert makes note o f  Fisher’s ability to exaggerate the magnitude o f  the German naval menace, blur the 
true strength o f  the Royal Navy and conceal the real direction o f  British naval policy.’ Sir John Fisher’s Naval 
Revolution (Columbia, S.C., 1999), p .8. Rosebery continued his pressure in favour o f  the Navy in September 
through Campbell-Bannerman, Gordon, p. 227.
7 MS Harcourt dep. 46, ff. 79—82, 28 September 1893. The Admiralty agreed with him, in 1890: ‘Our great 
superiority in ship-building power enables us to produce with ease the ships necessary to arrive at this 
[two[power] standard.’ PRO CAB 3 7 /2 9 /3  o f  1891 [dated 3 Jan. 1890], p. 1.
8 MS Harcourt dep. 46, f. 85. Fisher had, on recollection, described Spencer as a “perfect gendeman” from his 
dealings with him at the Admiralty. His description o f Harcourt, from the same time, was a “genial ruffian”. 
Hough, pp. 93 and 96.
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Duties, which Harcourt intended to use as a club to beat down the 1894 Estimates, warning 
the Cabinet that ‘there will be a considerable deficit this year and that ends won’t meet by a 
long way next year, and urging therefore all Ministers to avoid supplementary estimates this 
year and to keep down expenditures next year.’ There was the “confidential” and official 
warning from Hamilton to Harcourt ‘that unless the last six months are better than the first 
six months, we may have to face a deficit o f IV2 millions on Revenue.’9 The Naval demands 
marched in lockstep with the projected deficit, and Rosebery gave Hamilton a preview of 
the Cabinet divisions over the Navy which would soon become (almost) public. Due to 
Russian and French amity and the French fleet in construction he would ‘stipulate for 
further strengthening o f our Naval Defences.’10 It was in fact the next two days that were to 
count, as The Times began a campaign to put pressure on the Government’s naval policy. 
Hamilton could see the writing on the wall. ‘Lord Spencer will have his work cut out for 
him. The periodical Naval scare has commenced its appearance: and he will have no easy 
task in steering between Scylla (the British public or a section o f it) and Charybdis (an 
impoverished Exchequer).’11
It was indeed the outbreak o f another naval scare, but one far more calculated and 
irresistible than any which had preceded it. The great paradox was that it should occur just 
at the time when the Navy was indeed better positioned against its rivals and in a greater 
state o f efficiency than for many years. For it was above all a political agitation, calculated to 
take advantage o f the Liberals’ vulnerability to charges o f neglect o f imperial defence. A 
series o f four leading articles made their appearance in The Times beginning 6 November 
1893 entitled “The Strength o f the Navy and the Need for a New Programme”.12 This series 
was constructed o f four main arguments: an attack against Treasury control over and 
financial limitation o f naval estimates; an elaborate apology for the old Naval Defence Act
9 H D, iii, 26 Oct. and 3 Nov. 1893, pp. 212-3 and PRO T168/30 o f 2 N ov.
10 BL HD, Add. MS 48661, 4 Nov., f. 113.
11 BL HD, Add. MS 48661, 6 Nov., f. 116.
12 The Times, 6 ,1 3 ,1 7  and 20 Nov., pp. 7, 8, 8, and 8.
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and a demand for another one; the need for naval superiority in the shape o f  a two power 
standard; and that naval superiority over-rode all other Party and Parliamentary 
considerations, ‘we are not to be cozened into bartering it for a few paltry millions.’13 The 
goal was explicit, to remove
the unseen control o f the Treasury, always insidious and very often 
mischievous, and the baleful power o f the Executive Government o f the day 
to make the naval expenditure dependent on its transient financial or party 
exigencies.14
This was to neatly turn on its head Gladstone’s arguments from “Sound Finance” for the 
annual provision o f estimates under Parliamentary control so as to ensure scrupulous 
accounting and control o f public funds towards the goal o f a balanced and transparent 
budget. Democratic accountability and responsible government were to be overturned and 
rejected in favour o f a military primacy. Peace, Retrenchment and Reform for War, 
Expenditure and Military Dictatorship. Solon for Alcibiades. Gladstone and Harcourt 
recognized this.
The Naval Estimates themselves would be the result o f a dialectic process, and while 
there was the expected Parliamentary response to The Times article,15 it was within the 
administration itself that the argument played out, at the very highest levels. Gladstone and 
West were the intermediaries between Harcourt and Spencer although none concerned 
realised at this time how great was the distance between them. Worse, Gladstone and 
Harcourt did not realise that they, and not the First Lord o f the Admiralty, were becoming 
isolated on the issue. Perhaps the Prime Minister was coming to beware the ides o f  March, 
for at this time he was reading Julius Caesar:16 Rosebery was from the beginning Spencer’s
13 The Times, 17 Nov., p. 8. There was also much made o f the Navy’s insufficiency o f  cruisers and torpedo 
boats, a further suggestion o f  official inspiration for the series.
14 The Times, 20 Nov., p. 8.
15 4 H 18. 348, 7 Nov.
16 GD , xiii, pp. 324—5,13  and 15 Nov.
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staunchest and most voluble ally in Cabinet, and he was encouraged in this by the Queen.17 
This was followed by the inevitable yet painful report from Shuttleworth. Admitting 
outright the enormous difficulties ahead he urged the need not only to come to a decision 
for 1894—5 but for five years into the future as well. The inspiration was quite clear. ‘The 
idea o f the Sea Lords (at least this is Fisher’s rough impression) is a Programme o f New  
Construction totting up to 22 millions. They wish to do this in 4 years.’18 Fisher’s 
impression was ambitious, and it was repeated (and amplified) in the “Memorandum of  
Meeting to discuss Programme o f New Construction, April 1,1894, to April 1, 1899”.19
Spencer did not think that Harcourt’s proposed reallocation o f ships to the 
Mediterranean was the solution as it would cause ‘a terrific storm abroad to satisfy an 
exaggerated scare at home.’ Hard at work and ‘deep in Estimates’, he nonetheless had the 
courtesy to acknowledge Harcourt’s assistance. ‘Although I do not think it likely that I shall 
be able to agree to all criticisms and remarks, they are useful to me ... for I shall be able to 
use them to test the work which is now going on here now.’20 The Admiralty position came 
very close to an implicit challenge o f civilian control o f the military, and therefore, in the 
British case, o f executive responsibility and Parliamentary supremacy. This is the necessary 
context in which the naval debate o f 1893—4 must be placed. It was not simply a case o f  
Treasury cheese-paring or “insidious and mischievous” Treasury control o f naval 
expenditure. It was a battle over responsibility and democratic accountability. It was hardly a 
surprise that Gladstone would see this as militarism, and a dangerous precedent for both 
Britain and Europe.
17 Rosebery wrote on 16 Nov. that he ‘shares your Majesty’s feelings in the fullest degree.’ She noted on 
24 Nov. that she talked to Rosebery ‘o f  the anxiety that the Navy should be increased.’ G.E. Buckle, ed., 
letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd series, v. 2,1886—1901, (London, 1931), pp. 321 and 327.
18 Gordon, ii, p. 229,17 and 18 Nov.
19 PRO CAB 37 /34 /54 , dated 21 Nov. The aggregate cost o f the “Minimum” programme in this was 
£23,325,000 and for the “Desirable” programme it was £30,095,000.
20 Spencer to Harcourt, MS Harcourt, dep. 46, ff. 93—4,28  Nov.
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The programme o f construction from the 21 November Admiralty board meeting 
represented the steeled resolve o f the Admirals to impose their will on the government, thus 
the ‘minimum’ and the ‘desirable’ programmes.21 The opposition was also gaining resolve, 
for now Gladstone himself was taking notice of the navy scare and the skirmishing between 
Harcourt and Spencer was giving way to battle. Spencer again supported his Admirals’ 
classification and calculation o f strength o f the relative navies, ‘the naval men consider that 
these French ships cannot be brushed on one side, and would be formidable ships in battle,’ 
and closed by asking ‘will that satisfy the Admiral o f the Exchequer?’22 O f course it did not, 
for the financial implications o f the naval programme were starting to emerge out o f the fog 
o f war. ‘He would not give me a figure; but I hazarded a guess, that the Navy estimates 
would be up a million next year. He said, “I fear more nearly 2 millions.’”23 That is to say, at 
least an additional penny on the income tax.
The subject o f increased Navy Estimates is a thorny one, for Mr. Gladstone 
said the other day he thought it was best to refuse fresh expenditure, etc., 
resign, and go to the country on it — and what a smash it would be! but little 
does Mr. Gladstone think how the people love expenditure but hate paying 
for it!24
What is important is the suggestion that at this, the very earliest stage o f the debate, 
Gladstone considered it a matter o f such an important principle as to merit 
resignation and an appeal to the people.
What may indeed have made Gladstone unwell was the Admiralty’s “Programme o f  
New Construction. 1894—95 to 1898-99.” This was an additional statement to accompany 
the Memorandum o f 22 November which confirmed that it was necessary a minimum of
21 Marder, p. 190, states that it was here that Richards ‘resolved to take the bit between the teeth.’
22 Hutchinson, ed., p. 222,1 December 1893; MS Harcourt dep. 46, ff. 95—6, 2 Dec. 1893.
23 Hamilton’s recollection o f  a discussion with Spencer, BL HD, Add. MS 48662, f. 9, 4 D ec 1893.
24 West also noted that Rosebery informed him on the 8th that ‘the Queen knows that a Naval Scheme is 
preparing and writes to say the Government had been apathetic, but she had stirred them up.’ Hutchinson, p. 
225.
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seven battleships be included in the Programme for 1894—5 and that expenditure on armour 
should be considerably increased. The aggregate cost o f the programme was estimated at 
£31,000,000 over five years, and in this was the key yet unstated gamble by the Admiralty 
that they could again impose another five year Naval Defence Act, with or without that 
label, on a Liberal government.25 Harcourt was immediately writing Spencer in language 
which might be thought incendiary by anyone else. T do not consider the Admiralty are 
acting fairly towards the country in allowing panic to be created with reference to the 
conditions o f our Naval Defences by false statements circulated by persons interested in 
getting up a scare without any official statement of the true facts o f the case/26 Spencer in 
reply was moderate but adamant in his position. He believed that a statement would ‘do 
more harm than good’ as it would expose questions about the torpedo boats even as it 
reassured as to battleships. ‘At the same time I do not want to proclaim our weakness to the 
world.’ Manning levels in the fleet were insufficient and ‘not altogether a matter for 
boasting’ while above all it was first necessary to come to an agreement as to what the naval 
programme was to be. ‘I do not know what you and Mr. Gladstone and the Cabinet will say 
to our programme which I admit is a very serious one, and will I fear meet with your 
opposition. ... When this serious question is setded by the Cabinet, it may be desirable to 
make an authoritative statement.’ There was a subde yet unambiguous threat that if  
Harcourt were to make a statement ‘independendy o f the Admiralty’ Spencer would resign.27 
The Chancellor o f the Exchequer saw and raised him with a resignation threat o f his own, 
but he agreed that
the sooner the Cabinet make up their minds whether with the prospect o f a 
deficiency o f at least £3,000,000 in the coming year they propose largely to 
the Military and Naval Expenditure o f the country the better. This 
Government has thoroughly proved itself to be the most extravagant and 
reckless in its expenditure o f any which has existed for many years and if it is
25 PRO CAB 37 /34 /57 , 8 Dec. 1893.
26 MS Harcourt dep. 46, ff. 97—8, letter to Spencer [copy] 9 Dec. 1893.
27 MS Harcourt dep. 46, ff. 99—100, letter from Spencer, 10 Dec. 1893.
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resolved to be still more extravagant in the future the sooner it retires the 
better.28
Fortunately there was an external threat which at least temporarily united Admiralty and 
Treasury in defence o f the government.
Lord George Hamilton, the former Conservative First Lord o f the Admiralty, had 
put forward a motion to demand an immediate increase in the strength o f the navy.
Harcourt took a clear lead in dealing with the motion because he thought it could be 
manipulated to deal with the naval problem in and out o f the house.
Though I have supplied you with materials which will be very important 
when we come to close quarters on the subject of expenditure I think at the 
present moment it would not be expedient either in the Cabinet or in the 
House o f Commons to enter on the merits o f the question.29
What Harcourt proposed was to convince first the Cabinet that there should be no 
discussion o f the merits o f the motion or what the proper policy should be, because that 
‘might lead to differences o f opinion which it is better at present to avoid.’ Yet rather than a 
simple negative o f the motion he proposed to defeat it with an amendment which 
Gladstone was himself to move ‘putting directly in issue the true ground o f our resistance 
viz. the responsibility o f the Ministers o f the crown and a direct assertion o f the confidence 
o f Parliament in their due performance o f their duty.’ Harcourt felt that this tactic ought to 
bring even the wavering supporters of the Government to its defence, while strategically it 
might be the ‘most potent appeal to the Party and the country. If our men will not support 
us on this the sooner we throw up the cards the better.’30 What is most significant here is 
that at this time before the naval estimates had even been seriously thrashed out between the
28 Harcourt to Spencer, 12 Dec. 1893, Gordon, ed., ii, p. 231.
29 Harcourt to Gladstone, BL GP, Add. MS 44203, ff. 143—7,12  Dec. 1893. In this he had Spencer’s 
encouragement and thanks, see MS Harcourt dep. 46, ff. 105—6 and f. 109,12 and 13 Dec. 1893.
30 Harcourt to Gladstone, [copy] MS Harcourt dep. 13, ff. 219—21,13 Dec. 1893. Harcourt sent Gladstone 
multiple copies o f  his proposed amendments.
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Treasury and the Admiralty, let alone put before the Cabinet, Harcourt and Gladstone had 
recognised the danger and were working energetically to torpedo the Admiralty proposal.
The following day’s Cabinet unfolded as Harcourt had suggested: the motion was to 
be treated as a vote o f confidence and Gladstone was to move the amendment. He then 
read to them the Queen’s letter o f 7 December, and in his reply to her explained that Lord 
George Hamilton’s motion ‘substitutes the House o f Commons for the executive in the 
discharge o f its capital duties [preparation o f estimates]... It also entirely subverts our 
established administrative and financial system’ by demanding the naval estimates before 
they could be prepared.31 Still, Gladstone had grasped the more ominous portents o f that 
Cabinet, as he described explicitly in a letter to Morley. The ‘motion for a Navy scare’ was 
the ‘most factious and dangerous motion I have ever known announced from the 
opposition Bench’ and he was dwelling in the realm o f political tactics, when he stated ‘it is 
regarded as good for us in a party view.’ It was his Cabinet and government which 
worried him.
In my view they seem to indicate another o f these irrational and discreditable 
panics which generate one another and to which Spencer will probably feel 
himself obliged to bow; or will think himself so. They seem to indicate a 
large increase o f the Navy estimates probably with most unsatisfactory 
financial consequences. Many of the Cabinet remained silent. But on the 
whole and excepting the protests of Harcourt, economy appeared to be not 
dying but dead. With these indications upon me I felt myself bound in 
honour to say that I could in no way pledge myself to take part in proposals 
o f such a colour and must reserve active liberty o f action which as S. fairly 
enough said was “very serious”.
Hardly less significant was Gladstone’s request of Spencer the following day for copies o f  
the Admiralty papers sent to Harcourt about the relative strength o f battleships and
31 GD , xiii, p. 338; Buckle, j2, ii, pp- 330—1 ,1 4  December 1893.
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cruisers.32 The first and second lords of the Treasury would have to hang together or they 
would be hanged alone, unless o f course Harcourt shot himself first.
Spencer told West that the Board o f  Admiralty would resign if  they did not get the 
money they wanted, which money was more than Harcourt was prepared to spend. West 
added, ‘I fear [Gladstone] does not realise what everybody else does, the necessity o f  
expenditure, even if it were only for torpedo catchers, which Harcourt even is prepared for.’ 
Further discussions involving Spencer and Gladstone made it clear to him that the navy 
demands would not go away and that Gladstone, who ‘talked in a melancholy vein about 
economy now dead’ would not agree to them. 1 think the time is fast approaching when he 
should retire.’ He soon felt that he had no choice but to confront him with the gravity o f the 
situation. Gladstone was informed that his views about the navy were not shared by many 
and that both the Board o f Admiralty and Spencer would resign if  ‘they did not get the 
millions they required.’ He tried to bring Gladstone round by persuading him that duty to 
Ireland could not be thrown up for ‘the sake of a few millions.’ The response was evasive, 
‘perhaps he did not care so much, if  the country wished it, to spend the millions, but he 
could not permit the whole system of paying off the National Debt to be abandoned.’33 Or 
perhaps he was ambiguous about the direction o f popular government and fiscal policy, 
unwilling to tarnish his legacy by undermining his fiscal system. Was this a paradox o f  
popular government or a contradiction in fiscal terms between the joint responsibility of 
electorate and executive over expenditure in a parliamentary democracy? Gladstone’s 
behaviour suggests the former.34
32 GD, xiii, pp. 339-40.
33 Hutchinson, pp. 227—9 ,1 4 ,1 6  and 18 Dec. 1893.
34 The naval question brought this out in stark simplicity. T he reformed House o f  Commons looked upon 
expenditure from a standpoint very different from that adopted by the Parliaments o f  1832 to 1885.’ This was 
due now to the domination o f the middle class according to Lord George Hamilton, ii, p. 60. David Brooks 
argues that Gladstone had come to realize this, ‘as he now confessed privately, he dreaded “the Democracy’s 
first use o f  power.’” Gladstone’s Fourth Ministry 1892—94. Policies and Personalities. Unpublished Cambridge Ph.D. 
thesis, (1975), p. 40.
223
In his speech in support o f the motion Lord George Hamilton insisted that Britain 
must uphold a two power standard for its naval policy and that after the expiry o f the Naval 
Defence Act in 1894 it would start to lose that supremacy with respect to France and Russia. 
Cost was no object, ‘the duty o f the Chancellor o f the Exchequer, so far as Naval 
Expenditure is concerned, thus being simply to provide the amount o f money required 
under the Act.’35 Gladstone in reply was careful to refute that argument without making 
future commitments. He pointed out that British shipbuilding could do in three years what 
would take France four and a half, and that advantage was increasing. He insisted that to 
accept the motion would undermine both executive responsibility and Parliamentary 
accountability. *We rest on the principle o f annual account, annual proposition, annual 
approval by the House o f Commons ... which will secure Parliamentary control.’ He 
concluded by stating emphatically that the British navy was not only greater in strength than 
any other country but was stronger than any other two. ‘There is no state o f danger and 
emergency in the present.’36 In this he had made a success o f the tactics recommended by 
Harcourt and they might have hoped for a strategic triumph as well. Except that Harcourt 
by his intervention in the debate managed to snatch defeat back from the jaws o f victory.
‘I will tell you exactly how these things stand’ was how the fateful intervention 
began. He assured Parliament as to the ‘absolute’ supremacy o f  the present navy, dismissed 
almost entirely the Russian navy and claimed that in 1898 there might hypothetically be a 
ratio o f 22 British to 24 French and Russian ships but only if Britain didn’t build any more 
and the French and Russians were capable o f actually building theirs.37 ‘As regards the 
future, do not for a moment doubt that we mean to maintain the supremacy o f the British
35 4 H 19.1771-88 ,19  Dec. 1893.
36 4 H 19.1789—1803. This precise statement as to the strength o f  the navy had been agreed by Spencer and 
Gladstone on the 16th, Hutchinson, p. 228. This was sufficient, just, to mollify The Economist, which believed 
that the Navy must be ‘sufficient to overpower any probable combination o f  enemies.’ 23 Dec. 1893, p. 731.
37 They were not. On 1 Jan. 1900 Britain could range 39 battleships against 11 French, 12 American and the 
formidable 14 o f  Russia, the last o f  which would within 5 years give a conclusive demonstration o f  its naval 
efficiency and Harcourt’s powers o f  analysis.
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Navy.’38 It did not prevent the government’s amendment from being carried by a majority 
o f 36, but it completely incensed the Admiralty. The situation almost hopeless when a large 
minority allows itself in panic and joining hands with the professional elements works on 
the susceptibilities o f the people to alarm’ was Gladstone’s weary conclusion 39
Harcourt ‘must have been aware o f the fact that the sea lords had threatened to 
resign if an optimistic statement with no large naval increase were announced.’40 In this they 
were as good as their word. In an immediate letter to Spencer they reiterated their demands 
o f 22 November that seven battleships be laid down in 1894, the creation o f ‘at least 
80 Torpedo Boat Destroyers in the shortest possible time, and no matter what the cost’, and 
the need for additional cruisers. It got worse. ‘Having regard to the above statement o f fact, 
it is not understood on what grounds Sir William Harcourt in the debate yesterday made the 
following statement, under which we are unable to rest.’41 They were not alone, although 
their Minister was by no means as outraged. Spencer did not like Gladstone’s speech, ‘he fell 
into arguments which I implored him not to touch ... and was not in tune with the feeling o f  
the House.’ As to Harcourt, Spencer did not object to his statement, it was the attribution o f  
Admiralty approval which was the problem.42
There followed a series o f letters between Harcourt and Spencer in which the 
former had to come to suitable terms in the draft of his apology to the Admirals. In his
38 4 H 19.1877—83. What most incensed them was the implication that Harcourt’s information had ‘come 
from the highest authority.’ Gardiner, ii, p. 250. Hamilton could only agree that ‘it is a very awkward question; 
for we cannot afford to lag behind in shipbuilding; and the more we build, the greater will be the efforts o f  
other powers.’ BL H D, Add. MS 48662, f. 23,20 Dec. 1893.
39 GD, xiii, p. 342,19 Dec. 1893.
40 Marder, p. 199. O f course Spencer had himself threatened to resign i f  Harcourt made an independent 
statement. See above, p. 220.
41 Gordon, ii, p. 232. This letter was signed by all four Admirals on the board: Richards [now First Lord], 
Kerr, Fisher and Noel.
42 In fact Spencer provided Harcourt with tables working out schedules o f  completion and distribution o f  the 
fleet on the 18th, MS Harcourt dep. 46, ff. 111—6. Spencer to Rosebery, Gordon, ii, p. 232—3, 20 Dec. 1893. 
Rosebery did not like the speech at all. ‘At the moment when a clear and decisive note should have been 
sounded in Europe, which would have anticipated many evils and guaranteed peace,... what was wanted quite 
as much as new naval strength was the moral effect o f a timely if  general declaration.’ Rosebery to Spencer, 
ibid.
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letter Harcourt questioned the accuracy o f The Times report o f his speech, and denied 
mocking the authority o f the Admiralty or their building programme.
I never heard till today o f any suggestion o f laying down 7 Batdeships in 
1894. N o mention o f such a project was ever made to me or in my presence 
at the Admiralty or elsewhere.... I hope you will explain this to your admirals 
as I am very grateful o f the kind trouble they took to give me the 
information I desired and I should be very sorry to think that they 
considered I had in any way misrepresented their views.
Spencer to Harcourt: ‘I fear however that they will press for some public announcement to 
put them right.’ After further refinement Lewis Harcourt noted: The admirals agree and are 
grateful but want the word “completed” inserted.’ The statement was duly made in the 
Commons the same day as Harcourt refined his earlier statement to mean ‘first class 
battleships completed in the present financial year.’ All had ended well and Spencer 
informed his wife that ‘after some struggle and correspondence. W.V.H. volunteered to 
make a statement in the House and to my joy my Admirals agreed to accept it.’ O f course he 
did further note that the next week he and Harcourt would have to try and settle the navy 
estimates. Gladstone informed Rosebery o f the same.43
The Treasury had first to calculate the probable burden o f  the Navy estimates before 
Harcourt could be prepared to battle Spencer over their precise amount. There was in any 
event due to the nature o f the Naval Defence Act a greater complication in knowing exactly 
where they stood as to the authorised borrowings offset against spending actually incurred 
on new construction. Hamilton had been charged with working this through and he was 
able to report that the act was in fact winding itself down ‘in terms o f  payments required, for 
shipbuilding.’44 This left then only the repayment o f the loans outstanding, and so raised for 
them the question o f  how to deal with the outstanding obligations, by following through
43 MS Harcourt dep. 46, ff. 117—25; 4 H  20.112; and Gordon, ii, p. 233. GD, xiii, p. 343.
44 PRO T168/30, 22 Dec. 1893, TSfaval Defence Act 1893.’ Hamilton was also able to report the good news 
that there was in fact a margin o f £289,000 available which would further reduce the debt. MS Harcourt 
dep. 63, ff. 154-7, 25 Dec. 1893.
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with the act or, more drastically, repealing the act and making a special provision for 
repayment. Harcourt favoured the latter, and Hamilton provided him with two options. The 
first was to make a direct assault by applying the Sinking Fund towards it, the second to only 
appropriate a fixed amount, £1 to £1 .5 million, o f the Sinking Fund. Harcourt pressed for 
the first option, ‘I would rather charge the whole fund for two years and then have it clear 
for the future.’45 This was a significant step, for it would force the provisional deficit further 
into the red and at the same time increase the taxation necessary to meet it in the financial 
year, as borrowing could not be countenanced. It was the bold decision o f a “financial 
purist”, for Harcourt could not abide what he saw as the needless confusion o f  government 
accounts and debt calculations by this footnote finance, better by far to simply admit to it as 
ordinary debt and pay it o ff manfully by the customary and sanctioned manner o f the 
Sinking Fund. But it did make things worse for the present and next year’s finance.
It also seemed likely to make things worse for Spencer and the Admiralty, as 
Harcourt began their estimates haggling where he had left off, complaining about the facts 
and figures he had been supplied about the navy. Spencer would not be rebuffed, and his 
reply was both firm and decisive. Harcourt’s complaints were dismissed as a simple inability 
to listen to what he was being told. He insisted on his right to give his opinion on the 
estimates before a Cabinet consensus had been reached, otherwise lie  would not be doing 
his duty.’ He was willing nonetheless to ‘meet reasonable objections and criticisms and 
especially counsel as to money with the Chancellor o f the Exchequer.’ The estimates were 
not the result o f a scare, but followed naturally on the winding down o f the Naval 
Defence Act.
It would have been wrong for a new board before they knew anything o f
their work to play with anything new and large.... We always knew that we
should be obliged to enter upon a large expenditure this year. I did not, I
45 Hamilton was more cautious, There is some advantage in not having the whole o f  the Sinking Fund stricdy 
appropriated; while on the other hand the fact o f  it being mainly appropriated is a distinct safeguard.’
PRO T168 /3 0 ,2 8  Dec. 1893. Harcourt had been thinking along these lines as early as 25 N ov. 1893, BL HP, 
Add. MS 48615B, f. 57.
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admit contemplate ... [before 22 Nov. 1893] anything as large as what we 
have before us.
There followed a breakdown o f the estimated £4,750,000 expenditure for new construction 
in 1894—5, the key expenditure roughly divided amongst the seven new battleships, the 
cruisers and the Torpedo boat destroyers.46 The great significance o f this was that Harcourt 
was about to strike his pennant and surrender to the Admirals.
Harcourt began his negotiations with Spencer on the same day as meeting Gladstone 
‘on the great Admiralty scare’. Gladstone’s diary records ‘Subjects o f last night stiffens in my 
mind more and more’, an indication o f just how the Prime Minister’s opposition to the navy 
expenditure was hardening just as his first mate prepared to abandon the ship. A letter to 
Morley stated his position clearly.
In our Naval debate I personally laid it down in strong terms that there 
existed no condition o f Naval danger or I think emergency. I am at present 
puzzled to find an answer to the question how, as a matter o f honour, such a 
declaration would stand in the light thrown upon it by the adoption a month 
afterwards o f the stronger scheme which was in our mouths last night.47
His puzzlement must have turned to bewilderment upon receipt o f this letter from his 
Chancellor o f the Exchequer.
I have been examining the Admiralty figures tonight with the help o f  
Shuttleworth and find that they appear a very different colour from that 
which they bore as Spencer related to me. Spencer is not an adept at figures 
and had failed to appreciate the true effect o f Goschen’s borrowing device 
under the Naval Defence Act. I find that the average expenditure on New  
Construction in the last 5 years has been:
Out o f  Votes £2,500,000 
Out o f  Consol. Fund 2,000,000
4,500,000 [sub-total]
Shuttleworth articulates that the proposals which Spencer is to bring forward 
will raise the Expenditure on New Construction to 5,000,000 which is only
46 Gardiner, ii, p. 249, MS Harcourt dep. 46, ff. 138-45 and f. 148, which notes a further six Talbot class 
cruisers would raise the cost to £5,000,000.
47 GD , xiii, pp. 344—5,27  and 28 Dec. 1893.
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500,000 above the average expenditure o f the last 5 years.
There will be in addition to this £1,000,000 for increase o f other Votes, viz. 
Works Establishment &c. so that in the whole as far as I can ascertain the 
actual increase on Navy Votes will be 1,500,000 above the average o f the last 
5 years which is a very different thing from the 4,000,000 reported by 
Spencer who took no account o f the 2,000,000 now supplied out o f the 
Consol. Fund.
I will explain this to you at length when I see you on Monday.
Gladstone’s response was near incredulous.
An exceptional expenditure having been proposed by the late Govt, to make 
up arrears and lay in a stock for the future — and having been a good deal 
objected to for excess (as well as on financial grounds) by the Liberal party — 
it is proposed to adopt a rate equal to the whole o f that exceptional 
expenditure, and to add to it a million and a half?48
This was the precise point at which Gladstone found himself alone against the naval 
expenditure and his Cabinet.
1894 began for Gladstone with an attack on the navy programme after thoroughly 
working through the figures with the assistance o f Hamilton: ‘they seem but too conclusive.’ 
He had found that the average naval expenditure for the five years before the Naval 
Defence Act was about £13 million, even when taking account o f the 1885 crisis and vote 
o f credit. This he took to be the normal naval expenditure. Over the five years o f the act the 
average expenditure was £16,190,000 and thus an increase o f £3,190,000 over normal. Even 
in 1894—5 after the expiry o f the act there was still to be paid the annuity o f £1,429,000 
which would raise the normal expenditure to at least £14,429,000 and he thought closer to 
£15 million. Now on top o f this and in time o f peace was to be added the Admiralty 
demand for £4 million which would thus raise the normal expenditure in 1894—5 to at least 
£18,429,000. Even if  the annuity were excepted the figure was unprecedented and would
48 BL GP, Add. MS 44203, f. 156, 29 Dec. 1893, and GD, xiii, p. 346,30 Dec. 1893. Morley concluded the year 
with a letter to West speculating that on account o f the Navy Harcourt would have to find an additional £4  
million in taxation. Hutchinson, p. 231.
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still be £810,000 higher than the average during the five years o f the Naval Defence Act. 
Having seen Harcourt and interrogated Hamilton on the figures Gladstone was ‘greatly 
exercised in his mind. It was, he said, a step taken by this country for the first time to join in 
the race o f Europe for huge armaments. It was a grossly exaggerated scare. Had the country 
gone mad? he was tempted to ask.’ He had left Hamilton, who knew him so well, in no 
doubt that he would not assent to the increase and that ‘a great political crisis’ was likely.49
Spencer seemed to understand perfectly the situation, Harcourt alternating between 
abuse and attempts to find the money, Gladstone opposed and Morley noncommittal but 
likely to support the navy.50 Gladstone had written him contending with some o f his 
Admiralty calculations, the position o f the Russian Black Sea fleet and the danger o f a five 
year plan or act binding the estimates o f the future. Most importantly he disputed the whole 
outcome o f the Naval Defence Act. The promise, not the mere hope, under the N.D. Act 
was double: it was 1. to make up arrears, 2. to lay in a stock.’ He promised to meet him next 
day to discuss it and further sent along a memo of his calculations.51
Gladstone’s analysis again concerned the growth of the Admiral’s £4,240,000 
programme over the Naval Defence Act both as to the expenditure itself, the militarism 
which it represented, and his own personal position. ‘He could not stultify the work o f his 
life by adopting what he looked upon as militarism, which he had always resolutely and 
effectively opposed...’, but he also admitted to West that his physical decline in eyesight and 
hearing made it ‘impossible ... to stay on.’52 This last revelation caused shockwaves, not so 
much as to cause but to implications, and his colleagues conspired to forestall his 
resignation, at least on this subject.53 In writing to Morley on the 5th to summon a Cabinet
49 GD, xiii, p. 348, BL GP, Add. MS 44776, f. 1, and HD, iii, p. 216, all 1 Jan. 1894.
50 Spencer to Rosebery, Gordon, ii, 2 Jan. 1894, p. 233.
51 Gladstone had seen Harcourt ‘on the Navy imbroglio: rather severe. Worked further on Navy question.’ 
GD, xiii, pp. 348—9.
52 He also thought the figure likely to increase. BL GP, Add. MS 44776, ff. 11—12, and Hutchinson, p. 233.
53 See Morley to Spencer, 4 Jan. 1894 in Gordon, ii, p. 234, who reports that Gladstone was ‘extremely angry 
with W.V.H.’ It was indeed a conspiracy on many levels, for Morley’s role as intermediary between Gladstone 
and Spencer was not disinterested, as he had come round to support the navy. He was also among the group
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he hinted at the peculiar personal position he held with respect to Europe and then rounded 
on the naval estimates again.
As you are my depositary, I request you to take particular note that my 
concession (so to speak, and it is only one from my point o f view) would 
admit in round numbers
1. o f an increase o f 2% millions on the normal Naval Estimate (of 1888—9) 
being equal to the augmentation actually made upon it under the Naval 
Defence Act in the firstjear 1889—90.
2. o f  an increase o f a million on the estimates or voted monies o f the 
preceding, i.e. the present year— not upon its total expenditure.
This is so large a proceeding that it requires effort to justify it to myself.54
He had worried West with his good mood and absence o f Navy talk, especially as Spencer 
and Morley were in no such mood, and the former’s concession o f ‘£1,000,000 instead o f  
£3,000,000 looked bad.’55
It was considerable concession on Spencer’s part but did nothing for Gladstone’s 
position, being still £3% million over normal and £2 million over the 1893—4 naval 
estimates. Gladstone, in Brighton since the 5th, was on the 6th ‘much haunted by the Spectre 
in front’, and the Sunday service inspired him to face it, and on his terms. ‘Quite apart from 
myself, I think the proposal a most alarming one. It will not be the last. It is not the largest 
piece o f militarism in Europe, but it is one o f the most virulent.’56 Gladstone, in extremis, was 
prepared to spend £15,250,000, but Spencer now demanded £17,249,000 (with the annuity 
taken into account). All seemed set for the Cabinet showdown.
The other side o f the equation was the Budget, and the turn o f the year was the 
opportunity for Hamilton to prepare forecasts for the out-turn o f 1893—4 and the 1894—5 
estimate. It was very clear nine months into the financial year that prospects were not good.
concerned mainly with the effect o f  resignation on Gladstone’s reputation, along with West and Hamilton 
(and probably Gladstone himself). Harcourt, Rosebery and others were much more concerned for their party 
and personal prospects.
54 To Morley, 5 Jan. 1894. GD, xiii, p. 351.
55 Hutchinson, p. 235.
56 GD, xiii, pp. 351—4. The militarism had begun with Italy’s ‘immense new Army law o f  July 1893,’ which was 
both a reaction and catalyst to French and Russian militarism. Taylor, p. 340.
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There had already been large borrowings on deficiency and ways and means, only 1879—80 
and 1885 on account o f military expenditure were comparable, ‘this is a normal year and a 
year o f peace.’ He had warned Harcourt ahead of his forecasts what to expect and was 
confident it could be dealt with.
It is disagreeable to have to increase taxation; but it has been mainly in 
connection with difficult and bad times that our greatest financiers (notably 
Pitt & Peel) have made their reputations; and I believe that a bold course, 
such as (I rejoice to see) you contemplate, will ensure yours.57
Hamilton’s report o f 3 January, arrived at after consultation with Milner at the Inland 
Revenue, predicted a shortfall in the Customs and Stamps revenue o f some £910,000 below 
estimate in combination with a diminution o f £183,000 o f expenditure and a probable 
deficit o f £551,000, after allowing a suitable margin. There were further uncertainties as to 
the out-turn o f the exceptionally large income tax estimate and possible anticipations on 
indirecdy taxed consumables in March before the Budget.58
There followed on the 8th a ‘very rough’ forecast for the 1894—5 Budget. Revenue 
would be more or less unchanged at £90,496,000, but expenditure would increase 
substantially, to £95,080,000. This was mainly on account o f the anticipated £3 million 
increase for the navy but also included a further £500,000 on the civil services and perhaps 
£300,000 on the Army. The anticipated deficit was therefore £4,584,000 and could be 
reduced by a number o f tactics. Termination of the Naval Defence Act annuity o f  
£1,430,000 and the return to the Exchequer o f any unappropriated balance in the existing 
Naval Defence Account, (‘say, £290,000’) along with the appropriation o f the Suez Canal 
share receipts from the Imperial Defence account would yield a possible £1,980,000 and 
reduce the deficit to £2,604,00. If a margin o f £196,000 were allowed then the deficit that
57 PRO T168/30, 30 Dec. 1893; MS Harcourt dep. 63, f. 159, 30 Dec. 1893.
58 PRO T168/30, 3 Jan. 1894 and MS Harcourt dep. 64, ff. 1—15. Harcourt replied the next day that he was 
obliged and hoped ‘you may be a true prophet/ but that he thought the forecast too rosy. BL HP, Add. MS 
48615B, f. 57.
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fresh taxation would have to provide would be £2,800,000. N ot a pleasant prospect but a 
surmountable one, which could not be said o f the Cabinet problem.59
The 9 January Cabinet resolved everything and nothing. Gladstone in a speech o f 
almost an hour outlined and detailed his opposition. He could not personally ‘break himself 
in pieces’ after working most his life in ‘a continuous effort for economy.’ It ran counter to 
the Liberal party’s principles o f “peace, retrenchment, and reform.” From a government 
point o f view it required excessive taxation, questionable finance and the abdication o f  
responsibility and control o f policy to the ‘professional elements’ at the Admiralty. The 
effect abroad would be to encourage jealousy and alarm against Britain and possibly 
encourage defensive alliances at the same time as to stimulate increased naval expenditure 
against them. ‘Far above all. Stimulus and provocation to the accursed militarism.’ As to the 
Admiralty proposal in itself, ‘the demand is unreasonable.’ It represented a betrayal o f the 
reasons put forward in support o f the original Naval Defence Act o f 1889 which claimed to 
‘efface the arrears’ and ‘lay in a stock’ o f ships to secure naval supremacy. Now, before even 
this plan was paid for they were asked to increase expenditure by another £3 million. He 
questioned the two-power standard, it was not ‘cast-iron’, especially the way it had been 
calculated with respect to Russia and France. It ignored that the Austrian, Italian and 
German fleets would offset them to some extent. If there had to be an increase it ought to 
be a gradual increase, as indeed it had been under the Naval Defence Act. He kept therefore 
to his own plan for an increase o f £2.5 million on normal expenditure for a total o f  
£15,500,000 and which was still an increase of £1 million on the 1893—4 estimates and 
almost £500,000 on the actual naval expenditure o f 1893—4 when the annuity expence was 
included.60 He persuaded nobody, and his Cabinet colleagues could not move him. The 
question o f his resignation, ‘a remarkable course’, was raised by Harcourt and Rosebery and
59 PRO T168/30, 8 Jan. 1894 and MS Harcourt dep. 64, ff. 16-22.
60 Gladstone’s notes for the Cabinet. BL GP, Add. MS 44648, ff. 142—5 and Add. MS 44776 ff. 20—1.
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‘in the end the matter stood over without a ray o f hope against this mad and mischievous 
scheme/ The special responsibility is on Spencer and Harcourt.’61
It is certain that the both o f them accepted that special responsibility. Spencer wrote 
to Gladstone that cit was only what I considered the necessity o f the case which made me do 
it.’62 Harcourt, as could be expected, was more blunt in his reasoning and to Hamilton he 
made no pretence at diplomacy in an ‘irate’ denunciation o f Gladstone’s behaviour. While 
he agreed in disliking the naval demands which he characterised as unnecessary and the 
result o f a foolish scare there was no alternative. Spencer and the whole Board o f Admiralty 
would resign ‘(with a probability that no Admirals would be forthcoming to form a new 
Board)’ along with Rosebery, and the Government would fall. These facts,’ he said, ‘must 
be recognised; and I am prepared to find the money. If there is to be extravagance, the least 
harmful form o f it is over-insurance.’ Hamilton thought the government, even without 
Gladstone, was prepared to face this.
I expect [Harcourt] will have to find an additional 3 or 3 V2 millions o f  
taxation. He hopes to get out o f his Death Duty scheme about 1 million. He 
will put on an additional penny or two pennies (if necessary) on the income 
tax, relieving the landlords under Schedule A by allowing them to be 
assessed on their net incomes and extending the exemptions in the case of 
small incomes; and he will increase the duties on Beer and Spirits.63
This was the Budget.
Gladstone was further assailed by Harcourt who challenged his current rejection o f  
naval expenditure with the precedent o f the years 1859—60. Harcourt pointed out that in 
1861 the charges for the navy and the army were increased £4,000,000 and £2,500,000 
above those o f 1859. The total addition therefore to the Naval and Military charges to 
which you then were a party was about double what is now proposed.... In order to meet
61 GD, xiii, p. 354.
62 Gordon, ii, p. 236.
63 HD, iii, pp. 2 2 0 -1 ,1 0  Jan. 1894.
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this vast expenditure the Income Tax was raised from 5d. to 10d. and an additional 
2 millions on Customs and Excise.’64 Gladstone did not see it this way, 1 entirely or in the 
main differ as to your statement.’ He explained that the precedent o f 1859—63 did not apply 
because the increases were due to causes, the China war, Italian unification, and tensions 
arising from the American civil war, rather than in response to a scare, ‘though scare had 
something to do with them.’65 Gladstone seems to have wilfully misconstrued Harcourt’s 
comparison and he calculated the increase as only £2.4 million by avoiding the 1859 base 
date. His own inclination was to look to 1848 for precedents, when an increase had been 
withdrawn and the estimates reduced. The Government proposal for increasing the Income 
Tax from Id. to 1 /  was abandoned almost at once; and the estimates were referred to a 
Select Committee, by whom they were revised and reduced.’66
Clearly, however, the question o f precedents had some effect on Gladstone because 
in his notes he went through the figures in detail and repeated his admonitions o f ‘excessive 
taxation’, ‘shady finance’, ‘irresponsible professional domination’, ‘alarm in Europe’ and 
‘stimulus to militarism’. The diary records ‘the scheme is in my opinion mad’, and the next 
day ‘I am now like the sea in swell after a storm, bodily affected, but mentally pretty well 
anchored. It is bad: but oh how infinitely better than to be implicated in that plan!’67 He 
then opened a second front against Spencer, questioning the breakdown o f naval 
expenditure after 1894, how much in addition to the £3,146,000 outstanding on the Naval 
Defence Act would be added by these estimates, and how much was to go for new 
construction o f battleships and torpedo craft?68 Hamilton was by now becoming further 
convinced that Gladstone would resign on the question, ‘he whispered to me about the 
dangerousness o f the course on which his colleagues seemed to be embarking. “I foresee,”
64 MS Harcourt dep. 14, to Gladstone (copy), 10 Jan. 1894, ff. 1—2.
65 MS Harcourt dep. 14,10 Jan. 1894, f. 3.
66 BL GP, Add. MS 44776 f. 23 ,10  Jan. 1894.
67 Ibid., ff. 24-7 , GD, xiii, pp. 3 5 8 -9 ,1 0  and 11 Jan. 1894.
68 GD, xiii, p.360. The answer is in BL GP, Add. MS 44776, ff. 31—3, which includes Gladstone’s detailed 
notes on Spencer’s plan.
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he said, “serious calamities ahead.”69 Having fired his salvoes the Grand Old Man fled to 
Biarritz, out o f range, at least for a while, o f his colleagues.70
The precedent o f 1859 became so important because it was hoped that Gladstone, 
who put so much store in them, would acknowledge that what was being asked o f him in 
1894 was not worse than what he took responsibility for in 1859.71 The idea originated with 
Harcourt but was soon inspiring the “Treasury ring” o f Welby, Hamilton, and West, even 
Acton was a party to this ploy while at Biarritz. At the same time Rosebery was working 
actively to prevent, ‘at all hazards’, a compromise, determined that Spencer should stick to 
the Admiralty program.72 Rosebery was completely dismissive o f  Gladstone’s concerns for 
European militarism, believing that Britain needed the navy to maintain its security against 
that militarism.73 West travelled to Biarritz and made a great effort to reconcile Gladstone to 
the Cabinet’s position on the navy. He failed completely. None o f his arguments as to the 
effect o f a resignation on the Party, his Cabinet colleagues, or even Ireland, would do. The 
danger to Europe o f this naval militarism outweighed everything, and Gladstone entirely 
dismissed the 1859 precedent.74 Gladstone composed his own analysis o f his position with 
respect to “The plan.”
I deem it to be in excess o f public expectation. I know it to be in excess of 
all precedent. It entails unjust taxation. It endangers sound finance. I shall 
not minister to the alarming aggression o f the professional elements ... not 
lend a hand to dress Liberalism in Tory clothes. I shall not break to pieces 
the continuous action o f my political life, nor trample on the tradition 
received from every colleague who has ever been my teacher. Above all I 
cannot and will not add to the perils and the coming calamities o f Europe by 
an act o f militarism which will be found to involve a policy, and which 
excuses thus the militarism of Germany, France or Russia. England’s 
providential part is to help peace, and liberty o f which peace is the nurse; this
69 BL H D, Add. MS 48662, f. 57,12 Jan. 1894 and HD, iii, p. 222.
70 West claimed that as a part o f  this strategy Gladstone forbade his Ministers holding any Cabinets while he 
was away in order to avoid the issue being decided. Hutchinson, p. 238.
71 See Buxton, i, pp. 176—188 for the naval scare and its implications for Gladstone’s budget.
72 BL H D, Add. MS 48662, f. 68,16 Jan. 1894. Hamilton is here bitter at the Admiralty Board system, 
‘professional men with no responsibility to Parliament can almost dictate their own terms on threat o f  
resignation.’ Also Hutchinson, p. 246,17 Jan. 1894 for Lewis Harcourt’s intervention.
73 H D, iii, p. 225,19 Jan. 1894.
74 Hutchinson, pp. 247—54,19 and 20 Jan. 1894.
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policy is the foe o f both. I am ready to see England dare the world in arms: 
but not to see England help to set the world in arms.75
This was an unequivocal statement, and all subsequent attempts to argue him out o f it, 
whether based on the 1859 precedent or others, were doomed to fail. Still they were made.
Hamilton was instructed to send Gladstone facts and figures from the 1859 Budget 
speech, and he sensed ‘this will be rather a poser for him’, a precedent not even Gladstone 
could argue himself out of.76 Welby also submitted a letter to convince him o f the 1859 
precedent, and while that seems to have made a significant impression, Gladstone held firm. 
T am quite sure o f my memory,’ according to West’s recollection 77 Pressing the issue 
became Hamilton’s special task, and he was urged on in this by both Gladstone (‘still 
harping on the precedent o f 1859’) and Harcourt, who was determined to make the most 
o f it.
Your “secret” letter o f yesterday was satisfactory as far as it goes. I am 
extremely glad that you have worked the precedent o f  1859 so effectively.... 
as I am sure it is the one which will have most effect as “showing” that his 
“traditions” are all the other way.
Hamilton was instructed to incorporate some additional Harcourt arguments before sending 
the revision, ‘as and from you’, to Gladstone immediately so he could ‘have time to digest 
it.’78 This did in fact turn the tables, because Gladstone now felt he had enough material to 
refute the precedent. He wrote to Hamilton and Lord Acton on the 6th, ‘my own 
contemporary exposition o f my proceedings at that date which were in my view as 
compared with the present proposal chalk & cheese.’ He wrote to Harcourt the next day,
75 GD, xiii, p. 364, 20 Jan. 1894.
76 H D, iii, p. 227, 25 Jan. 1894.
77 Hutchinson, p. 262.
78 BL HP, Add. MS 48615B, Harcourt to Hamilton, 4 Feb. 1894. Hamilton complied, sending to Gladstone on 
the 5th, but finding that he was in fact correct about Sardinia and Nice. MS Harcourt, dep. 64, ff. 46—7. See 
also ff. 43—59 for Hamilton’s work on this precedent.
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ending the precedent battle by declaring himself undefeated.79 This victory made his own 
resignation unavoidable.
The resignation came at a Cabinet on 1 March, but had become effective nearly a 
month earlier when he could not come to terms with his colleagues on his return from 
Biarritz. Richard Shannon argues that the turning point was 31 January, but that Gladstone 
had made one last effort to thwart his colleagues and avoid the increased estimates. 
‘Gladstone would turn the tables on them by setting aside the naval problem and by using 
the wickedness o f  the House o f Lords against his party as he had once used the Eastern 
question [in 1877—80],... Gladstone proposed to dissolve the 1892 Parliament on the 
grounds o f its representation o f the people being thwarted by the Lords.’80 This, Shannon 
asserts, was one o f Gladstone’s ‘brilliant insights’.
The fourth o f the series o f supreme moments o f political juncture, in his 
career, when his providentially inspired appreciation o f the general situation 
and its result and his insight into the facts o f particular eras generated in his 
mind a conviction that the materials existed for forming a public opinion 
and directing it to a particular end.81
Matthew is less dramatic in his interpretation o f the resignation, noting that while Gladstone 
was prepared to consider a dissolution on the Lords, ‘whether the people o f  the U.K. are or 
are not to be a self-governing people,’ that he abandoned it once he realised that it had no 
support in the Cabinet.82 Morley’s rather reticent account of the whole naval estimates crisis 
and Gladstone’s plan for dissolution tends to support Matthew’s interpretation, yet he
79 GD, xiii, pp. 371—3, 6 and 7 Feb. 1894. Gladstone was technically correct, he had acknowledged the crises 
abroad as a justification for the £5,180,000 increase on military estimates which he insisted on paying for out 
o f  current revenue through fresh taxation. In  time o f peace nothing but a dire necessity should induce us to 
borrow.’ 3 H 154.1393—5,18  July 1859; but also 3 H 150. 180 and 240, 21 July and p. 1142 o f  8 Aug. 1859 
noting the ‘great crisis in European history.’
80 Richard Shannon, Gladstone: Heroic Minister, 1865—1898 (London, 1999), pp. 558—9. The Home Rule Bill, 
Employers’ Liability Bill, and the Local Government Bill were rejected or mutilated in the upper chamber.
81 Shannon, Gladstone, p. 559. The other three were his 1853 budget, the question o f  the Irish Church in 1868, 
and the question o f  Home Rule for Ireland. Morley confirms this, recalling that even in 1897 Gladstone was 
still insisting to him that they ought to have dissolved and called an election, T h e case, he said, was clear, 
thorough, and complete.’ Gladstone, ii, p. 558.
82 Matthew, ii, p. 352.
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probably underplays the sheer force and fury o f Gladstone’s position. Given his hatred o f  
militarism and his belief in a kind o f popular democracy, albeit filtered through the 
representative process o f Parliament, it is plausible that he was willing to kill the estimates 
and out-flank his colleagues by this strategy. Yet by this same reasoning he was himself 
forced to bow to the inevitable acceptance that his colleagues themselves had every claim to 
a representative and democratic legitimacy for their naval estimates, and that those estimates 
seemed at least to have the benefit o f popular support.
What had not changed at all were the prospects and problems o f the 1894—5 budget. 
Yet their great task was the budget itself, even if a resignation spectre haunted the prospects 
o f Harcourt ever actually delivering it. The main concerns were expenditure, debt 
repayment, and the likely 1893—4 deficit, and the new taxation necessary to make up the 
anticipated 1894 deficit. The last was at least likely to be ameliorated by the death duties 
plans reluctantly postponed from 1893 and long decided upon. Hamilton’s speculative guess 
above was essentially correct: income tax and beer and spirit duties would have to make up 
the balance. The question was how much to make up and what ratio between direct and 
indirect taxes? 1859 certainly provided a precedent, for the greatest part o f the burden was 
met by the income tax and little else from indirect taxation.83
The plan for the Budget fell into place along exactly these lines. The Death Duties 
were to be revised and reformed, increasing the revenue but not to its fullest extent in the 
first year. Income tax, by now always the great shock absorber for making ends meet, would 
be increased again, and there were bold contingencies. Beer and spirit duties would play 
their part on behalf o f indirect taxation. There would be a financial adjustment o f the Naval 
Defence Act so as to eliminate debt finance, and everywhere else revenue would be 
squeezed and massaged to meet the targets, where necessary.
83 Buxton, i, p. 188. Hamilton found that the budget o f 1859 offered useful precedents for that o f 1894, for 
example the likelihood that an anticipation o f  a prospective deficit would encourage a ‘rush to clear the duties 
on ... tea and spirits’ so as to avoid the likely budget increases on customs and excise. MS Harcourt dep. 64, 
f. 34, 20 Jan. 1894.
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First, estimates had to be finalised, and the key variables were those o f the Army and 
Navy. Harcourt was aggrieved to report that the Army estimates would also have to be put 
up to £18,100,000, and he was doubtful the Navy could be kept to £17,240,000 when 
£18,000,000 was so close at hand. 1 only hope the day may come and that before long when 
it shall be impossible that a Government which produces such Estimates should exist.’84 
Hamilton’s feelings ran the same way, 1 am afraid I am not likely to see the day when the 
existence o f Governments will be imperilled by vast estimates.’85 The peril would lie with 
the Chancellors o f the Exchequer and their budgets.
Harcourt’s attack on and overturning o f Goschen’s Naval Defence Act finance was 
for him the easiest choice even though it made for financial hardships. Harcourt was set to 
be fierce, and no arguments for tenderness towards Goschen or consideration towards the 
will o f  Parliament could be entertained.86 Hamilton urged professional caution, his plan was 
to apply the Sinking Funds past, present and future to redeem the outstanding and future 
liabilities under the Acts. O f course this laid Sir William open to the charge o f  a raid on the 
Sinking Fund, and to forestall any such assault Hamilton was commissioned to produce a 
memorandum over-viewing the Act and their repudiation o f  it.87
The end o f February brought them close enough to the financial year-end to prepare 
an accurate forecast o f the out-turn and to fine tune the 1894—5 estimate. The latter was
prepared without the revised Navy Estimate but with the Army at £18,100,000 after 
Hamilton had confirmed the £294,500 increase.88 Expenditure was provisionally put at
84 BL HP, Add. MS 48615B, Harcourt to Hamilton, ff. 61 -3 ,17  and 19 Jan. 1894.
85 Hamilton to Harcourt, MS Harcourt dep. 64, ff. 32—5,20 Jan. 1894. Milner was now advising Hamilton that 
the Inland Revenue should come close to realising its estimate for 1893—4, £200,000 down as the worst that is 
likely to happen’, and that Hamilton’s rough forecast o f  £15,500,000 for 1894—5 was realistic. PRO T168/30, 
17 Jan. 1894.
86 This would also be applied to the Imperial Defence Act o f 1888. MS Harcourt dep. 64, f. 25 ,16 Jan. 1894.
87 ‘Memorandum on the Machinery o f  the Naval Defence Act 1889.’ MS Harcourt dep. 64, ff. 67—79, 20 Feb. 
1894. Harcourt was broadly in approval but thought that it should also include a statement explicidy treating 
the proposed scheme to discharge the debt. Once done he offered ‘A thousand thanks for your explanation o f  
the Naval Defence Act which is excellent.’ A copy was sent to Spencer. BL HP, Add. MS 48615B, f. 68 and
f. 71, 22 and 27 Feb. 1894.
88 PRO T168/30, 24 Feb. He was later informed the increase would ‘stand I think at £278,100.... Every little 
helps.’ Ibid., 28 Feb. 1894.
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£92,369,000 against Revenue o f £90,416,000 which made a deficit o f £1,953,000. ‘This 
deficit would admit o f being made good by the contemplated amendments o f the Defence 
A cts/ Elimination o f the £1,430,000 N DA  annuity and £145,000 on the interest charge o f  
the Army and Navy votes provided £1,575,000 o f reduced expenditure. The restoration o f  
the “mortgaged” Suez Canal dividends (£260,000) and foregoing the £290,000 payment to 
the Naval Defence Account increased revenue by £550,000 to £90,966,000, and deficit was 
converted to a surplus o f £172,000. Harcourt’s thorough reading o f this estimate was more 
optimistic, he put the Excise at £25,000,000 on Milner’s advice, thought Stamps likewise too 
pessimistic, and doubted that the increased cost o f the Post Office would not yield a gain in 
revenue. On the other hand, he felt income tax arrears would not increase by £350,000 
given the depression in the yield. ‘I don’t know how far these things will balance one 
another but I am disposed to think you have put the estimate o f  revenue for next year too 
low when you fix it at £1,200,000 less than in the current year.’89 It was left for Hamilton to 
arrive at these figures.
For 1893—4 revenue o f £90,610,000 against expenditure o f £91,359,000 was forecast 
to yield a £749,000 deficit, an improvement at least upon earlier fears and entirely due to an 
£800,000 shortfall on Stamps. This was not an acceptable prospect when it was so 
important to use the proceeds o f the Sinking Fund to pay down the N D A  debt, and so the 
revenue departments were advised to “squeeze”.
I hope you will impress upon the Customs the necessity o f  collecting this 
year up to the quick. Our measures will give us plenty o f money next year.
What we want is to cut down our deficit as much as possible this year and to 
justify as far as possible our estimates. I should think it possible that with the 
screw on we might bring the Customs nearly up to the mark. A. Milner is 
prepared to do all he can with the Inland Revenue in this direction.90
89 PRO T168 /3 0 ,2 8  Feb. 1894. Hamilton had in fact been advised by Milner that his figures were ‘about 
right’, and similarly as to the Post Office. MS Harcourt dep. 64, ff. 85—86a.
90 Harcourt to Hamilton, BL HP, Add. MS 48615B, ff. 69-70, 26 Feb. 1894.
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There was more than ever a need to get close to a balanced budget. But it was not going to 
be so easy to do so, and there was some resistance. Milner, despite Harcourt, had 
reservations about it. 1 can’t do again what I did last year, & deliberately put up my 
estimates to get the C. o f E. out o f a hole. It is magnificent, but it isn’t business.’ Even the 
Post Office was obstreperous, ‘a general election would justify an addition o f about £10,000 
to the Postal revenue. Will you add it?’91
Yet further work on the 1894—5 Estimates had by 10 March settled the broad 
principles o f the Budget. It had not been smooth sailing, Customs for example had to push 
hard to get their figures up to £19,800,000 and £190,000 beyond what was expected from
1893—4 on account o f slight falls in tobacco and rum.92 These measures, when combined 
with revised Army and Navy estimates o f £18,081,000 and £17,366,000 suggested a deficit 
o f  £4,870,000 from £95,476,000 expenditure on £90,606,000 revenue. The new measures 
would cut expenditure by the elimination o f the NDA annuity at £1,430,000 and foregone 
interest charges on these loans o f £145,000 which made £1,575,000, thus reducing the 
deficit to £3,295,000. Suez Canal dividends worth £260,000 and the return o f a £290,000 
overpayment on the N D A  combined to add £550,000 to the revenue and brought the 
deficit down to £2,745,000.
To meet this there would be
(1) The estimated yield from Death Duties amendment £1 ,000m
(2) The proceeds from additional tax on Beer (6d per barrel) & on Spirits
(6d per gallon) 1,500m
(3) An additional penny on Income Tax would yield £1 ,780m
a. An abatement o f £150 extended to incomes under £500 wd. mean loss o f
824m [subtotal] 956
b. An allowance o f 15% under Schedule A would mean loss o f
689 [subtotal] 267m
The addition to revenue therefore would be 2,767,000
The margin therefore would be 22,000
But by springing the Revenue very moderately over different heads it ought
91 PRO T168/30, Milner to Hamilton, 16 and Post Office to Hamilton, 15 March.
92 PRO T168/31, 9 March.
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to be quite possible to calculate on an additional sum of £200,000; and the 
account would thus be balanced.93
It was well that it sufficed, for Hamilton and Milner were keen to stop there, believing these 
innovations radical enough for one year’s budget.
What most concerned them was the plan to impose an additional income tax 
surcharge on large incomes. The speculative plan was to impose a graduated Income Tax 
surcharge above £5,000 at a rate o f 1 /2 d. at £5,000 increments up to £100,000. ‘I am afraid 
it will frighten people while the result to Revenue is a pure shot and may lead to very little.’94 
Hamilton advised that, as above, the Budget would be safe to balance while allowing the 
income tax abatement to be raised to £150 from £120 on incomes under £500 and a change 
in calculation o f income tax liable under Schedule A from gross to net income with an 
allowance o f 15% on this. It was further suggested that land and houses could be 
differentiated, £it being land, which is entided to the most consideration, and the relief o f 
which would most likely grease the Budget wheels. I attach great importance to this point.’ 
This because it was felt that the impact o f the revised death duties would fall hardest upon 
land. The surtax , however, was beyond the pale.
I confess the abandonment o f the idea o f establishing an income tax 
surcharge would not be unwelcome to me. It has never much smiled upon 
me from the first. I have always felt
a. that it would establish a principle that might create great alarm for 
probably a very small return/result;
b. that it would over-weight your already heavy Budget, & that you might 
thus endanger other parts o f it;
c. that graduated taxation, though sound in principle, should be introduced 
by slow degrees & very easy steps; & that therefore the proposal to graduate 
one tax in one year is perhaps sufficient & more politic.
I have long held that the tax o f all others which lends itself most easily and 
most justly to graduation is the House Tax; that being the best o f all
93 MS Harcourt dep. 64, ff. 9 4 -7 ,1 0  March 1894.
94 David Brooks, ed., The Destruction of herd Rosebery. From the Diary of Sir Edward Hamilton, 1894—1895 (London, 
1986), p. 118, 6 March. Hereafter: Brooks, HD.
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measures o f the means of individuals; but for the reasons I have just 
adduced I should be afraid o f it this year.95
Milner shared these objections. ‘I am glad you think the surcharge abandoned for the 
present. I shall never like it, at any time, but, o f course, my great objection is to over-loading 
the ship with it this year.’96 This last objection did indeed seem most pertinent, for the 
Treasury was itself divided on the subject, Welby sceptical o f some o f these objections and 
Harcourt unconvinced. Daunton in fact argues that it was at this very point that the 
arguments in favour o f graduation carried the day.97
This was more than just a theoretical point, for Harcourt had to present his budget 
to the Cabinet 15 March, and there were various reasons for the reception to be less than 
welcoming. Having failed in his bid for the leadership of the Liberal party, acrimonious in 
his personal relationship with Prime Minister Rosebery, he had also alienated many Cabinet 
colleagues by his style o f outrageous combativeness and seemingly explosive temper.98 
Although speculation about his resignation was tactical rather than principled, and his 
seeming leadership o f the party’s radical faction ambiguous,99 he really did have an 
opportunity with this budget to consolidate his new position as leader in the Commons and 
recover his prestige. It was a chance to make history, as he and Hamilton were both well
95 Hamilton to Harcourt, MS Harcourt dep. 64, ff. 92—3,10  March 1894.
96 PRO T168 /3 0 ,1 6  March 1894, Milner to Hamilton.
97 Martin Daunton, ‘The Political Economy o f Death Duties: Harcourt’s Budget o f  1894’, p. 164, in Negley 
Harte and Roland Quinault, eds., Land and Society in Britain, 1700—1914. Essays in Honour o/F .M .L Thompson 
(Manchester, 1996).
98 See Gardiner, ii, pp. 259—74, R. R. James, Rosebey. A  Biography of Archibald Philip, Fifih Earl ofRosebeiy 
(London, 1963), pp. 294—328, Brooks, HD, pp. 1—12 and pp. 110—20 for Hamilton’s diary 20 Feb. through
8 March 1894. The other important change, while not significant or eventful in terms o f  Treasury policy, was 
the retirement o f  Sir Reginald Welby as permanent secretary to the Treasury. He was created Baron Welby 
(Lord Welby o f  Allington) and succeeded by Sir Francis Mowatt (1837—1919) in March 1894. Hutchinson, p. 
276,14 Feb. 1894 gives West’s account o f  his discussion with Gladstone on this point, having first raised the 
matter himself with Welby on 10 Jan. 1894, p. 238.
99 Harcourt saw himself as the spokesman ‘o f  rank and file Liberalism, especially its more Radical inclinations.’ 
David Brooks, ‘Gladstone’s Fourth Administration, 1892—1894’, in Bebbington and Swift, eds., Gladstone 
Centenary Essays, pp. 225—42, p. 231. This made his confrontation with Rosebery, inspiration for Liberal 
Imperialism, even more charged with antipathy.
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aware.100 The Cabinet accepted the proposals, although the Income tax surcharge had been 
"reluctantly’ abandoned. Hamilton continued to moderate his opposition, not "opposed to 
the principle’ o f the graduated surtax, but agreeing with Milner’s practical objections that it 
was uncertain in yield and so hard to estimate, would encourage evasion, make the Budget 
bill too complicated, and especially its inquisitorial nature and the attendant increase in staff 
which would be required by the Inland Revenue.101
The continued efforts to get in the 1893—4 revenue were meeting with success, 
indeed, perhaps too much. Hamilton’s 22 March estimate o f the 1893—4 balance sheet 
showed revenue o f £90,796,000 and expenditure o f £91,303,000 yielding a £507,000 deficit. 
Milner informed Hamilton on the 28th that the Inland Revenue would have a further 
£50,000 to contribute towards lowering the deficit. Also that his squeezing o f the Income 
tax had been almost too successful, and that if it did not come to £15,400,000 "it is only 
because I am back watering as hard as ever I can. As ever, the efforts we have made to get 
the tax in have over-shot the mark. I don’t want a penny more under this head in view o f  
next year.’102 It was what was wanted, and the recast balance sheet now showed a deficit o f  
£207,000 on revenues o f £91,096,000 and £91,303,000 expenditure. The revenue reports 
were almost being updated day by day, expenditure already known, and it was soon found 
that the deficit had been whittled down to £170,000. Given that at various times the deficit 
had been put at £1 million or more, this out-turn was a great relief.103
The Estimate for 1894—5 was coming to fruition almost as fast, but Harcourt was 
still looking for reassurance that ends would meet. He had decided by 27 March to follow 
Hamilton’s suggestion and graduate the House duty at values over £150 or £200. Rosebery
100 Hamilton had written a long and tactful note to Lewis Harcourt about his father being passed over for 
leadership by Rosebery, but also pointing out the duty and opportunity o f  his position as Chancellor o f  the 
Exchequer. MS Harcourt dep. 64, ff. 86b—d, 4 March 1894. Hamilton was in an awkward position because o f  
his close friendship with Rosebery, his classmate at Eton.
101 Hamilton still favoured the House Tax for graduation. Brooks, HD, pp. 124-5 ,15  March 1894.
102 PRO T168/30, 22 and 30 March 1894. On the 28th the deficit was still being put at £407,000. MS Harcourt 
dep. 64, f. 119.
103 Brooks, HD, p. 128,1 April 1894.
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was also thinking along this line, ca double dose o f graduation would, he thought, alarm 
people considerably.’104 Hamilton made every reasonable effort to avoid recourse to the 
House duty, he had only to build on the £90,596,000 o f estimated revenue. ‘I don’t think 
the deficit can be larger; and it is quite possible, if revenue goes on tumbling in as it has 
lately, the deficit may be even still smaller.’105 The additions to beer and spirits were 
estimated to raise a further £1,400,000 on Customs and Excise, but he was also able to gain 
another £50,000 from the Customs, and even the Post Office chipped in £50,000 more.106 
He could now anticipate a deficit o f £4,624,000 from £90,846,000 o f revenue and 
£95,470,000 expenditure. Termination o f the N D A  would reduce that expenditure by 
£2,123,000, while the new taxes would produce £2,710,000 and turn the deficit into a small 
surplus o f  £209,000. The graduated house duty could be abandoned.107
But that was not the end o f battles on graduation, Harcourt presented his Budget to 
the Cabinet again on 2 April, and the death duties were in a definitive form. The scale o f  
graduation began at 5% on estates over £25,000 and moved in one percent increments 
above £100,000, £200,000, £300,000, £500,000 to a maximum o f  10% on estates above 
£1,000,000. Rosebery wanted this adjusted at lower rates and Hamilton agreed with him, 
albeit with a caveat ‘After all, who is it that called for this huge naval expenditure? The 
propertied and commercial classes: so they ought not to complain if  the bulk o f the charge 
falls upon them.’108
Yet in spite o f the clarity o f the above statement this became a bitter and divisive question 
between Harcourt and Rosebery, sparked by the latter’s memo o f 4 April in which he raised 
some concerns regarding the treatment o f property by the budget. Rosebery felt that the 
liberal party had lost touch with men o f property and that the budget would worsen that
104 Ibid., pp. 126-7, 27 and 28 March.
105 MS Harcourt dep. 64, f. 117, Hamilton to Harcourt, 28 March 1893.
106 pRo  T168/30, 30 and 31 March 1894.
107 Brooks, HD, p. 128,1 April 1894.
108 Ibid., p. 129, 2 and 3 April 1894.
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division. The tax measures were likely to favour those earning under £500, he admitted, but 
felt they would be neither grateful nor numerous enough to compensate for the antagonism 
o f  property. He thought it would insufficiendy attract the masses, as no benefit was given to 
teetotallers whereas ‘if they drink spirits, those spirits are further taxed. So we can hardly 
hope for much enthusiasm or active support from the masses.’ Rosebery was concerned that 
the Liberal party was developing towards only working class support, and he pointed out the 
further danger o f art collections having to be sold off to America in order to pay the Death 
Duties.109 He finished by pointing out that the end result in raising the £1,000,000 by this 
tax would be to redistribute it back to those below the £500 exemption, Svhile all other 
classes are taxed for a common interest, the maintenance of an adequate efficient navy.... I 
hope therefore that the graduation may be mitigated as far as possible. Proposals o f this 
kind should be introduced with gendeness, and high graduation appears to me in any case to 
be essentially a war tax.’110 Harcourt’s response was withering in its sarcasm and obnoxious 
for its condescension, yet was nonetheless a fair and able defence o f the principles behind 
his graduation o f the Death Duties.
In the first place he pointed out that his object was ‘to place all property o f whatever 
kind upon an equal footing in respect to liability to taxation.’ To this end he had litde 
sympathy for ‘Tories and Whig magnates’ who might as a class be alienated from the Liberal 
party. As for those under £500, Harcourt ignored the strict application o f this question to 
income tax payers, noting that their numbers made up the vast bulk o f the electorate and 
population, and that the Liberal party was unlikely to gain the support o f the masses so long 
as they defended the ‘fiscal privileges and exemptions o f the wealthy which are universally 
condemned.’ He asserted that the ‘horizontal division o f parties’ and the ‘cleavage o f classes’
109 Peter Mandler points out the rather gende treatment such collections received at the hands o f  the Inland 
Revenue, and also the way in which the “old masters” o f the landed interest received preferential treatment as 
compared to the “impressionists” o f  the nouveau rich. ‘Art, death, and taxes: the taxation o f  works o f  art in 
Britain, 1796—1914’, Historical Research 74, (2001), pp. 271-97.
110 James, Rosebery, pp. 342—3.
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was a natural consequence o f household suffrage and their democracy. The death duty was 
defended as a suitable property tax which struck but once in a generation and would be 
difficult to avoid so long as the property was to be legally settled.
The fear as to the taxation o f capital had some foundation fifty or sixty years 
ago when capital in this country was in deficiency. At the present time it is 
superabundant, and not finding sufficiency o f employment at home runs to 
waste in Argentine and elsewhere.... Your argument seems to involve that it 
is necessary to maintain an unequal incidence o f taxation in order to avert 
the breaking up o f large properties irrespective o f the character o f their 
possessors. This is a very fine old Tory doctrine — it is one which the Liberal 
Party are not likely to accept.
The question o f art collections was dismissed, but not without an allusion to public galleries 
and an imprecation as to the public spirit o f private owners. The misunderstanding as to the 
£1,000,000 to be raised was swiftly corrected, in point o f fact and in principle. ‘Our first 
object is to accomplish an act o f financial justice to which the Liberal Party are deeply 
pledged.’ The £1,000,000 represented a six month yield in the first year o f a tax which 
should produce £4,000,000 per annum for ‘the reduction o f other taxes or, what is more 
probable, to satisfy further Jingo panics.’ The question o f election finance was beneath his 
contemplation or contempt, and he challenged Rosebery to have both o f their 
memorandums put on record before the Cabinet. Yet this blustering confrontation was 
followed by a vital concession on graduation.
I believe the principle o f graduation to be a sound one, and I am sure it is 
one on which the Liberal Party will insist, but I agree that a new principle o f  
this description should be introduced in moderation, and I am quite 
disposed to meet your views on the subject o f the mitigation o f the scale as 
far as is consistent with the exigencies o f the Revenue, and this I hope may 
be to a great degree accomplished. As to aggregation I do not see what 
argument can be advanced against it. If graduation is accepted at all it must 
be upon the total sum of the value of the whole property whatever may be 
its description.
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His last point was that the changes to the death duties would not affect anyone leaving less 
than £25,000 personalty.111 Afterwards both Chancellor o f the Exchequer and First Lord o f  
the Treasury were agreed at least that the Government could not last much longer.112
Fortunately the prospect o f delivering such a historic budget seems to have, at least 
temporarily, turned Harcourt’s mind from battling Cabinet colleagues towards perfecting his 
brief and rising to the occasion on its delivery. Hamilton was in London over the weekend 
to be available to work with Harcourt on the budget, and the estate duty scale was modified 
so as to ‘go up in smaller steps and the maximum rate of duty is limited to 8 per cent.113 
This will tend to diminish alarm.’ Hamilton took satisfaction in noting that those who had 
demanded the Navy expenditure would soon have the pleasure o f paying for it, in which 
case the increased Death Duties were preferable to the income tax, let alone a graduated 
income tax, again because it was capital and not income which bore the burden.114 As the 
budget date drew closer Harcourt’s mood improved, Hamilton thinking it good for the 
Liberal Party and his chief. It was ‘cut and dried’ the 14th, and Harcourt read it out the 
morning o f the 15th. While anticipating that it would be furiously denounced both for its 
effect on property and spirits, Hamilton predicted (and really hoped for) ‘a distinct 
success.... To gain the name o f a financier would go some way to compensate for recent 
disappointments: and success may conduce to keep him in a good humour and make him a 
litde less anti-Roseberyite.’115
111 Gardiner, ii, pp. 283—7, 4 April 1894. Harcourt’s analysis is consistent with Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 
W.J. Ashley, ed., (London, 1929), p. 809. Indeed, estates below £500 and £1000 would gain by the changes at 
a cost o f  £100,000, PRO IR 6 3 /2 ,10 April, ff. 7-10.
112 Hamilton relates this sentiment o f  Rosebery on 5 April and Harcourt the 7th. Brooks, H D, pp. 130—1.
113 This 8% rate had been proposed 20 March, PRO IR63/2, ff. 17-46. The higher and steeper 10 % rate o f  
graduation was in a later memo o f  2 April, PRO T168/31.
114 H D , iii, p. 259, 8 April 1894.
115 Brooks, HD, p. 133. Hamilton recorded that this was the twentieth and last time Harcourt had read the 
statement to him in preparation for Parliament.
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Harcourt’s Budget, delivered on 16 April 1894, was almost universally acknowledged 
as a “great” budget, although this was not necessarily meant as a compliment.116 By this time 
he had mastered the rhetoric o f budgets, using the opportunity to make a report on the 
economic situation o f the past year as indicated by the yield o f the respective taxes, and he 
predicted, correctly, that 1893 would prove to have been the nadir o f the business cycle, in 
decline since 1890. He went further in proclaiming that his Budget, in spite o f  this adversity, 
showed the soundness o f British finances and the underlying stability o f  its fiscal resources. 
Despite a deficit o f £170,000 he denied that the Treasury had resorted to squeezing the 
income tax, had they done so there would have been no deficit, but he did not regard such 
practice ‘as sound finance.’ Instead he praised his Treasury staff for the precision o f  their 
forecast in the face o f  such obstacles. He then took the opportunity to dismiss bimetallism 
as an ‘inflationist doctrine’ along with its similarly unsound counterpart, ‘protectionist 
practice’.
1894—5 would bring £3,994,000 o f increased expenditure due mostly to the navy but 
not really surprising given the growth o f expenditure over the past twenty years. Harcourt 
might deplore this but could not hope to vanquish it. Revenue o f £90,956,000 against 
Expenditure o f  £95,458,000 was estimated to produce a £4,502,000 deficit. The naval 
expenditure had now to be considered as normal, and so Harcourt rejected any notion o f  
borrowing to meet the charge, for that would be ‘a fatal and a cowardly error, unworthy o f a 
great nation.’ Most importantly he argued that Britain’s financial credit, which was 
maintained by the Sinking Fund, was as important a resource for war as the navy and army. 
‘The stability o f your currency and your commercial prosperity is very greatly sustained by 
the constancy and fortitude with which this principle is maintained.’ The £6—7 million debt 
reduction represented by the Sinking Fund was equivalent to the annual interest charge on
ii6 4  h  23. 469—509. I t  was universally admitted that his speech was most lucid and able. O f course the 
delivery o f  it was pompous and funereal-like.’ Brooks, HD, p. 133. See ‘Financial Statement 1894—95’ pp. 1-5, 
P.P. 1894, (6 8 ) li. 125,16 April 1894, for Budget figures.
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£200,000,000, and would therefore be available in the event o f  a serious war (as indeed 
proved to be the case during the Boer war). Having said this, he was determined to follow 
through on his commitment to throw the NDA debt onto the general Consolidated fund 
and so to treat it as ordinary debt, which meant the interception o f the new sinking fund for 
this purpose. This also required that fresh taxation would have to be imposed to make up 
the now £2,379,000 deficit, and the death duties were foremost in this.
Following on the economic principles of J.S. Mill117, ‘and every work that has ever 
professed to deal with political economy’ he accepted graduation as an ‘axiom o f finance’ 
which required the reform, equalisation and graduation o f the death duties. Again, to justify 
this graduation, he noted that ‘every writer on political economy and finance has laid down 
the doctrine that taxation should be proportionate to the ability to bear it o f those on whom 
it is imposed.’ The top rate o f graduation would be 8% and Harcourt expected to receive 
£3,500,000 annually, although only £1,000,000 o f this would arise in the first year o f its 
application. Again, as in 1893—4, the income tax would be raised by a penny, from Id . to 8d. 
for an expected yield o f £1,780,000. Yet reform was necessary if  the income tax were to be 
maintained at such a high rate and he resolved to ‘adjust its pressure so as to make it less 
intolerable to those who are least able to bear it.’ This meant abatements for those with 
incomes under £400 and £500, ‘a large and most deserving class’ numbering some 500,000. 
Property was also to be relieved somewhat by way o f an allowance o f 10% (15% for 
landlords with responsibility for repair of rentals) on gross income assessed under Schedule 
A.118 The cost to the Treasury o f both measures was estimated at £840,000 and £800,000 
respectively, but only £1,450,000 during the first year so that the increased income tax 
would yield a mere £330,000. Harcourt did not rule out the principle o f graduation being
117 ‘The principle o f  graduation (as it is called), that is, o f levying a larger percentage on a larger sum, though 
its application to general taxation would be in my opinion objectionable, seems to me both just and expedient 
as applied to legacy and inheritance duties.’ J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy. W.J. Ashley, ed., (London, 
1929), p. 809. Gladstone marked exactly this passage in his copy o f the 2 v. 3rd edition o f  1852, Temple o f  
Peace library, Gladstone Estate, Hawarden.
118 Milner elaborated this in PRO T168/31 o f  10 April 1894.
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applied to the income tax in the future, if only the practical and administrative problems 
could be overcome. Still having £1 million o f deficit to make up he imposed additional 
duties o f  6d. per barrel on beer and 6d. per gallon on spirits, this stricdy for revenue and ‘not 
upon moral or social considerations.’ Believing the incidence o f the new taxes low enough 
to avoid being passed onto the consumer, he anticipated an increased revenue o f  
£1,340,000, notably the largest o f the increases. All o f which neady turned the deficit into a 
£291,000 surplus. He concluded in justifying his measures by an appeal to the philosophy 
and principles o f taxation and finance.
He rejected the charge that his budget was partisan or class biased, arguing that his 
responsibility was that o f a financial trustee for the nation as a whole. Yet the rest o f his 
statement was just such an analysis. ‘The guiding principle o f taxation is that the liability 
should be imposed where it shall be least heavily felt.’ There ought to be no effective 
increase o f taxation on those with incomes below £160, unless the increased spirit duties 
were to increase by a penny the price o f a bottle. That is the extent o f the burden imposed 
upon the means o f the great mass o f  the people who earn their livelihood by the sweat o f  
their brow.’ Incomes between £160 and £500 would gain by the changes to the income tax, 
effectively a form o f graduation at the lower end o f the scale, while those above £500 ‘will 
be called upon to pay an additional Id. for national defence.’ For this he was unapologetic, 
implicitly following Gladstone’s 1859 precedent.
You have voted your vast Estimates from a conviction that the expenditure 
was necessary and politic. If you have performed your duty in that respect 
you will not fail in the obligation to meet that charge. The House o f  
Commons will never ... shrink from or refuse any effort which is necessary 
to sustain the honour and provide for the safety o f the country.
Those who would call the tune were expected to pay the piper.
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Bernard Mallet’s assessment was that Harcourt had achieved a budget which ‘in its 
social and fiscal results, was as significant as those for which [Gladstone] had been 
responsible half a century before.’119 He had made a breakthrough in taxation by the 
introduction o f graduation, ensured that debt reduction charges remained sacrosanct and 
that the now normal extraordinary expenditure would be met by taxation raised in the 
current year for which it was required. Even his decision to impose further indirect taxation 
upon beer and spirits was a courageous insistence that all levels o f society had to bear some 
o f the responsibility for increased national expenditure, although his explanation was 
disingenuous in his hope that the trade, not the consumer, would absorb it.120 Daunton 
argues that Harcourt was updating Gladstone’s fiscal constitution.
He was in many ways pursuing the same end as Gladstone in 1853: to use 
the tax system to unite rather than divide classes. He was building from the 
middle out, offering concessions to the lower level o f income tax payers.
The increase in the death duties helped to contain the pressure from the 
radicals for an outright attack upon land, without mounting an onslaught on 
land as a separate fraction o f capital...121
Insofar as this is true, for there is no doubt that Harcourt was using the system to impose 
responsibility for expenditure on the wealthier taxpayers and to consolidate political support 
at the more popular level o f incomes below £500, this revised fiscal constitution was also a 
response to the new, more democratic constitution o f 1884. Yet land taxes were symbolic, 
income taxes brought tangible rewards to the Exchequer, and it was this realisation which 
shaped so much o f  the reaction to the Budget in Parliament and the Press. It was the ways
119 Mallet, British Budgets, p. 77. The budget is discussed pp. 77—94, and he notes p. 93, that the Budget finally 
passed its third reading in the Commons by a 14 vote majority on 17 July, and on 30 July 1894 in the Lords, 
‘without a division.’
120 Mallet states that Harcourt was correct in this, p. 88. Hamilton had started working on a comparison o f  the 
ratio o f  Direct to Indirect taxation on 18 Jan. 1894, and a memorandum had been completed and printed by
8 March, showing that in 1891—2 indirect taxation paid 56:44 direct taxation. MS Harcourt dep. 64, f. 29 and 
f. 87. Harcourt had also requested that Hamilton provide him with the debates from 1885 when Childers had 
increased the beer and spirit duties. Hamilton’s advice, noting also the precedent o f  1890, was to expect 
opposition from the Scottish and Irish at what they perceived as the excessive taxation o f  spirits compared to 
English beer. BL HP, Add. MS 48615B, f. 64, 28 Jan. 1894 and MS Harcourt dep. 64, f. 41, 3 Feb. 1894.
121 Daunton, T h e Political Economy o f  Death Duties: Harcourt’s Budget o f  1894’, p. 166, in Harte and 
Quinault.
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and means which mattered, not the symbolism.122 Harcourt, and Gladstone, knew this; 
Lloyd George would pay for his ignorance after 1909.
Goschen was first to respond to the Budget and, as expected, his immediate target 
was Harcourt’s decision to use the Sinking Fund to pay ‘new debt instead o f old debt.’ He 
was especially concerned that sufficient time should be made available for Parliament to 
thoroughly debate the complex and important provisions o f the Budget.123 Opposition 
criticism covered two main points: that land was now being placed under an undue burden 
on account o f the death duties and increased income tax; and that the principle o f  
graduation was in itself dangerous because it could be extended to the point o f  
confiscation.124 The Economist was concerned that the Budget attempted to do too much, but 
did concede that while it would appeal to class interests it was free from an ‘electioneering 
taint/ On the great question o f the death duties there was cautious approval. ‘The principle 
o f  graduation has long been admitted in our finance, but no scheme o f progressive taxation 
on a like scale with the present one has ever before been proposed in this country/125 The 
economist C. F. Bastable discounted criticism of the death duties as an attack on capital. 
‘There is not much effect produced on the accumulation o f wealth even by fairly high death 
duties,’ while evasion was unlikely to prove a serious problem.126 Even banking journals 
were cautious in their criticism, I t  is impossible to regard the Budget as altogether a bad 
one,’ despite finding the principle of graduation with respect to death duties and the income 
tax ‘repugnant’.127 These ideas were less aridly theoretical for The Times, whose leader page 
was given over to Harcourt’s Budget three times in the week following, and in the Edinburgh
122 This is the conclusion drawn by T.H. Farrer, ‘Sir William Harcourt’s Budget’, Contemporary Review, 66 (1894), 
pp. 153-64.
123 4 H  23. 510. Hamilton had advised Harcourt to have some consideration for Goschen’s sensibilities when 
amending the Local Taxation and N D A  so as to avoid a wrangling debate. MS Harcourt dep. 64, f. 109,
14 March 1894.
124 Mallet, pp. 90—3.
125 The Economist, v. LII, 21 April 1894, pp. 476—8.
126 The Economic Journal, v. IV, June 1894, The New Budget’, p. 353.
127 The Bankers’, Insurance Managers’ and Agents’ Magazine, v. LVII, April 1894, ‘The Budget’, p. 688.
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'Review which virulently denounced Harcourt’s budget as that o f a “Ministry o f the Masses” 
against the “classes”.128
What must be realised is that while the death duties budget was a direct response to 
the naval estimates in particular and the general rise in expenditure, the death duties 
themselves, with all their revolutionary implications in terms o f the graduation o f taxation, 
were going to be imposed with or without the huge increase in the naval estimates. It was 
the combination o f a shortage o f  Parliamentary time available in 1893 on account o f the 
Home Rule debates with the need to surmount a deficit greater than the estimated first year 
yield o f the death duties which caused Harcourt to postpone their introduction that year. 
This was merely tactical, the strategy had already been decided. The death duties were a 
response to both the great growth in expenditure and the growth in the electorate. The first 
required a significant and robust addition to taxation, the second that the disproportionate 
balance between direct and indirect taxation be redressed in favour o f the latter. Throughout 
this period the Liberals had always been willing to impose additions to the income tax to 
meet exceptional circumstances, because this direct tax was especially suited to this end. 
Now, given that exceptional circumstances had to be accepted as normal expenditure, the 
revision and graduated extension o f the death duties allowed Harcourt not just to 
supplement but to reform the income tax with another direct tax. As Daunton has argued, 
he was able to graduate at both ends o f the scale, the lowest level o f the income tax payers 
and the highest levels o f property liable to the death duties. This was always going to 
happen. What the naval estimates did was ensure that Harcourt had to impose instead o f  
remit taxation, for in their absence he would have been able to reduce the income tax by 
two pennies, or more probably, by one penny and remit the taxation on tea, coffee and 
tobacco towards the goal o f the “free breakfast table” which was so dear to the hearts o f the 
members o f the radical wing o f his party.
128 The Times, 17,18, and 24 April, p. 9. The Edinburgh Review, v. clxxx, no. 369, pp. 235—58.
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Gladstone had accepted this in 1893 just as he would have in 1894, except that he 
could not abide the increase in the naval estimates that the graduation o f the death duties 
helped to pay for. Harcourt understood, as in fact did Gladstone, that the gradual evolution 
towards a democratic electorate required the strengthening through the tax system o f the 
fiscal accountability and electoral responsibility which “Sound Finance” depended upon. 
Where they differed was that Gladstone could not accept what he considered the reckless 
and dangerous popular demands to submit to a naval panic. Harcourt, in contrast, would 
reluctantly bow to the demands o f his new masters, and provided they were for their part 
willing to accept the yoke o f financial responsibility and thus the burden o f taxation 
necessary to meet it, he was willing to find the money to pay for it. This is exactly what he 
accomplished in his Death Duties Budget o f 1894-5. “Peace, Retrenchment and Reform” 
may have been no more, but “Sound Finance” endured.
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION
Gladstone never trusted Leviathan, he sought to tame, master, control and direct it. 
It was his presumption, perhaps born out o f equal parts arrogance and idealism, that the 
people, the masses, were morally fitted to take upon themselves — through their 
representatives in Parliament — this grave and sobering responsibility. 1894 dashed this 
illusion, insofar as what he considered the moral cowardice o f his Liberal Cabinet colleagues 
was disillusioning for what it revealed about the masses. He had already long despaired o f  
the Tories for their selfishness and recklessness. Salisbury, for his part, learned this lesson 
through 1887—92: democracy would not master them, rather it could be led, within certain 
constraints. Those constraints were, above all, imposed by “Sound Finance”. Yet, in 1894 
Harcourt had removed one o f the most important o f these checks which would contribute 
to the disaster o f  the Boer war: a limit on expenditure. Had not the military been unleashed 
in 1894 Harcourt might well have been able to reduce the income tax by two pence in 
combination with the death duties, perhaps even remissions on tea and tobacco towards a 
free breakfast table. Instead Hicks Beach was awash in revenue and there was consequently 
little to check the Conservatives from the escalation o f jingoistic Imperialism in South 
Africa when the opportunity for adventure arose. O f course, they were able to harness 
public opinion for some while before they were made to account for the responsibility of 
the financial burden they had imposed upon the electorate.
Gladstone had foreseen this, and Salisbury too, but they each feared it from 
opposite poles o f perspective: Gladstone wary o f democratic enthusiasm for war, Salisbury 
that the enthusiasm o f the masses would not long tolerate the sacrifices required by his 
foreign policy. Idealism ranged against cynicism. Nothing illustrates more clearly the 
paradox o f the democratic imperative that they faced, and which has continued to challenge
257
all British statesmen and women: democratic responsibility may be managed but it cannot 
be evaded, for long.
In 1895 the Liberal government self-destructed, not over finance but certainly the 
tensions between finance and foreign policy contributed to it. The hatred between Rosebery 
and Harcourt was too much to be contained within one party let alone one Cabinet.1 The 
Budget o f 1895 was the last for Harcourt and would be the last for the Liberal party for ten 
years. Harcourt probably welcomed the first and may have anticipated the latter, for his 
budget speech admitted as much. There were almost no changes to the finance, his work 
had been done the year before and he could only put on record the fact that the age o f  
economy was done and expenditure begun.2 It was also true that the role o f the economy in 
politics and politics in the economy had also changed.
The resignation o f Gladstone in 1894 marked both the beginnings o f a new politics 
and new tensions within the Liberal party. In the second instance it exposed the fault-lines 
between Liberal Imperialists and Radicals, broadly represented by Rosebery and Harcourt. 
Although the immediate result would be to divide the party and keep it out o f  office for a 
decade, the longer-term implications were o f greater significance. The Liberal Imperialists 
rejected Gladstone’s ‘moral force liberalism’, and their commitment to an Imperial vision 
would require that expenditure and foreign policy take precedence over ‘the traditional idea 
that retrenchment and reform should extend the political rights o f the individual.’3 This 
would pave the way for an expansionist state in both social and foreign policy when the
1 See Brooks, HD, ch.4 ‘The 1895 Session and the Fall o f the Government’, pp. 63—95.
2 A H  23. 293—319, 2 May 1895. See Mallet, pp. 95—101. Hamilton was in agreement, ‘I am certain that finance 
is going to be the crux ahead for the Government o f  the day in the near future.’ Brooks, HD, p. 246. He raised 
the alarm further for the benefit o f  the Conservative Government in a memorandum outlining the revenue 
options and constraints which were in prospect. ‘Some Remarks on Public Finance’, PRO CAB 3 7 /3 9 /3 8  o f  
24 July 1895.
3 H.C.G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: the Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Elite (Oxford, 1973), pp.135- 
227.
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liberals returned to office, because Asquith would make sure to tap the full resources o f  
‘Sound Finance” which had been demonstrated since Harcourt’s budget o f 1894.
In the first instance it ‘marked not only the end o f Gladstone, but it constituted also 
a significant landmark in the emergence o f that solid party system so characteristic o f  
twentieth century politics.’4 From now on political parties would seek advantage from fiscal 
policy no longer constrained by the moral force for self-restraint imposed by personalities as 
dominant as Gladstone’s or even the collective check imposed by back-bench conscience. 
This is why by the end Gladstone had come to dread ‘Democracy’s first use o f power’5 just 
as Salisbury was learning to live with it. “Sound Finance” allowed tremendous fiscal 
resources to the state but depended upon the responsibility o f the electorate to constrain it. 
When Gladstone delivered Reform in 1884-5 he had believed that the masses would act on 
his definition o f responsible and disinterested virtue. By 1895 it was apparent that the virtue 
o f the democratic masses, like that o f the Liberal party itself, was no longer, if  it had ever 
truly been, under Gladstone’s tutelage.
Yet the foundations he had provided would continue to serve a vital purpose, 
because no matter what end the expenditure would be directed to, it was still within the 
compass o f Parliamentary control and, ultimately, democratic accountability. “Sound 
Finance” provided the institutional structure to ensure this, and much more besides. As the 
role and ambition o f the state changed Britain would find itself with the financial resources 
to accomplish its ends, whether social reform or Dreadnoughts, as the minimal state was 
displaced by the nascent welfare state. “Sound Finance” would make this possible, and its 
guardians fully realized this.
4 David Brooks, Gladstone’s Fourth Ministry 1892—94. Policies and Personalities. Unpublished Cambridge University 
Ph.D. thesis, (1975), p. 236.
5 Ibid., p. 40.
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N ot long after his warnings against expenditure Hamilton would send to Gladstone
his own ‘tale o f progress, testifying to the “leaps and bounds” which this country has made
in material progress during Queen Victoria’s reign.’
Her people are better governed, better protected and better educated. The wages o f 
the manual classes are appreciably higher;... they are able to feed and clothe 
themselves more cheaply. They are much less heavily taxed; indeed every 
commodity which constitutes a necessity o f life is (unless tea is held to belong to 
that category) duty free. They have relatively not only less burdens to bear, but they 
have more resources with which to meet the burdens which are still imposed for the 
purpose o f carrying on the government o f their country. There is unquestionably a 
higher standard o f life throughout all classes. In short, it is perhaps not too much to 
say that it is a splendid record o f a splendid reign.6
The evidence for the material progress o f the British masses was unassailable.
This analysis was extended both in terms o f analysis and time frame by Welby in his 
presidential address to the Royal Statistical Society surveying the century to 1914. He 
pointed out the important yet fine balance which the actions o f the state had on the national 
economy.
Financial administration has direct influence on national progress. The State 
Expenditure is a necessary deduction from the spending and saving power o f the 
people themselves, and its growth must be criticised in its relation to the growth o f  
population and wealth.
He noted that the first act o f the unreformed Parliament in 1815 was to repeal the income 
tax and reduce the malt tax, ‘two striking instances o f class legislation ... for [it] left 
untouched the taxes on consumption, which are essentially taxes on the poor.’ This despite 
the ‘wretched condition o f the working classes’; but the great reform acts, especially 1884, 
had now changed all this.
These measures admitted the working-classes to a large share o f power — in the long 
run, perhaps, to predominant power.... With us it has been a time o f unparalleled
6 BL GP, Add. MS 44191, f. 242,14 June 1897. Hamilton had not, however, lost his trepidation about the 
future o f  finance. T h e plainest and simplest o f  all answers is that it is fashionable now to spend money 
profusely, and that the public and the House o f  Commons representing the public, instead o f  complaining o f  
our vast annual outlay, would like to spend a great deal more if  they could. Economy is dead and buried.’ To 
Robert Giffen, 14 March 1898. BLPES, Giffen Papers, v. 1 no. 144, ff. 221—3.
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prosperity shared by all, but especially by the working classes. They claim not 
unreasonably a larger share o f that prosperity, and there is in consequence some 
unrest among them .... [1853—1913] has a special interest for the financial student. It 
records the transition from a financial policy of economy and tax reduction to a 
policy o f unlimited expenditure and increased taxation.... From these facts I draw 
the conclusion that the change from the old to the new financial policy dates 
approximately from 1885.7
This was the great hinge, and it is o f crucial importance that it occurred while Gladstone was
still ultimately responsible for the finance o f his governments. It was his “Sound Finance”
which made it possible.
It also represented an important change in the relationship between citizen and state.
Welby’s professional insight was also recognized in economic theory.
There is a real advance when national wealth has reached so high a point that the 
lowest class are called to contribute only through their luxuries, but the highest stage 
is that in which the improvement o f society is such that all classes are in a position 
to pay their share as citizens for the common services o f the state.8
This would prove to be the great question for “Sound Finance” in a modem democratic 
society, for it depended on the electorate performing their responsibilities as citizens and, in 
theory at least, in a virtuous and disinterested manner. This is what Gladstone expected o f 
them. Yet it was almost simultaneously threatened by the slippage from citizen to consumer, 
in which the self-interest o f the classes that Gladstone reacted against, was replaced, over 
time, by the self-interest o f the masses as consumers.9 Without the restraint o f  civic virtue, 
and if  government was similarly unscrupulous, “Sound Finance” threatened to make 
available to the state sufficient resources to extinguish itself as a financial institution. If, once 
more, Leviathan was unchained, could it possibly be trusted? This was the awesome 
responsibility that Gladstone had bequeathed to Democracy.
7 Lord R. Welby, ‘The Progress o f  the United Kingdom from the War o f  the French Revolution to 1913’, 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, v. LXXVIII, pt. l,Jan. 1915, pp. 1—31. This compares interestingly with the 
memorandum prepared for Lloyd George showing the growth o f taxes and expenditure, particularly military. 
‘Budget Statement 1912: Liberal Finance’, PRO T171/2.
8 C.F. Bastable, Public Finance (London, 1903), p. 324.
9 This transition is the subject o f  Trentmann’s research, although along very different lines. See ch .l, p. 21 
n.41.
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This study has by no means exhausted “Sound Finance” as a subject for scholarly 
enquiry. Indeed, it has raised a great many more questions than was practical to encompass 
in this thesis. The growth o f the state and the development o f political economy theory 
deserves further and deeper exploration. The great debate over the gold standard and the 
challenge o f bimetallism is worth a monograph o f its own, particularly the role that 
monetary theory played in expanding or retarding the growth o f the British economy before 
1914. The present divide between economic theory and history needs to be bridged. The 
whole question o f Irish Home Rule finance has been, perhaps for understandable reasons, 
neglected. Yet it was so critical to the whole project o f Home Rule and so integral to 
Gladstone’s vision o f what Home Rule would allow Ireland that it should be pursued to the 
full. There is a similar need to investigate the financial history o f the Royal Navy and its 
relationship with government between 1880 and 1895 at the least (perhaps what is needed is 
a financial history o f the Navy). In fact this list could be continued almost indefinitely, the 
Treasury records, in their multitudes, await us in the Public Record Office. Additionally, we 
have in Hamilton’s diary not just an extraordinary insight into these sources, but very good 
company as well.
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APPENDIX A 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, 1880-1895
Revenue 1880-811
Customs
Excise
Stamps
Land Tax (& House Duty) 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce of Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money of Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Budget Estimate for
1880-81
19.300.000
25.151.000
11.800.000
2.760.000
10.425.000
6.400.000
1.420.000
390.000
1.250.000
3.800.000
82.696.000
Payment into Exchequer
1880-81
19.184.000
25.300.000
11.940.000
2.740.000
10.650.000
69.814.000
6.700.000
1.600.000
390,000 
1,247,712 
4,289,576 
84,041,288
Estimate for 
1881-82
19.180.000
27.440.000
12.290.000
2.760.000
9.540.000
6.800.000 
1,600,000
390.000
1.200.000
3.900.000
85.100.000
Expenditure
National Debt Services 
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 28,800,000
Interest on Local Loans 500,000
Charge of Suez Loan 200,000
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 1,846,978
Total Consolidated Fund Services 31,346,978
Army(+Afghan War& India Forces) 17,587,300
Navy 10,702,935
Civil Services 15,907,805
Collection, Customs & I.R. 2,891,809
Post Office 3,438,604
Telegraph Service 1,245,126
Packet Service 719,468
Total 83,840,025
Surplus /  (Deficit) 1,144,025
28,800,000
575,410
199,854
1,669,769
31,245,033
16,673,943
10,702,935
15,778,730
2,850,491
3,415,200
1,240,000
716,934
82,623,266
1,418,022
28,920,000
500.000
200.000
1.750.000
31.370.000 
18,109,500 
10,845,919
16.087.504 
2,851,208 
3,539,525 
1,294,081 
707,767
84.805.504 
294,496
1 P.P. 1881, (169) lvii. 217. “Financial Statement for 1881—82’.
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Revenue 1881-822
Customs
Excise
Stamps
Land Tax (& House Duty) 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services 
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 
Interest on Local Loans 
Charge o f  Suez Loan 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services 
Army(+Afghan War& India Forces)
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1881-82
19.180.000
27.440.000
12.290.000
2.760.000
9.540.000
6.800.000
1,600,000
390.000
1.200.000
3.900.000
85.100.000
Payment into Exc'
1881-82
19.287.000
27.240.000
12.260.000
2.725.000
9.945.000
71.457.000
7,000,000
1.630.000
380.000 
1,219,262 
4,135,220 
85,821,482
Estimate for 
1882-83
19.300.000
27.477.000
11.145.000
1.035.000
1.740.000
9.400.000
7.150.000
1.650.000
380.000
1.180.000
4.235.000
84.692.000
28,920,000
500.000
200.000
1.750.000
31.370.000
18,109,500 
10,845,919
16.087.504 
2,851,208 
3,539,525 
1,294,081 
707,767
84.805.504 
294,496
28,961,836
504,235
199,874
1,664,439
31,330,384
17,409,585
10,756,453
16,419,038
2,840,755
3,606,800
1,366,000
708,542
84,437,557
1,383,925
29.003.672
510.000
200.000
1.701.000
31.414.672
17.058.000 
10,483,901 
16,502,729 
2,900,977 
3,743,300 
1,435,298 
710,514
84,249,491
442,509
2 P.P. 1882, (155) xxxvii. 211. “Financial Statement for 1882-83’.
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Revenue 1882-833
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f  Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services 
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 
Interest on Local Loans 
Charge o f Suez Loan 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services 
Army(+Afghan War& India Forces)
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1882-83
19.300.000
27.477.000
11.145.000
1.035.000
1.740.000
9.400.000
7.150.000
1.650.000
380.000
1.180.000
4.235.000
84.692.000
Payment into Exc
1882-83
19.657.000
26.930.000
11.841.000
1.045.000
1.755.000
11.900.000
73.128.000
7.300.000
1.710.000
380.000 
1,218,845 
5,267,611 
89,004,456
Estimate for 
1883-84
19.749.000
26.755.000
11.510.000
1.040.000
1.785.000
10.265.000
7.400.000
1.580.000
380.000
1.185.000
4.380.000
86.029.000
29.003.672
510.000
200.000
1.701.000
31.414.672
17.058.000
10,483,901 
16,502,729 
2,900,977
3,743,300 
1,435,298 
710,514
84,249,491
442,509
29.003.672
510.000
200.000
1.701.000
31.414.672
16.689.400
10,438,901 
17,350,001
2,870,301
3,828,500
1.510.000
719,625
84.821.400
4,183,056
28,954,000
525.000
200.000
1.640.000
31.319.000
17.337.000
10.757.000
17.253.000
2.775.000
4.124.000
1.518.000
706.000 
85,789,000
240.000
3 P.P. 1883, (122) xxxviii. 295. ‘Financial Statement for 1883—84’.
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Revenue 1883-844
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services 
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 
Interest on Local Loans 
Charge o f  Suez Loan 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services 
Army(+Afghan War& India Forces)
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1883-84
19.749.000
26.755.000
11.510.000
1.040.000
1.785.000
10.265.000
7.400.000
1.580.000
380.000
1.185.000
4.380.000
86.029.000
Payment into Exc
1883-84
19.701.000
26.952.000
11.620.000
2.875.000
10.718.000
71.866.000
7.730.000
1.745.000
380.000 
1,196,128
3,408,056 
86,325,184
[uer Estimate for 
1884-85
19.850.000
26.778.000
11.490.000
1.055.000
1.880.000
10.050.000
7.900.000
1.800.000
380.000
1.180.000
3.170.000
85.533.000
28.954.000
525.000
200.000
1.640.000
31.319.000
17.337.000
10.757.000
17.253.000
2.775.000
4.124.000
1.518.000
706.000
85,789,000
240.000
29,651,526
1,589,647
31,241,173
17,140,326
10,728,781
17,181,935
2,771,749
4,507,500
1,707,000
721,100
85,999,564
325,620
28.883.673
725.000
1.495.000
31.103.673
16,180,600
10,811,770
17,243,754
2,733,566
4,752,517
1,734,589
731,356
85,291,825
241,175
4 P.P. 1884, (139) xlvii. 223. ‘Financial Statement 1884—85*.
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Revenue 1884-855
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services 
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 
Interest on Local Loans 
Charge o f Suez Loan 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services 
Army (+Afghan War) 
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1884-85
19.850.000
26.778.000
11.490.000
1.055.000
1.880.000
10.050.000
7.900.000
1.800.000
380.000
1.180.000
3.170.000
85.533.000
Payment into Exc'
1884-85
20.321.000
26.600.000
11.925.000
2.950.000
12,000,000
73.796.000
7.905.000
1.760.000
380.000 
1,027,350 
3,174,760
88,043,110
Estimate for 
1885-86 
20,200,000
27.800.000
11.650.000
1.050.000
1.880.000
15.400.000
8,000,000
1.720.000
380.000
1.360.000
3.200.000
92.640.000
28.883.673
525.000
200.000
1,495,000
31.103.673
16,180,600
10,811,770
17,243,754
2,733,566
4,752,517
1,734,589
731,356
85,291,825
241,175
29,548,239
I,479,412 
31,027,651 
18,655,338
II,427,064
17,561,836 
2,745,368
4.666.000
1.731.000
728,625
88,542,882
-499,772
23.363.939
752.000
1.760.000
25.875.939 
29,000,700 
12,386,500 
17,686,825 
2,800,890 
4,854,659 
1,839,816 
753,781
95,199,110
-2,559,110
5 P.P. 1885, (174) xlv. 245. ‘Financial Statement 1885—86’.
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Revenue 1885-866
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services 
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 
Interest on Local Loans 
Charge o f Suez Loan 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services 
Army (Afghan + Credit 9,451,000)
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1885-86
20,200,000
27.800.000
11.650.000
1.050.000
1.880.000
15.400.000
8,000,000
1.720.000
380.000
1.360.000
3.200.000
92.640.000
Payment into Exc'
1885-86
19.827.000
25.460.000
11.590.000
1.040.000
1.850.000
15.160.000
74.927.000
8.150.000
1.740.000
380.000 
1,376,080 
3,008,213
89,581,293
Estimate for 
1886-87
1.970.000
25.694.000
11.365.000
1.040.000
1.880.000
15.755.000
8.270.000
1.730.000
370.000
1.165.000
2.900.000
89.869.000
23.363.939
552.000
200.000
1,760,000
25.875.939
29,000,700
12,386,500
17,686,825 
2,800,890 
4,854,659 
1,839,816
753,781
95,199,110
-2,559,110
23,449,678
478,340
199,979
1,638,387
25,088,065
26,728,084
12,660,509
17,725,764
2,751,664
4,793,744
1,745,000
731,014
92,223,844
-2,642,551
27,424,214
635,333
0
1,762,000
29,821,547
18,233,200
12,993,100
18,008,691
2,753,563
5,218,955
1,845,510
735,663
89,610,229
258,771
6 P.P. 1886, (123) xxxviii. 223. ‘Financial Statement 1886—87’.
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Revenue 1886-877
Budget Estimate for Payment into Exchequer Estimate for
1886-87 1886-87 1887-88
Customs 1,970,000 20,155,000 19,600,000
Excise 25,694,000 25,250,000 25,292,000
Stamps 11,365,000 11,830,000 11,758,000
Land Tax 1,040,000 2,980,000 1,065,000
House Duty 1,880,000 1,920,000
Property and Income Tax 15,755,000 15,900,000 14,340,000
Total Produce o f Taxes 76,115,000
Post Office 8,270,000 8,450,000 8,600,000
Telegraph Services 1,730,000 1,830,000 1,950,000
Crown Lands 370,000 370,000 370,000
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 1,165,000 1,176,192 240,000
Miscellaneous 2,900,000 2,831,566 3,000,000
Total Revenue 89,869,000 90,772,758 88,135,000
National Debt Services
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 27,424,214
Interest on Local Loans 435,333
Charge o f Suez Loan 200,000
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 1,762,000
Total Consolidated Fund Services 29,821,547
Army 18,233,200
Navy 12,993,100
Civil Services 18,008,691
Collection, Customs & I.R. 2,753,563
Post Office 5,218,955
Telegraph Service 1,845,510
Packet Service 735,663
Total 89,610,229
Surplus/(Deficit) 258,771
27,978,023
1.762.000 
29,740,023 
18,653,138 
13,265,401 
18,008,691 
2,676,918 
5,436,893
1.935.000 
724,900
90,440,964
331,794
26,000,000
214.000 
0
1.714.000
27.928.000 
18,393,900 
12,476,800 
18,261,508 
2,715,727 
5,420,770 
1,950,248 
699,341
87,846,294
288,706
7 P.P. 1887 (126) xlix. 249. ‘Financial Statement 1887—88’.
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Revenue 1887-888
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 
Charge o f Suez Loan 
Naval Defence Fund 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services
Army 
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1887-88
19.600.000
25.292.000
11.758.000
1.065.000
1.920.000
14.340.000
8.600.000
1.950.000
370.000
240.000
3,000,000
88,135,000
Payment into Exc
1887-88
19.630.000
25.597.000
12.940.000
1.050.000
1.890.000
14.340.000
75.447.000
8.650.000
1.950.000
390.000
242.000
2.910.000
89.589.000
Estimate for 
1888-89
19.925.000
25.505.000
11.780.000
1.046.000
1.890.000
12.250.000
72.396.000
8.800.000 
2,000,000
390.000
241.000 
3,000,000 
86,827,000
26,000,000
214.000 
0
1.714.000
27.928.000 
18,393,900
12,476,800 
18,261,508 
2,715,727
5,420,770 
1,950,248
699,341
87,846,294
288,706
26,000,000
213,911
1,758,084
27,971,995
18,167,196
12,325,357
18,210,000
2,707,745
5,403,438
1,940,012
697,901
87,423,644
2,165,356
26,000,000
214.000 
0
1.647.000
27.861.000 
16,730,300 
13,082,800 
17,850,293 
2,745,549 
5,666,666 
2,036,836
641,500
86,614,944
212,056
8 P.P. 1888, (97) lxv. 235. ‘Financial Statement 1888—89’.
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Revenue 1888-899
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge
(b) Outside the Fixed Charge 
Naval Defence Fund 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services
Army 
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1888-89
19.925.000
25.505.000
11.780.000
1.046.000
1.890.000
12.250.000
72.396.000
8.800.000 
2,000,000
390.000
241.000
3,000,000
86,827,000
Payment into Exc'
1888-89
20.067.000
25.600.000
12.270.000
1.020.000
1.940.000
12.700.000
73.597.000
9.100.000
2.080.000
430,000 
240,957 
3,024,855 
88,472,812
Estimate for 
1889-90
20.050.000
22.870.000
12.580.000
1.035.000
1.925.000
12.550.000
71.010.000
9.350.000
2.230.000
430.000
280.000
2.850.000
86.150.000
26,000,000
214.000 
0
1.647.000
27.861.000 
16,730,300
13,082,800 
17,850,293 
2,745,549 
5,666,666 
2,036,836
641,500
86,614,944
212,056
26,000,000
224,594
1.629.986 
27,854,580 
15,957,738 
12,999,895
17.872.986 
2,718,322 
5,667,849
1,965,000 
637,502
85,673,872
2,798,940
25,000,000
220,000
1.430.000
1.624.000
28.274.000
17.335.000
13.685.000 
15,739,092 
2,679,961 
5,452,553 
2,135,516
664,405
85,966,827
183,173
9 P.P. 1889, (116) xlvii. 237. ‘Financial Statement 1889-90’.
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Revenue 1889-9010
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge
(b) Outside the Fixed Charge 
Naval Defence Fund 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services
Army 
Navy- 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1889-90
20.050.000
22.870.000
12.580.000
1.035.000
1.925.000
12.550.000
71.010.000
9.350.000
2.230.000
430.000
280.000
2.850.000
86.150.000
Payment into Exc
1889-90
20.424.000
24.160.000
13.060.000
1.035.000
1.965.000
12.770.000
73.414.000
9.450.000
2.320.000
430.000
279.000
3.411.000
89.304.000
Estimate for 
1890-91
19.116.000
23.652.000
13.642.000
1.030.000
1.460.000
13.200.000
72.100.000
9.670.000
2.470.000
430.000
240.000
2.700.000
87.610.000
25,000,000
220,000
1.430.000
1.624.000
28.274.000
17.335.000
13.685.000 
15,739,092 
2,679,961 
5,452,553 
2,135,516
664,405
85,966,827
183,173
25,000,000
227.000
1.429.000
1.634.000
28.290.000
17.361.000
13.842.000
15.590.000
2.655.000
5.463.000
2.176.000
664,000
86.041.000
3.263.000
25,000,000
214.000
1.430.000
2.124.000 
28768000
17.828.000
13.787.000
15.851.000
2.668.000
5.548.000
2.244.000
683.000
87.377.000
233.000
10 P.P. 1890, (138) xli. 221. Financial Statement 1890-91’.
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Revenue 1890-9111
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge
(b) Outside the Fixed Charge 
Naval Defence Fund 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services
Army 
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/ (Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1890-91
19.116.000
23.652.000
13.642.000
1.030.000
1.460.000
13.200.000
72.100.000
9.670.000
2.470.000
430.000
240.000
2.700.000
87.610.000
Payment into Exc
1890-91
19.480.000
24.788.000
13.460.000
1.030.000
1.570.000
13.250.000
73.578.000
9.880.000
2.380.000
430.000
242.000
2.979.000
89.489.000
Estimate for 
1891-92
19.700.000
25.300.000
134.500.000
1.030.000
1.450.000
13.750.000
74.680.000
10.120.000
2.480.000
430.000
220.000
2.500.000
90.430.000
25,000,000
214.000
1.430.000
2.124.000 
28768000
17.828.000
13.787.000
15.851.000
2.668.000
5.548.000
2.244.000
683.000
87.377.000
233.000
25,000,000
207.000
1.429.000
2.067.000
28.703.000
17.560.000
14.125.000
16.040.000
2.644.000
5.683.000
2.272.000
706.000
87.733.000
1.756.000
25,000,000
200,000
1.430.000
3.485.000 
30115000
17.545.000
14.215.000
16.641.000
2.694.000
5.924.000
2.422.000
708.000
90.264.000
166.000
11 P.P. 1891, (200) xlviii. 217. ‘Financial Statement 1891—92’.
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Revenue 1891-9212
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Budget Estimate for
1891-92
19.700.000
25.300.000
134.500.000
1.030.000
1.450.000
13.750.000
74.680.000
10.120.000
2.480.000
430.000
220.000
2.500.000
90.430.000
Payment into Exchequer
1891-92
19.736.000
25.610.000
13.700.000
1.050.000
1.434.000
13.810.000
75.340.000
10.150.000
2.480.000
430.000
222.000
2.373.000
90.995.000
Estimate for 
1892-93
19.900.000
25.452.000
13.560.000
1.040.000
1.410.000
13.400.000
74.762.000
10.400.000
2.560.000
435.000
220.000
2.076.000
90.453.000
Expenditure
National Debt Services 
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 25,000,000
(b) Outside the Fixed Charge 200,000
Naval Defence Fund 1,430,000
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 3,485,000
Total Consolidated Fund Services 30115000
Army 17,545,000
Navy 14,215,000
Civil Services 16,641,000
Collection, Customs & I.R. 2,694,000
Post Office 5,924,000
Telegraph Service 2,422,000
Packet Service 708,000
Total 90,264,000
Surplus/(Deficit) 166,000
25,000,000
200,000
1.429.000
2.381.000
29.010.000
17.259.000
14.150.000
17.501.000
2.692.000
6.126.000
2.489.000 
701,000
89.928.000
1.067.000
25,000,000
200,000
1.429.000
1.683.000
28.312.000
17.631.000
14.240.000
17.791.000
2.649.000
6.345.000
2.556.000
729.000
90.253.000
200.000
12 P.P. 1892, (162) xlviii. 213. ‘Financial Statement 1892—93’.
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Revenue 1892-9313
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge
(b) Outside the Fixed Charge 
Naval Defence Fund 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services
Army 
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1892-93
19.900.000
25.452.000
13.560.000
1.040.000
1.410.000
13.400.000
74.762.000
10.400.000
2.560.000
435.000
220.000
2.076.000
90.453.000
Payment into Exc'
1892-93
19.715.000
25.360.000
13.805.000
1.040.000
1.410.000
13.470.000
74.800.000
10.400.000
2.480.000
430.000
220.000
2.065.000
90.395.000
Estimate for 
1893-94
19.650.000
25.100.000
13.600.000
1.035.000
1.425.000
15.150.000
75.960.000
10.600.000 
2,480,000
430.000
220.000
1.950.000
91.640.000
25,000,000
200,000
1.429.000
1.683.000
28.312.000
17.631.000
14.240.000
17.791.000
2.649.000
6.345.000
2.556.000
729.000
90,253,000
200.000
25,000,000
200,000
1.429.000
1.677.000
28.306.000
17.542.000
14.302.000
17.780.000
2.616.000
6.513.000
2.595.000
721.000
90.375.000
20.000
25,000,000
200,000
1.429.000
1.691.000
28.320.000
17.803.000
14.240.000
18.136.000
2.706.000
6.791.000
2.739.000
735.000
91.464.000
176.000
13 P.P. 1893, (182) 1. 231. ‘Financial Statement 1893-94’.
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Revenue 1893-9414
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge
(b) Outside the Fixed Charge 
Naval Defence Fund 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services
Army 
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1893-94
19.650.000
25.100.000
13.600.000
1.035.000
1.425.000
15.150.000
75.960.000
10.600.000
2.480.000
430.000
220.000
1.950.000
91.640.000
Payment into Exc"
1893-94
19.707.000
25.200.000
12.860.000
1.035.000
1.425.000
15.200.000
75.427.000
10.470.000
2.540.000
420.000
218.000
2.065.000
91.140.000
Estimate for 
1894-95 
20,010,000
26.240.000
14.080.000
1.030.000
1.440.000
15.530.000
78.330.000
10.570.000
2.620.000
420.000
396.000
1.839.000
94.175.000
25,000,000
200,000
1.429.000
1.691.000
28.320.000
17.803.000
14.240.000
18.136.000
2.706.000
6.791.000
2.739.000
735.000
91.464.000
176.000
25,000,000
200,000
1.429.000
1.681.000
28.310.000
17.940.000
14.048.000
18.226.000
2.671.000
6.721.000
2.664.000
723,000
91.303.000 
-163,000
25,000,000
1.653.000
26.653.000
18.006.000
17.296.000
18.688.000
2.677.000
7.038.000
2.777.000
749.000
93.884.000
291.000
14 P.P. 1894, (68) li. 125. Tinancial Statement 1894—95’.
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Revenue 1894-9515
Customs 
Excise 
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services 
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge
(b) Outside the Fixed Charge 
Naval Defence Fund 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services
Army 
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/(Deficit)
Budget Estimate for
1894-95
20,010,000
26.240.000
14.080.000
1.030.000
1.440.000
15.530.000
78.330.000
10.570.000
2.620.000
420.000
396.000
1.839.000
94.175.000
Payment into Exc
1894-95
20.115.000
26.050.000
14.440.000
1.015.000
1.435.000
15.600.000
78.655.000
10.760.000
2.580.000
410.000
413.000
1.866.000
94,684,000
Estimate for 
1895-96
20.240.000
25.950.000
15.800.000
1.020.000
1.450.000
15.530.000
79.990.000
10.900.000
2.620.000
415.000
687.000
1.550.000
96.162.000
25,000,000
1.653.000
26.653.000
18.006.000
17.296.000
18.688.000
2.677.000
7.038.000
2.777.000
749.000
93.884.000
291.000
25,000,000
1.642.000
26.642.000
17.900.000
17.545.000
18.915.000
2.646.000
6.869.000
2.674.000
727.000
93.918.000
766.000
25,000,000
0
1.625.000
26.625.000
17.984.000
18.701.000
19.298.000
2.702.000
7.134.000
2.805.000
732.000
95.981.000
181.000
15 P.P. 1895, (244) lxi. 173. Tinancial Statement 1895-96’.
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Revenue 1895-9616
Customs 
Excise 
Estate, duties, etc.
Stamps 
Land Tax 
House Duty 
Property and Income Tax 
Total Produce o f Taxes 
Post Office 
Telegraph Services 
Crown Lands 
Interest on Purchase Money o f Suez 
Miscellaneous 
Total Revenue
Expenditure
National Debt Services 
(a) Inside the Fixed Charge 
(b) Outside the Fixed Charge 
Naval Defence Fund 
Other Consolidated Fund Charges 
Total Consolidated Fund Services
Army 
Navy 
Civil Services 
Collection, Customs & I.R.
Post Office 
Telegraph Service 
Packet Service 
Total
Surplus/ (Deficit)
Budget Estimate for Payment into Exchequer Estimate for 
1895-96 1895-96 1896-97
20.240.000 20,756,000 21,020,000
25.950.000 26,800,000 27,000,000
10.140.000 11,600,000 9,775,000
5.660.000 7,350,000 6,700,000
1.020.000 1,015,000 900,000
1.450.000 1,495,000 1,475,000
15.530.000 16,100,000 16,200,000
79.990.000 85,116,000 83,070,000
10.900.000 11,380,000 11,660,000
2.620.000 2,840,000 2,940,000
415.000 415,000 415,000
687.000 690,000 695,000
1.550.000 1,533,000 1,700,000
96.162.000 101,974,000 100,480,000
25,000,000
0
1.625.000
26.625.000
17.984.000
18.701.000
19.298.000
2.702.000
7.134.000
2.805.000
732.000
95.981.000
181.000
25,000,000
1,601,000
26,601,000
18.460.000
19.724.000
19.800.000
2.702.000
7.018.000
2.744.000 
715,000
97.764.000
4.210.000
25,000,000
1,660,000
26,660,000
18.056.000
21.823.000
19.795.000
2.735.000
7.242.000
3.009.000
727.000 
100,047,000
433.000
16 P.P. 1895, (244) lxi. 173. Tinancial Statement 1895-96’.
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